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FORT STANWIX

HISTORY, HISTORIC FURNISHING, AND HISTORIC STRUCTURE REPORTS

FORT STANWIX

HISTORY, HISTORIC FURNISHING, AND HISTORIC STRUCTURE REPORTS

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA

APR 131977

LL
DEPOSITORY

SB438

171;'

1 mow el the she of Fori Stanwix during excavation. The line white line defines the periphcrv of the fort.

FORT STANWIX

CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY HISTORY

John F. Luzader

HISTORIC FURNISHING STUDY

Louis Torres

HISTORIC STRUCTURE REPORT

Orville W. Carroll

Office of Park Historic Preservation

National Park Service

U.S. Department of the Interior

Washington 1976

As the Nation's principal conservation agency, the
Department of the Interior has responsibility for most
of our nationally owned public lands and natural
resources. This includes fostering the wisest use of our
land and water resources, protecting our fish and
wildlife, preserving the environmental and cultural
values of our national parks and historical places, and
providing for the enjoyment of life through outdoor
recreation. The Department assesses our energy and
mineral resources and works to assure that their
development is in the best interests of all our people.
The Department also has a major responsibility for
American Indian reservation communities and for
people who live in Island Territories under U.S.
administration.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Main entry under title:

Fort Stanwix : history, historic furnishing, and historic
structure reports.

Includes bibliographies.

CONTENTS: Luzader, J. F. Construction and mili-
tary history, 1758-1777. — Torres, L. Historic furnish-
ing study. — Carroll, O. W. Historic structure report.

I. Stanwix, Fort, N.Y. 2. Stanwix, Fort, N.Y. —
Siege, 1777. I. United States. National Park Service.
II I uzader, John F. Construction and military history,
1758-1777. 1976. III. Torres, Louis, 1921-
Historic furnishing study. 1976. IV. Carroll, Orvillc
W. Historic structure report. 1976.
FI29.R82F67 069'.53 75-619385

I oi s;ilc by the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, DC. 20402-Price $3.50

Stock Number 024-005-00664-8

FOREWORD

The reconstruction of Fort Stanwix is one of
the National Park Service's major Bicentennial
efforts. It also illustrates the successful combina-
tion of history, archeology, and historical architec-
ture in the accomplishment of a major preservation
project.

The British first built Fort Stanwix in 1758 to
guard the strategic portage between the Mohawk
River and Wood Creek from the French. Following
the French and Indian War and the British con-
quest of Canada the fort was abandoned and
gradually fell into disrepair. Its site became stra-
tegically important again with the coming of the
American Revolution, however, and the Patriots
rebuilt the fort in time to thwart a British invasion
of New York by way of the Mohawk River Valley.
The wood and earthen structure fell into disuse and
was abandoned for the last time in 1781. Buildings
of the City of Rome, New York eventually blanketed
its site.

In 1935, at the request of citizens of Rome,
the Congress authorized Fort Stanwix as a national
monument. Years passed and there was no further
Federal action. In 1963 the Secretary of the Interior
designated the site a national historic landmark;
coincidently it fell within the boundaries of an
urban renewal project. The city received urban
renewal funds in 1965, began to clear the site, and
requested the National Park Service to prepare a
master plan for Fort Stanwix.

The Fort Stanwix master plan, approved on
March 14, 1967, called for the reconstruction of
the former fort — prematurely perhaps, for studies
that would indicate the feasibility of the proposal
had not been made. The plan noted that reconstruc-
tion would require the removal of existing struc-
tures, donation of the site to the National Park

Service, archeological investigation, historical
research, and the preparation of plans.

The extensive study and documentation needed
to reconstruct a structure of the magnitude and
character of Fort Stanwix is presented in the
historic structure report. This report for Fort Stanwix
consists of four basic sections: a historic data
section, an archeological data section, an archi-
tectural data section, and an administrative data
section, the latter immediately following this
foreword.

A historical data section provides available
pertinent information on a structure's construction
and use together with appendixes containing copies
of appropriate documents and illustrations, a
bibliography, and recommendations for further
study. Historian John F. Luzader prepared such a
section for Fort Stanwix in 1969. It contains not
only data on the fort's history but a history of the
1777 military operations around Fort Stanwix as
well. Although not necessary for reconstruction
itself, the latter was needed for interpretive pur-
poses and was included with the structure report as
a matter of convenience. A single comprehensive
study is the result.

An archeological investigation was essential
to the reconstruction of Fort Stanwix. Although
the surface remains of the fort had been obliterated
by city streets and some 70 buildings, extensive
remains were believed to exist beneath ground level.
A preliminary archeological investigation explored
a small portion of the site in 1966 and a major
investigation took place between 1970 and 1972.
The results of these investigations are presented by
Archeologists Lee Hanson and Dick Ping Hsu in
the archeological data section of the Fort Stanwix
report. The National Park Service has published

this report separately under the title "Casemates
and Cannonballs."

Beginning in 1971, Historical Architect Orville
W. Carroll worked closely with the archeological
team and maintained contact with Historian Luzader
as the work progressed. His report is a synthesis of
his own investigation of written and graphic sources
and information provided by the other disciplines.
The results of his work and his recommendations
arc presented in the text and drawings of the
architectural data section.

After the professional reports are submitted
and analyzed, the area superintendent or regional
director completes the report by adding its adminis-
trative data section. This brief section states the
significance of the structure, its Order of Significance
as recorded in the Service's List of Classified
Structures, and its proposed treatment. The section
also outlines any cooperative agreements, legisla-
tion, or documents having a bearing on the use of
the structure. In short, the administrative data
section is an administrative summary of the pro-
fessional reports and recommends action for
preservation, restoration, or reconstruction.

After the proposed treatment is determined
and funds to support it are available, a historical
architect prepares needed working drawings and
specifications and work can begin. The project
should close with the preparation of a historic
structure preservation guide to direct site managers
in the structure's care and maintenance.

Reconstruction of Fort Stanwix alone would
be insufficient to make it meaningful to most visitors,
furnishings arc needed. The initial step in provid-
ing such furnishings is the historic furnishings
study, gathering and presenting pertinent evidence
on the contents of a structure in its historic period.

(Furnishings at Fort Stanwix include its armament
and military equipment.) This study is usually pre-
pared by a historian or curator. When data on the
furnishings of a specific structure are not available
he seeks comparable data from similar structures.
Historian Louis Torres prepared the Fort Stanwix
furnishings study in 1974. His study, though not a
section of the historic structure report, is included
as a fitting companion to the other sections.

This publication is presented less for its infor-
mation on Fort Stanwix than for the process of
restoration directed research within the National
Park Service that it illustrates. Each section ap-
pears here as an entity as it was prepared by its
author. Thus, though there is some duplication in
texts and illustrations, this juxtaposition makes the
role of the individual reports and their continuity
readily apparent. We hope that others committed
to the vital but difficult task of preserving this
Nation's heritage will find it useful.

Administrative Data

Fort Stanwix National Monument was author-
ized by an Act of Congress approved August 21,
1935 (49 Stat. 665). A master plan for the monu-
ment approved on March 14, 1967 recommended
that it include 18-acres of the historic fort site and
that events that had taken place there be interpreted
through a reconstruction of the 1777 fort.

When completed the reconstructed fort will
be proposed for listing on the List of Classified
Structures as a structure of the First Order of
Significance.

The site contains 16.2 acres. Apart from
easements given to local utilities for lines which
traverse the monument, there are no formal
cooperative agreements governing its administration.

CONTENTS

Construction and Military History 1

1758 to 1777

Introduction 2

I The Oneida Carrying Place and Its Early Forts 3

II The Building of Fort Stanwix 7

III Fort Stanwix in the Revolution: Rebuilding 21

IV Fort Stanwix in the Revolution: Siege 30
Appendices: Plans. Sketches, Thoughts of Burgoyne 56
Notes 66
Bibliography 70

Historic Furnishing Study

Preface

Introduction

Provisions

Arms and Accouterments

III

Clothing

Indian Supplies

Livestock

Hardware, Utensils, Furniture, and Accessories

VII

The Furnished Areas

Appendix: The "Stars and Stripes" at Fort

Stanwix: A Summary of the Evidence

110

Notes

114

Bibliography

119

Historic Structure Report ,21

I Summary 122

II Studies Completed to Date 123

III Historical Background of Fort Stanwix 125

IV Proposed Use of the Fort Structures 129
V Proposed Reconstruction Work with Military Glossary 131

Appendices

A. The Fort Stanwix Historical Center 166

B. Class C — Cost Estimates 171

C. Addendum — Lumber Procurement and Preservation 176
Notes 194

VII

FORT STANWIX

CONSTRUCTION AND MILITARY HISTORY

1 758 TO 1 777

John F. Luzader

Introduction 2

The Oneida Carrying Place and Its Early Forts 3

The Building of Fort Stanwix 7

Fort Stanwix in the Revolution: Rebuilding 21

Fort Stanwix in the Revolution: Siege 30

Illustration: Plan of Fort Stanwise [Stanwix] 16

Appendices 56

I "Plan of Forts at the Oneida [sic] or Great Carrying Place" 56

II "Return of His Majesty's Troops Detached from the Oneida Station — 15th August 1758
under the Command of Lieut. Colonel Bradstreet" 56

III "Plan of Fort Stanwix Built at Oneida Station by Provincial Troops in 1758" 57

IV "Plan of Fort Stanwix Showing what Works were done at that Post from July to December
1759" 58

V "Plan of Fort Stanwix Built at the Oneida Station 1758" 59

VI "A Sketch of Fort Stanwix, with its Buildings and Outworks, November 19, 1764" 59
VII "Plan of Fort Stanwix, Showing what is finished and what is to be done to compleat

it" 60
VIII Francois de Fleury. "A Sketch of the siege of Fort Schuyler" 60
IX "Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix" 61

X "Plan Showing the Putative Layout of Fort Stanwix in August 1777" 62
XI John Burgoyne. "Thoughts for Conducting the War from the Side of Canada" 63
Notes 66
Bibliography 70

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to provide an
account of the history of Fort Stanwix (Fort
Schuyler) that stood on a site within the limits of
the modern city of Rome, New York. The emphasis
is upon the story of the fort's construction and its
role in the defeat of Gen. John Burgoyne's cam-
paign of 1777, an American victory that resulted in
the internationalization of the War of Independence.
Other incidents, including the two Treaties of Fort
Stanwix and the border warfare of 1778-81, are
mentioned very briefly, not because they are in-
significant but because they are not central to the
purpose noted above.

Special thanks arc due to a number of persons
whose assistance was valuable in the preparation
oi tins work. Among them are: Melvin Weig.
former Superintendent, Morristown National His-

torical Park, now retired; his successor, James
Coleman; Roy E. Appleman, former Chief, Park
History Studies, National Park Service, retired;
Historian William Meuse, formerly of Saratoga
National Historical Park, now with the Harpers
Ferry Center, National Park Service; Dr. Eugene
Kramer. Senior Historian, New York State History
Office; the staff of the Rome Historical Society;
and the staffs of the Map Division, Library of
Congress, Huntington Library, New York Public
Library, Boston Public Library, New York State
Library, British Public Record Office, Public
Archives of Canada, New Jersey Historical Society,
and New-York Historical Society. A particular debt
is owed to my colleagues: Archeologist Lee Hanson.
Architect Orville Carroll, and Historian Louis
Torres.

THE ONEIDA CARRING PLACE
AND ITS EARLY FORTS

The city of Rome, New York, lies athwart an
ancient route along which travelers, traders, and
warriors moved for centuries. On the south-east
side of the city are the headwaters of the Mohawk
River, which flows eastward until it joins the
Houston to reach the Atlantic Ocean. On the
northern side is Wood Creek, which with the Fish
Kill (Creek), Lake Oneida, and Oswego River
forms a passage to the Great Lakes. Using this
route, the Indian and colonial trader had only to
carry his canoe over the nearly level land between
the two riparian systems to travel by water from
the ocean to the Great Lakes and Canada. The
short portage between the Mohawk and Wood
Creek came to be known as the Oneida Carrying
Place. Possession of this portage was a significant
strategic position on the northwest frontier, which
carried with it control of the water route. It would
be difficult to exaggerate the importance of that
frontier. That the Mohawk was the gateway to a
vast western region was apparent to the colonists
and the government in London. More immediately
important were its associations with the local
Indians. The area from the upper Hudson to Lake
Erie was the land of the confederacy known as the
Six Nations of the Iroquois, which was composed
of the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga,
Seneca, and Tuscarora nations. In spite of their
limited numbers, the Iroquois were the strongest
native power in eighteenth century North America;
and they were the generally consistent foes of the
French and their Indian allies, supporting first the
Dutch and then the English in their colonial wars.
But for them, the English colonists would have been
flanked north and west by France and her native
confederates, the Algonquins and Hurons. They
were economically important as the entrepreneurs

of a fur trade that made the northwest frontier one
of the most important economic areas in North
America.

Provincial interest in the region and its people
appeared early in the Colonial period. Dutch traders
in Fort Orange (Albany) carried on an extensive
beaver trade with the natives and were constantly
concerned that France would seduce the Iroquois
and possess their lands. This concern continued
after the colony became English, and as early as
1727 the province built a small fortified trading
post at the mouth of the Oswego River on Lake
Ontario. This was eventually replaced by a larger
and stronger post; and, before the middle of the
century, stockades stood at the falls of the Oswego
and at both ends of Oneida Lake. The size of the
garrisons varied, depending upon the intensity of
the international rivalry for the Indian trade.

The Oneida Carrying Place was one of the
most critical points on the route to the Great
Lakes and Canada. On July 10, 1702, two Indian
tribes, the Twightwighs (a Miami group) and the
Teoreondaties (perhaps a Seneca group) petitioned
Governor Cornbury of New York, asking that a
path be marked over the portage and that trees be
removed from Wood Creek to permit the passage
of canoes. The governor granted their request and
promised to send guides to meet the Indians and
conduct them to Albany. 1

More than two decades later, on November
10, 1724, Cadwallader Colden, then Surveyor
General and later Lieutenant Governor and author
of a classic history of the Five Nations, prepared a
memorial concerning the fur trade for Governor
William Burnet in which he referred to the Carrying
Place, describing the portage as being three miles
long except in dry weather, when its length was

4 Fort Stanwix

five miles.- Occasionally the provincial govern-
ment's officials, especially the Commissioners for
Indian Affairs, gave their attention to matters
related to the portage, as when they considered
the complaints of forty-seven traders who were
having trouble with the Oneidas because the Indians
were making too much of a good thing of their
situation at the Carrying Place. 3

The Oneida Carrying Place's position on the
route between Albany and the Great Lakes was
described in the following terms:

Oswego, along the accustomed route, is computed to be
about 300 miles west from Albany. The first sixteen,
to the village of Schenectady, is land carriage, in a
good waggon road. From thence to the Little Falls of
the Mohawk River, at sixty five miles distance, the
battoes [sic] are set against a rapid steam; which too,
in dry seasons, is so shallow, that the men are fre-
quently obliged to turn out, and draw their craft over
the rifts with inconceivable labour. At the Little Falls,
the portage exceeds not a mile: the ground being
marshy will admit of no wheel-carriage, and therefore
the Germans who reside here, transport the battoes in
sleds, which they keep for that purpose. The same
conveyance is used at the Great Carrying Place, sixty
miles beyond the Little Falls; all the way to which
the current is still adverse, and extremely swift. The
portage here is longer or shorter, according to the
dryness or wetness of the seasons. In the last summer
months, when the rains are most infrequent, it is
usually six or eight miles across. Taking water again.
we enter a narrow rivulet, called the Woodcreek.
which leads into the Oneida Lake, distant about forty
miles. This stream, tho' favorable, being shallow, and
its hanks covered with thick woods, was at this time
much obstructed with old logs and fallen trees. The
Oneida 1 ake stretches from east to west about thirty
miles, and in calm weather is passed with great facility.
At its western extremity opens the Onondaga [Oswegol
River, leading down to Oswego, situated at its entrance
on the south side of Lake Ontario. Extremely difficult
and hazardous with rifts and rocks', and the current
Mowing with surprising rapidity. The principal obstruc-
tion is twelve miles short of Oswego, and is a fall of
about eleven feet perpendicular. The portage here is
by land, not exceeding forty yards, before they launch
lor the last time. 4

B\ the middle of the eighteenth century, the
( meida Carrying Place was an active station on the
western route with four landing places, an upper
one on each end for use during the spring and early
summer when the waters were high and the lower
ones for the drier seasons. Indians and possibly a

few white settlers took advantage of the location,
supplying wheeled vehicles to carry freight over
the portage.

The Carrying Place's military potential be-
came obvious in 1755, when William Shirley,
Governor of the Massachusetts Bay and Major
General of the Royal Forces in North America,
prepared for his Niagara campaign. Capt. William
Williams of the 51st Regiment of Foot was sent
to Oneida to open the road between the river and
Wood Creek. Supplies and men moved up the old
route, bound for Oswego, where ships were being
readied for the lake voyage to Fort Niagara. The
general moved his headquarters into a newly-
erected building and directed the operations from
there throughout the rest of June and July. It was
here that he received official news of Gen. Edward
Braddock's defeat on the Monongahela on July 9.
That event was a great personal tragedy to him, for
his son and namesake was among the slain. To his
sorrow and immediate burdens was added the
vastly increased responsibility for the success of
British arms in the Colonies. Braddock's death
made him the commanding general in North
America. 5 Here in his log headquarters, Shirley
struggled with the problems of his new role. It was
a difficult one for a 61 -year-old man who had
spent his adult life in the courts of law and in
colonial administration. Everywhere he turned
problems faced him, not the least of which was
the effective use of the services of another im-
portant civilian turned soldier, William Johnson.
Here, also, he enlarged the purpose of his expedi-
tion from the limited objective against Niagara
(Frontenac) to the conquest of the Great Lakes
region. To that end, Oswego should be fortified
because "It is as much the key of these lakes and
the southern and western country lying round them,
to the English, as Nova Scotia is of the sea coast
and eastern parts of North America; and the loss
of them to the French . . . must not only make them
absolute masters of the navigation of all these
lakes. . . . but let them into the heart of the country
inhabited by the Six Nations." By reducing the
French posts. Britain would secure "the whole
southern country behind the Appalachian or
Alleghenny [sic] Mountains to the Crown of Great
Britain, and have a further effect, to render Canada
itself, of little or no value to the French." fi

Throughout the summer. General Shirley
worked at strengthening Oswego and preparing to

History 5

take the offensive against Niagara. However, the
campaign was delayed when a council of war
recommended that it be deferred until spring,
"when greater numbers of men, vessels, provisions,
and muskets would be available". 7 Deciding to
winter his units at Oswego and Wood Creek, the
general continued to plan for the next year and to
seek support for his theories of how the British
should move against the French in the lake country.

Shirley was concerned about the security of
the Albany-Oswego supply route. He had a healthy
respect for French and Indian tactical mobility and
was alert to the route's vulnerability to raids. On
October 29, while stopping at the Carrying Place
en route from Oswego to Albany, he prepared a
set of instructions for Captain Williams that dealt
with the security of that part of the supply line.
After ordering him to assemble all of his command
at the portage and to remain there until ordered
elsewhere, to safeguard military stores, and to
provide for transport over the Carrying Place,
Shirley instructed Williams:

You are to employ as many of the Men of the Detach-
ment under your Command as you possibly can, in
finishing the Fort this day marked out at this place
and called Fort Williams and Compleating Barracks
therein to contain 150 Men. you are to build therein
a Storehouse of about the same Demensions [sic.] of
that already built here, and as soon as the Barracks are
fit to receive the Men of your Detachment you are
to Quarter them therein.

He instructed the captain to repair the road
over the portage, to build a bridge over the
"morass," and to provide quarters for one officer
and thirty men who were being detached from
Oswego to his command. He then informed him
that "I have ordered Captain Marcus Petri with
the Men under his Command to build a Fort at the
upper Landing on the Wood Creek, to be called
Wood Creek Fort." When Petri had completed the
fort, he was to clear Wood Creek of obstructions;
and Williams would station thirty men and an
officer at the fort and build a storehouse there. 8

The captains carried out their assignments.
Fort Williams was erected near the Mohawk land-
ings. It was a stockade with four half-bastions,
each mounting a cannon. Inside were barracks for
150 men and two storehouses or blockhouses that
John Oisher was directed to build in October. The
Wood Creek Fort, subsequently called Fort Bull,

was a smaller, weaker post, built of a double row
of palisades, the outer one 15 to 18 feet high and
the interior one about the height of a man. It
mounted no cannon and could accommodate
approximately thirty men. 9

Shirley's fears for the safety of the supply
route were well-founded. Early in the morning of
March 27, 1756, a French party commanded by
an officer named de Lery attacked Fort Bull.
Everyone within the fort, except a woman and a
few soldiers, *vas killed. The post's magazine caught
fire and the powder exploded, wrecking the fort.
A sortie from Fort Williams and the belief that
William Johnson was within striking distance with
a superior force deterred the French from attacking
the larger fort. 10

Alarmed by this threat to the security of the
Carrying Place, the British began strengthening
their position. Two engineers, Mackellar and
Sowers, started building a new and stronger fort
on the site of the one recently destroyed. It was a
stockade with a ditch on three sides. On the side
toward Wood Creek, the water was raised by a dam
that impounded the water to facilitate floating
batteaus down Wood Creek. The post was approxi-
mately 1 50 feet square, but the nature of the
ground prevented building a perfect square. 11 The
work was completed by Major Charles Craven;
and by August a stronger fort, named Fort Wood
Creek, with three structures, probably barracks and
storehouses, had been completed.

At the upper landing of Wood Creek, Major
Craven erected a new post, named Fort Newport.
It was built to receive supplies brought over the
portage from the Mohawk and to cover a dam that
raised the water of the creek so that upon opening
the flood gate batteaus could float down to Fort
Wood Creek, three miles away "which saved much
Land Carriage, & in dry Seasons 7 Miles to Canada
Creek."

Fort Williams had been built hurriedly and
was not strong enough to provide an adequate
degree of security. Therefore, Craven was instructed
to replace it with a new fort, called the Pentagon
or New Fort and designated Fort Craven by later
writers. It was built of "Hewed Loggs Horrisontaly
[sic] layed, & tyed with Cross Beams, nine feet
wide & filled with the Earth dug out of the
Ditch. The Bastions intended for Bomb proof
Magazines . . . , the Rampart near the Gates was
raised higher than the Gates, the highth [sic] being

6 Fori Stanwix

near 10 feet & almost as High, all round." When
the Pentagon was completed, Fort Williams would
be razed. As shall be seen, it was never completed. '-

Bj the end of the summer of 1756, the Oneida
Carrying Place was an active unit in the colonial
military supply system. Three forts stood guard;
Wood Creek, Newport, and Williams, and the
Pentagon was nearing completion. Two dams on
Wood Creek cut the portage time so that the seven
miles from the upper landing to Canada Creek
could be negotiated in an hour and a quarter. There
was a brick kiln, a saw-pit, and forge; and sutlers'
houses lined the road leading from the Mohawk. A
large post garden lay at the junction of the river
and Little Creek. Craven's camp was located in an
open area near Fort Williams and the Pentagon,
which was still under construction. The situation
at the Carrying Place had never been so strong. 1 ' 5

The year 1756 was a critical one for British
interests. William Shirley's plan for a comprehen-
sive campaign on all frontiers was wrecked on the
shoals of shortages and colonial governments'
unwillingness to contribute to a common effort,
less ambitious efforts against Crown Point and
I iconderoga and the forts on Lake Ontario were
all that were salvaged. Toward these undertakings
Shirley turned his energies. In spite of personal
sorrow and political frustrations, he gave of himself
unstintingly. He vested the command of the Crown
Point expedition in John Winslow and retained
the direction of the Great lake campaign for
himself.

The destruction of Fort Bull had been an
illustration of one of Shirley's most serious military
problem— enemy activity along the western supply
route and the difficulty of maintaining the British
garrison at Oswego. William Johnson investigated
the matter, but little could be done except repri-
mand Captain Williams for building a defective
fort and not providing for adequate defenses of the
Carrying Place." Williams had also ignored re-
peated orders to huward supplies to Oswego, had
left his post against orders; and the situation at
that place had become so bad that its commander.
Col. Janus Mercer, had been forced to drag sup-
plies through the snow from \arious forts alone
the route. Finally, the new Governor, Sir Charles
Hardy, had organized a relief part\ '■

I hrough April and May. supplies, workers, and
arms were rushed to Oswego in preparation for the
campaign. Shirley worked hard at recruiting men

for his expedition, which, if brought to full strength,
would give him an effective strength of approximately
4,500 men.

While the general was struggling with these
preparations, a political campaign directed against
him bore fruit. He lost the patronage of the Duke
of Newcastle, letters poured into London criticizing
every phase of his civil and military administrations,
local critics won over Governor Hardy, and the
Ministry removed him. After a period of uncertainty
about the command in North America, Col. Daniel
Webb was named Shiley's interim successor. He
would be followed by James Abercromby. who
would eventually be superseded by John Camp-
bell, the Earl of Landown, who was to become the
commander-in-chief in North America." - ' While he
awaited the arrival of his successors, Shirley went
ahead with his plans for Crown Point and Ontario.

Webb and Abercromby arrived in America in
June, and Lord Loudoun in July; and the three
new commanders met in Albany, where Loudoun
abandoned the Lake Ontario offensive in order to
concentrate upon Ticonderoga. This did not imply
an abandonment of Oswego; and on August 12,
Webb, with the 24th Regiment of Foot and some
of Bradstreet's batteauxmen, was ordered to rein-
force the Ontario garrison, about which the new
commander-in-chief was becoming apprehensive.

Loudoun's concern was justified. Soon after
Webb, now a temporary major general, arrived at
the Oneida Carrying Place on August 20, word
reached him that Oswego had been captured by the
French and that they were advancing toward the
Mohawk, 6,000 strong. As soon as he heard the
news. Major Craven mounted two six-pounders on
one of the Pentagon's completed bastions and
prepared to mount two more. Webb was in no
frame of mind to defend the portage. Although he
had Craven's troops, the garrisons of Forts
Williams, Newport, and Wood Creek, the last
including 150 of Schuyler's new Jersey Regiment.
plus his own 24th Regiment and an unknown
number of Bradstreet's men, on August 31 he gave
the order to destroy the works and retreat to
German Flats.' ' It was an inaurpicious beginning
for his American career, whose record included the
disastrous failure to support Fort William Henry
almost a year to the day later, which earned him
the unenviable reputation of Britain's most in-
competent general officer in America during the
Seven Years' War.

THE BUILDING OF FORT STANWTX

The French capture of the forts at Oswego
and Webb's destruction of the posts at the Oneida
Carrying Place were severe blows to British prestige
on the northwestern frontier. The vital region of
the Iroquois was exposed to the machinations and
maneuvers of the French and their Indian allies.
The tribes of the Six Nations were not favorably
impressed by the defence of Oswego and were
contemptuous of the abandonment of the Carrying
Place. Taking council of their self-interest, many
of the province's red friends began to question
the wisdom of identifying themselves with so inept
and cowardly a lot as their white neighbors seemed
proving themselves to be. Might not a more ac-
commodating attitude toward the French — or least
a neutral pose — be the better part of wisdom? It
required all of William Johnson's and George
Croghan's skill to preserve a working relationship
with the tribes that would prepare the way for an
eventual recouping of English fortunes.

The events not only damaged relations with the
Iroquois; they emboldened other tribes already
allied with or favorably disposed toward France
to harass Anglo-American settlers and traders and
to increase their enthusiasm for cooperating with
French military efforts.

Nor were the results confined to military
matters. The economic effects were crippling for
those involved in the fur trade, of which the
Iroquois were the middle-men and for which the
Albany-Ontario route was the life-line.

The settlers of the Mohawk Valley were left
in an extremely dangerous situation. They were
vulnerable to Indian raids, and there was a
frightening possibility that the French would
invade the province and bring organized war and
devastation — a possibility that became a reality in

November 1757, when Picote de Bellstre and the
Sieur de Lorimer, with 300 regulars and an equal
number of Canadians and Indians, moved eastward
to German Flats and Fort Herkimer. The inhabitants
of the region were predominantly German. They
lived on the western fringe of settlement, where
they had been settled as a buffer for the older
settlements. The provincial government had not
always used them well, and they had grievances
against the English that the French intended to
exploit, at the same time persuading the neighbor-
ing Oneidas to joint the anti-English coalition. The
settlers had confirmed French hopes by secretly
agreeing to remain neutral. The fort was garrisoned
by 200 men of the 22d Regiment under Capt.
Richard Townshend, who warned the Palatines of
the approaching French and urged them to take
refuge in the fort. Trusting the French to respect
their neutrality, they declined his offer. The French
avoided the fort and at 3 o'clock in the morning
of November 12 attacked the settlement, stealing
and slaughtering the livestock and burning the
houses and barns. Fifty of the Germans were killed
and scalped and 150 were taken captive. The rest
were left homeless to face the winter without shelter
or food. The garrison was too weak to save the
settlement, and its members probably counted
themselves lucky to have escaped an attack or
siege. When Lord Howe arrived from Schenectady,
he found a scene of slaughter and destruction. The
French commander on the Niagara frontier, the
Marquis de Vaudreuil, reported the affair with
obvious satisfaction, writing: "I have ruined the
plans of the English; I have disposed the Five
Nations to attack them; I have carried consternation
and terror into all those parts." 1

As the year 1757 came to an end. Frenchmen

8 Fort Stanwix

had reason to bo pleased with the progress of the
war. Their control of the Ohio Valley was so firm
that, for the present, it was not being challenged.
They had razed Fort William Henry. The Albany-
Ontario line and Mohawk country lay exposed.
Governor Vaudreuil made bold plans for carrying
the war into the heart of New York. Montcalm
would move down Lake George and take Fort
Edward. The Chevalier de Levis would take 3,000
soldiers and Indians into the Mohawk Valley. The
Iroquois, persuaded by French strength, would join
him in sweeping down the valley; and Albany
would be doomed. 2

The governor's plan, similar in design to
Burgoyne's for 1777, never took effect. General
James Abercromby, who had succeeded Lord
Loudoun as commander-in-chief, was at the head
of Lake George preparing to attack Ticonderoga.
The French plan for the Mohawk was abandoned,
and Levis and his men were ordered to march
from Montreal to reinforce Montcalm.

The defeats of 1757 had far-reaching effects
on the British leadership. William Pitt was making
plans for redeeming the situation in the Colonies,
and these included an invasion of Canada via
Ticonderoga and Crown Point, an amphibious
attack on Louisbourg, and an attack on Fort
Duquesne. The Ticonderoga operation failed with
the repulse of Abercromby on July 7, 1758, but
the other parts of the plan succeeded; and before
the year ended. Louisbourg and Duquesne were
English. The tide of war turned and was running
in Britain's favor. :|

I he renewal of British vigor was evident in the
Iroquois country. Sometime in the late spring or
early summer of 1758, Abcrcomby, amid his
concerns for the expedition against Ticonderoga.
decided to repossess the Oneida Carrying Place,
and he directed Brigadier John Stanwix to occupy
the portage with four New York Independent
Companies, 1,400 Provincials, and a company of
Rangers He instructed Stanwix "to take Post at
the Oneida Carrying Place, which I apprehend
will not onlj cover that Country, but enable them
to send oul large Scouts, to annoy the Enemy, and
remove all the Fears and Objections of the Five
Nations have raised against their joining us. upon
whom to this Hour. I cannot depend for a single
Man." '

In the meantime. Sir William Johnson had
been negotiating with the Oneida Indians to obtain

their consent to the construction of a new fort at
the Carrying Place. To gain their approval, the
British made two promises: that the fort, like the
others on the Mohawk, would be demolished at
the end of the war; and that there would be a
"plentiful and cheap trade." r '

With the Oneida's acquiescence assured, the
British began to plan their new fort. Lt. Col.
James Montressor prepared a proposal, probably
accompanied by a plan, that provided for:

A Good Post to be made at the Oneida Carrying Place
capable of Lodging 200 Men, in the Winter, and for
3 or 400 Men in the Summer, for its Defense: with
Logs — A Parapet of such a thickness, as the Engineer
shall think necessary, according to the Scituation —

A Ditch to be made, to serve to thicken the Para-
pet — Barracks to be made underneath the Rampart,
with the Flues of the Chimneys, to come thr'o the Top.

The Square will be the Cheapest Form, to be made
use of for this Work —

The Bastions in like manner, can be made use of, for
Storhouses [sic] or Magazines.

In the Square may be made, Lodgings for the Officers,
and the rest of the Quadrangle clear — The whole for
be Loged [sic].

And opposite to the Officers' Barrack may be made a
Storehouse for the Deposit of Indian Goods. 6

Brigadier General Stanwix ordered his
engineer, Capt. William Green, to review the plan
and submit his opinion of its usefulness. The
captain commented at length:

By a good Post — I understand to be meant, such a
one, as will contain with ease, the said Number of
Men; To be executed in such a manner, as to protect
them from a Coup de Main, and to be of such a Size,
as will admitt [sic] of a proper Defence by such a
Garrison, — The Exterior side of which Square, cannot
possibly be less (if so little) that 300 ft wch procures
but a very small Defence, from its flanks, && will
make an Exterior Circuit of Logging, of nearly 1420
ft by, at the very least 14 ft high, according to the
Scituation may be, & in order to admitt of Barracks
under the Rampart, to which the Retaining & Bracing
Logwork, as well as the Logwork fronting the Interior
Area, must in course be considered, as likewise the
Loggwork to cover the Barracks, storehouses, and
Magazines, t Hat are proposed to be made under the
Rampart of the Curtins [sic], and Bastions, by wch it
will appear, that the greatest part of the Rampart

History 9

round this Post, must be formed & Supported with
Logwork.

As I am ignorant of the Scituation I conceive that any
Form of a work that does not take up more in it's
Exteriour & Interiour Circuit attention being made
to an equal Flank Defence must be as cheap and a
[s] good as a Square, as it might not be in my Power
strictly to adhere to that Figure — As to the thickness
of the Parapet, being informed cannon can be brought
there, by the Enemy, it cannot be less than 12 ft., if
so little, 18 ft being the Standard in such Cases.
The Rampart for the Manuevre of Cannon, and like-
wise to admit of a Reasonable Breadth for the
Barracks underneath cannot be less than 20 ft.

The Breadth and Depth of the Ditch cannot be con-
sidered in Proportion for the Earth wanted, to form
the said Parapet, and to cover the Loggwork of the
Proposed Barracks, magazines & Storehouses to be
made under the Rampart.

His Excellency General Abercrombie is pleased to
observe in His Letter of the 16th July to the following
Purport — That He does not find Himself, vested with
the Power of Building Forts, and that His Excellency,
does not think, that it would be right for Him, to
undertake the Building of those He Proposed &c &c.

I hmbly conceive, that the plan ordered for the Post
at the Oneida Carrying Place, is in all Respects &
Circumstances to be Considered as a Fort, as it
partakes, not only the figure, and the respective parts
of a Fort, but even of the Permanent Intentions of a
Fortress, as must clearly appear, by considering all
the Particulars Ordered in that Plan, the Materials, of
which it is ordered to be built with, being only peculiar
to the Country and Scituation, and can no ways effect
the Intention of that Work, and as to its capacity, in
Point of Size, and the proper Strength, requisite in the
Execution, when considered, it is ordered To be made
a good Post, for 200 Men to 400 Men, I should think
it my Duty, to execute it with Propriety, Care, and
Attention, in order that it might answer the end
Proposed — That of Covering that part of the Country.

How far this can be executed, (allowing it, only to be
looked upon, as a Post, instead of it's absolutely
partaking, of all the Qualities and Intentions of a
Fort) to answer the use Proposed, of having it finished
against the Winter, must appear, by Considering
First It will be near the end of this Month,

before it will be begun upon,
2dly How soon the Winter sets in in that part

of the Country
3dly The great quantity of Carpenters Work,

to be executed in Logging & Bracing at

least 1420 Exteriour Circuit by 14 ft high.

4thly

Besides the Retaining Loggwork, and the
Front Loggwork towards the Interiour
Area, together with covering the Barracks,
Storehouses, and Magazines with Loggs,
under the Rampart, all this being com-
posed of Heavy workmanship, besides the
lodgings for the Officers, and Storehouses
for Indian Goods.

The Consequences, that may attend, this
post being attacked, if only half, or two
thirds Compleated.

And lastly, the Practicability of executing the post,
before the Winter sets in, must still further be judged,
not only, by the Number of Artificers, that would be
Requisite, to compleat it, in due time, but by con-
sidering, It is one of the Reasons, (inter Alia,) His
Excellency, General Abercrombie Himself, gives, for
laying aside the Scheme of Building a Fort there — By

Observing as follows "Besides, when I Recollect,

how far the Season is advanced, and that it is not
likely, that by beginning a Fort * now, it would be
finished, against the Winter, & consequently not of the
use proposed.

* I beg it may be remembered that I have concluded
the Post Order'd, to be Fort.

NB The Exterior Circuit of Fort Edward is nearly
1564 Ft and as I am informed, took nearly Two
Seasons to build it And the Exterior Circuit of the
Fort Proposed, will be nearly 1420 Ft. 7

Colonel Montressor answered Captain Green's
comments in this brief reply:

The orders for building a Post or Fort at Oneida
Carrying place were so plain that they did not seem
to warrant any Explanation, except in the Scituation,
wch not being exactly the figure of Course is subjected
to it, and tho' called a square, has often its four sides
unequal!, and as part may be unattainable by a swamp,
morass &ca. that side has a Parapet and Rampart less
strong that the others and without a Ditch, all those
alterations and changes are left to the Engineer.

As to its Execution, Amongst the number of Troops
on the Mohawk River, there are no doubt carpenters
more than sufficient who understand that business.

2d. The winter sets in there as oyer [other] parts of
the Province of New York, and not sooner; and as to
the Practibility of Executing this post or Fort before
the winter Major Eyers began Fort Wm Henry in
Sept. and it was finished by the end of Novr following
being an irregular square of about 300 ft each side
with Provincials along and without any Expense. 8

lo Fori Si.mu i\

Genera] Abercromby had obviously intended
that the new station at the Carrying Place be a
rather modes! affair, less extensive and permanent
than what would be ordinarily considered a fort.
Both Montressor and Green projected a more
ambitious undertaking: a fortification that included
curtains, bastions, ramparts, barracks, magazine,
and storehouses. In spite of his doubt about his
authority to have such a "fort" constructed, the
genera] soon accepted the implications inherent in
the proposals and referred to the project as a fort.
Abercromby also realized, along with Stanwix,
that the engineers were in essential agreement in
their proposals, with Green's remarks representing
"rather a Protraction on his Part to put that
Plan into Execution, than any valid reasoning to
invalidate its taking place." He proceeded to author-
ize Stanwix to order Green to begin construction"
without any further Delay." 9

Several problems attended getting work on the
new fortification under way. In the first place.
Captain Green's health was not equal to the task
of directing the construction. General Stanwix
asked that Montressor be detailed to work with
the captain, a request that fortunately was not
granted, since in his next letter Stanwix wrote:
I lonel Montressor's letter to Captain Green has
given him the greatest shock the poor man was
very ill before this proposal has almost killed
him." "' Abercromby replaced Green with Lt. John
Williams, noting "that he is acquainted with that
Part of the Country. & Accustomed to the method
of working in it. besides from Capt Greens bad
state of health, and the difficulties he stated to
former Plan, which was not near so extensive, it is
morrally [sic] certain he would not execute it with-
in the proper time." "

S condly, the refortification of the Great
( 'arrying Place was only one part of the operations
planned for redeeming British interests in the
Iroquois country I t Col. John Bradstreet's plan
for attacking Fort Frontenac had been revived, and
much of General Stanwix's attention was directed
toward assisting in collecting men and having them
read) to move up the Mohawk to the Carrying
Place, where they were assembled preparatory to
marching westward toward 1 ake Ontario. A total
of 5.600 men was intended for the Mohawk-
Ontario area, of whom 3.600 would accompany

Istreet and 2.000 would be employed in build-
ing the new fort.' -' Desertions and sick lists lowered

the effective numbers to the point where Bradstreet
ended up with less than 3,000 men and Stanwix
had to carry on the construction with a much
smaller force than he believed necessary. i:t

Lieutenant Williams, the newly assigned
engineer, joined Stanwix on August 14; and, in
spite of the general's pessimism about prospects of
carrying out the work within the time available
and with the provisions on hand and at Schenectady
within a few days he began work on the site marked
out within entrenchments that had been laid out by
Major Eyres, Abercromby's assistant engineer.'' 1
Horatio Gates, a survivor of Braddock's defeat and
future victor at Saratoga, became the brigade
major, responsible for the administrative details of
the force at the Carrying Place.

Work got under way at a pace that must have
been gratifying to General Stanwix. The first log
for the new fort was laid on August 26, and ten
days later the commander wrote:

we have finished the foundation of the fort inside &
outside & tyed the work the work wfijth retaining Logs
& half way round the second tier of logs, are pretty
forward with a Magazine in one of the Bastions & laid
the foundations of two of the Curtains for Casemats
fsic] for the Barracks, have got 40000 Bricks ready to
Burn for the Chimneys & propose another Kiln of
100000, if the Weather will allow, in a weeks time
shall have a Saw Mill Completed wch. will furnish us
plentifully with Boards & plank, and have got ready
a great quantity of shingles for Covering such huts &
other Buildings as we shall be able to erect & are not
without hopes if we get back our men from Col.
Bradstreets Enterprize in any time to make tollerable
( over for 400 men for the winter & this Fort will take
I view that number at least to defend it as our Bastions
are very large & when a Ditch & Glacis is Completed
will take up all the height oi this fine spot & as Oswego
is by you in one of Your letters proposed to be the
principle Fortification this will I think answer every
purpose if we can in time make it Tenable, in which
all pains & industry shall be made upon it. 18

While Lieutenant Williams was making such
praise-worthy progress, important news reached
the Carrying Place. Colonel Bradstreet had cap-
tured the French fort at Cataraqui (present
Kingston, Ontario) on August 27 and had burned
it and the ships moored there. 1 ,;

At about the time news from the west reached
Stanwix. Lieutenant Williams received a letter
from Colonels Montressor and Eyres directing him
to stop following the plan that he had been

History 1 1

using and follow one that had been considered
earlier. General Stanwix had favored the one that
Montressor and Eyres were now endorsing, but the
lieutenant argued that changing plans at that point
would preclude making the fort tenable in time for
its use during the winter. The general recorded
how the matter was resolved on the spot in the
following manner:

that we might not lett half our time be misspent in
doing nothing I desired that Williams & Green would
examine the ground & form something in which we
might have a possibility of succeeding before the
Winter wch. would cover in that season 400 men & so
far to finish it that no insults might be feared from
small Arms, of which Williams sent Montressor a
plan and we have proceeded upon it as I desired Mr.
Williams in his post Script to say that I determined to
try how far we are to proceed upon it, the body of
the place will not be large but Bastions will contain —
Room for the Guns Eight in Each Bastion which with
the Advantage of the Situation and guns sufficient for
the post will make it pretty Strong I am told every
way preferable to Fort Edward, and if it is thought
hereafter not respectable a Fortification may be made
to which this as it is the highest ground may serve
for a good Cittydel [sic] but as I always doubt my own
judgment I called all the Colonels to gether who were
unanimously of Opinion to proceed on what we have
now been about in preparing & executing near a month
wch I think to pick to pieces would be discouraging
for such Troops who are already but indifferently
inclined to work for no pay, I inclose the Colonels
Opinion to you tho I am Confident you will always be
so good to me as to believe I shall ever do that wch
occurs to me to comply with yur commands & do
every thing possible wth me to forward the Service.

Col Montressor's plan wch has all along been

My Favorite had it been thought practicable in the
time, he Calculates it to be executed by 2000 men in
three months, for this Month past I could never get
above 400 men to Work out of the Troops here fit for
duty wch has never exceeded 1100. Guards Piquets
Covering partys & perpetual Scouts taking up the rest,
including a Capt: & three Subs, with 130 Men I am
obliged to employ on the Mohawks River as Batteau
men between this and Schenectady. 17

General Abercromby responded to Stanwix's
letter telling him of the decision to continue building
the fort according to Williams' plan following
terse terms: "All I shall say upon it is, that — now
the Men which were with Colo. Bradstreet
are — Returned, I expect that Lieut. Williams will

fullfill his Engagement, and so far finish the Present
Fort, as to take tolerable Lodgements for 400
Men, and tenable against Musquetry for the
Ensuing Winter, — upon Failure of which he must
be answerable for the Consequences." 18

This exchange between the generals helps
identify some of the problems that attended build-
ing the fort. One source of trouble — one so com-
mon that it easy to overlook — was the product of
geography. Abercromby's headquarters during much
of the autumn was at Lake George. Eyres was on
his personal staff and usually at headquarters.
Montressor was near-by at Fort Edward; and
Stanwix and Williams were at the headwaters of
the Mohawk. By the water route, the distance
between Oneida Station and Lake George was
approximately 160 miles, no great distance by
twentieth century standards, but in a primitive
environment the time consumed in exchanging
correspondence was a matter of days.

Another problem, one closely related to
distance, was that of supply. All of the tools and
provisions had to be conveyed up the Mohawk
from Schenectady, a time-consuming operation
when the supplies were in stock; and if the stores
in the depot lacked what was needed, the problem
was compounded. Then, too, men were required to
man the batteaus, four officers and 130 men,
according to Stanwix's report.

Another drain on Stanwix's available man
power was the necessity to provide for the security
of his station. Reconnaissance parties were con-
stantly on patrol to guard against surprise, for he
dared not relax his vigilance, even after Bradstreet's
success on Lake Ontario. Pickets, camp guards,
and covering parties for the work details sent into
the woods to cut timber limited the number of men
who could be working on the construction. Sick-
ness, injuries, and malingering took their toll. Prior
to the return of Bradstreet's column, the largest
number of men that Stanwix had on duty was 1,100
of whom never more than 400 were available for
work on the fort.

The return of the troops from Lake Ontario
made more men available, but they were less
numerous than the generals and Montressor had
expected, as Stanwix's letter to Abercromby of
September 29 demonstrated:

you will perceive the great falling off of our members
of wch you will of Lt. Col Bradstreets see near a
thousand, numbers of wch are dead or dying dayly

2 Fort Stanwix

for . . . that Enterprize was perform'd with so much
expedition & fatigue that few could well bear it, & I
believe his great sweep was wholy owing to it. So that
of the 5600 men you ordered for the services only
2750 remained fit for duty the 20th of the month
near one half, & the sick list increasing very fast wch
is supposed to be owing to their living wholy upon
salt pork without pease, roots or greens. 1 ''

In spite of the limited number of men available.
General Stanwix expected to have the new fort
ready for 400 men and secure against small arms
by the first of December.

As the autumn advanced, the euphoria resulting
from Bradstreet's success dissipated under persistent
rumors that the French and their allies were about
to avenge themselves upon the western frontier. Sir
William Johnson and General Stanwix warned
Abercromby that friendly Indians were bringing
frequent news of approaching attacks. 2 " The force
at the Carrying Place was vulnerable to attacks on
working parties and batteau men; and a large
French and Indian force could threaten the camp
by attack or, less probable, isolation. The settle-
ments from German Flats eastward to west of
Schenectady were in greater danger. Stanwix's
troops were the keystone of the defense of the
Mohawk frontier, and General Abercromby wrote
their commander:

it — becomes necessary for You to be on Your Guard
and to keep out constant Scouts to bring You In-
telligence oi the Motions not only of the French, but
our supposed faithful Allies the Six Nations', For
which Purpose You will send out a Scout somewhat
stronger .... to follow Luttridge the Day after his
Departure from you, and give them the same Instruc-
tions with this Difference that they are to avoid
Luttridge's Tracts [tracks], by which means I should
hope you will discover the Intentions of the Enemy
both publick and secret: And to enable You to
frustrate their Designs the better. I have order'd
I raser's Battalion of Highlanders, lately returned
\\ ith M ( i [ Major ( ieneral] Amherst from the Eastward
to join you forthwith. I should have sent You a
stronger Reinforcement. Hut I am apprehensive You
will not have Provisions enough to maintain them at
present However, as from the Applications that have
repeatedlj been made to the Agent Victualers for this
Month past to supply this Deficiency, there is Reason
to hope the) will soon be provided with a proper
Quantity, if You find it necessary, you shall, upon
Requisition, be further Strengthened, either from the
I loops here, or the Regiments that are come with the
Roval. Vizi the 17th. 47th. 48th. & 63d. which arc all

encamped at Albany, and are stoped [sic] there, as it
has not been judged Advisable or practicable to
employ them this Season this Way, by Reason of it's
being too far advanced, and the Enemy from repeated
Intelligence too well prepared for our reception. 21

Stanwix had asked Headquarters for additional
cannon, and Abercromby replied:

the proportion of Ordnance for the Defence of your
Post . . . has been laid before the proper Officer, and
it is found far beyond what is requisite, nevertheless,
had it been in my Power to furnish you with it. I
shou'd not have objected to sending it: but it seems
we have no more than two 18 Pounders Iron at
Albany that have Carriages: it is true there are more
at Schenectady, but as they want Carriages they can
be of no Use to You at present I have sent Orders to
Mr. Furnis at New York, to make Application to the
I ieut. Ciovr: They certainly might spare some from
thence, and they are sufficiently interested in the
Defence of the Frontiers not to refuse them: but I
do not find they are much inclined to do anything for
themselves, and. as is customary in this Country
wou'd willingly exempt themselves from any Share
in the Means to secure themselves. 22

Rumors of hostile activity continued to reach
General Abercromby at Lake George; and in
addition to the Highlanders, the Second Battalion
of the Royal Regiment was ordered to the Mohawk.
When a report reached Headquarters that Stanwix's
camp was invested. Colonel Benton of the Royal
Regiment ordered the Battalion's grenadier and
light infantry companies to march from Greenbush
to Schenectady to be ready to proceed to the
Oneida Carrying Place, if the report proved to be
accurate.-''

The fear of a Franco-Indian attack and
approaching winter made the completion and
arming of the fort increasingly urgent. Both
Abercromby and Stanwix urged the lieutenant
governor of New York to use his influence to
obtain cannon, and an effort was made to purchase
pieces brought into New York City by privateers.- 1

The reconnaissance patrols that went out from
Oneida returned with conflicting reports: some
claimed that they had seen the enemy, while others
reported no evidence of either French or hostile
Indian parties. Stanwix continued to fear that the
enemy intended to "disturb our Works." although
the Indians at Oneida Castle told him that his
position was so strong that there was nothing to
fear from anv hostiles in the area. As the autumn

History 13

advanced, Stanwix held his breath, hoping that no
attack would be made before his fort was ready for
winter. On October 22 he expressed himself as
follows:

if we hear nothing certain of any strong Armament
with Artillery between this & the beginning of
November we may give up all expectation of any
unseasonable Visit for this approaching winter, wch
will enable us to carry our Fort all round en barbet
cover our Casmets [sic] for 400 men & Complete our
Ditch & Glassic [sic], and I am hopeful I shall be
able to leave here six months provisions for that
number, 250 beds will be wanting & absolutely neces-
sary as the Company of Rangers are to stay wch I
can well accomodate in good huts without the works.- 5

Artillery for the new fort continued to be the
subject of considerable concern for both Stanwix
and Abercromby. The former had submitted
"calculations" that members of the latter's staff
considered excessive; and while there were tubes
in the Schenectady depot, there were no carriages,
which meant that there was no artillery immedi-
ately available. As has been noted, appeals were
made to the lieutenant governor, and attempts were
made to purchase cannon from privateers. On
October 22 Stanwix was still trying to get the guns
that his post needed. At Abercomby's suggestion,
he wrote to Lieutenant Governor De Lancy asking
him to use his good offices in persuading the
province to contribute six each 18-pounders,
12-pounders, 9-pounders, and 6-pounders, with
8,000 shot for each piece of ordnance, promising
him that the province would be reimbursed with
guns from England or Louisbourg. He also wrote
Abercromby that he believed some of the Louisbourg
cannon should be sent to the Onedia post.

General Stanwix was especially eager to have
armament on hand because the fort was ready to
accommodate the cannon. By October 22, a bomb-
proof magazine with a capacity of 2,000 barrels
had been installed under the southeast bastion.
Other work accomplished included "seven good
Hutts, Brick chimneys. Shingled floor'd & lined
with — and at least two good Glass windows in
each & very sufficient for twenty one officers." The
general lived in one "and never desire a warmer a
more comfortable or better room, and 'tis by much
the worst of them."

Although the work was progressing, it was
far from being free of problems. The reports of
hostile activity had hindered construction:

&in order to get forward was obliged to send for some
Carpenters, & Mr. Dice has been of infinite use to us,
but experience of this Sort when works are carried to
a Certain degree of perfection are seldom found . . .
these troops at first produced but few Carpenters and
now the woods become Cold & Wet scarce at all, and
indeed there is such a surprizing falling of[f] from
the working men of these Battalions that from 5600
intend'd for the service this way that not 1500 left fit
for duty & these I am sending down sick in Boat loads
every day. I think all the provincials whilst with me
have behaved well but they are really worn out, work'd
down & fairly jaded with Fatigue, to wch the Batteau
Service and Caderaqui [Bradstreet's expedition] has
not a little Contributed — -Colonel Williams & Colo
Dotty's Boston Battalions their time is out the First
of November and they begin to be impatient to be
gone Jersey Regiment: their time out the 15th of
November: no time fix'd for the New York or Rhode
Islanders but end with the Campaign, please as soon
as you can — let me know when these severl [sic]
Regiments are to be dismiss'd. 26

Stanwix's personal situation was serious — more
so than the correspondence might indicate. He had
been ordered to use only the provincial soldiers in
the construction, partly for reasons of economy and
because Abercromby and Montressor believed that
a number of troops had experience as carpenters.
While probably many of the men knew something
about domestic carpentry, few if any had ever
engaged in a major construction at all comparable
to building a fort. Of course, most of them were
capable of cutting timber and digging ditches, and
that was the work that required the most hands.

As we have seen, military duties and sickness
contributed their share in slowing construction. But
as winter approached, all of the problems were
compounded by weather, the necessity of getting
the post ready for winter, and the expiration of the
troops' terms of service. While the terms of the
Massachusetts levies were extended for 15 days by
the provincial council, the situation was critical and
it never was appreciably eased, because alarms
continued to demand extraordinary security meas-
ures; and civilian carpenters were in scarce supply
on the frontier and those in Albany and Schenectady
were probably less than eager to work under the
conditions of danger and discomfort that prevailed.

On October 30 Abercromby wrote to Stanwix
from Albany concerning the final stages of the
year's work and plans for the winter:

I see with Pleasure the Forwardness your present Post

14 J ui i Slanwix

was in, and that we may expect by the 2d or 3d. of
next Month to have it so far finished, as to lodge and
Cover it's intended Garrison against every Insult, but
Artillery, which I join in Opinion with you, there will
soon be no Room to apprehend anything from, as the
Season advances last in which the Roads will render
it impracticable for the Enemy to bring any against
it. — I have given Direction for the providing of the
Beds, Snow Shoes, & Provisions You say will be
necessary and the D.Q.M.G. is to see them worthwith
sent up. — With Regard to the Proportion of Ordnance
& its Attviail, I am sorry it is not in my Power to
furnish You with the Whole of Your Demands, since
you remain of Opinion that You cou'd well dispose
of it: Notwithstanding my Requisition to the Lieut.
Governor; backed by Your very proper Letter to the
same Purpose, we have not been able to obtain more
than ten 12 and two 9 Pounders, Iron — Ordanance,
mounted on Garrison Carriages, which Mr. Furniss
by his Letter of the 23d. was to ship the next day for
this — whence, so soon as it Arrives it shall be
forwarded to You: and so soon as Capt. Ord come
down here, which will be in a few Days, I shall settle
with him the Officers and Men — of the Department
under his command, that can be spared for the
Oneida Station: but I must observe to you, that they
will fall far short of what You ask, as I have not in
mj Department, above 80 Men of that Branch, out
of which some are to remain here and others to be
left at Fort Edward.

As I see that You Convenience, and intend to hut the
Rangers. I suppose You propose the Garrison shou'd
consist of 400 Regulars exclusive of them and the
Small Detachment of Artillery, and as I intend that
( do. I laser's Battalion should furnish that Garrison
you will either leave them be Detachment or Com-
panies as you see best, and the Remainder of that
Battalion, I am inform'd by Colo. Bradstreet can be
very well cantoned in the District of Conajohary &
Stone Arabia, which Justice Fry has promised the
Deputy Or. Mr. Gen. to prepare and hold in Readiness
for them.

I have had a letter from Lieut. Williams, desiring that
he might be relieved, but as I have nobody in that
Branch, whose Department is not already settled &
of Nowise none to send in his Room, You will please
to tell him that he must remain there, and indeed
nobodj cm be more proper for it than himself, as he
will be at hand so soon as the Weather permits to
finish the Work.

With Regard to the provincial Troops, you may dis-
miss them so soon as Your Works will permit:
particularly the Massachusetts & Rhode Island People.
who have a long Ways home and the Roads daily
growing had; besides which, the Bostoners, who were

with me, are already on their March, which I dare
say will make Your's plead hard for their Discharge:
The sooner they were all gone, would be but better, as
it wou'd be a great Saving in the Article of Provisions,
especially in the present Scarcity; However, so long
as You can not do without them to finish the Fort
fit for the Reception of the Garrison, You must keep
them: But at the same Time, such of them as are sick
and unfit for Duty, might very well be sent Down
immediately as otherwise they will consume a great
Quantity of Provisions to no Manner of Purpose.
The Troops destined to be under Your Command this
Winter, and those going Down, will be here I expect
in a few Days, where I shall likewise be glad to see
you, so soon as you can conveniently leave Your
present Post.- 7

By mid-November 1758 Stanwix's work at
Oneida Station was completed, and he moved his
headquarters to Albany, where he commanded the
troops posted on the Mohawk and in northern
New York.

The first description of the fort that has
survived is Colonel Montressor's, which together
with a copy of the plan, shows the fort's situation
at the close of the first season's work. The Colonel
wrote:

This fort was begun the 23d 1758 by the troops under
the Command of Brigdr Genl. Stanwix and finished
en Barbette 28 as Represented in the draught of Novr
18, 1758 the yellow shows what parts are unfinished
A is a small creek wch runs southward and has its
head from three springs 500 yards above the Fort. B.
The Road from the Landings Place on the Mohawk
River over the Carrying place to Fort Niewport. C. a
section thro DE taking in the Ditch the Common
breadth of 40 and not the Breadth as it is upon the
middle of the Curtain. The fort is built on a Level
spot of Ground Compund of Pebble Stone mixed wt
Gravel and Sand is to the Eastward and Southward 19
ft. above the Level of the Swamps and Low Lands.
To the Northward the Ground is much on a Level with
the fort, but to the Westward it descends gradually
for three Quarters of a Mile to Fort Niewport to
the Common Level of the Swamps. To the West, North
and Eastward, the woods are Cleared between 3 and
400 hund[re]d yards and to the Southward 700 yards.
FA Magazine 65 foot long by 1 6 ft wide Bomb Proof.
The loggs of wch the fort is built are generally 2 ft
thick, flatted on the upper and under sides. The
Casementes fsicl (at present Barracks) are covered
wt two teer of Square timber from 1 2 to 24 Ins thick
as Represented in the Profil. 29

The colonel's description is very useful and

History 1 5

probably represents as good a picture of the fort as
can be had. However, it and the drawing must be
used with some caution. For instance, they do not
include the seven "hutts" for officers that Stanwix
mentioned in his letter of October 22. Secondly, he
described the fort as being completed 'en Barbette,"
but the plan shows forty-three embrasures. Thirdly,
there is a contemporary, though much less de-
tailed, plan that was enclosed in a letter from
General Abercromby to Prime Minister William
Pitt, dated November 25, 1758, that gives different
dimensions. The plan that accompanied Montressor's
description gave the length between the points of
the bastions as 350 feet. The one that accompanied
Abercromby's letter showed a distance of 330
feet. 30 An explanation of the differences may be
that both represent preliminary plans — not actual
construction drawings.

The 400 men from Fraser's Highlanders and
the detail of Royal Artillery spent the winter of
1758-59 in the new fort, while the Ranger detach-
ment occupied huts in a camp outside its walls. It
was a strong force for the Carrying Place, and the
frontier west of German Flats was more secure
than it had been since before the opening of
hostilities.

Somewhat against his wishes, John Williams
remained at Fort Stanwix, as the new post was
coming to be termed, in order to be on hand to
complete the work whenever the weather permitted.
Sometime during the winter or summer, he pre-
pared a plan entitled "Plan of Fort Stanwix Built
at Oneida Station. By Provincial Troops in 1758."
This probably represents the first attempt to present
an "as built" depiction of the fort by one who not
only knew it first hand but was its construction
superintendent, and it may be the most important
single document relating to the original building of
the fort.

Williams' plan shows a bastioned fort with
the points of the bastions forming a square 335
feet to the side. The walls were constructed of logs
laid crib fashion to a height of nine feet on the
outside and eleven feet on the inside of the curtains.
Their thickness at the base was slightly more than
20 feet and at the top 18 feet. The southeast
bastion, under which the magazine was located,
was nine feet on the outside and \5Vi on the
inside. The other three bastions may have had
higher ramparts than the curtains, but this is not
reflected in the plan. The bastions were 120 feet

deep, with two sides ca. 38 feet long and two 90
feet. The curtains measured ca. 140 feet. The
sally-port, about ten feet wide, was located in the
center of the south curtain. Another, narrower
gateway about five feet wide in the east curtain gave
access to the covered way and thence to the creek.

Inside the fort were four casemates, the roofs
of which formed the terreplein for the curtains.
These were log structures, built to a height of ten
feet in front and approximately eight and a half in
the rear. The external depth from the front to
the curtain wall was approximately 20 feet. The
northern and western casemates extended 119 feet
in front and 145 in the rear. The other two case-
mates were divided by the sally-port and east gate.
The south-western one measured 50 by 60 feet;
the south-eastern 58 by 60; the east-southern 58
feet square; and the east-northern 52 by 60. The
northern and western casemates were divided into
three sets of quarters, each with a door and three
windows opening onto the parade. The southern
casemates consisted of one unit per structure, each
with a door and six windows. The eastern ones
consisted of one unit per structure, each with a
door and four windows. Each unit was heated by
a fire-place with a brick chimney that extended
above the terreplein.

Nineteen huts were located in the parade,
most of them officer' quarters, but one or more
may have been kitchens. The plan does not provide
details, but General Stanwix described the one he
occupied as being one of the "worst," saying that
they had brick chimneys, were shingled, floored,
and having at least two glass windows. 31

The magazine was located beneath the south-
east bastion. It was a bomb-proofed structure,
measuring on the inside ca. 69 by 19 feet.

Except a distance of approximately 150 feet
where the bastions stood within less than 45 feet
of the stream, a ditch, 21 feet wide at the top and
eight at the bottom, extended around the fort. A
row of eight to ten feet high posts stood upright
in the ditch. A similar palisade formed a V in front
of the sally-port. The spoil from the ditch was
piled against the walls of the fort and as a glacis
outside the ditch. A "Necessary house" (latrine),
reached by an elevated walk, stood over a portion
of the stream opposite the south-east bastion. At
the end of the ditch opposite the north-east bastion,
a covered way led to the water. 32

Another season of construction began at

16 Fort Stanwix

■

-v

<■

V of Fore STANV

if * —

Plan of Fort Stanwise [Stanwix]. Colonial Office. Public Records Office, 5/50, Transcript. Manuscript
Division, Librarv of Congress.

History 17

Fort Stanwix during July 1759, and the work
that was accomplished during that year was re-
corded in a "Plan of Fort Stanwix Showing what
Works were done at that Post — from July to
December 1759." 33 Among the additions were two
huts for the officers, bringing the total in the
Parade to 21. Chimneys were completed or replaced
for some of the officers' quarters. New bedsteads
were installed in the casemates. Six cannon plat-
forms were installed on the bastions. The parapet
of the north-west "flag" bastion was raised four
feet, embrasures created, and a firing step installed.
The ramparts of all the bastions were raised. The
ditch was widened to 26 feet at the bottom and 40
at the top. The parapet of the curtains was raised
by placing barrels and horizontal logs on the
parapets of the curtains. A floor was installed in
the magazine, and a cellar for garden stuff was
built under the south-east bastion. Horizontal
pickets were installed on the north-east bastion.

Another, apparently contemporary, plan shows
the fort with the same features, minus the
"Necessary" and covered way to the stream and
without a ditch on the eastern side. The "flag"
bastion is shown with embrasures. A store-house,
with its western end palisaded, is shown west of the
fort. This plan shows a much smaller fort with the
sides of the square formed by the bastions only ca.
230 feet long, which probably means that the
indicated scale of 1 inch to 100 feet is in error. 34

While Fort Stanwix took form, William Pitt
prosecuted the war with the vigor, boldness, and
imperial vision that won him a place in history. As
Brigadier John Forbes advanced westward, the
French blew up Fort Duquesne. Forbes died shortly
thereafter, and General Stanwix replaced him with
orders to consolidate the British victory in the Ohio
Valley. Louisburg fell, and its victor, Jeffrey
Amherst, replaced Abercromby as commander-in-
chief. James Wolfe distinguished himself at Louis-
burg and was given the command that led him to
Quebec and immortality. Back in London, Pitt was
preparing plans for the expulsion of the French
from North America that astonished some of his
fellows and must have made General Amherst
wonder whether His Majesty's minister knew what
he proposed: Invade Canada, launch an attack
along the southern frontier, re-establish the fort at
Oswego — even attack Fort Niagara. The last was
accomplished in late spring and summer of 1759,
and Brigadier John Prideaux's and Sir William

Johnson's forces passed the new fort on their way
to Lake Ontario and Niagara.

In the meantime, money and labor were being
expended in improving Fort Stanwix. In 1761 it
was still unfinished, with completion anticipated the
following year. Yet, even as it was being completed,
its importance was diminishing. The defeat of the
French in the west and the termination of hostilities
reduced the purpose of the fort to showing the flag
among the Iroquois. By 1761 the garrison was
down to fifty men. 35

By the end of the war, the fort was a strong post
with massive log and earthen walls built up so
that all the bastions and curtains were capped by
embrasured parapets. The ditch on the eastern side
was apparently filled in, but a stockade extended
along that face. Two ravelins, one covering the
sally-port and a smaller one for the gate leading to
the stream, were constructed betwerf 1759 and
1 764. The officers' huts were replaced by two build-
ings measuring 120 by 20 feet -md one measuring
35 by 20. 3fi

The Peace of Paris ended the Seven Years
War in 1763, and Britain's attention turned from
conquest to consolidating and administering the
Empire. For the American Colonies, that meant
the end of "salutary neglect," and Parliament took
a more active interest in making the colonies
contributing members of the Empire. A series of
acts flowed out of London affecting trade, customs,
colonial administration, land speculation, and
Indian affairs; and most of them collided with an
American interest. The product was the American
Revolution that ended with independence and the
new nation's inheriting most of the problems that
had caused the separation. But that gets ahead of
our story of Fort Stanwix.

However, as a part of the military establish-
ment on the frontier, the fort shared the historic
scene. As has been noted, its primary function after
the elimination of the French threat was to provide
for an imperial presence in the Iroquois country,
particularly among the Oneidas. The Indians'
response to that presence was mixed. Insofar as it
encouraged increased trade, they favored the
existence of posts that would facilitate such com-
mercial contacts. On the other hand, the Indians
had acquiesced in the building of Fort Stanwix and
other installations on the condition that they would
be demolished after the war. 37 The maintenance of
the forts during the post-war years was a source of

18 Fort Stanwix

irritation to the Iroquois that Sir William Johnson
had to cope with in his relations with the tribes. At
the same time, forces were working that made a
wholesale abandonment of the war-time forts
unthinkable. The western tribes, resentful of official
arrogance, the dishonesty of traders, and their
exclusion from consultation when the French sur-
rendered the western posts, and fearful of the
advancing English settlements, plotted to expel the
British.

In the spring of 1763, the western frontier
erupted into war along a thousand-mile front. One
after another, the posts in the formerly French
territory fell, until only Fort Pitt, Detroit, and
Niagara stood fast. Frontier settlements were
ravaged, and according to some accounts, more
people died in 1763 than in 1759, at the height of
the Seven Years' War. Not until July 1766, when
Sir William met the hostiles in a council at Oswego,
did the war end with acknowledgement of British
sovereignty and Pontiac's pardon. 38

With the frontier ablaze, the British would not
abide by the promise to demilitarize the inter-
mediate zone just east of the frontier. Instead of
destroying Fort Stanwix, attention was directed
toward its repair. Engineer Lt. George Demler
inspected it and found it in a surprisingly bad state.
I lie southeast bastion, which covered the magazine
and cellar, was in an especially dilapidated condi-
tion, with its "whole Face fallen down." The
western half of the south curtain and the southwest
bastion were "so rotten that they can not stand
over this winter." The casemates were uninhabitable
and beyond repair. 1 ' 1

The lieutenant began repairing the fort on
Juyl I. 1764. The work was carried on by civilian
artificers and laborers, and by the end of the
season f 1 40— 5s.— I Od., New York currency, had
been expended and a surprising amount of repair
accomplished. 40 During that time the southeast
and southwest bastions and the curtains were re-
paired and made en barbette. The casemates were
rebuilt, and chimneys installed in the officers'
barracks. The northwest and northeast bastions
were rebuilt with embrasured parapets. A covered
passageway from the cast gate to the small ravelin
was built of wood and earth." The escarpment and
covered waj (glacis) were sodded and a small
parapet was installed on the covered way. By the
end of the year, work remained to be done on the
southern bastions, the parapet on the southeast end

of the covered way, the earthen part of the covered
passage to the eastern ravelin, and the closing of
the northeast end of the ditch by completing the
covered way. 1 - Whether these were completed
during subsequent periods of work is uncertain.
More money was expended in early 1765 and in
1767. Yet on May 27 of the latter, Maj. Gen.
Thomas Gage recommended to the Secretary of
State, the Earl of Shelburne, that Stanwix be
abandoned "in order to lessen expenses." The fort
was in ruins and not important enough to merit
repairs necessary to make it tenable. He proposed
to withdraw the small garrison and leave the fort
in the care of an "old half-pay officer" on the con-
dition that he should return everything to the
Crown when "required for the King's service." 43
The next year, John Lees, a Quebec merchant,
wrote in his Journal, describing the fort as a "neat
little fortification built of wood & fitt to garrison 3
Regiments' but it fis] now falling all to ruins. There
is a half pay officer with a Corporal & his men
that keep Possession of it, intended chiefly for
forwarding Expresses to the Officers at the upper
Forts: the country is entirely unsettled round this
Fort.—" 44

Thus by the year of the great Indian congress
that negotiated the Treaty of Fort Stanwix the fort
had become a dilapidated inactive post. Although
it is not the purpose of this monograph to provide
an in-depth study of that treaty, a brief account is
in order.

Britain's victory over her arch-rival, France,
had expelled that power from the North American
mainland, leaving her with greatly expanded pos-
sessions, incorporating not only Canada and
Florida, but also the vast region between the
Appalachians and the Mississippi River, a region
rich in lands and furs and inhabited by Indian
tribes, some of which had been active allies of
France. To the government in Whitehall, this
acquisition was a valuable territory that required
imperial policies that would provide for the orderly
settlement of western lands and peaceful relations
with the Indians. To those ends, the king issued the
Proclamation of 1763 that imposed a temporarv
settlement west of a line that ran north and south
along the crest of the Appalachians, reiterating a
pledge made to the western tribes in the Treaty of
Faston (1758) to respect native claims and to
refrain from settling on them without the Indians'
consent.

History 19

The Proclamation offended important Ameri-
can interests and values. The ignorance of its
authors had left several hundred whites west of the
Proclamation Line in Indian territory. More fun-
damental was its violation of the common-sense
American belief, amounting to an article of faith,
that white men were destined to occupy and exploit
western lands and that the Indians must be driven
away or destroyed. Settlers, land speculators, and
fur-traders competed for the new lands, but they
agreed in opposing any form of regulation, especially
if it emanated from London, that limited their
freedom of action. 4 "'

The inherent weaknesses of the policy that
produced the Proclamation and pressure from
economy-minded members of Parliament, greedy
speculators, and disgruntled traders forced the
British government to revise its frontier policy. A
shake-up in the ministry resulted in centering con-
trol of American affairs in the new office, Secretary
for the Colonies, which was assumed by Lord
Hillsborough in January 1768.

Hillsborough prepared a set of recommendations
that was accepted by the cabinet in March con-
tained the first practical plan for the North
American West yet developed. While the Indian
superintendencics were retained, their powers were
limited to imperial functions: land purchases from
the tribes, readjustments of the Proclamation line,
and settling diplomatic problems. Local matters,
including regulation of the fur trade, were left in the
control of the colonies. This made the western posts
that had been the centers for the trade unnecessary,
and all were abandoned except those at Detroit,
Niagara, and Mackinac, which were retained for
defense. Instead of establishing three western
colonies, as had been demanded by expansionists.
Hillsborough tried to satisfy them by ordering the
Proclamation line shifted westward.

General Thomas Gage, commander of the
British army in North America, complied with the
terms of the new policy; and within a year withdrew
all the western garrisons except Detroit, Niagara.
Mackinac, Fort Pitt and Fort de Chartres. The
superintendents dismantled their elaborate trade
establishment to the delight of the fur traders, who
swept into the West to set up their private posts
through the northern country.

Orders were received by John Stuart and Sir
William Johnson, Indian Superintendents for the
Southern and Northern Departments respectively.

Sir William's task was to extend the western
boundary line from the mouth of the Great Kanawka
River in [West] Virginia across Pennsylvania to
the Indian village Oswego near the southern border
of New York, leaving the troublesome problem of
determining the bounds of the Iroquois territory to
later negotiations. To accomplish this delicate
undertaking, he called a congress of most of the
northern tribes to meet at Fort Stanwix during
November 1768.

Johnson's action was a signal for speculators
along the entire frontier to go into action. In
Virginia, they pressured the government to appoint
Dr. Thomas Walker, an active land-grabber, as the
colony's delegate to the conference; and he set out
for Fort Stanwix committed to open as much of
Kentucky as possible to settlement. Pennsylvania
officials impressed their commissioners with the
necessity of obtaining the region between the
Susquehanna and West Branch Rivers. In New
York, the Indiana Company's leaders set about
persuading Sir William to guarantee that their
interests would profit. In June, Samuel Wharton,
William Trent, and George Croghan met Johnson
at New London, Connecticut, and discussed the
best ways to ensure success; and he committed
himself to obtaining from the Indians a specific
grant for the Indiana Company's leaders.

Johnson, thus, deliberately conspired to vio-
late his instructions, which had directed him to
ratify a line he had discussed with the tribal leaders
in 1765. Under no circumstances, was he to en-
large the boundary from the mouth of the Great
Kanawka down the Ohio to the Cherokee [Ten-
nessee] River.

When the conference convened, 3,400 In-
dians, commissioners from New York, Pennsyl-
vania, Virginia, New Jersey, and Connecticut
assembled within the dilapidated fort's walls. Lines
were clearly drawn. On one side was the Virginia
interest, whose objective was two-fold: to open
Kentucky and to keep any outside company from
exploiting that colony's back country. On the other
was the leadership of the Indiana Company, hun-
grily promoting their effort to obtain their grant
in the upper Ohio, quite aware that the region lay
within Virginia's northwest. Because of Johnson's
association, the latter group had the advantage.
With h>'s help, they persuaded the Iroquois to sell
them the 1 ,800,000 acres they wanted on Novem-
ber 3, but Virginia's consent was required. Walker

20 Fort Stanwix

was appeased by Johnson's extending the new
boundary line past the mouth of the Great Ka-
nawka to the Tennessee River. This would force
the Southern Superintendent, Stuart to redraw the
southern part of the line in a manner that would
open the lands of the Greenbrier and Loyal Com-
panies to settlementt or confuse the entire bound-
ary so completely that all the Kentucky country
would be thrown open to unregulated speculation.

The treaty was anti-climatic — the important
business had already been conducted by the com-
missioners in private, unrecorded sessions. Accord-
ing to the terms of the treaty, signed November 5,
the line began, not at Oswego, but near Fort
Stanwix, then west across Pennsylvania to open the
Susquehanna Forks area, and thence along the
Allegheny and Ohio Rivers to the mouth of the
I ennessee. In return for ceding their claims to the
lands, the Indians received £10,460 in gifts. Sir
William was aware of the fact that he had violated
his instructions and deranged the entire boundary
demarkation system, at the same time angering the
Delawares, Shawnees, and Cherokces by defraud-
ing them of their hunting lands in the Ohio coun-
try, to which they, not the Iroquois Confederacy,
had the better claim. He was intelligent enough to
know that the treaty left the whole western frontier
in turmoil. The real thrust of the treaty was re-
vealed in the shift of the boundry to the mouth of
the Tennessee, which showed that the line of de-
markation could be shifted westward by any specu-
lators with sufficient influence. The company of
famous and near-famous men: Benjamin and Wil-
liam Franklin, Samuel Wharton, George Croghan,
William Trent, and Sir William Johnson, had left
a heritage of cupidity that testified to the sordidness
that characterized much of the history of the de-
velopment of western lands. ir>

Six years after the negotiation of the Treaty
of Fort Stanwix. Governor William Tryon reported
that fort Stanwix had been dismantled. 17 Within
a decade and half after its establishment, the fort
at the Oneida Carrying Place seemed to have ful-
filled its historic mission. But a new career would
open for it during the War for American Independ-
ence that won it a new and more important place
in history.

Ill

FORT STANWIX
IN THE REVOLUTION

REBUILDING

The end of the Colonial Period found the
western and northern portions of the Province of
New York still in varying degrees frontier in na-
ture. Much of the western part continued to be
Iroqouis country. The Confederacy had lost much
of its early strength; and its people, especially the
Mohawks, Onandagas, and Oneidas, were becoming
more "civilized" and dependent on the whites. The
Mohawk Valley was thus a region where the races
met in frequent contact, and relations between
them was an important subject for the local people
and the provincial government. Sir William John-
son, who from 1756 until his death on the eve of
the Revolution was superintendent of Indian affairs
for the tribes north of the Ohio River, was the val-
lley's dominant personality. Its white population
was a mixture of German, Scottish, and English
with a small numbei of descendants of the old colo-
nial Dutch families. In 1772 the half of New York
bordering on Canada and the Iroquois country,
including all of the Mohawk Valley from about two
miles west of Schnectady, was separated from Al-
bany County and named Tyron County in honor of
Governor William Tryon.

The people of the county entered the era of
Revolution with divided loyalties. Communities
and families split as some members aligned them-
selves with the rebellious colonistsi while others re-
mained loyal to England and its provincial admin-
istration or hoped to remain aloof from the war.
For many the choice was agonizing as men found
themselves forced to choose from among conflict-
ing interests. For the Germans, with no sentimental
ties to England, the natural choice would seem to
have been to cast their lot with the rebels — as many
did. However, as they had tried to do during the
Seven Years' War, some sought neutrality in a quar-
rel that they felt was not their concern. For others.

remembering shabby usage by New York patricians
like the Schuylers, who were leaders in the resist-
ance to imperial authority, and believing that they
were more likely to receive fair treatment from a
royal governor than a native oligarchy, the choice
was to be loyal to the Crown. Among them the
Johnson influence may have been a factor. Sir
William's wife, Sir John's mother, was a German,
and the Palatines had found the baronet fair and
sympathetic. The Highlanders were divided, but
some had served in the British Army and had
little love for the Hudson Valley grandees; and these
remained true to their old allegiance. The English
and Dutch settlers, mostly native-born, probably
included more dedicated members of the "Patriot"
party than did the other elements of the population.
Thus to the people of the Mohawk country, the
Revolution had many of the characteristics of a
civil war.

Leadership of the Loyalists centered in the fam-
ily of Sir William Johnson. His political heirs were
his son, Sir John : his nephew, son-in-law, and succes-
sor to the superintendency, Guy Johnson; another
son-in-law, Daniel Claus; and John Butler, who had
been Sir William's deputy. Closely associated with
them was Joseph Bryant (Thayendanega), Sir Wil-
liam's secretary and brother of Molly Brant, his
Mohawk mistress. Sir John, hereditary head of the
family and of the imperial interest, undertook to
organize the valley's Loyalists and Indians into a
provincial force; but his efforts were thwarted, and
he and some of his supporters were disarmed and
placed on parole. Fearful that pro-British elements
might yet rally on the Johnsons, the state's revolu-
tionary leadership resolved to arrest him. When he
learned that his family's old rival, Philip Schuyler,
was sending a force under Colonel Dayton to carry
out that resolution, he escaped to Canada in May

22 Fort Stanwix

1776, where he was commissioned a lieutenant-
colonel and authorized to raise a loyal regiment.

American concern for the security of the valley
was not confined to local or provincial action. Maj.
Gen. Philip John Schuyler, commanding general of
the Northern Department, was aware of the re-
gion's economical potential and its political and
military significance. On June 8, 1776, he wrote to
the President of the Continental Congress recom-
mending that troops be posted at the site of Fort
Stanwix and that the Indians be advised of 'the
Continentals' intentions. 1 He did not wait for an
answer from Congress before preparing to carry his
suggestion into effect. Three days later, he informed
General Washington that he was "preparing every-
thing I can with utmost secrecy for taking post at
Fort Stanwix, which 1 propose to do immediately
after the conference with the Indians." - Congress
did not delay considering the general's recommenda-
tion and on Friday, June 14:

Resolved, That General Schuyler and the other com-
missioners for Indian affairs in the northern depart-
ment be directed immediately to hold a conference
with Six Nations; to engage them in our interest upon
the best terms that can be procured, and treat with
them on the principles and in the decisive manner
mentioned in his letter:
[of June 8]

That General Schuyler's preparations for immediately
taking post at Fort Stanwix, and erecting a fortifica-
tion there, be approved of: and that Gen. Washington
be instructed to give him directions for carrying that
measure into execution.' 1

The Commander-in-Chief complied with the
Congress's resolution: 1 and although the Indians
postponed negotiations, General Schuyler pushed
preparations for occupying the Carrying Place. He
ordered Col. Elias Dayton of the 3d New Jersey
Regiment of the Continental Line to take post at
Fort Stanwix with 500 men of his regiment, 150 of
Colonel Cornelius Wynkoop's 4th New York Con-
tinental Regiment, 75 Tryon County Militia "in-
tended for Canada," and an additional 200 of the
county militia. 6

On June 26 General Schuyler gave orders for
the shipment of supplies and artillery by batteaus
to be commanded by Captains I ansing and Wolcott.
Strict secrecy was enjoined, and the batteaumen
were not to be informed of their destination. Prep-
arations proceeded rapidly, and on July 1 the sup-

plies began to move westward from Albany/'
Colonel Dayton's troops assembled and reached
their new post on July 23. In the meantime.
Schuyler moved to German Flats to meet with the
Indian delegations, in compliance with the Con-
gress's June 14 resolution; and he reported that the
occupation of the Carrying Place had not given um-
brage to the Indians. 7

The troops, accompanied by Engineer Na-
thaniel Hubbell, found the fort dismantled and
ruinous. 8 Their task was to secure the vicinity,
serve as a center for patrols, and either rebuild the
fort or construct a new one. General Schuyler left
to Dayton's discretion the selection of the two alter-
natives, telling him: "As I never was at Fort Stan-
wix, I cannot positively recommend any particular
place for erecting a Fortification, but from the best
Information I have been able to procure. I am led
to believe the Spot on which the old Fort stood, the
most Eligible, of this you must be the Judge." 9
The general apparently expected Dayton to build a
new fort, either on the site of the colonial one or
at a new location. However, he wisely left the final
decisions of how to accomplish that part of the
mission to the local commander. While the sur-
viving correspondence that has been studied does
not explicitly spell out how the colonel exercised
his options, enough information exists to form some
conclusions.

Since the Mohawk column did not arrive at its
post until the middle of July, the commander and
his engineer were faced with the problem of build-
ing a fort that could be occupied during the next
winter within a severely limited period of time. Al-
though there were more than 900 men in the expe-
dition, only a portion of that number could be
employed at a given time in construction, because
military and camp duties absorbed part of the avail-
able man-power. The condition of the colonial fort
was the key to the solution of their problem. If it
could be repaired, a great saving of time could be
realized. On the other hand, if it was too dilapi-
dated, two alternatives remained: the fort could be
razed and the site reused; or another location could
be selected and prepared before new construction
could be commenced. Two questions require an-
serine: Did the Revolutionary fort occupy the site
of the original Fort Stanwix? Was the old fort re-
paired; or did Dayton's men construct a completely
new facility?

History 23

The first question is answered by two cartogra-
phic representations of the Revolutionary period
fort. One of these is a copy of a map by Francois
de Fleury entitled, "A Sketch of the siege of FORT
SCHUYLER Presented to Col. Gansevoort L.
Fleury." The other is a "Plan of Fort Stanwix"
that hung in Peter Gansevoort's Albany home for
many years and now in the New York Public Li-
brary. 10 Both of these locate the fort on the site of
the original one.

The second question can be answered with al-
most as much precision. The representations of the
(Revolutionary fort's curtains, bastions, glacis, sally
ports, and covered way correspond very closely with
the earlier plans, particularly Crown Maps 99, 100
and 101. Within less than a fortnight after the
troops arrived, Nathaniel Hubbell wrote to General
Schuyler praising the soldiers' performance and pre-
dicting, "The Fort will be Tenable by 15 Agust
[sic]." " A letter from Schuyler to Washington of
August 1 is couched in terms that indicate the old
fort was being repaired when he wrote, "Fort Stan-
wix is repairing and is already so far advanced as
to be defensible against light artillery.' '- On the
same day. Colonel Dayton wrote to commander.
"The Fort here which at present is very defensible
against almost any Number of Small Arms we had
this day the pleasure to name Fort Schuyler." ,:!
Two days later, Schuyler wrote to General Horatio
Gates:

Yesterday I received information that the enemy in-
tended to possess themselves of Oswego, and to march
a body of troops to destroy the settlements on the
river. I can hardly imagine that they will venture to
leave Fort Stanwix in the rear, which is already in
such a condition as to be tenable against small-arms,
and even light artillery. 14

By the end of August, scarcely six weeks after
beginning the work, Colonel Dayton was able to tell
his commanding general that, "Unless the Enemy
visit us by the first of October, I imagine they will
not disturb Fort Schuyler this season." 15 Thus
within two months, the fort was strong enough to
persuade the local commander and his superior,
who had spent most of the summer engaging in
:alks with the Indians at German Flats, that it could
withstand any force the enemy was likely to bring
igainst it that year. This had been accomplished
n spite of rumors of hostile activity, continued
irains on Dayton's man-power in providing scouts.

and the loss of Wynkoop's two companies, who
were ordered down-river on August 2. 1G This state
of preparedness could have been achieved only by
utilizing and repairing the curtains, bastions, ditch,
and glacis of the original fort.

While Dayton and Schuyler had hoped to have
the barracks for 400 men completed by the begin-
ning of winter, a scarcity of bricks, boards, and
nails forced deferment of that portion of the work
until the next year. 17 But the engineer went to Al-
bany for materials so that work could be resumed
as early in the season as possible. 18 The cor-
respondence does not provide details concerning
other buildings constructed during 1776, but they
probably included officer' quarters, a storehouse,
and a powder magazine. Supplies and ordnance had
been dispatched throughout the summer and fall,
and facilities for their storage during the winter
would have had a high priority. 1 ''

The lack of barracks limited the number of
men who could be stationed at the fort during the
winter months to about 200. This worried Colonel
Dayton, whose men's time would expire at the end
of the year, and he wrote General Schuyler telling
him that he did not expect the enemy to move
against the fort, adding:

I conclude General Schuyler will order no more than
about 200 men to garrison this Fort the ensuing
winter as I suppose that number sufficient and not
more than 200 can be properly accommodated. On
this account I fear a Separation of my Regiment
unless you Sir, should think it fit to order us to a
more active and important station, and send a part of
Colonel Elmore's Battalion which I understand is
equal to mine in point of numbers, to relieve us at
this Post.'-'"

General Schuyler complied with Dayton's re-
quest and on October 9 ordered Col. Samuel
Elmore's Connecticut troops to leave German Flats
and occupy Fort Schuyler [Stanwix], which they
did on the 17th. Because not all the barracks had
been completed, a part of Elmore's command re-
turned to German Flats to winter there at nearby
Burnet's Field.- 1 At the end of December, beef and
an eight-month supply of flour, along with soap and
candles, were ordered sent to Elmore's men at Fort
Stanwix. 22

One of the last actions taken by the Conti-
nental Congress in 1 776 was the passage of a resolu-
tion on Saturday, December 28, providing:

24 Fort Stanwix

That Fort Stanwix be strengthened, & other fortifica-
tions be made at proper places near the Mohawk
river, ... to be executed this winter, commanding
officers of artillery, chief engineer, quartermaster
general, & commissary general, provide & perform
whatever things in the respective departments are
necessary, or may contribute to the accomplishment
thereof. 23

The winter of 1776-77 was a period of quiet
on the northern frontier, but it was not one of com-
placency. Sir Guy Carleton's aborted 1776 in-
vasion confirmed American fears that the British
intended carrying the war into the interior; and al-
though Sir Guy had withdrawn to Canada, there
was ample evidence that the project was deferred,
not abandoned. Shortages of every form of ma-
terial hounded the commanders in the Northern
Department. Illness and desertion ate into the effec-
tive man-power. Sectional and personal loyalties
divided men and units, a condition that was re-
flected in the shifts of command between Philip
Schuyler and Horatio Gates. Crown Point and
Ticonderoga at the northern terminus of the
Champlain-Hendron line were still American, but
every problem that plagued the Americans seemed
to focus and compound there. Fort Stanwix was
unfinished and while defensible against small arms
and light artillery, it was vulnerable to a determined
attack supported by heavier field pieces.

During the late winter, a new and little-known
figure entered the story of the fort. A French offi-
cer. Captain B. De Lamarquisc. who had been
assigned to the Northern Department as an engi-
neer, submitted to General Schuyler a plan for re-
building the fort. The general accepted it and
ordered the engineer to:

make the alterations agreeable to the plan you have
laid before me. ami to guard as much as possible
against any misfortunes, that might be occasioned by
an attack before the alterations are compleat. whilst
the other is going on as possible that the garrison may
be covered. Perhaps it will be best to begin with one
bastion and the adjacent curtains and compleat as
much as possible before another is begun. 2 '

I amarquise's plan has not been located, and thus
an important element of the constaiction history of
the fort is missing. That it envisaged substantial
changes as indicated in the general's letter to
Colonel Elmore in which he wrote: "Captain Mar-
quizes [?] has in charge from the general to New

Moddle [model] Fort Schuyler and make some ad-
ditional fortifications at that place." 2B

At the end of March, while preparing to leave
for Philadelphia, General Schuyler ordered Col.
Peter Gansevoort of the 3d New York Regiment of
the Continental Line to Fort Stanwix to replace
Elmore's men of the Connecticut Line. 2 ' 1

The first detachment of the new garrison
reached the fort on April 17. On May 3 Colonel
Gansevoort arrived and took command. A week
later, Elmore's men, who had spent the winter on
the frontier, marched out of the fort on their way
to Albany. The remainder of Gansevoort's regi-
ment, under the command of Lt. Col. Marinus
Willctt arrived on May 28. 27

Gates replaced Schuyler as Commanding Gen-
eral of the Northern Department. In his papers is
an undated report from Captain de Lamarquise,
written prior to Gansevoort's arrival, detailing the
hitter's work at the fort:

Capt. De Lamarquise's proceedings at Fort Schuyler
since his arrival at that post —

has made halves to the axes, pickaxes & spades
& other implements

has made 200 embares on riviere

has made a guard house at the entry of the Fort
which before his arrival was behind

has made sentry-boxes where necessary to keep
centinels

has built a house by order of the general for one
stefanny who is married to a squaw 24 ft long by 1 2
ft deep

has made a small store to put provisions under
cover finished a house for the savages when they
come to that post also arranged the Barracks which
were of no service not being in a state without altera-
tion to receive 200 men and he will put them in a
state to receive 500 or at least 400 say.

The Garrison has not yet permitted him to
undertake the putting the fort in proper order and
were there men sufficient, the grass will not be of
sufficient strength for 15 days, to cut turf he has
therefore employed the few he has to open a road
to the westward of the fort where he can get cedar
and pine near at hand, whereas before they were
obliged to go three miles to fetch a piece of wood as
also firewood.

as soon as Colo Gansevoort arrives he will set
about the fort and trim it up with turf &c from the
bottom of the ditch &c.

He proposes to raise the parapet with cedar (as
there is enough about a mile from the fort) by the
end of next month he thinks it will be necessarv to
order 200 to 300 militia to assist in that work if no

History 25

other troops are to be sent but Gansevoort's.

He proposes next week to make a hospital for
the sick for the want of which and a surgeon he will
be obliged to send them down having already done it
Major Cockran is now very ill.

When he arrived at Fort Schuyler the 20th of
April with a company of 20 carpenters a few days
after he was obliged to discharge 10 of them being
shoemakers, tailors, & smiths who did not understand
their business for which they engaged. 28

Within three weeks, the engineer wrote Gen-
eral Gates proposing to build a new fort rather than
'epairing the existing one, saying:

■ have received orders from General Schuyler to
epair this fort in the same way form it was last war.
t is absolutely necessary that I make it entirely new.
Jarracks, Ramparts, Parapet, Fosse and covered way,
? raise and Cheveaux de fiese; all is destroyed. If
here is no more troops to come than Col. Gansevoort's
Regiment, I can not absolutely repair this Fort so
oon as I would wish it and necessity requires. I wish
'ou wouuld send a reinforcement as soon as it is
>ossible and give orders to the Quarter Master General
o supply the necessities of the Garrison, by means of
vhich I can in a little time put the place in condition
lot to fear the enemy. 29

Almost simultaneously, Gansevoort assured
lhe departmental commander that he would co-
perate with the engineer to the full extent of his
apabilities, but that he simply did not have the
ersonnel to do everything that was needed, "as
he whole fort and barracks is to be new modelled."
le also informed him that he needed at least ten
lore batteaus to transport boards. 30

Before Gates could respond to Gansevoort's

nd Lamarquise's correspondence. Congress again

hifted the Northern Department's command to

chuyler. 31 At this point, the construction history of

le fort becomes more confusing. The engineer had

isisted that the old fort was beyond repair and that

new one would have to be built, and Gansevoort's

lemorandum to Gates indicated that the works

ere to be "new modelled." On May 26 Lt. Col.

larinus Willctt arrived from Fort Constitution with

i te rest of Gansevoort's regiment, minus a detach-

lent left at Fort Dayton. 32 Colonel Willett pre-

| ared an account of his military career thirty years

a ier the siege of Fort Stanwix, and that narrative

r akes the following contribution to the story of the

rt's remodeling:

Instead of repairing the works after the manner of
their original construction, which could easily have
been done, — for though in a state of decay, the
principal outlines of the old fort were sufficiently
visible,— the engineer sent out large parties to pro-
cure logs from the swamp. Having ordered them to be
drawn near the fort, he began to erect them in the
covert way and not in the center of the ditch where
they formerly had been placed. After having with
much labor procured the logs, it appeared that each
log was seven feet longer than was necessary; the logs
being seventeen in length, when the pickets that were
to be made of them only required ten feet. This
blunder of the engineer, together with the remissness
he showed, at so critical a moment, led Colonel
Willett to suggest to Colonel Gansevoort the propriety
of discharging him from the office he filled. Colonel
Gansevoort, however, from the circumstance that the
engineer had been appointed by the commander-in-
chief of the Northern Department, General Schuyler,
to superintend the fortifications, was reluctant to take
the step.

The fortifications, consequently, continued to go on
under the superintendence of the engineer. The bar-
racks were repaired within the fort, and a large and
commodious building intended for this purpose was
erected a little beyond the foot of the glacis. But all of
those works were of secondary importance; indeed
the barracks out of the fort at the foot of the glacis,
could be of no use in care of investment, but rather an
injury. And so it actually proved: for the enemy set
fire to this very building at a time, when the wind,
blowing fresh toward the fort, occasioned considerable
inconvenience to the garrison. In the meantime little
was done to strengthen the fort, though there was
every reason to expect the instant arrival of the
enemy.

The anxiety of Colonel Willett, arising from a con-
viction of the incompetency of the engineer, in con-
nection with the critical state of the fort, led him
closely to inspect the progress of the state of the fortifi-
cation. The engineer had begun to erect a salient angle
to the gate, with two embrasures in it. He was also
engaged in erecting pickets along the covert way. The
pickets were placed about three feet from the parapet
of the glacis. Two of them were framed together
with cross-pieces, and formed a kind of porthole which
were intended to be placed opposite the embrasures.
But it soon appeared from the manner in which the
pickets were arranged that the portholes formed of
the pickets with crosspieces would come opposite
the neck of the embrasures. By this means the salient
angle would be rendered wholly useless Colonel
Willett at an early stage of the work, noticed the
error, but thought it best to let the engineer take his
own course until the line of pickets should be carried

26 Fort Stanwix

to that part of the salient angle where they would be
opposite to the embrasures. When the engineer reached
this part of his work, his ignorance would be without
the least covering; and yet he never discovered his
error until the pickets were erected opposite the neck
of the embrasures. Then for the first time he saw that
all his labor in erecting the salient angle had been in
vain; and that it could not be used without first
knocking away the neck of the embrasures. The case
being stated to Colonel Ganscvoort, he directed Colonel
Willett to arrest the engineer, which was accordingly
done. He was permitted to repair to headquarters; a
letter at the same time being sent to General Schuyler
assigning the reasons of the arrest.

It was not until some time in the month [July] that
this step was taken. Information had already been
received that the enemy were advancing toward the
garrison.' 13

Because the account was written so many years
after the events took place and was rewritten by his
son William, the colonel's story must be used cau-
tiously and in conjunction with other, more con-
temporaneous sources. Returning to those sources,
one can trace a part of the course of rebuilding of
the fort. On June 15, in reply to a query of Schuy-
ler's concerning the progress of the work, Gansc-
voort wrote that, in spite of the fact every available
man was on fatigue details, progress was very slow
and that:

there arc about 2,000 Pickquettes lying around the
fort which we have Drawn out of the swamp through
which we have been obliged to make Roads for that
purpose and will soon he able to compleat that part
of the business — nothing of any importance is yet done
towards the strengthening of the fortification which
at present has little more than the name of a fortifica-
tion. The engineer at this place has just laid the
foundation of a salient angle before the gate and the
carpenters arc employed in framing a Barracks to be
raised just before the glacis opposite the south Bastion
the Barracks at present being bad and the whole
works insufficient to contain the few men we have
here, the whole of the works which appear to me to
be necessarv and which (apt. Marquisic tells me are
to be done at this place undoubtedly require more
strength than we have at present. I. therefore, humbly
request that part of my Regiment which is at present
stationed at Fori Dayton may be relieved and ordered
to this place.

He reported that the engineer appeared to be
diligent, thai many of the supplies went to "victual-
ing" the Indians, that a number of his men were ill.

and that he had to send as far as Conajohary for
boards and to Little Falls for lime. 34

Suddenly, on July 10, General Schuyler wrote
to Ganscvoort directing him to "send Capt. Mar-
quisie down & let Ivlajor Hubbcl superintend the
works." :!: ' Nothing in the contemporary corre-
spondence reveals the reasons for this apparently
abrupt action. Schuyler was not a man who gave
his confidence lightly and he was equally slow to
withdraw it. The reasons for ordering the French-
man's replacement must have been weighty. Look-
ing at it from the distance of nearly two centuries,
some of Lamarquise's acts, and decisions, and
statements certainly are hard to understand and de-
fend. For one thing, he intruded himself into the
field of Indian relations, as witness this report to
General Gates:

I have the honor to write you this to inform you of the
arrangements which I have made with the savages of
the Six Nations, that after having held council with
them of which Mr. Stephnes was the interpreter, they
promised me neutrality, and that they will not medle
any more with the affairs of the King of England,
and they are satisfied that the King of France was a
friend of the Americans for which they will rest at
peace

The 26th of April last the savages of the Six Nations
sent to the Fort for me, in consequence of which I
was sent with them in Council with the savages that
was arrived from Canada. These savages from Canada
promised me also neutrality in the presence of Mr.
Dean, the Interpreter, and told me that they will
refuse General Carleton all sorts of propositions, and
that they will not medle more with anything, and they
gave the following news:

At a place called I.a Gallctte (Oswaygatia I believe)
fOswcgol where they are constructing a vessel of 28
pieces of cannon which ought to be finished. There
is in the Fort 50 or 60 men, and 6 pieces of artillery
mounted. At Niagara there is about 200 men which
Mr. Johnson's son [Sir John Johnson] left when he
was last fall at New York. At St. John's last winter
they had there and at the Isle auxNois 1.000 men. and
there they are constructing 12 batteaus of one mast.
and several more large batteaus. When Messrs.
Nermonet and the other gentlemen arrived. I had
arrargned [arranged] all this on my good will and
money, about a fortnight: being glad to have the
occasion to oblige the country and render myslf useful
to the Continent.

I hope General this will give you pleasure, and that
you will have some regard to my good intention: it has
cost in presents to make them drink about one

History 27

hundred dollars which I expended with a good heart.

... I shall always be ready to execute your orders,
and that will give much pleasure to the savages. 30

In his undated memorandum describing the
situation prior to May 5, the date of Gansevoort's
arrival, he wrote concerning the conference with
the Indians:

The 26 April 2 savages from the Sault St. Louis near
Montreal arrived among the 6 Nations. As soon as
they heard there was a French officer at the fort they
sent for him to hold a council which lasted from 9 in
the morning to 6 in the evening but not being ac-
customed to such councils he neglected to lay in a
good breakfast. Therefore declares when he broke up
had great occasion for a good dinner. In the counsel
the savages from Canada agreed with the Six Nations
and him not to take part with the English as they
call our enemies but remain neutral.
When he went out to meet them they received him
with the honors of war a salute of 3 cannons and
each savage fired his fusil, which I answered with 3
discharges from the detachment I had with me. When
I left them the same ceremony happened. They made
him a present, but unfortunately not worth much. He
did all he could to engage the Canadian Indians to
come down but could not succeed . . . P.S. — If you
send Capt. Florimant here I believe it will be of
service first to assist in the works, secondly the right
of another French officer will confirm to the savages
what I have already told them — and also you may be
assured he is an honest man.-' 7

Lamarquise's reports pose some problems. First,

Tolonel Elmore, the fort's commanding officer and

he official responsible for Indian affairs in that

/icinity, and his successor, Colonel Gansevoort,

lever referred to the council, nor did General

Schuyler, departmental commander and Indian

:ommissioner. This is strange, if so important a

•onference as the engineer describes convened.

Secondly, the only members of the Six Nations

vhose presence in any numbers is reported at or

lear the fort and with whom the Americans ap-

mrently had friendly contacts were the Oneidas.

Thirdly, the conduct of the Six Nations, excepting

; he Oneidas, was exactly the opposite of what La-

I narquise reported they had pledged. If the coun-

il took place, it probably included not representa-

ives of the Confederacy, but only a few of the

acal bands; and the Indians succeeded in hood-

' /inking the Frenchman, playing upon his sense of

importance. There are no documents authorizing
the engineer to treat with the Indians and none that
have been studied support his story; although a
probable result was Schuyler's order to Gansevoort
forbidding persons not employed by the Indian De-
partment to make speeches to the Indians. :tK

Lamarquise's professional performance is not
always easy to defend. As has been noted, he was
commissioned to restore the fort "in the same way
it was last war." Contending that it was beyond
repair, he advised building a completely new one
and apparently proceeded to act as though that was
what he was doing. This would have been a very
ambitious undertaking under the best of conditions,
and one that would have demanded a severely im-
posed husbanding of men, time and equipment.
However, he built a house for Stephen Degran, a
local French squaw-man, a building to shelter the
Indians who visited the fort, and erected a large new
barracks outside the fort that had to be destroyed
during the siege to prevent its screening the enemy's
approach. His utilization of building materials was
not what would have been expected of an engineer
working against time in a wilderness environment.
Instead of erecting log barracks, he used boards that
had to be shipped by batteaux from Conajohary, a
distance of almost fifty miles. In fact, if he intended
building a new fort to replace the old one he failed.
Nothing in the contemporary documents indicates
that he razed the old ramparts; and as shall be
noted, the evidence indicates that the old fort was
still standing in August. Perhaps he intended to
build a new one and that time, the approaching
enemy, and his recall precluded his accomplishing
his objective. The Gansevoort-Schuyler corres-
pondence does not tell why he was replaced — per-
haps Colonel Willett's account of Lamarquise's
incompetence provides the answer.

The Americans continued working to
strengthen their position under Hubbell's super-
vision. As the summer advanced, enemy activity
in the vicinity increased. On June 25 a party of
Indians attacked Captain Gregg and Corporal Madi-
son while hunting. The corporal was killed and the
captain almost fatally wounded. 39 On July 3 En-
sign lohn Spoor and a party of seven men cutting
sod at the ruins of old Fort Newport were attacked.
One soldier was killed and scalped, one wounded
and scalped, and the officer and four men were cap-
tured. 40 Not unnaturally, the fort's commander sus-

28 Fort Stanwix

pectcd the neighboring Oneidas of having a share in
these events; and, according to William L. Stone,
Sr., the Indians denied any complicity, protesting
their good-will and friendship, to which the Colonel
replied:

Brother Warriors of the Six Nations: I thank you for
your good talk.

Brothers: You tell us you are sorry for the cruel usage
of Captain Gregg, and the murder of one of our
warriors; that you would have immediately pursued
the murderers, had not General Schuyler, General
Gates, and the French general desired you not to take
any part in this war; and that you have obeyed their
orders, and arc resolved to do so. I commend your
good resolution.

Brothers: You say you have sent a runner to the Six
Nations to inform them of what has happened, and
that you expect some of the chiefs will look into the
affair, and try to find the murderers. You have done
well. I shall be glad to smoke a pipe with your chiefs,
and hope they will do as they speak.

Brothers: I hope the mischief has been done, not by
any of our good neighbors of the Oneida nation but
by the Tories, who are enemies to you as well as to
us, and who are ready to murder yourselves, your
wives, and children if you will not be as wicked as
themselves.

Brothers: When your chiefs shall convince me that
Indians of the six Nations have had no hand in this
wicked thing, and shall use means to find out the
murderers and bring them to justice, you may be
assured that we will strengthen the chain of friendship,
and embrace you as good brothers. I will not suffer
any of our warriors to hurt you. 11

The details of the work done after Lamar-
cpiisc's departure cannot be traced in the corres-
pondence that has survived. Thus a picture of
what the fort looked like when Brigadier Barry
St. Lcger's men laid siege to it in August must be
inferred from the data that we have reviewed and
from two cartographic sources.

Captain Lamarquise had reported to General
Gates that the original fort was beyond repair and
that a new one would have to be built, and Colonel
Gansevoort apparently acquiesced in this. There-
fore, one question that needs answering is whether
a new fort was indeed constructed. The engineer's
and Gansevoort's letters to Schuyler and Willett's
Narrative give the impression thai was the objective
of the work undertaken during the summer of 1776;

but the same sources raise doubts that much prog-
ress was made toward that goal.

The reports and letters, and especially Wil-
lett's account, clearly indicate that the original ditch
and glacis were retained. This meant that before a
new fort could be constructed the old one would
have to be razed, but there is no documentary evi-
dence that this was done. In fact, the ramparts re-
ceived scant attention. The engineer reported to
Gates before May 5 that he intended to raise the
parapet with cedar. He mentioned the laying of
turf on the ramparts' exterior slopes, and beginning
work on a "salient angle" in front of the main gate.
Colonel Willett recalled that "little was done to
strengthen the fort," and Colonel Gansevoort re-
ported on June 15 that "nothing of any importance
is yet done towards strengthening the fortification

The cartographic evidence argues strongly
against the construction of a new fort. The most
nearly contemporary plan or map was the one made
by the French officer. Francois de Fleury. entitled.
"A Sketch of the siege of FORT SCHUYLER
Presented to Col. Gansevoort by L. Fleury." The
original Map is lost, but two copies exist. One by
G. H. Bowen is preserved in the Cornell University
Library's Sparks Collection. Another was prepared
by William Campbell for William L. Stone's Life
of Brant. A later sketch of the fort was drawn by
an unknown artist and presented to Colonel Ganse-
voort, in whose Albany home it hung for many
years. It is now owned by the New York Public
Library.'- This presents a view of the fort and its
environs after the siege, possibly in 1778. These
representations of the Revolutionary fort's curtains,
bastions, glacis, and gates correspond closely with
the earlier plans, especially numbers CXXI 99. 100.
and 101 of the British Museum's Crown Mar
Collection.

From the correspondence of 1777 and the
Fleury map. a general description of the historic
fort as it existed at the time o\~ the siege may hi
projected. The ditch and glacis conformed to the
pre-Revolutionary design, i.e.. a ditch that wai
about 40 feet wide and a glacis approximately 9(
feet wide. However, Willett said that instead o
being in the center of the ditch, the pickets wen
placed on the covered way, the space between th
outside berm of the ditch and the glacis parapel
The pickets, according to Willett. were ten feet long

History 29

of which approximately six or seven feet stood
above ground. An unfinished salient angle stood
opposite the main gate, which was located in the
center of the south curtain. A drawbridge gave
access to the gate. In the center of the east curtain
was another gate, or sally-port, that gave access
to a spring-fed stream. A small sailent covered this
entrance after 1764, and an unidentifiable symbol
indicates that some type of work did so in 1777.
A fraise of horizontal inclined pickets was near the
top of the external slope of the ramparts. All re-
ports agreed that a very limited amount of work
was done on the ramparts, except for placing sod
on the exterior slope and raising the parapet with
cedar. The map's representation of the ramparts
shows a heavy line for all sections except the south
curtain and southeast bastion. This may indicate
that the latter were in a less advanced state of re-
pair. The flag staff was on the southwest bastion,
where three cannon were mounted. Four guns were
on the northwest bastion, three on the northeast,
and four on the southeast. The bombproof was in
the southeast bastion. The sources do not indicate
whether the parapet was en barbette or had em-
brasures, although the post-siege plan shows em-
brasures. There is a tradition that because of the
topography, the eastern curtain was shorter than
the others; and this seems logical because a small
stream flowed within a few yards of the fort on
that side, and its west bank would appear to have
required a weaker and shorter curtain. This is
supported by St. Leger's description of the fort:
I found it a respectable Fortress strongly garrisoned
with 700 men and demanding a train of Artillery we
were not masters of for its speedy subjection. — Its
form is a kind of Trapezium or four sided figure with
four Bastions freized and picketted, without them is a
good ditch with pickets nipping out a considerable
way at the salient angles of the Bastions three nines
F our sixes two threes with a considerable number of
wall pieces were all the Artillery the Enemy made use
:>f during the Siege. 4 ''

The structures inside the fort are not easily
dentified. The key to the map uses letters to ac-
:omplish this, but they are not always distinct. In
>ne instance, the guard house, no reference is found
n the key. This building stood to the left of the
nain gate as one entered the fort. Opposite it was
he store-house. The barracks stood east and west
)f the parade, and the commandant's quarters and
leadquarters stood north of it. The key also lists a

"Laboratory," whose location may have been iden-
tical with the store-house or commissary. Because
the conclusions that may be developed from the
documentary and cartographic sources lack certi-
tude, it is hoped that archeological study will en-
large knowledge of the physical features and
correct any errors of interpretation. 44

After the siege, repair and construction con-
tinued, because the threat to the frontier remained
critical. The post-siege map shows a hospital, car-
penter shop, blacksmith shop, "Indian House," and
stable outside the fort's walls and a "Necessary
House" built over the creek and connected to the
southeast bastion by a bridge in the position that a
similar facility occupied in 1759, as depicted on
Crown Map CXXI, 99.

FORT STANWIX
IN THE REVOLUTION

SIEGE

While the men of Colonel Gansevoort's com-
mand were repairing Fort Stanwix, the British gov-
ernment and two of its generals were preparing
plans for a campaign that was to test the fort and
its defenders. What they planned was an invasion
of the northern frontier that would, among other ac-
complishments, redeem the aborted one of 1776.
To understand that plan and what it did and did not
contain, we need to go back to November of that
year when William Howe proposed a plan for 1777
providing that 2,000 men would hold Rhode Island
while 10,000 would move from there against New
England and 5,000 would hold New York City and
8,000 would "cover New Jersey" while 1 0,000 would
advance up the Hudson to cooperate with a renewed
invasion from Canada. The 8,000 men covering New
Jersey would also threaten Philadelphia, which Sir
William intended to attack after being reinforced.
If the American Capital fell and troops became
available, he planned to attack Virginia during the
autumn and South Carolina and Georgia in the win-
ter. This plan was predicated upon his having avail-
able a total of 35,000 men, requiring a reinforcement
of 15,000.'

On December 20, before a response to his
initial plan could be received from London, the
general wrote to Lord George Germain, the Sec-
retary of State for Colonics and Lord Commissioner
of Trade and Plantations, outlining a modification
of his plan. This proposed opening the campaign
with an offensive against Pennsylvania, where he
believed the sentiments of the people were favor-
able to the British, and deferring "the offensive
Plan towards Boston until the Reinforcement
arrives, that there might be a Corps to act defen-
sively on the lower part of Hudson's River to cover
Jersey and to facilitate in some degree the approach

of the Canada Army." He changed the proposed
distribution of troops to 2,000 for Rhode Island.
4,000 in the New York City area, 3,000 to act on
the lower Hudson, and 10,000 to operate in Penn-
sylvania, a total of 19,000.-

At the close of the northern campaign of
1776, one of Gen. Sir Guy Carleton's subordinates,
Maj. Gen. John Burgoyne, like other officers who
were members of Parliment, returned to England
for the winter sessions and to advance personal pro-
fessional interests. He arrived at an important
point in the development of plans for the coming
year. Between the Colonial Minister and Sir Guy
there was an old and cherished enmity. The gen-
eral's failure to prosecute the invasion of the
northern frontier was grist in Lord George's mill,
and even George III agreed that the command of
the next campaign should be given to a more ag-
gressive general. 3

There were two candidates for the honor:
Henry Clinton and Burgoyne. Clinton did not seek!
the assignment, at least in part because he expected
Howe to give it to him when the invading force
established contact with New York. 4 Burgoyne
was the more obvious choice, in spite of his associ-
ation with the failed invasion. In fact, he turnec
that association to an advantage. Not only couk
he pose as being familiar with the American scene
but he also assiduously cultivated the impressiot
that he had opposed the abandonment of Crowr
Point; and a precis in the American Department'
papers shows that the account he gave of the cam
paign of the previous summer did not always plac
Carleton in the most favorable light. He ha<
brought a letter from his commander recommend
ing him to the secretary as a source of informatio l
and advice, and he took advantage of this, especiall

in detailed observations on Sir Guy's requirements
for the next campaign. 5 He used a technique of
moderate criticism and suggestive contrast to con-
vey an impression of Carleton's inadequacy.

On New Year's Day Burgoyne wrote to Lord
Germain telling him that he was leaving London
for Bath:

My physician has pressed me to go to Bath for a short
time, and I find it requisite to my health and spirits
to follow his Advice. But I think it a previous duty to
assure your Lordship that should my attendance in
town become necessary, relative to information upon
the affairs in Canada, I shall be ready to obey your
summons upon one day's notice.

Your Lordship being out of town, I submitted the
above intentions a few days ago personally to his
Majesty in his closet, and I added, "that as the
arrangements for the next campaign might possibly
come under his royal contemplation before my return,
I humbly laid myself at his Majesty's feet for such
active employment as he might think me worthy of.

This was the substance of my audience of my part, I
undertook it, and I now report it, to you Lordship, in
the hope of your patronage in the pursuit, a hope My
Lord, founded not only upon a just sense of the
honour your Lordship's friendship must reflect upon
me but also upon a feeling that I deserve it, inasmuch
as a solid respect and sincere personal attachment can
constitute such a claim. (i

Burgoyne was clearly soliciting the command of
the army that would invade the Colonies' northern
frontier.

As late as February 24, 1777, the day after
;he receipt of Howe's December 20 modification
3f plans for 1777, the King wrote to the Prime
Minister, Lord North, that Germain was going to
propose that the northern command be given to
Sir Henry Clinton and that Burgoyne be sent to
Mew York. However, on the following day, the
Tabinet agreed to send Burgoyne back to Canada. 7
jermain had made certain that Carleton would not
conduct the campaign, and he flattered himself
hat, although he had failed in an attempt to effect
he Governor-General's recall, the invasion would
)e directed by a general who possessed the quali-
ies the Secretary found so lacking in Sir Guy.

Leaving Carleton in command in Canada and
ppointing Burgoyne to command the expedition
reated a strange and potentially dangerous situa-
ion of dual command with "Burgoyne dependent
>n Carleton for his base and transport, yet march-

ing independently to place himself under the orders
of another General [Howe], while Carleton dis-
owned all responsibility for events beyond the
frontier of Canada." 8

General Burgoyne had not been idle while his
professional future was being settled: he was busy
preparing his own plan. On February 28 he sent
to Germain his "Thoughts for Conducting the War
from the Side of Canada." 9

In examining Burgoyne's plan, two matters are
pertinent to this study: the basic purpose or objec-
tive of the invasion and how it involved the Mo-
hawk Valley. A great deal of ink has been
expended in identifying the first. The isolation of
New England through a junction of three forces,
Burgoyne's from Canada, Sir William Howe's from
New York, and Brigadier Barry St. Leger's from
Oswego at Albany was a time-honored, simplistic
definition. Recent scholarship has made the story
more complex and in so doing has redefined the
strategic role that the campaign was intended to
play. The heart of the solution of the problem lies
in Burgoyne's plan.

That plan was, in the first place, a discussion
of alternatives. After retaking the first British ob-
jectives, Crown Point and Fort Ticonderoga, "The
next measure must depend upon those taken by the
enemy, and upon the general plan concerted at
home." I0 If the Government's plan provided that
Sir William Howe's entire army would act on the
Hudson and if "the only object of the Canada army
is to effect a junction with that force," Burgoyne
recommended that the main invading column go to
Albany by way of Lake George. If, as he believed
probable, the Americans should "be in force on the
lake," light infantry and Indians should act around
the lake to "oblige them to quit it without waiting
for naval operations." If that failed to clear the
lake, the army should attempt to move southward
by Lake Camplain's South Bay and Skenesborough
[Whitehall, N. Y.]. Burgoyne expected this alter-
native to be very difficult and at best requiring a
significant number of vehicles for his artillery and
supplies. The vehicles had to come from Canada.
If, at the same time, the Americans should continue
to occupy Lake George, the British would have to
leave a chain of posts as they moved southward to
secure their communications.

While Burgoyne expected that the British
would be able to rid Lake George of the Ameri-

32 Fort Stanwix

cans, he advocated that the army "at the outset
should be provided with carriages, implements, and
artificers for conveying armed vessels from Ticon-
deroga to the lake."

His second alternative was based upon co-
operation with the British force posted in Rhode
Island by getting control of the Connecticut River.
Such an expedition would be faced with serious
transport, communications, and security problems,
but "Should the junction between Canada and
Rhode Island armies be effected upon the Con-
necticut, it would not be too sanguine an expecta-
tion that all the New England provinces will be
reduced by their operations."

The third alternative that Burgoyne suggested
was that if the force available for service were too
small to undertake an over-land expedition with a
reasonable promise of success, it might be wise to
send the army by sea to join Sir William Howe.

If the first alternative, the one Burgoyne pre-
ferred, were chosen, he defined the expedition's
mission in these works: "These ideas are formed
upon the supposition, that the sole purpose of the
Canada army is to effect a junction with General
Howe, or after cooperating so far as to get pos-
session of Albany and open the communication to
New York, to remain upon Hudson's River, and
thereby enable that General to act with his whole
force to the Southward." If the second alternative,
providing for gaining control of the Connecticut
River and cooperation with the troops in Rhode
Island, were selected, the reduction of New Eng-
land, which Britain saw as the heart of the rebellion,
would certainly facilitate Howe's movements in
other quarters. The third alternative, involving the
transfer of the northern army by sea, would obvi-
ously be exclusively directed toward Howe's re-
inforcement. Nothing in Burgoyne's plan made
holding the Camplain-Hudson line and isolating
New England his mission, except in so far as "co-
operating so far as to get possession of Albany and
open the communication to New York, to remain
upon Hudson's River, and thereby enable that Gen-
eral [Howe | to act with his whole force to the
Southward'* would contribute to attaining that end.

Burgoyne's proposals received careful atten-
tion; and when the King responded to them, he and
his ministers had not only the general's comments
but also Howe's letter of November 30 containing
his first plan, the one of December 20 altering that

plan by shifting the offensive from New England
to Philadelphia, one dated December 30 and that
reported the affair at Trenton, and one dated Janu-
ary 20. When Sir William wrote the last, his
fragile optimism had evaporated in the face of the
battles of Trenton and Princeton and the amazing
recuperative power displayed by Washington's
army, and he wrote: "I 'do not now see a prospect
of terminating ye War but by a general Action, and
I am aware of the difficulties in our way to obtain
it. as ye Enemy move with so much more celerity
than we possibly can with our foreign troops who
are too much attach'd to their baggage, which they
have in amazing quantities in ye field." n

With all these documents before them, the
King's advisors, members of the Cabinet, and
George III made the choice from among Burgoyne's
proposals. The King's decision is contained in a
document entitled "Remarks on 'The Conduct of
the War from Canada'," containing the royal ob-
jections to the second and third alternatives, ending
with this paragraph:

The idea of carrying the army by sea to Sir William
Howe would certainly require the leaving a much
larger part of it in Canada, as in that case the rebel
army would divide that province from the immense
one under Sir W. Howe. / greatly dislike the idea. 12

The decision was made by the ministry and
Crown. The primary purpose of the invasion
would be to bring a two-column army from Canada
to Albany, where it would be at Gen. Sir William
Howe's command to utilize in prosecuting the war.
If in accomplishing this other benefits should
accrue, such as the isolation of New England, de-
struction of the army of the Northern Department.
and reconquest of a geographic area, that would be
so much the better. Perhaps in the face of such a
disaster, the rebellion would collapse.

The second matter, and the one more directh
associated with Fort Stanwix. concerns the part the
Mohawk Valley was destined to play in Bur
goyne's strategy. He covered that subject in hi:
"Thoughts" with these paragraphs:

To avoid breaking in upon other matter. I omitted it
the beginning of these papers to state the idea of ar
expedition at the outset of the campaign by the Laid
Ontario and Oswego to the Mohawk River, which as ;
diversion to facilitate every proposed operation, woull
be highly desirable, provided the army should b
reinforced sufficiently to afford it.

History 33

It may at first appear, from a view of the present
strength of the army, that it may bear the sort of
detachment proposed by myself last year for this
purpose; but it is to be considered that at that time
the utmost object of the campaign from the advanced
season and unavoidable delay of preparation for the
lakes, being the reduction of Crown Point and
Ticonderoga, unless the success of my expedition had
opened the road to Albany, no greater numbers were
necessary than for those first operations. The case in
the present year differs; because the season of the year
affording a prospect of very extensive operation, and
consequently the establishment of many posts, patroles,
etc., will become necessary. The army ought to be in
a state of numbers to bear those drains, and still
remain sufficient to attack anything that probably can
be opposed to it.

Nor, to argue from probability, is so much force
necessary for this diversion this year, as was required
for the last; because we then knew that General
Schuyler with a thousand men, was fortified upon the
Mohawk. When the different situations of things are
considered, viz, the progress of General Howe, the
early invasion from Canada, the threatening of the
Connecticutt from Rhode Island, etc., it is not to be
imagined that any detachment of such force as that
of Schuyler can be supplied by the enemy for the
Mohawk. I would not therefore propose it of more
(and I have great diffidence whether so much can be
prudently afforded) than Sir John Johnson's corps,
and a hundred British from the second brigade, and a
hundred more from the 8th regiment, with four
pieces of the lightest artillery, and a body of savages;
Sir John Johnson to be with a detachment in person,
and an able field officer to command it. I should wish
Lieutenant-Colonel St. Leger for that employment.

I particularize the second brigade, because the first is
proposed to be deminished by the 31st regiment re-
maining in Canada, and the rest of the regiment
drafted for the expedition being made also part of the
Canada force, the two brigades will be exactly
squared. 13

Burgoyne's discussion is a strange combination
of proposing a diversion by way of the Mohawk
and a questioning of its wisdom. But, again, it is
wise to remember that he was writing about alter-
natives. For a purely military perspective, there
was really not too much to commend the Mohawk
expedition. True, it would be diversionary, but did
it promise to be effective enough to justify the com-
mitment of the white troops that would be required,
especially when so few could be spared? The Gov-
ernment's decision to operate in western New York

was based upon political rather than military con-
siderations operating in the valley and farther west.

The region was the gateway to the great west-
ern country whose importance had long been ap-
preciated at Whitehall. Memories of Pontiac's
conspiracy were fresh, and prudence dictated that
the western tribes become accustomed to support-
ing British interests in the interior.

More immediately important was the retention
of the loyalty of the Six Nations. Two of the tribes
were refusing to support their old allies, the British;
and one, the Oneidas, was actively assisting the
Colonies. The presence of victorious royal troops
would insure the steadfastness of the loyal and
recall the allegiance of the alienated.

The local Loyalists were another factor — not
only the active ones like the Johnsons and their
associates, but also the inactive and wavering. The
former had suffered self-exile for their principles,
had raised a body of "provincials" in the British
service, and had persuaded the authorities at home
that the majority of the valley's people would rise
for the Crown whenever a British army should
appear.

On the basis of this combination of military
and political interests, the ministry decided to make
a commitment in the Mohawk-Ontario Country
and Lt. Col. Barry St. Leger of the 34th Regiment
of Foot was given its command with the local rank
of brigadier.

General St. Leger was given 100 men from
each of two regiments stationed in Canada, the 34th
and the 8th; Sir John Johnson's Regiment (the
Greens); a company of rangers under Walter But-
ler; and 342 Hanau Chasseurs (light infantry or
Jagers). To these were to be added "a sufficient
number of Canadians and Indians." The expedition
also had 40 artillerymen to serve the six-pounders,
two three-pounders, and four 4.4-inch "Coehorn"
mortars. 14 Of the Hanau troops, only one company
joined the expedition. Exact figures of St. Leger's
strength cannot be established, but an estimated
700-800 white troops and, according to tradition,
800 to 1,000 Indians comprised his force. 15

The British regulars and militia left Lachine
near Montreal on or about June 23. When he left
Montreal, St. Leger had received intelligence about
Fort Stanwix to the effect that "there were 60 Men
in a picketed place." lfi Upon this information, the
commander formulated his plan to make a dash

34 Fort Stanvvix

through the wilderness and storm what he believed
to be a very weak frontier post, which was con-
sistent with his ordnance capability. Col. Daniel
Claus was skeptical about the accuracy of this in-
telligence and he sent out a reconnaissance party
that reported a very different situation:

Between 60 & 70 Leagues from Montreal by recon-
noitering party returned and met me with 5 prisoners:
(one a Lieut) and 4 scalps having defeated a working
party of 16 rebels, as they were cutting Sodd, 17
towards repairing and finishing the old Fort which is
a regular Square, and garrisoned by upwards of 600
Men, the Repairs far advanced, and the Rebels ex-
pecting us, and were acquainted with our Strength
and Rout [e]. I immediately forwarded the Prisoners
to the Brigr. [Brigadier] who was about 15 Leagues
in our Rear. On his Arrival within a few Leagues of
Buck Island he sent for me, and talking over the
Intelligence the Rebel Prisrs. gave, he owned that if
they intended to defend themselves in that Fort, our
Artillery were not sufficient to take it, however he
said he was determined to get the Truth of these
Fellows. I told him that [?] examined them separately
they agreed in their Story; and here the Brigr. had
still an Opportunity & time of sending for a better
Train of Artillery, and wait for the junction of the
Chasseurs which must have secured us Success as
every one will allow, however he was still full of his
Alert, making little of the Prisrs Intelligence. 18

Although St. Leger refused to wait for more
Germans and send back for additional artillery,
he agreed to go to Oswego, which he had intended
to by-pass, and join the Indians who were assem-
bled there.

Since July 8, Claus had been superintendent
of the expedition's Indians, and he wrote concern-
ing the junction at with the Idians:

The Brigr. set out from ye Island [Buck island] upon
his Alert the 19th July. I having been ordered to
proceed to Oswego with Sr. John Johnson's Regt. and
a Compy of Chasseurs lately arrived, [?] to con-
vene & prepare the Indians to join the Brigr. at Fort
Stanwix, on my Arrival at Oswego 23 July I found
Josefph] Brant there, who acquainted me that his
party consi [sting] of abt. 300 Indns would be in that
day, and having been more than 2 months upon
Service, were destitute of Necessaries Ammunition &
some Arms, Joseph at the same time complaining of
having been very scantily supplied by Colo. Butler with
Ammunition when at Niagara in the Spring . . .

The 24 of July I received an F.xpress from Brigr. St.
I eger at Salmon Creek to repair thither with what
Arms & Vermilion I had. and that he wished I would

come prepared for a March thro' the Woods, as to
Arms & Vermilion I had none, but prepared myself
to go upon the March and was ready to set off when
Joseph came into my Tent and told me that as no
person was on the Spot to take care of the Number of
Indians with him, he apprehended in case I should
leave them they would become disgusted & disperse,
which might prevent the rest of the 6 Nations to
assemble, and be hurtful to the Expedition, and begd
I would first represent those Circumstances to the
Brigr. by Letter. Br. St. Leger mentioned indeed my
going was chiefly intended to quiet the Indns. with him
who were very drunk & riotous, and Captn. Tice who
was the Messenger informed me, that the Brigr.
ordered the Indians a Quart of Rum apiece which
made them all beastly drunk and in which Case it
is not in the power of Man to quiet them; Accordingly
I mentioned to the Brigr. by Letter the Consequences
that might affect his Majestys Indn Interest in case I
was to leave so large a Number of Indns. that [were]
come already, & still expected. Upon which Represen-
tation and finding the Indians disapproved of the Plan
and w [ere] unwilling to proceed, the Brigr. came away
from Salm [on] Creek, and arrived the next day at
Oswego with the Compy of 8th & 34 Regt. and abt
250 Indians.

Having equiped Josephs party with what Necessaries
and Ammunition I had, I appointed the rest of the 6
Nations to Assemble at the 3 Rivers a convenient
place of Rendezvous & in the way to Fort Stanwix,
and desired Col. Butler [to] follow me with the
Indians he brought with him from Niagara and equip
them all at 3 Rivers. 19

Obtaining and holding the cooperation of the
Indians was no easy matter. They were somewhat
less than unanimous in their desire to commit them-
selves to the active support of British interest.
There were too many memories of white men's
breaking their promises and of using the Indian in
advancing their own self-interest. The white man
who had title to their affection and loyalty. Sir
William Johnson, was dead, and there was no one
who could really assume his mantle. Relations be-
tween Daniel Claus and John Butler were not har-
monious.-" Joseph Brant, who was uniquely able
to relate to both races, endeavored to secure fair
treatment for his fellows, at the same time binding
l hem to the British cause. Neither Sir John, who
should have inherited some of his father's great skill
in dealing with the red men, nor St. Leger, whose
training and background ill fitted him to deal with
an aboriginal people, could through their personal
leadership command the Indians' loyalty, much less

History 35

their obedience. There was never a time when St.
Leger could depend upon his Indian allies' un-
reserved cooperation — they were always an un-
known quantity in the tactical equation.

While St. Leger's composite force assembled
and launched its invasion of the northwestern fron-
tier, events took place in the Mohawk Valley that
affected its outcome. One of these was a confron-
tation between Joseph Brant and Brig. Gen.
Nicholas Herkimer, leader of the pro-American
Germans and commanding general of the Tyron
County militia. The details of the meeting are ob-
scure and capable of contradictory interpretations.
The general may have urged Brant to support the
rebellion or at least remain neutral. The latter de-
clared for the King and, without molestation from
the militia, withdrew his people to Canajohiric
Castle and, as had been noted, eventually joined
St. Leger. At least some Americans believed that
Herkimer had not conducted himself very well, and
his leadership was compromised, a factor that was
to have considerable influence when he attempted
to support the fort a few weeks later.- 1

Atmost simultaneous with this event. General
Schuyler, while Burgoyne's main column was at
Crown Point, learned something definite about the
British plan. On June 29 he wrote Herkimer that
he had heard that Sir John Johnson was on his
way to Oswego and planned to attack Stanwix, and
he ordered him to have the militia ready to support
Gansevoort "at a moments warning." -- During
the next day, he wrote to Gansevoort: "A report
prevails that Sir John Johnson intends to attack
your post. You will therefore put yourself in the
best posture of defence ... I have written General
Herkimer to support you with the militia, in case
you should be attacked. Give him therefore th?
most early intelligence if any enemy should ap-
proach you. 23

Intelligence that his fort was likely to be at-
tacked did not take Gansevoort by surprise. As
early as May 28, Oneida Indians reported that they
had met hostiles on their way to Osewego who in-
tended to attack the fort. 24 He and his men drove
themselves, working against time to make the fort
defensible and felling trees to obstruct Wood
Creek.-" 1 His personnel problem was critical, and
he feared a surprise while his men were on fatigue.

General Schuyler immediately took steps to
relieve the man-power and ordered Herkimer to put

200 militiamen to clearing the road between Forts
Dayton and Stanwix, so that reinforcement of
Gansevoort might be expedited. Another 200 men
were to be dispatched to reinforce the garrison. -"
The general was not leaning upon a very
sturdy reed. The Tyron County Committee was
begging him to send Continental troops to the
valley at almost the same moment he was ordering
Herkimer to call out 400 men to assist Ganse-
voort. This was at a time when Burgoyne was ad-
vancing southward from Ticonderoga and Schuyler
was desperately trying to impede that advance and
save his army for a future stand. Writing from Fort
Edward on July 10, he said:

I am sorry, very sorry, that you should be calling upon
me for assistance of Continental troops, when I have
already spared you all I could [the 3d New York]
. . . For God's sake do not forget that you are an
overmatch for any force the enemy can bring against
you, if you will act with spirit. 27

The committee acted with a spirit, but not the
kind the general desired. Poor Herkimer, who had
to implement Schuyler's directions, wrote concern-
ing the order to reinforce Gansevoort:
Necessity urgeth me to trouble you again with these to
acquaint you of the present circumstances of our
county. Agreeable to your direction, I ordered 100
men of my brigade for reinforcement of Fort Schuyler,
but with great trouble I got them to assemble for
march. The first arrived Party I sent along with some
Officers to assist respectively with work and guard in
repair of the road to Fort Schuyler, but instead of
advancing of the others to be expected, I must hear
to my surprise that they have been stopped in their
march and countermanded entirely by an order of the
committee chairman, Lt. Colo. Wm Seeber and a few
members of the committee, as the inclosure will con-
vince your honor clearly. I resented immediately these
contrary proceedings, whereupon another committee
meeting was called. I also renewed my orders that such
a number of militia should march, and the committee
at their last convention repealed the orders to the
colonels, that the ordered militia should march on.
But that stopping of the militia by the committee as
aforesaid, made such a confusion and discouragement
that I hardly got and was able to dispatch today a
number of men sufficient to guard the battoes being
loaded at German Flatts with provisions, arms and
ammunition for Fort Schuyler. It appears a general
disturbance and declining of courage in the militia of
our county, for reason of which they allege that they
see themselves exposed to a soon invasion of enemies
and particularly of a large number of cruel savages.

36 Fort Stanwix

and foresaken of any assistance of troops to save the
country. They alone think themselves not able to
resist such enemies, for if they would gather them-
selves to oppose their poor wives and children would
be then left helpless and fall prey to merciless savages.
I can assure you, that some are already busy moving
away, some declare openly that if the enemy shall
come, they will not leave home, but stay with their
families, and render themselves over to the enemy, as
they can't help themselves otherwise without succor.
I may say, whole numbers of men in each district are
so far discouraged, that they think it worthless to fight,
and will not obey orders for battle, if the county is not
in time succorded with at least 1,500 men, Continental
troops. The loss of the important Fort Ticonderoga
and Mt. Independence made the greatest number of
our affected inhabitants downhearted, and maketh
the disaffected bold. ... I was urged to promise ihe
men. I sent to guard the battoes, and on the road as
above mentioned, they shall not stay longer than three
weeks from home to home and the committee orders
are but for 16 days. 28

Schuyler ordered Wesson's Continental Mas-
sachusetts Regiment to move into Tyron County
to encourage the people. 20 Reinforcements for the
fort's garrison arrived from the 3d New York and
the New York militia on July 19. :!0

In an effort to improve both the strength and
the morale of the people, Schuyler placed all of the
troops in the county under the command of a
senior colonel, Goose van Schaick, of the 1st New
York, who had been wounded at Ticonderoga on
July 6. :n

The people at the fort became increasingly
conscious of the dangers of the hour as work parties
of militia labored under the protection of Conti-
nentals to obstruct Wood Creek, as the reports of
scouts brought news of the approaching enemy, and
as hostile Indians prowled the woods trying to way-
lay members of the garrison and local inhabitants.
On Sunday, July 27. three girls went out to pick
raspberries about 500 yards from the fort. A party
of Indians fired on them, killing and scalping two
and wounding the third. In order to protect his
workers from ambush and to concentrate his man-
power, Gansevoort called in the Wood Creek
parties -' During the next day. he sent away "those
women which belonged to the Garrison which have
children with whom went the Man that was Scalped
the Girl thai was Wounded Yesterday & Sick in
the Hospital" 33

Oneidas and Mohawks sent messages to the

fort informing the commander of the progress of
St. Leger's column and the whereabouts of Indian
parties. These Indians were in a dangerous situa-
tion. The other nations of the Confederacy were not
likely to be merciful to any of their ancient allies
who took a pacifist's position. Neutrality in any
war is difficult and often dangerous. In border war-
fare, it is practically impossible. If the Americans
failed to turn back the British advance, the future
of the friendly tribes would not be happy.

Capt. Thomas De Witt, who had been left at
Fort Dayton by Colonel Willett, arrived on the 13th
with about 50 men of Garisevoort's regiment, and
Maj. Ezra Badlam brought in 150 men of Col.
James Wesson's 9th Massachusetts. The fort's
commissary, a man named Hanson, arrived the
same day with word that seven batteaux, loaded
with provisions and ammunition were on their way
up-stream. 34 Within 24 hours, Oneidas brought
word that there were 100 "Strange Indians" at the
old Royal Block House on their way to the fort.
Fearing that they intended to intercept the batteaux.
Gansevoort dispatched 100 men under a Captain
Benschoten to reinforce the batteaux-guard. 35

Gansevoort knew that it could be only a matter
of hours before the fort would tried by the in-
vaders, and he completed his preparations to receive
them. Colonel Willett's Orderly Book records the
disposition of the garrison:

August 1, 1777

A picquet guard to mount this evening consisting of 1
capt 3 sub [subalterns] 4 sergeants. 1 drummer & 80
privates who are in case of alarm by the firing of a
gun to mount and man the bastions, 1 commissioned |
officer 1 sergeant 1 corporal and 20 privates on each
bastion, and if the officer commanding the picquet
should think the alarm of sufficient importance he is
immediately to order the drums to beat the alarm,
upon which the garrison is to turn out Immediately
and to repair to the alarm posts, Major Badlam's
detachment to man the S. E. bastion and adjacent
curtain. Captains De Witt. Swartout and Bleecker to
man the N. E. bastion Capt. Gregg's Company to
repair to the parade till further order . . . . 3f>

Blocking Wood Creek had been so effective
that St. Leger's column was advancing too slowly
to suit his purposes, and he feared that additional
men and supplies would reach the fort before he
could get into an investing position. In order to
obtain intelligence and intercept any relief parlies.
he sent an advance guard under Lieutenant Bird

History 37

toward the fort. The lieutenant had difficulty with
Indians, most of whom would not advance. 37

Upon receiving the lieutenant's report that
closed with the statement: "those with the scout of
fifteen I had the honor to mention to you in my
last, are sufficient to invest Fort Stanwix if you
honor me so far as not to order the contrary," the
commander replied:

your resolution of investing Fort Stanwix is perfectly
right; and to enable you to do it with greater effect, I
have detached Joseph [Brant] and his corps of Indians
to reinforce you. You will observe that I will have
nothing but an investiture made; and in case the
enemy observing the discretion and judgment with
which it is made, should offer to capitulate, you are to
tell them that you are sure I am well disposed to listen
to them: this is not to take any glory or honour out of
a young soldier's hands, but by the presence of the
troops to prevent the barbarity and carnage which will
ever obtain where Indians make so superior a part of a
detachment . . . , 38

It is easy to laugh at the brigadier's optimism
in imagining that the garrison might surrender to so
limited a display of force, but he shared two fairly
common attitudes of his contemporaries: disdain
for provincial arms and determination and a hu-
' mane fear of what Indians might do to surrendered
persons in the absence of a large number of regular
troops. While he naturally hoped that a mere show
of force would persuade the Americans to surren-
der, he probably did not really expect them to;
and his orders to Bird simply provided for the
eventuality.

After the advanced party reached the ruins of
Fort Newport, the batteaux that Gansevoort was
expecting approached Fort Stanwix. Colbrath's
August 2 entry in his journal described the event:

Four batteaus arrived being those the Party went to
meet having a Guard of 100 Men of Colonel Weston's
[Wesson] Regiment from Fort Dayton under the
Command of Lieut-Col. Millen [Mellen] of that
Regiment The Lading being brought safe into the Fort
the Guard marched in when our Centinels on the SW
Bastion discovered the Enemys fires in the woods near
Fort Newport, upon which the Troops ran to their
Respective Alarm posts in this Time we discovered
some Men Running from the Landing towards the
Garrison On their coming they Informed us, that the
Batteau Men who had staid behind when the Guard
marched into the Fort had been Fired on by the
Enemy at the Landing that two of them were wounded,
the Master of the Batteaus taken prisoner and one

Man Missing. A party of 30 Men with a field piece
was sent out in the Evening to set Fire to two Barns
standing a Little distance from the Fort, Two cannon
from the SW Bastion loaded with Grape Shott, were
first Fired at the Barnes to drive of [f] the Enemys
Indians that might have been Sculking about them
when the party having Effected their Design
Return'd 3! >

The advanced party had failed to accomplish
its immediate mission, i.e., intercepting the supply
boats, but the "investiture" of Fort Stanwix was
begun. St. Leger was not able to commit all of his
men to laying siege to the camp, because 110 of
them were employed for nine days clearing the
obstacles from Wood Creek and another party to
cutting a temporary road from Fish Creek over
which to bring artillery and stores. 40

On the day the siege opened, two or possibly
three, important events have been reported as
taking place. The first occurred early in the morn-
ing of Sunday, August 3, when a flag that has en-
tered American folklore was raised on one of the
fort's bastions. Briefly stated, the tradition de-
veloped during the nineteenth century that the news
of the passage of the Flag Resolution by the Conti-
nental Congress on June 14 reached Fort Stanwix,
either in a letter to Colonel Gansevoort or in a
newspaper account brought in when the batteaux
and one hundred men of the 9th Massachusetts
Regiment arrived under Lt. Col. James Mellen on
the second. Upon receiving this dramatic news,
some of the people prepared a flag of thirteen
stripes, alternating red and white, and thirteen
stars on a blue field in compliance with the con-
gressional resolution. This new national standard
was then hoisted and a salute fired, marking the
first time the Stars and Stripes flew over American
troops. If true, this was certainly one of the most
dramatically significant events of the American
Revolution.

One of the early champaions of this interpre-
tation was Pomeroy Jones, a local scholar whose
interest in Fort Stanwix's history had a lasting in-
fluence on the work of the later scholars. Jones was
born several years after the siege; but he knew a
number of veterans and their children, including
Judge Joshua Hathaway and his son Jay, and in-
voked their memories in identifying the flag as the
"Stars and Stripes." 41 Jones's account was the
basis for a number of assertions concerning the flag,
including Dr. James Weise's, that the new national

38 Fort Stanwix

flag was unfurled, a salute fired, and that an adju-
tant read the resolution from the newspaper brought
to the fort by the battcaux detail. 4 -' Weise's version
was picked up by the New Lamed History, in
which the following appears:

. . . the Journal of Capt. Swartwout of Col. Gansevoort's
regiment written August 3, 1777 in Ft. Schuyler shows
beyond cavil when the first flag of Stars and Stripes of
which we have record was made and hoisted, but it
was in a fort (Schuyler), not in the field, or at the
head of a regiment. ,:i

There is no Startwout Journal, just Weise's
publication, which was not based upon any original
source.

John Albert Scott's popular Fort Stanwix
(Fort Schuyler) and Oriskany repeated the story of
the newspaper report and the raising of the "first
Stars and Stripes." " Although Fort Stanwix's
claims were frequently disputed in favor of other
sites as Bennington, Brandywine, and Guilford
Courthouse, many writers uncritically perpetuated
the tradition.

A study of the evidence upon which to assess
the Sanwix flag's significance is in order. The basic
document for the origin of the Stars and Stripes
is the so-called Flag Resolution passed by the Con-
tinental Congress on June 14, 1777. which reads:
"RESOLVED: that the flag of the United States be
made of thirteen stripes, alternate red and white:
that the union be thirteen stars, white in a blue
field representing a new constellation." 4r ' This
resolution was preceded and followed by matters
brought to the Congress's attention by its Marine
Committee. Since the resolution was converting the
unofficial Grand Union into an official standard,
substituting thirteen stars upon a blue field for the
canton derived from the British Union, which com-
bined the crosses of Saints George and Andrew, it
was appropriate that it emanate from that com-
mittee. This was the case because, following British
precedent, flying the Grand Union was common
to ships and permanent land installations. Thus.
the Congress was providing for a new marine flag.
not a national military standard.

Crucial to the examination of the Fort Stanwix
tradition is the record of what happened immedi-
ately after the passage of the resolution. Thacher's
Military Journal's entry for August 3. 1777, noted
that: "It appears by the papers that Congress re-

solved on 14 of June last, that the flag of the thir-
teen United States be thirteen stripes, alternate red
and white, that the union be thirteen stars in a blue
geld . . ." 4<1 At first blush, Thacher's statement
seems to be evidence that the news of the resolu-
tion had reached Albany, where he was on duty at
the hospital, if not Fort Stanwix, by August 3.
However, so far as this writer has been able to de-
termine, the first public notice of the resolution
appeared in the Pennsylvania Evening Post on Au-
gust 20 in the following item: "In Congress, June
14, 1777. Resolved that the FLAG of the United
States be THIRTEEN STRIPES alternate red and
white; that the union be THIRTEEN STARS white
in a blue field. Extract from minutes, CHARLES
THOMSON, sec." 4T Other papers printed the
resolution between September 3 and October 2, and
the first New York papers to publish it were the
September 8 issue of the New York Journal and
General Advertiser and the September issue of
New York Patent and the American Advertiser.
The papers to which Thacher most likely had access
were the two from New York and the Boston
papers, the Gazette and the Spy, in which the story
appeared on September 15 and 18 respectively. 4 *
The obvious conflict in testimony can only be ex-
plained by acknowledging that the doctor may have
had access to a newspaper that is unknown to his-
torians or, more probably, that when the Journal
was prepared for publication prior to January 1.
1832, this was one of the instances in which alter-
ations were made in organizing the material of the
original manuscript.

More immediately pertinent to the Fort Stan-
wix flag are the testimonies of William Colbrath
and Marinus Willett. In the entry for Sunday. Au-
gust 3. Colbrath wrote: "Early this morning a Con-
tinental Flagg made by the officers of Col. Ganse-
voort's Regiment was hoisted and a cannon levelled
at the Enemies Camp was fired on this occasion.'* 19
His calling the standard a "Continental" Union is
important because that was the term applied to the
Grand Union. It is also significant that he did not
refer to the flag as a new one. as would have been
natural if he was recording such a momentous
event.

Lieutenant Colonel Willett wrote one of the
earliest accounts of the siege in a letter to Jonathan
Trumbull. Jr. He was probably also' the author of
the account that appeared in the August 28 issue of

History 39

the Independent Chronicle and Universal Advertiser
under the title "Extract of a Letter from an Offi-
cer of Distinction." In neither of these nor in his
Oderly Book did he refer to the flag, a surprising
oversight if it was as historically important as such
a first would have been. 50

Concerning the cloak from which the blue
cloth had been cut, Willett wrote: "What Baggage
the enemy had it consisting of only a few Blankets
and Cloaks — A blue Camblot Cloak taken here
! [Pcekskill] afterwards served to enable us to use
it for blue strips of a Flagg which was afterwards
hoisted during the siege of Fort Schuyler." 52 The
statement about blue strips could only refer to a
Continental flag, because the Stars and Stripes has
a blue field, not blue stripes.

More than thirty years after the siege, Willett
prepared the manuscript of his "Narrative," in
which he wrote:

The Fort had never been supplied with a Flagg — The
importance of having one on the arrival of the enemy
had set our Ingenuity to work, and a respectable one
was formed the white stripes were cut out of ammuni-
tion shirts the blue strips out of the Cloak foermerly
mentioned taken from the Enemy at Peeks-Kill. The
i red strips out of different pieces of stuff collected from
■ sundry persons. The Flagg was sufficiently large and a
general Exhilaration of spirits appeared on beholding
it Wave the morning after the arrival of the enemy. 51

That Marinus Willett had an appreciation of
his historic role is apparent in his letters and the
"Narrative." If he had been a party to or a witness
of the manufacture and display of the first national
flag, the fact would have been prominently re-
corded by him.

The papers of two other important American
officials, Peter Schuyler and Peter Gansevoort,
would be expected to throw some light upon such
an importnt subject. General Schuyler was the
commanding general of the Northern Department
when the Flag Resolution was passed and continued
in that office until August 19. If the Resolution
had been published or become a matter of either
official or common knowledge during that period
and if it had the effect of authorizing a new national
military standard, he would have been among the
first to have known about it. Schuyler was a meticul-
ous record keeper. His papers include all the corre-
spondence he received from the Congress, General
Washington, and every person with whom the had

occasion to transact public or private business, as
well as copies of all letters and documents that he
sent to them. There is nothing in that important
collection to indicate that the general or any of his
correspondents knew about the Resolution before it
was published on August 20.

Peter Gansevoort, the fort's commanding offi-
cer, also left a valuable collection of papers. They
contain no letter advising him of the passage of
the Flag Resolution. Nor do they include any docu-
ments that would support the assertion that the
flag raised at his post was one that reflected compli-
ance with the congressional act.

One of the soldiers of the 3d New York Regi-
ment was James (Alexander) Mc Graw, who had
enlisted during July 1775 and been shot in a leg
during the Canadian campaign of 1775-76. He
re-enlisted in Capt. Leonard Bleeker's company, 3d
New York, and was confined to quarters at Fort
Stanwix in March 1778 because of an "Ulcerous
leg." It may have been during that period of con-
valescence that he carved the powder-horn that
has figured prominently in the flag controversy,
although the date on the specimen is December 25,
1 777. r ' :{

If the horn is genuine and McGraw made it,
and its accuracy in depicting the fort and its com-
ponents argues for its authenticity, it offers valu-
able evidence. Flying from the southwest bastion is
a flag that, except for the absence of the cross of
St. George, resembles the Grand Union very
closely.

A second powder-horn is one that apparently
was carved by Christopher Hutton, who after serv-
ing in Meade's Regiment of New York Militia,
became an ensign in Cpt. Henry Tiebout's Com-
pany of the 3d New York Regiment on November
21, 1776, and was made regimental adjutant on
May 28, 1778. He subsequently received a lieu-
tenant's commission on February 6, 1779, trans-
ferred to the 2d New York on January 1, 1783,
and was discharged on June 3, 1783. 54 His tour of
duty at Fort Stanwix presumably extended from the
end of March 1777 to November 1780, the period
during which the regiment garrisoned the post.

At an unknown date, but presumably 1777.
he carved or had carved for him, the horn associ-
ated with his name. The specimen has several sub-
jects incised into its sides, including "Chris. Hutton
1777"; a diagrammatic sketch of the Mohawk and

40 Fort Stanwix

Schoharie Rivers; "Ft. Schuyler III Rege"; "Ft
EWD"; a field cannon and a pyramidal stack of
six balls; an Indian armed with a musket and Toma-
hawk; a mounted figure with the caption, "Peter.":
and most important to this study— a flag of stars
and stripes.

The Hutton power-horn is more difficult to
interpret than the McGraw specimen. It does not
include such elements as the fort that make a com-
parison with documented data possible; and it poses
several questions that defy easy solutions. The
most obvious is whether it is what it is purported
to be. Since there is no conclusive authentication,
that question remains moot; although on the basis
of design, lettering, and general appearance, it ap-
pears to be a late 18th century specimen. The
second question is, what designer's objective? Was
he using the characters to illustrate events that
occurred at Fort Stanwix in 1777? If so, why was
the small legend "Ft EDW,"' which must refer to
Fort Edward, included? That fort was located at
another important carrying place, the one between
the Hudson River and Wood Creek that provided
a portage to and from Lake Champlain. Why was
l he Hag located where it was? It, obviously was not
intended to mark Stanwix's location in relation to
the Mohawk River. While the mounted man cap-
tioned "Peter" may represent Colonel Gansevoort,
it was a strange way for lowly Revolutionary period
ensign to identify the regiment's commander.

Ensign Hutton may have intended that the
powder-horn present a graphic record of his mili-
tary career. But that still does not solve the prob-
lem of the flag. The question of when the horn
was carved remains. Does it really date from 1777,
or is it a later exercise in nostalgia? Because there
is almost overwhelming evidence that Hutton could
not have known of the passage of the Flag Resolu-
tion until during the autumn of 1777, it must be
assumed that the horn was made some time after
the siege. There is no answer that satisfies all the
canons for historical criticism.

Another of the powder-horns that depict Fort
Stanwix and a Hag is one attributed to James Wil-
son, a private in Col. Goose Van Schaick's 1st
New York Regiment, which garrisoned the fort
from tin- end of 1778 until November 1780. Al-
though it does not show the buildings that stood
within the fort, it does include five sentry boxes,
the necessary, and a structure on the southeast

bastion that was demolished on December 20, 1780,
after the 1st New York moved out. Along with
other features, both historic and decorative, it also
has an elaborate symbol of a hand grasping thirteen
arrows surrounded by a floral scroll bearing the
legend: "THE XIII UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA." There is also a flag flying over the
fort, an ensign of eleven stripes without a canton
and stars."'"' The fact that this flag differed signifi-
cantly from the Grand Union and the Stars and
Stripes docs not detract from the specimen's value,
but reflected the historic reality as will become ap-
parent in the following paragraphs.

Turning from the power-horns, with their evi-
dentiary problems to the sounder ground of docu-
mentary evidence, it should be remembered that
the congressional resolution of June 14 concerned
a maritime flag and was not intended to provide an
official standard to troops in the field. This is con-
firmed by subsequent events.

Almost two years after the siege of Fort Stan-
wix, Richard Peters, secretary of the Board of War.
wrote to Genera] Washington that requisitions for
drums and colors had not been filled because "we
have not the materials to make either in sufficient
numbers." He went on to write concerning the
flags:

... as to the Colours, we have refused them for
another reason. The Baron Steuben [Inspector-General]
mentioned when he was here [Philadelphia] that he
would settle with your Excellency some Plan as to the
Colours. It was intended that every Regiment should
have two Colours — one a Standard of the United
States, which should be the same throughout the
Army, and the other a Regimental Colour which
should vary according to the facings of the Regiment.
But it is not yet settled what is the Standard of the U.
Stales. If your Excellency will therefore favour us
with your Opinion on the Subject we will report to
Congress and request them to establish a Standard
and as soon as this is done we will endeavour
to get Materials and order a Number made sufficient
for the Army. Neither can we tell what should
be the Regimental Colours as Uniforms were by late
Resolution of Congress to be settled by Your
Excellenex '

Peters' letter makes il obvious that the resolu-
tion of June 14. 1777, did not authorize a national
military standard, that as of May 1779, no such flag
had been adopted, and that the Board of War would
ask the Congress to establish one after Washington
had expressed his opinion on the matter.

History 41

The Board continued to consider the design for
a new national military flag during the summer of
1779 and by September had narrowed the choice
to: "The one with the Union and Emblem in the
middle ... as a variant from the Marine Flag." r>T
The Marine Flag was the Stars and Stripes, and
the Board favored a different form for military use.

The matter was still unsettled when the final
shot of the war was fired in South Carolina in 1782.
This does not mean that no flags of one design or
another including stars and stripes appeared on the
field. One of them, the so-called Bennington Flag, is
believed by some students to be the oldest such color.
While there is no contemporary record to confirm its
Revolutionary vintage, a nineteenth century tradi-
tion claims that it was raised at Bennington by
President Fillmore's grandfather, Nathaniel Fill-
more, who kept it until during the War of 1812,
when he gave it to his nephew. Septa Fillmore, in
whose family it remained until 1926. It does not
conform to the Flag Resolution, having in the cen-
ter of the union the number "76." Nor could it
have been carried in the field, being ten feet long
by five and half feet wide. 58

Another claimant for honors is a flag that is
said to have been carried by North Carolina militia
at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse on March 15.
1781. Noted flag authority R. C. Ballard Thurston
believed that this is the only such flag carried by
troops during the war. It does not follow the color
scheme defined in the Flag Resolution in that it
has seven blue and six red stripes and thirteen blue
stars on a white union. 59

That the Stars and Stripes flew at Yorktown
is attested by a contemporary watercolor by Lt.
Col. John Graves Simcoe of the Queen's Rangers.
It resembles the Guilford flag in having red and
blue stripes and blue union with "a pattern figures,
marks or, perhaps, stars in what seems to be a
darker shade of blue." 00

It might be argued that the flag flown at Fort
Stanwix was also an unofficial version of the Stars
and Stripes. However, that contradicts Colbrath's
testimony and strains Willett's statement, to say
nothing of the evidence, for what it is worth, of the
McGraw powder-horn. If it was certainly not a re-
sult of the Flag Resolution, for there is not a scintila
of evidence that anyone in the fort knew of the
Congress's act in August 1777.

An exhaustive, if not comprehensive, search

has failed to locate any claims identifying the Fort
Stanwix Flag as the Stars and Stripes that date be-
fore the 1850's, three-quarters of a century after
the siege.

In the absence of testimony favoring the tra-
dition that meets the minimum canons for historical
accuracy, a careful study of the documentary
sources leads to the conclusion that the fort's flag
was a locally made version of the Grand Union and
could not have been the first Stars and Stripes to be
flown over American troops in the presence of the
enemy.

There is a tradition that on the day the siege
was opened St. Leger paraded his troops to over-
awe the garrison. Hoffman Nickerson, as usual
without citing a source, records it as follows:

St. Leger's first thought was to impress the garrison.
Accordingly he held a review of his entire force within
sight of the besieged. From their palisaded earthworks
Gansevoort and his men could see the white breeches
and scarlet coats of the British infantry, the blue coats
of the British artillerymen, and green faced with red
of the German chasseurs, and the green faced with
white which gave Sir John Johnson's regiment the
name of Royal Greens. Here and there may have
appeared the black skull cap fronted with a brass
plate and the green coat faced vermillion which were
the official uniform of Butler's rangers. But for the
most part these last seem to have been painted and
dressed like Indians. If so they increased what must
have been the deep-set impression made upon those
within, that is, that of St. Leger's command the
greater number were savages. The sight of the Indians
with their feathers, their hideous warpaint, toma-
hawks, and scalping knives, and the sound of their war
whoop, showed the garrison vividly enough what
would be their own fate should their resistance fail
and what would happen to the settlements behind
them.

At the same time the review must have shown them
that in white men alone the numbers of St. Leger's
force were at most equal and if anything inferior to
their own. 01

Christopher Ward, also without citing a
source, told the same story in less detail. - Con-
temporary American and British reports that have
been consulted in the preparation of this study do
not document such a review. Colbrath did record
in his Journal for August 3 that "about three o'clock
this after the Enemy shewed themselves to the
Garrison on all Sides Carry'd off some Hay from
a Field near the Garrison." G3 However, this falls

42 Fort Stanwix

short of corroborating the dramatic show of force
that Nickerson and Ward described.

At 3 p.m., St. Leger sent Captain Ticc under
a flag to demand the fort's surrender and offered
protection to the garrison. Colbrath recorded that
the demand and promise were "Rejected with dis-
dain." (| William L. Stone, who was not above
tampering with his sources in the interest of a good
story, gave this text of the British general's
proclamation:

By BARRY ST. LEGER, Esq., commander-in-chief
of a chosen body of troops from the grand army, as
well as an extensive corps of Indian allies from all the
nations, &c., &c.

The forces entrusted to my command are designed to
act in concert, and upon a common principle, with the
numerous armies and fleets which already display on
every quarter of America, the power, justice, and,
when properly sought, the mercy of the king.

The cause in which the British arms are thus exerted.,
applies to the most affecting interest of the human
heart, and the military servants of the crown, at first
called forth for the sole purpose of restoring the rights
of the constitution, now combine with love of their
country and duty to their sovereign, the other extensive
incitements which spring from a due sense of the
general privileges of mankind. To the eyes and ears of
the temperate part of the public, and to the breast
of suffering thousands in the provinces, be the melan-
choly appeal, whether the present unnatural rebellion
has not been made a foundation for the completest
system of tyranny that even God in his displeasure
suffered for a time to he exercised over a froward and
stubborn generation. Arbitrary imprisonment, con-
fiscation of property, persecution and torture unpre-
cedented in the inquisitions of the Romish Church, are
among the palpable enormities that verify the affirma-
tive these arc inflicted by Assemblies and committees
who dare to profess themselves friends of liberty, upon
the most quiet subjects, without distinction of age or
sex, for the sole crime, often for the sole suspicion of
having adhered in principle to the government under
which the\ were born, and to which by everv tie.
divine and human, they owe allegiance. To con-
summate these shocking proceedings, the profanation
of religion is added to the most profligate prosecution
of common reason; the consciences of men are set at
naught: and multitudes are compelled, not only to bear
arms, but also to swear subjection to usurpation they
abhor.

Animated by these considerations: at the head of
troops in the full powers of health, discipline and
valor, determined to strike when necessary, and
anxious to spare where possible: 1 by these presents

invite and exhort all persons, in all places, where the
progress of this army may point, and by the blessing
of God I will extend it far, to maintain such a conduct
as may justify me in protecting these lands, habitations
and families. The intention of this address is to hold
forth security, not depredation to the country.

To those whom spirit and principle may induce them
to partake the glorious task of redeeming their coun-
trymen from dungions, and reestablishing the blessings
of legal government, 1 offer encouragement and em-
ployment; and upon the first intelligence of their as-
sociations, 1 will find means to assist their undertak-
ings. The domestic, the industrious, the infirm, and
even the timid inhabitants, I am desirous to protect,
provided they remain quietly at their houses; that they
do not suffer their cattle to be removed, nor their corn
or forage to be secreted or destroyed; that they do not
break up their bridges or roads; nor by any other acts,
directly or indirectly, endeavor to obstruct the opera-
tions of the king's troops or supply those of the enemy.

Every species of provision brought to my camp will be
paid for at an equitable rate in solid coin. If, notwith-
standing these sincere endeavors and sincere inclina-
tions to effect them, the frenzy of hostility should re-
main. I trust I shall stand acquitted in the eyes of God
and man, in denouncing and executing the vengeance
of the state against wilful outcasts. The messengers of
justice and of wrath await them in the field and
devastation, famine and every concomitant horror that
a reluctant but indispensable prosecution of military
duty must occasion, will bar the way to their return.

Barry St. Leger

By order of the Commander-in-chief
Will., OSB. HAMILTON, Secretary. 65

This proclamation was an almost verbatim
copy of General Burgoyne's and it was equally
effective.

The Americans continued to try to work at
strengthening the fort against the assault that they
were certain St. Legcr would undertake whenever
he was able to bring up his artillery and the men
who were working on the temporary road and clear-
ing a passage on Wood Creek. However, the con-
tinuing fire from the Indians harassed the working
parties, forcing them to work at night. On the night
of the 4th. details went out and brought in 27
stacks of hay for the cattle that were impounded in
the fort's ditch and to burn a house and barn that
obstructed the field of fire. 08 The Indians' fire re-
sulted in two deaths among the garrison on the 4th
and 5th, and six were wounded during the former.
The barracks that I amarquise had erected outside

History 43

the fort was burned by the British during the late
afternoon of the 5th. 07

On the same afternoon, St. Leger received
word from the late Sir William Johnson's Indian
wife, Molly Brant, that a relief column was on its
way to the fort and would be within 10 or 12 miles
of the British camp by that night. St. Leger now
had a serious tactical problem to solve. He had to
sustain the siege and destroy the relief column.

The relief column was General Herkimer's re-
sponse to learning of St. Leger's advance on the
fort. On June 30 he ordered the Tryon County
militia to muster at Fort Dayton. By August 4,
between 800 and 900 men assembled and the march
to raise the siege was begun. On the night of the
5th Herkimer sent three or four scouts forward to
inform Gansevoort of his advance and to ask the
fort's commander to cooperate if the enemy should
attack the militia. Gansevoort was asked to fire
three shots to acknowledge receipt of the runners
and to express his willingness to make a sortie when
Herkimer's column approached, then to engage the
enemy about the fort and prevent them from con-
centrating on the militia.

On the morning of the 6th, Herkimer had
reached a critical point in his march to the fort's
aid. No cannon shots had been heard from its de-
fenders. Should he continue to advance or await
the expected signal? He convened a council of war
to discuss the matter. His preference was for wait-
ing for the signal, but the overwhelming majority
of his officers favored an immediate advance. The
discussion became heated, and as the commander
maintained his opinion with traditional Teutonic
stubbornness some of the officers accused him of
Tory sympathies or cowardice, making much of the
fact that one of his brothers was an officer in Sir
John's regiment. Berated and maligned, the old
soldier-farmer yielded and gave the order to march.
With his Oneida scouts in the lead, the general took
the head of a double column of about 600 men,
followed by a 200-man rear-guard.

When he received the news of Herkimer's ad-
vance, St. Leger dispatched about 400 Indians and
the light infantry company of Sir John's regiment,
under Sir John, Colonel Butler and Joseph Brant,
to ambush the military relief force.

With surprisingly poor march security, the
Tryon men marched to a place about six miles from
the fort where the road crossed a broad ravine

about 50 feet deep with very steep banks. There
the Anglo-Indian party had laid an ambush with
the light infantrymen on the west and the Indians
along the ravine's margin in a curve, leaving the
eastern side open to Herkimer's men. When the
middle of the column was deep in the ravine, the
light infantrymen were to check its head while the
Indians closed the circle around the rear-guard.

The main body of the column made its way
into the ravine and up the western side when the
Indians east of the ravine opened fire and rushed
the road-bound militiamen. The trap was sprung
too early to catch the rear-guard, which fled. Her-
kimer, at the column's head, turned back to investi-
gate the firing. The light infantry and Indians on
the west rushed forward; and the general's horse
fell dead and he suffered a wounded leg.

The circle was completed; and the Americans
took cover behind trees, formed small circles, and
fought with a valor born of desperation. After
three-quarters of an hour, a cloudburst wet the
muskets' priming and for an hour the fighting
stopped. During the lull, Herkimer's men took
cover by twos so that, when one had fired and was
reloading, the other would be ready to shoot any of
the enemy that attacked.

The Tryon County men gave a good account
of themselves that day; and the Indians, who suf-
fered severely, began to lose their aggressiveness.
At this point, a second detachment of Sir John's
regiment, under Major Watts, arrived on the scene.
He ordered his men to turn their coats inside out,
concealing their uniforms. Thus they advanced
under the guise of a sortie from the fort. The mili-
tia discovered the ruse and attacked, and a fierce
hand-to-hand fight followed that ended when the
Indians retreated, followed by the white troops.
The Battle of Oriskany was over. The militia was
too badly mauled to pursue, and they gathered
their wounded to begin the march back to Fort
Dayton. 68

The morning of August 6 was a time of un-
certainty at the fort. The garrison noted that the
Indians, who had been maintaining a continual
firing, were going away from the immediate area
toward the lower landing on the Mohawk. Not
knowing what was really happening, the officers
and men feared that something was afoot in the
river valley and that the loyalty of its inhabitants.

44 Fort Stanwix

would weaken if the fort were reported taken. Col-
brath expressed the men's fears in these terms:
This Morning the Indians were seen going off from
around the Garrison towards the Landing as they
withdraw we had not much firing. Being uneasy least
the Tories should Report that the Enemy had taken
the Fort Lieut. Diefendorf was Ordered to get Ready
to set of [f| for Albany this Evening to Inf Gen '
Schuyler of our Situation. ,; ''

But before the lieutenant could get away, the
men whom Herkimer had sent with the message of
his approach arrived, and Colbrath recorded that:

between 9 & 10 this morning three Militia Men
Arrived here with a Letter from Gen ' Harkeman
[Herkimer] wherein he writes that he had Arrived at
Orisca [Oriskany] with 1000 Militia in Order to Re-
lieve the Garrison and open the Communication which
was then Entirely Blocked up and that if Colonel
Should hear a Firing of small Arms desired he wou'd
send a party from the Garrison to Reinforce Him.
General Harkeman desired that the Colonel would fire
three Cannon if the Three Men got safe into the Fort
with his Letter which was done and followed by three
cheers by the whole Garrison. According to Gen *
Harkemans Request the Colonel Detached two
Hundred Men and one Field piece under command of
Lieut. Colonel Willett with Orders to proceed down
the Road to meet the Generals party. 70

In his letter of August 11, his first account of
the events. Colonel Willett wrote:

Wednesday morning there was an unusual silence; we
discovered some of the enemy marching along the
edge of the woods downwards. About eleven o'clock,
three men got into the fort, who brought a letter from
Gen. Harkeman, of the Tryon county militia, advising
us that he was at Eriska (eight miles from the fort)
with part of his militia, and proposed to force his way
to the fort, for our relief. — In order to render him
what service we could in his march, it was agreed that
I should make a sally from the fort with two hundred
and fifty men. consisting one half of Gansevoort's,
and one half of Massachusetts men, and one field
piece, (an iron three pounder) The men were in-
stantly paraded, and I ordered the following disposi-
tions to be made: Thirty men for the advanced guard
to be commanded by Van Bcnscoten and Lieut.
Stockwell: thirty for the rear guard under the com-
mand of Capt. Allen of the Massachusetts troops, and
Lieut. DurlTcndrefT: thirty for flank guards, to be
commanded by Capt. from Massachusetts.

and Ensign ( hase. The main body formed into eight
subdivisions, commanded b\ (apt. Bleaker. Lieuten-
ants Conine. Bogardus. M'Clcnme. and Ostrander.
Ensign Baylcy, Lewis, and Dennison, I ieut. Ball, the

only supernumerary officer, to march with me. Capt.
Johnson to bring up the rear of the main body — Capt.
Swardwoundt, with Ensigns Magee and Arent, with
fifty men to guard the field piece, which was under
the direction of Major Badlam. 71

Thus the detachment from the fort set out
down the old military road that lay between Al-
bany and Oswego. When the column reached a
point a little more than half a mile from the fort,
it came upon Sir John Johnson's camp and its mis-
sion was altered on the spot. The troops raided this
camp, the nearby Indian one, and perhaps Lieu-
tenant Bird's about half a mile away at the "Lower
Landing Place." The colonel reported:
Nothing could be more fortunate than this enterprize.
We totally routed two of the enemy's encampments,
destroyed all their provision that was in them, brought
off upwards of fifty brass kettles, and more than a
hundred blankets (two articles which were much
needed by us) with a number of muskets, tomahawks,
spears, ammunition, cloathing, deer skins, a variety of
Indian affairs, and five colours, which on our return
to the fort, were displayed on our flagstaff, under the
Continental flag. The Indians took chiefly to the
woods, the rest of their troops to the river. The
number of men lost by the enemy is uncertain, six lay
dead in their encampment, two of which were Indians,
several scattered about in the woods, but their greatest
loss appeared to be in crossing the river, and no
inconsiderable number on the opposite shore. I was
happy in preventing the men from scalping even the
Indians, being desirous, if possible, of teaching even
the Savages humanity. But the men were better em-
ployed, and kept in excellent order. We were out so
long, that a number of British regulars, accompanied
by what Indians. &c. could be rallied, had marched
down to a thicket on the other side of the river, about
fifty yards from the road we were to pass on our re-
turn; near this place I had ordered the field piece. The
ambush was not quite formed when we discovered
them, and gave them a well directed fire. — Here
especially. Major Badlam. with his field piece, did
considerable execution — here, also, the enemy were
annoyed by the fire of several cannon from the fort.
as they marched round to form the ambuscade. The
enemy's fire was very wild, and though we were very
much exposed, did not execution at all. 72

The loot taken from the camps included "sev-
eral bundles of papers and a parcel of letters be-
longing to our garrison, which they had taken from
our militia, but not yet opened. . . . There were
likewise papers belonging to Sir John Johnson, and
several others of the enemv's officers, with letters

History 45

to and from Gen. St. Leger, their Commander;
their papers have been of some service to us." 73

From prisoners brought in from the camp,
the garrison learned about the fight at Oriskany,
the enemy's strength, the number and type of his
artillery. 74

The question of why Willett stopped to plun-
der the camp instead of obeying the order to meet
Herkimer is not clearly answered — in fact, it is not
broached in the contemporary documents. The
men from the fort did not know that the militia
had been engaged, but their curiosity must have
been piqued by the absence of so large at part of
the enemy. Apparently, Willett simply decided that
the immediate and obvious benefits to be derived
from attacking the camps outweighed any obliga-
tion to rendezvous with Herkimer. Although it
could not have influenced Willett's decision, it was
too late to have done the militia much good. Adam
Hellmer, one of Herkimer's runners, testified that
he entered the fort at one o'clock, although Col-
brath wrote that the men came in by 10 a.m. and
Willett put their arrival at "about 1 1 o'clock." If, as
is probable, Hellmer was correct, Willett's detail
did not leave the fort until nearly mid-afternoon,
too late to have influenced the outcome at Oriskany.
This fact, along with the results of his raid, prob-
ably muted criticism of his failure to execute his
orders.

St. Leger, from his main encampment north-
east of the fort, undertook to intercept Willett's
sortie, but arrived too late to prevent its successful
return with the captured goods. 75

The raid on the Indian camp was to have
especially significant results. The loss of their
clothes, blankets, and provisions coupled with the
loss of several of their chiefs at Oriskany dampened
their enthusiasm for what was threatening to be-
come a long, unrewarding siege, a type operation
for which they rarely had an affinity. In fact, the
British situation was not nearly good enough to
give much promise of success, unless St. Leger
could persuade the fort's garrison that defence of
the post was doomed to failure. Nevertheless, he
put the best poossible face on conditions when he
reported to Burgoyne:

on the 5th I learnt from discovering parties on the
Mohawk River that A Body of one thousand Militia
were on their March to raise the Siege. On the con-
irmation of this News I moved a large body of Indians

with some troops the same night to lay in ambuscade
for them on their march — They fell into it — The
compleatest victory was obtained. Above 400 lay dead
on the field amongst the number of whom were almost
all the principal Movers of Rebellion in that Country
— There are six or seven hundred men in the Fort — The
Militia will never rally — All that I am to apprehend
therefore that will retard my progress in joining you,
is a reinforcement of what they call their regular
troops by way of Halfmoon up the MohawK River. A
diversion therefore from your army by that quarter
will greatly expedite my junction with either of the
grand armies. 70

Of course, Burgoyne was many miles north of
Halfmoon and in no condition to send the Mohawk
expedition assistance in any form.

The men in the fort enjoyed a respite from
enemy fire during most of the 7th, although "at
1 1 o Clock this Evening the Enemy came near the
Fort called to our Centinels, telling them to come out
again with Fixed Bayonets and they should give us
Satisfaction for Yesterdays work, after which they
fired 4 small Cannon at the Fort we laughed at
them heartily and they returned to Rest." 77 At
midnight, the runners from Herkimer's column and
a militianman who brought news of the fight at
Oriskany set out for the lower valley.

The connon fire that Colbrath reported indi-
cated that St. Leger had finally brought up his
artillery. More shots were fired into the fort during
the day, and the garrison "in order to Return the
compliment, they [the enemy] were Salluted with
a few Balls from our Cannon." 78

At about 5 p.m., St. Leger's adjutant. Major
Ancrum, Colonel Butler, and a surgeon came to
the fort under a flag. Colonel Willett's "Narrative"
gives this dramatic example of total recall:
The afternoon of the next day, the beating of the
chimade and the appearance of a white flag, was
followed by a request that Colonel Butler, who
commanded the Indians, with two other officers, might
enter the fort, with a message to the commanding
officer. Permission having been granted, they were
conducted blindfolded into the fort, and received by
Colonel Gansevoort in his dining room. The windows
of the room were shut and candles lighted; the table
also was spread with crackers, cheese and wine. Three
chairs placed at one end of the table, were occupied
by Colonel Butler and the other two officers who had
come with thim; at the other end, Colonel Gansevoort.
Colonel Mellon and Colonel Willett were seated. Seats
were also placed around the table for as many officers
as could be accommodated, while the rest of the room

46 Fort Stanwix

was nearly filled with the other officers of the garrison
indiscriminately; it heing desirable that the officers in
general should be witness to all that might take place.
After passing around the wine, with a few common-
place compliments. Major Ancrum, one of the mes-
senges, with a very grave, stiff air, and a countenance
full of importance, spoke, in nearly the following
words:

"I am directed by Colonel St. Leger, the officer
who commands the army now investing the garrison,
to inform the commandant, that the colonel has, with
much difficulty, prevailed on the Indians to agree,
that if the garrison, without further resistance, shall
be delivered up, with the public stores belonging to it,
to the investing army, the officers and soldiers shall
have all their baggage and private property secured to
them. And in order that the garrison may have a
sufficient pledge to this effect, Colonel Butler accom-
panies me to assure them that not a hair of the head
of anyone of them shall be hurt." (Here turning to
Colonel Butler, he said:

"That. I think was the expression they made use
of, was it not? To which the colonel answered, "Yes.")
I am likewise directed to remind the commandant
that the defeat of General Herkimer must deprive the
garrison of all hopes of relief, especially as General
Burgoyne is now in Albany, so that, sooner or later.
the fort must fall into our hands. Colonel St. Leger,
from an earnest decision to prevent further blood-
shed, hopes these terms will not be refused; as,
in this case, it will be out of his power to make them
again. It was with great difficulty the Indians con-
sented to the present arrangement, as it would deprive
them of the plunder which they always calculate upon
on similar occasions. Should these, the present terms
be rejected, it will be out of the power of the colonel
to restrain the Indians, who are very numerous, and
much exasperated not only from plundering the
property but destroying the lives of. probably, the
ere. iter part of the garrison. Indeed, the Indians are
so exceedingly provoked, and mortified by the losses
they have sustained, in the late actions, having had
several of their favorite chiefs killed, that they
threaten — and the colonel, if the present arrangement
should not be entered into, will not be able to prevent
them from executing their threats — to march down
the country, and destroy the settlement with its in-
habitants. In this case, not only men. but women and
children, will experience the sad effects of their
vengeance. These considerations, it is ardently hoped.
will produce a proper effect and induce the com-
mandant, by complying with the terms now offered.
to save himself from further regret when it will be
too late."
With the approbation of Colonel Gansevoort, Colonel

Willett made the following reply. Looking the im-
portant major full in the face he observed:

"Do I understand you, sir? I think that you say,
that you come from a British colonel, who is com-
mander of the army which invests this fort; and, by
your uniform, you appear to be an officer in the
British service. You have made a long speech on
the occasion of your visit, which, stripped of all its
superfluities, amounts to this, that you come from a
British colonel to the commandant of this garrison,
to tell him that if he does not deliver up this garrison
into the hands of your colonel, he will send his Indians
to murder our women and children. You will please
reflect, sir. that our blood will be on your heads, not
ours. We are doing our duty: this garrison is com-
mitted to our charge, and we will take care of it.
After you get out of it. you may turn round and look
at its outside, but never expect to come again, unless
you come a prisoner. I consider the message you have
brought a degrading one for a British officer to send,
and by no means reputable for a British officer to
carry. For my part, I declare, before I would consent
to deliver this garrison to such a murdern'g set as your
army, by your own accounts consists of, I would suffer
my body to be filled with splinters and set on fire, as
you know has been practiced, by such hordes of
women and children killers as belong to your army. 7i '

The deputation from the British commander
presented a letter written by Colonel Peter Bellinger
and Major Frey. who had been captured at Oris-
kany, that read:

It is with concern ne are to acquaint you that this was
the fatal day in which the succors, which were in-
tended for your relief, have been attacked and de-
feated, with great loss of numbers killed, wounded and
taken prisoners. Our regard for your safety and lives,
and our sincere advice to you is, if you will avoid
inevitable ruin and destruction, to surrender the fort
you pretend to defend against a formidable body of
troops and a good train of artillery, which we are
witnesses of: when, at the same time, you have no
farther supports or relief to expect. We are sorry to
inform you that most of the principal officers are
killed: to wit — General Herkimer, Colonels Cox,
Seeber. Isaac Paris. Captain Graves and many others
too tedious to mention. The British army from Canada
being now perhaps before Albany, the possession of
which place of course includes the conquest of the
Mohawk River and this fort. s "

Gansevoorl believed the letter to be a forgery
or prepared under duress, and it had no effect upon
his determination to defend the fort.

History 47

Colonel Willett's post-war account differs from
his first reports of the conference in detail and
mood. His first version of the event, which is con-
tained in his important August 1 1 letter, related
that:

This evening [August 8] they sent us a flag, with
which came their Adjutant-general, Capt Armstrong
[Ancrumf Col. Butler, and a surgeon, the surgeon to
examine Singleton's wounds; the principal business of
the flag was to acquaint us, that Gen. St. Leger had,
with much difficulty, prevailed on the Indians to
agree, that if the Commanding Officer would give up
the fort, the garrison should be secured from any kind
of harm, that not a hair of their heads should be
touched; but if not, the consequences to the garrison,
should it afterwards fall into their hands, must he
terrible; that the Indians were very much enraged,
on account of their having a great number of their
Chiefs killed in the late actions, and were determined,
unless they got possession of the fort, to go down the
Mohawk River, and fall upon its inhabitants. Our
answer was, that should this be the case, the blood of
their inhabitants would be upon the hands of Mr.
Butler and his employers, not upon us, and that such
proceedings would ever remain a stigma upon the
name of Britain; but for our parts, we were determined
to defend the fort. sl

An account that appeared in August 28, 1777,
issue of The Independent Chronicle and Universal
Advertiser, Boston, entitled "Extract of a Letter
from a Olficcr of Distinction," who was probably
'Willett, read:

Friday, — Butler and a regular officer came into the
fort, with proposals, representing that "Burgoyne was
in Albany, — everything was lost — and it would be in
vain for the fort to be obstinate, the militia were
entirely routed, — the Indians were enraged at their
loss, and that they feared the consequences of an
obstinate resistance, as the fort must finally fall, — they
were determined to have it, — that they had prevailed
on the Indians so far that if the garrison would sur-
render immediately, they might march with their
effects without molestation, and take themselves
where they pleased; but otherwise they feared the
:onsquences.

~ol. Gannsevoort answered, that he was surprised at
heir proposals, they implied a reflection upon the
officers of the whole garrison — that they were not to
">e intimidated by threats — that he was determined to
told the fort as long as possible, and that he and his
Vlen would die in the Trenches before he would
urrender — at the same time took the occasion to
emonstrate with Butler on the cruelty of their late

practices, in scalping and murdering innocent in-
habitants, particularly murdering the three little
girls — Butler had little to say. 82

The record is clear that the British made their
proposal and that Colonel Gansevoort refused to
entertain the idea of surrendering the fort. In fact,
the only thing that would have persuaded him to
do so would have been a loss of nerve. He knew
that it was highly unlikely that Burgoyne had
reached Albany, even if the main portion of the
Northern Department's army had been defeated,
which was improbable. He also knew that the
British artillery was incapable of breaching his
works; and he had no confidence in the British
ability to restrain the Indians. Daniel Claus ac-
curately summed up the reasons for the Colonel's
refusal when he wrote: "The Rebels knowing their
Strength in Garrison as well as Fortification and the
Insufficiency of our Field pieces to hurt them, and
apprehensive of being masacred by the Indians for
the Loss they sustained in the Action [at Oriskany].
They rejected the Summons s[ai]d that they were
determined to hold out to the last Extremity." 83

Shortly after mid-night. Colonel Willett, ac-
companied by Lieutenant Levi Stockwell, left the
fort to go to Fort Dayton to raise a relief expedition.
It was from there that the colonel wrote his August
I 1 and August 13 letters. 84

During the first day of the cease-fire following
the conference, St. Leger sent a flag to the fort
with a written statement of the demands presented
on the previous day by Adjutant-general Ancrum.
That paper read:

Camp before Fort Stanwix, August 9, 1777.
Sir:

Agreeable to your wishes, I have the honour to give
you on paper, the message of yesterday, though I
cannot conceive, explicit and humane as it was, how
it could admit of more than one construction. After
the defeat of the reinforcement, and the fate of all
your principal leaders, on which, naturally, you built
your hopes; and having the strongest reason from
verbal intelligence; and the matter contained in the
letters that fell into my hands, and knowing thoroughly
the situation of General Burgoyne's army, to be
confident that you are without resource — in my fears
and tenderness for your personal safety, from the
hands of Indians, enraged for the loss of some of
their principal and most favourite leaders — I called to
council, the chiefs of all the nations, and after having
used every method that humanity could suggest, to
soften their minds, and lead them patiently to bear

48 Fort Stanwix

their own losses, by reflecting on the irretrievable
misfortunes of their enemies, I, at last, laboured the
point my humanity wished for; which the chiefs
assured me of, the next morning, after a consultation
with each nation, that evening, at their fire places —
Their answer in its fullest extent, they insisted should
be carried by Colonel Butler; which he has given you
in the most categorical manner; you are well ac-
quainted that Indians never send messages without
accompanying them with menaces on non-compliance,
that a civilized enemy would never think of doing:
you may rest assured therefor, that no insult was
meant to be offered to your situation, by the King's
servants, in the message they peremptorily demanded
be carried by Colonel Butler.

I am now to repeat what has been told you by
my Adjutant-general.

That provided you will deliver up your garrison,
with every thing as it stood, at the moment the first
message was sent, your people shall be treated with
every attention that a humane and generous enemy
can give.

I have the honour to be,
Sir, Your most obedient
humble servant

Barry St. Leger
Brig Gen of his Majesty's forces.

P.S. I expect an immediate answer, as the Indians are
extremely impatient: and if this proposal is rejected, I
am afraid it will be attended with very fatal conse-
quences, not only to your and your garrison, but the
whole country down the Mohawk River — such con-
sequences as will be very repugnant to my sentiments
of humanity, but after this, entirely out of my power
to prevent.

Barry St. I cger
Colonel Gansevoort, commanding Fort Stanwix 85

The fort's commander replied immediately:

Fort Schuyler, Aug 9, 1777
Sir:

Your letter of this morning's date I have received, in
answer to which I say. that it is my determined reso-
lution, with the forces under my command, to defend
this fort and garrison to the last extremity, in behalf
of the United American States, who have placed me
here to defend it against all their enemies.

I have the honour to be, in
Your most ob't humble serv't
Peter ( iansevoort
Col. commanding Fort Schuyler
Gen. Barry St. 1 eger 80

Although the armistice was to have lasted for
three days, the British began to bombard the fort
at 10:30 p.m. and continued a "well directed fire"
all night. The fort's papers and money were stored
in the bomb-proof in the southwest bastion. Artil-
lery and small arms fire were exchanged at intervals
during the next week with very limited effect on
the garrison and none on the fort's fabric. On the
16th, Colbrath recorded that "the Enemy threw
some Shells Horrisontally at our Works." ST The
explanation of this technique is found in St. Leger's
report to Burgoyne:

it was found that our cannon has not the least effect
upon the sodwork of the fort, and that our royals
[mortars] had only the power of teasing, as a six-inch
plank was a sufficient security for their powder-
magazine, as we learnt from deserters. At this time
Lieutenant Glenie of the artillery, whom I had ap-
pointed to act as assistant engineer, proposed a con-
version of the royals (if I may use the expression)
into howitzers. The ingenuity and feasibility of this
nuance striking me very forcibly, the business was set
about immediately, and soon executed, when it was
found that nothing prevented their operating with the
desired effect but the distance, their chambers being
too small to hold a sufficiency of powder. There was
nothing now to be done but to approach the fort by
a sap to such a distance that the ramparts might be
brought within their portice, at the same time all
materials were preparing to run a mine under the
most formidable bastion. 88

The Fleury map shows a portion of St. Leger's
disposition of positions for the siege. The lack of a.
scale limits its usefulness in determining distances,
but an estimate based upon the size of the square
formed by the fort's bastions. 335 feet to the side,
except for eastern face, the distance between the
original battery positions and the fort was approxi-
mately 350 yards. The sap or approach directed
toward the northwest bastion. v '

While St. Leger's men worked at the approach
trench, the garrison and their enemies kept up the
exchange of fire. The fort suffered little or no
damage, although a few casualties occurred among
its defenders. The effects of the American fire can-
not be determined. On August 21 a woman in the
fori who was "big with Child" was wounded in the
thigh by the artillery fire. The next day, she
birth to a daughter on the southwest bastion'
bombproof, and Colbrath recorded that both an<
mother and child "do well with the Blessing o
God." ' The enemy diverted the stream that wa

History 49

the main water source, and the garrison dug wells
within the fort. Sorties went out for a variety of
purposes, and both sides lost men through de-
sertion. 91

While the siege continued, the British did not
ignore the country that the fort defended. After
the Battle of Oriskany, Sir John Johnson proposed
to his commander that he be permitted to take 200
men and "a signifficient body of Indians" down the
valley to bring the people back to the royal cause,
but St. Leger "said he could not spare the men,
and disapproved of it." '■'- A few days later, Walter
Butler took two regulars and three Indians to German
Flats in an effort to enlist the assistance of the
inhabitants in persuading the garrison to surrender.
Butler carried with him a proclamation, signed by
Sir John, Daniel Claus, and John Butler, that read:

Camp he fore Fort Stanwix, Aug. 13
To the Inhabitants of Tryon County
Notwithstanding the many and great injuries we have
received in person and property at your hands, and
being at the head of victorious troops, we most
ardently wish to have peace restored to this once
happy country; to obtain which we are willing and
desirous, upon a proper submission on your parts, to
bury in oblivion all that is past, and hope that you are
or will be convinced in the end, that we were your
friends and good advisers, and not such wicked de-
signing men as those who led you into error, and
almost total ruin. You have, no doubt, great reason to
dread the resentment of the Indians, on account of the
loss they sustained in the late action, and the mulish
obstinacy of your troops in this garrison but in them-
selves, for which reason the Indians declare, that if
they do not surrender the garrison without further
opposition, they will put every soul to death, not only
the garrison, but the whole country, without any
regard to age, sex, or friends — for which reason, it is
become your indespensible duty, as you must answer
the consequences, to send a deputation of your prin-
cipal people, to oblige them immediately, to what in a
very little time they must be forced, the surrender of
the garrison — in which case we will engage on the
faith of Christians to protect you from the violence
3f Indians.

Surrounded as you are by victorious armies, one half
(if not the greater part) of the inhabitants friends of
:he government, without any resource, surely you
:annot hesitate a moment to accept the terms pro-
posed to you, by friends and well-wishers to the
jountry. 93

The garrison at Fort Dayton captured the little
>arty, and nothing came of this ploy. 94

While St. Leger's and Gansevoort's men con-
tended for the Mohawk country, events elsewhere
were taking place that were to be decisive in bring-
ing failure to British designs.

Gen. Philip Schuyler, whose command of the
Northern Department placed upon him ultimate
responsibility for the defense of the Mohawk Valley,
was retreating southward along the Hudson before
Burgoyne's hitherto victorious advance. He was
struggling to retard that advance and prepare his
main army for a stand that would halt the British
invasion. Shortages, personality clashes, sectional
animosities, political rivalries, and a succession of
disheartening reverses conspired in making his task
almost impossible. Yet he did not neglect his re-
sponsibilities in the western part of his command.
During July, he worked at trying to obtain addi-
tional Continental troops for the Tryon County
area and sought the state's assistance in finding units
that could be sent up the Mohawk. He wrote letters
to the Tyron County committees and General
Herkimer that endeavored to encourage and advise
them.

On August 6 Schuyler's assistance took a more
concrete form when he ordered a Continental force
to move toward Fort Stanwix. This contingent
was followed by others on and after August 9. The
Continentals were Brig. Gen. Ebeneezer Learned's
brigade of Massachusetts troops, which had been
posted at Van Schaick's Island near the junction of
the Mohawk and Hudson Rivers. 05 He also wrote
to the Tryon County officials requesting that they
cooperate with their militia.

The main body of Schuyler's army lay at the
vilage of Stillwater, and from that place Maj. Gen.
Benedict Arnold departed on August 13 to direct
the relief of Fort Stanwix. There is a well-known
story of his assignment to the command that had its
origins in Isaac N. Arnold's Life of Arnold and
has been repeated by many other writers including
Hoffman Nickerson in the classic. The Turning
Point of the Revolution:

On receiving at Stillwater the news, first of St.
Leger's arrival before Stanwix, then of Herkimer's
retreat from Oriskany, Schuyler had determined to
relieve the fort. According to the military custom of
the time he called a council of war in which he pro-
posed detaching a part of his own dis-spirited forty-five
hundred to act against St. Leger.
The risk involved was high. Within twenty-four miles
of them — a single day's forced march — Burgoyne lay

50 Fort Stanwix

at Fort Edward with seven thousand victorious troops.
He might come down upon them. Indeed, as the
council sat he was issuing orders to his main body to
advance eight miles to Fort Miller, and for Fraser
and his advanced corps to go on four miles farther to
the mouth of the Battenhill, where they would be only
twelve miles from Schuyler and his unhappy little
force. Of course Schuyler's council did not yet know
of this advance, which was intended merely to cover
the Bennington expedition, but as they saw the situa-
tion it is not surprising that all except Arnold opposed
Schuyler's plan.

On the other hand, Schuyler undoubtedly rea-
soned from Burgoyne's delay that the army from
Canada was having trouble with its transportation. He
knew that to the eastward patriot forces were gathering
which would soon either reinforce him or cut in on
Burgoyne's left and rear. Finally, he thought it neces-
sary to run risks on the Hudson in order to save the
Mohawk. All along he had known the political situa-
tion in that district to be unsatisfactory. Should a
Tory rising spring up there to assist St. Leger, the
example might spread and the whole political basis of
the Revolution in the North might go.

Schuyler's argument failed to persuade his
officers. In his agitation he walked to and fro in the
room, a pipe in his mouth. While doing so he heard
some of them say, 'He means to weaken the army.'
He well knew the New England rumors that he was
at heart a traitor. Was it possible, he thought, that
officers under his command believed the slander? Al-
most as he heard their words he found that he had
bitten his pipestem clean through. Never to the end
of his life could he forget the bitterness of that
moment.

Nevertheless he controlled himself quickly. Indeed
his instant of rage helped him to make up his own
mind. He made no further effort to persuade, but said
that he would take upon himself the responsibility of
the expedition. Whereupon the fiery little Arnold
sprang up and voluntcred for the command.'"''

Isaac Arnold's version offers other details.
After telling of the officers' opposition and the gen-
eral's breaking the pipe, he wrote that Schuyler
said: "Gentlemen: I shall take the responsibility
upon myself; Fori Stanwix and the Mohawk Valley
should be saved! Where is the brigadier who will
command the relief' 7 I shall beat up for volunteers
tomorrow." No brigadier offered his services, and
Benedict Arnold:

though a major general and second in command, in-
dignant that his friend should be so wronged, instantly
volunteered Impulsive, ever read) for deeds ol daring,

knowing how false and cruel were the imputations
cast upon Schuyler, he at once offered his services,
and they were gratefully accepted. On the next morn-
ing the drums were beaten through the camp for
volunteers, and it was announced that Major General
Arnold offered to lead them, and before noon 800
men had volunteered to follow him to the rescue of
( iansevoort. <J "

Not a single contemporary source supports
this story, and there are several facts that contradict
it.

Starting with Nickcrson't first sentence, Schuy-
ler was not at Stillwater when he received news of
St. Leger's arrival at Stanwix, of Herkimer's retreat
from Oriskany, and made his decision to relieve
the fort. He was at his home in Albany, which was
his headquarters until he went to Stillwater on or
about August 10. General Learned was already on
the march toward Stanwix, and another brigadier
was not required to command the relief. What was
needed was a higher ranking general officer, and
Arnold was the only major general on hand.

The beating of the drum for volunteers simply
did not occur. The Continentals that were com-
mitted were moved from Van Schaick's Island,
more than 20 miles away, from three to seven days
before the legendary council; and Arnold's instruc-
tions make it clear that he was to join those troops
and take command of them — not that he was to
take troops with him from Stillwater. In addition.
Schuyler never refcred to the fort as Fort Stanwix
after it was renamed in his honor.

Schuyler's instruction to Arnold appear to
support the part of the story that related to the
latter's volunteering to command the relief expedi-
tion when he wrote: "It gives me greatest satisfac-
tion that you have offered to go and conduct the
military operations in the Tryon county. !,s How-
ever, the circumstances of his volunteering are not
clear, especially in the light of a letter from Wash-
ington to Schuyler, dated July 24. in which he pro-
posed that Arnold, "or some other sensible spirited
officer," be assigned to Fort Stanwix" in case any-
thing formidable should appear in that quarter." 9S j
The proposal was couched in terms that in a nor-
mal military interpretation would be almost tanta-
mount to an order.

There is no evidence for representing Schuy-
ler's general officers as opposed to the Mohawk
undertaking. In fact, in one of his reports to

History 51

Washington, Schuyler wrote that the detailing of
the Massachusetts regiments was done "by the
unanimous advice of all the general officers here
[Stillwater]." 10 °

Schuyler ordered Arnold to "repair thither
[Tryon County] with all convenient speed and take
upon you the command of all the Continental troops
& such of the Militia as you can prevail upon to
join your troops. Fort Schuyler is being beseiged
you will hasten to its relief and hope that the Conti-
nental troops now in the county of Tryon, if joined
by some of the militia will be adequate to the
business."

Arnold set out immediately for Albany, where
he met Colonel Willett, and together they hurried
to Fort Dayton, which they reached on August 20.
During the following day, he convened a council
consisting of Brigadier General Learned; Colonels
Willett; John Bailey, 2d Massachusetts; Cornelius
Van Dycke, 1st New York; Henry Beeckman Liv-
ingston, 4th New York; James Wesson, 9th
Massachusetts; and Lt. Col. John Brook; 8th Mas-
sachusetts. The official report in the Gates Papers
reads:

The general [Arnold] informed the council that previ-
ous to his leaving Alhany, General Schuyler had sent
a belt and a message to the Oneidas to meet at Albany,
and intrusted him. General Arnold, to engage as
many of them as possible in our service, and had
furnished him with presents for them, in consequence
of which, he had dispatched a messenger to them,
requesting they would meet him at German Flatts; as
yesterday they did not arrive he has given orders for
the army to march for Fort Schuyler this moning.
since which a deputation from the Oneidas and
Tuscaroras had arrived, acquainting him that the
chiefs of both Tribes with their families would he
here the day after tomorrow, requesting a meeting with
us; one of the Oneidas, who had lately been at the
enemy's encampment also informed that all the Six
Nations, except the two tribes above mentioned, had
joined the enemy, the whole with foreign Indians
amounting to 1,500 by the enemy's account. The
Oneida, who is known to be a fast friend of ours,
says that from viewing their encampment he is fully
:onvinced there is upwards of 1,000 Indians, and from
'.he best authority their other forces are near 700,
resides some Tories who have joined since their
irrival. Colonel Willett, who lately left the fort, being
present, is fully of opinion the above account is nearly
rue. The general then acquainted the council that by
he returns delivered this morning, our whole force,
ank and file, effectives, are 933, and 13 artillerymen.

exclusive of a few militia, the whole not exceeding
100 on whom little dependence can be placed; at the
same time requests the opinion of council whether it
is prudent to march with the present force and en-
deavour to raise the siege of Fort Schuyler, or to
remain at this place, until reinforcements can be
solicited from below, and more of the militia
turned out to join us, and until the Oneidas had
determined if they would join us, of which they give
encouragement.

Resolved, That in the Opinion of this Council,
our force is not equal to that of the enemy, and it
would be imprudent and putting too much to the
hazard to attempt the march to the relief of Fort
Schuyler, until the army is reinforced; the council are
of the opinion that an express ought immediately to be
sent to General Gates, requesting he will immediately
send such reinforcements to us as will enable us to
march to the relief of the fort, with a probability of
suceeding and that in the meantime the army remain
at the German Flatts, at least until an answer can be
had from General Gates, and that all possible method
be taken to persuade the militia and Indians to join
lis. 1 " 1

Benedict Arnold has a reputation for auda-
city equalled by few if any of his contemporaries,
but he approached the relief of Fort Stanwix with
uncharacteristic caution. While it was true that the
evidence indicated that St. Leger's force outnum-
bered Arnold's column, the total American
strength, including the fort's garrison, gave them a
force more than equal to that of their enemy. At
the most, St. Leger's white troops numbered 700 to
800 men, of whom approximately 300 were Ca-
nadian militia, not the most reliable of troops. The
Indians, who may have numbered 800 at this time,
were of limited usefulness in a pitched battle; and
even that number had been reduced by the fighting
at Oriskany. Between Arnold and Gansevoort,
the Americans had a maximum of 1,746, of whom
all but about 100 were Continentals. 102 St. Leger
could not maintain the siege and repel the relief
column; and if he abandoned the siege, the garri-
son would be free to cooperate with Arnold against
him. The responsibilities of an independent field
command had sobered the flamboyant general who
so often made his superiors seem pedestrian when
he did not have ultimate responsibility for the con-
duct of a campaign.

If he was not prepared to rush into battle, he
was ready to sound aggressive, so he issued a
proclamation:

52 Fort Stanwix

By the Hon. BENEDICT ARNOLD, esq. Major-
general and Commander in Chief of the army of the
United States of America on the Mohawk River
Whereas a certain Barry St. Leger a Brigadier-general
in the services of the George of Great-
Britain, at the head of a banditti of robbers, murderers,
and traitors, composed of savages of America, and
more savage Britons (among whom is noted Sir John
Johnson, John Butler, and Daniel Claus) have lately
appeared in the frontiers of this State, and have
threatened ruin and destruction to all the inhabitants
of the United States. They have also, by artifice and
misrepresentation, induced many of the ignorant and
unwary subjects of these States, to forfeit their
allegiance to the same, and join with them in their
crimes, and parties of treachery and parricide.

Humanity to those poor deluded wretches, who
are hastening blindfold to destruction, induces me to
offer them, and all others concerned whether savages,
Germans, Americans or Britons PARDON, provided
they do, within ten days from the date hereof, come
in and lay down their arms, use for protection, and
swear allegiance to the United States of America.

But if still blind to their own interest and safety,
they obstinately persist in their wicked courses, de-
termined to draw on themselves the first vengeance of
Heaven, and of this exasperated country, they must
expect no mercy from either.

B. Arnold, M.G.

Given under my hand, HeadQuarters, German
Flats, 20th August, 1777. 103

Willctt once again returned eastward to deliver
to General Gates the council of war's resolution
August 21 along with a request for 1.000 light
infantry men. 104

Without waiting for reinforcements, Arnold
resorted to a strategm that has few parallels in
American history and folk lore. A Loyalist plot
had been uncovered in the vicinity of German Flats,
and among the prisoners taken was one of the less
prepossessing members of the numerous Schuyler
clan, a mentally retarded fellow named Hon Yost
Schuyler. He had lived among the Indians, who
apparently held him in some awe because of his
affliction. He was condemned to death for his part
in the plot, but his brother Nickolas and their
mother came into Arnold's camp to plead for the
life of the unfortunate man. Nickerson's account
of how Arnold used him is probably more accurate
than most that have come down to us:

Taking Hon Yost's brother as hostage for his
good conduct. Arnold told the half-wit that his life

would be spared if he would go to St. Leger's camp
and frighten the Indians there by playing upon their
emotions and especially by exaggerating the numbers
of the relieving force. The half-wit, delighted at the
chance of saving himself, prepared with considerable
cunning for the attempt. In order to represent himself
as an escaped prisoner who had been fired upon, he
caused several bullet holes to be shot through his
clothes. Such were the political relations of the various
Iroquois tribes that it was possible for a friendly
Oneida in Arnold"s camp to offer to follow Hon Yost
and confirm his story.

Circumstances admirably set the stage for the
half-wit. Rumors of the coming of Arnold. 'The Heep
Fighting Chief,' had already disturbed St. Leger's
Indians. St. Leger on his side seems to have com-
mitted the error of proposing that the red man should
again take the lion's share of resisting this new effort
at relief as they had already done against Herkimer.
They had refused. In order to persuade them to march
at all he had to promise that he would lead them in
person and support them with three hundred of his
best white troops. Even so the incident had made
them still more suspicious of them.

At this moment the half-wit appeared pointing
to the holes in his clothes as proof of the story of his
escape. When asked Arnold's numbers he looked
upward vaguely and pointed to the leaves on the
trees. Such a message from one so mysteriously
stricken by the Great Spirit was enough to put the
Indians in commotion.

Brought before St. Leger, Hon Yost repeated his
story with a wealth of detail. Arnold with two thousand
men, he said, would be upon them within twenty-four
hours.

About this time the Oneida appeared, and he
too played his part well. On his way through the
woods he had met certain other Indians whom he
knew and persuaded them to follow him one by one
in order to increase the effect of what he proposed
to say. His message was that Arnold had no quarrel
with St. Leger's Indians, but proposed to attack only
the British and Tories. One by one according to their
agreement his friends took up the talc. One went so
far as to say that a talking bird had warned him that
great numbers of hostile warriors were on their way.
On top of the existing discouragement among St.
1 eger's Indians, all this was irresistible. Oriskany bad
taken all the fight out of them, and now they were
determined to go. 106

St. Leger, Sir John, and the Indian superin-
tendents. Claus and Butler, tried to prevent their
allies from overreacting to the tales of Arnold's
advance. A council was convened, at which the

History 53

general learned that 200 Indians had already de-
camped. The chiefs then informed him that if he
did not retreat, they would abandon him. 106

Just how much Hon Yost's story played in
influencing the Indians is open to question. The
campaign certainly had not been profitable to the
Iroquois, and they had little stomach for either a
prolonged siege or another battle. The appearance
of the half-demented white man must have seemed
very fortuitous. They now had an excellent excuse
for doing what they wanted to: abandon the expe-
dition. Daniel Claus put the best face possible on
the affair when he wrote:

The Indians finding that our besieging the Fort was of
no Effect, our Troops but few, a Reinforcement as
was reported of 1500 or 2000 Men with Field pieces,
^y the way, began to be des[pi]rited & file off by
Degrees: The Chiefs advised the Brigr to retreat [to]
Dswego and get better Artillery from Niagara & more
vlen and return & renew the Siege, to which the
3rigr agreed and accordingly retreated wch, was on
he 22 of Augt.'- 17

Everyone knew that the siege would not be
enewed — that the expedition was a failure.

The British withdrawal was so precipitant that
they left part of their equipment behind. Colbrath
described the evacuation from the garrison's
(respective:

Vugt 22d. This Morning the Enemy bombarded very
martly The Sergeant Major and two privates were
/ounded. At Noon a Deserter came to us whose
examination was that the Enemy had news in the
1 "amp that Burgoynes Army was Entirely Routed and
nat three Thousand men was Coming up to reinforce
i s and further that the Enemy was retreating with
i reat precipitation and that he with another was
f onveying off on Lieut Anderson's Chest when he had
I lade his Escape and that most of their Baggage was
j one — upon which the Commanding Officer Ordered
111 the Cannon bearing on their Works to Fire severall
I junds each to see whether they wou'd return it which
I artly confirmed the Report of the Deserter. Some
k me after 4 Men came in and reported the same and
it lat they had left part of their Baggage upon which
it le Col. ordered 50 Men & two waggons under
K ommand of Capt. Jansen to go to their Camps where
t ley killed 2 Indians and took 4 Prisoners one of
t lem was an Indian. After they had Loaded the
I agons with what Baggage they cou'd carry they re-
it rned but Night Coming on they cou'd not return to
t tch what Baggage was still Left in their Camp. At
I s ight two Men came in one of them was assisting the

first Deserter in carrying off Lieut Anderson's chest
the other John Yost Schuyler, who informed the
Commanding Officer that he was taken prisoner at
the German Flatts and confined at Fort Dayton 5
Days That Gener'l Arnold had sent him to General
St. Leger commander of the King Troops to inform
him that 2000 Continental with 2 Fields Pieces and
a great Number of Millita were on their march for
this place to Reinforce the Garrison that he informed
General St Leger of it and in Consequence of which
he Ordered his Troops to strike their Tents and pack
up, and further after he had done his Errand he hid
himself in the woods till Night and coming acoss the
above Men they came in together, he likewise in-
formed us that near 17 Indians were at Fort Newport
quite drunk upon which the Col ordered a party of
men under the command of Major Cochran to go
and take them who in about an Hour Returned and
informed the Colonel he had been there but did not
find any and that he went to Wood Creek and found 8
New Batteaus which the Enemy had left behind While
they were out the woman that was wounded with a
Shell last Night was brought to Bed in our S W
Bombproff of a Daughter She and the child are like
to do well with the Blessing of God Our Bolckade
Ended and the Garrison once more at Liberty to walk
about and take the free Air we had for 21 Days been
Deprived of At 12 o'clock this Night the Commanding
Officer sent off 3 of his Regimen* to inform General
Arnold of the Precipitate retreat of the Enemy A
deserter came in who said he just left the Enemy's
Cohorns below Wood Creek Bridge

Augt 23d. This Morning the Col sent out a party
under the command of Major Cochran to take them,
who returned with three prisoners 4 Cohorns and
some Baggage and reported there was 17 Batteaus
lying there: another party was sent to the Enemy's N.
Camp to bring in the rest of the Baggage left by us
last Night containing of Ammunition camp equapage
and entrenching Tools another party was sent to the
Enemys S E Camp who brought in 15 Waggons a
3-pound field piece Carriage with all its Apparities
most of the Waggon Wheels was cut to pieces as
were the Wheels of the Carriage Several Scouts were
sent out to Day one of whom took a German prisoner
who Reported that the Enemys Indians had when
they got about 10 Miles from this Fort fallen on the
Scattering Tories, took their Arms from & Stabb'd
them with their own Bayonets And that for fear of
said Indians he and 9 more German Soldiers had took
to the woods the rest are not yet found their
Design was not to come to the Fort as Butler and
Johnston told them when Orders were given to Re-
treat, that those who fell into our hands would be
Hanged immediately Another Scout proceeded to
Canada Creek found a Carriage for a Six pounder

54 Fort Stanvvix

& 3 Boxes of Cannon Shott which they brought in
This afternoon the Honble Major General Arnold
Arrived here with near a 1000 Men They were
Saluted with a Discharge of powder from our Mortars
formerly the Enemys, and all the Cannon from the
Bastions amounting in the whole to 13 Attended with
three cheers from the Troops on the Bastions. 107

Colonel Gansevoort's official report to General
Arnold confirmed Colbraths account, setting the
time that he learned of St. Leger's withdrawal at
3:00 p.m. 108

The impedimenta abandoned by the retreat-
ing army included:

4 Royals, 4 2.5 inches diameter, 126 shells for ditto, 3
travelling carriages damaged, 2 damaged limbers for
ditto, 135 three-pound round shot, 20 six-pound ditto,
72 three-pound shot flannel cartridges, 4 tin tube
boxes, 60 tubes, 1 1 cannisters, 1 set horse-harness, 1
set of men's ditto, 4 sponges, 3 ladles, 3 wad-boks, 28
boxes musket balls, 2 powder-horns, 2 lanthorns, 4
handspikes, 3 haversacks, 1 drudging-box, 2 linstocks,
2 port-fires, 1 apron, 1 pair of good limbers, 27 oil-
cloths, 2 pair cloathes, 1 coil-rope, a large quantity of
junk, a quantity of woollen yarn, 17 three-pound
boxes of cartridges damaged, 5 six-pound ditto, 2160
good musquet cartridges, a large number of ditto
damaged, 30 copper hoops. 101 '

General Arnold, at German Flats, had learned
of the enemy's attempt to dig approach trenches
nearer the fort; and fearful that an attack might
carry the place, he decided to move to its relief.
An express reached him when he had marched
about two miles and informed him of St. Leger's
withdrawal. He pushed about 900 men forward in
an effort to catch up with the British rear. He
reached the fort at 5 p.m., too late to press the pur-
suit. The next morning, he sent 500 men to con-
tinue the chase, but bad weather forced its
abandonment, except for a small party that reached
Oneida Lake in time to see the last of the British
soldiers crossing it in boats. 110 Arnold soon hurried
back to the Hudson with Learned's brigade and
participated in the decisive Battles of Saratoga.

Harry St. Leger intended to join Burgoyne on
the Hudson and redeem the defeat he had suffered
on the Mohawk. The distance were too great, and
St. Leger did not get to join the main drive against
Albany.

The British plan for 1777 went awry on the
Hudson with more dramatic and far-reaching re-

sults than was the case on the Mohawk. As we
have noted, Sir William Howe had proposed shift-
ing his primary threat from New England to Phila-
delphia. 111 The king and his ministers approved
this change in priorities early in March, 112 and he
moved against the American capital, leaving Sir
Henry Clinton in New York with about 3,000
men to defend the city and act on the lower Hud-
son. Burgoyne's main army advanced to the north-
ern part of the township of Stillwater, where Gates
had blocked the road to Albany. On two days,
September 19 and October 7, he fought two en-
gagements, called the Battle of Saratoga, on the
American general's terms. Failing to drive or lure
the Americans off Bemis Heights, he retreated
northward to the village of Saratoga (Schuyler-
ville), where he capitulated to Gates on October
17. The British grand design for 1777 was
wrecked. A strategic and tactical turning point in
the war was passed, and a family fight had become
an international conflict. 113

The American victory at Fort Stanwix pur-
chased temporary security for the troubled Mo-
hawk valley that was shattered each of the
remaining years of the war by raids by British
regulars and, especially, their Loyalist and Indian
auxiliaries. Except for the regulars, the people on
both sides were fighting for their home country;
and the fighting was often characterized by the mu-
tual savagery of internecine warfare. The Ameri-
cans retaliated in 1779 with the Sullivan-Clinton
campaign that devastated the hostile Iroquois towns
but failed to destroy the Indians' ability to fight.
Although the tribes suffered severely during the
winter of 1779-80, the heaviest of the century,
they joined their white allies for even more serious
raids, especially Joseph Brant's and Sir John John-
son's forays of 1780; and the northern frontier was
a theatre for destructive but indecisive border war
until the end of the Revolution. 114

Fort Stanwix continued to guard the Great
Caryying Place until the spring of 1781. During
the fort's final years, the elements and fires worked
havoc on its fabric and structures. A fire in April |
1 780 destroyed the guardhouse and threatened the '•
nearest barracks so seriously that it had to razee
to prevent the fire's spreading. m On May 14
1781. another fire, preceded by a rainstorm, de-
stroyed all the barracks; and the rain did extensi\(
damage to the fort's walls. On May 27, Wash

History 55

ington wrote the President of the Continental
Congress:

There has been a necessity of abandoning the post at
Fort Schuyler and removing the Garrison and Stores
to German Flats. The Barracks had been [during] the
beginning of the month consumed by fire and the
Works so exceedingly damaged by the heavy rain
storm that they were rendered indefensible, nor could
they be repaired in any reasonable time by the
number of Men who can be spared as a Garrison. 116

ing Place, as each had throughout the story of the
white man's conquest of the frontier.

A decade after the second Treaty of Fort
Stanwix was signed, the State of New York erected
a blockhouse for housing military stores on the
parade of the fort. Still standing in 1815, it dis-
appeared at an unknown date, and the entire fort
was leveled by 1830. 118 The history of Fort Stan-
had come to a close.

The general visited the Great Carrying Place
in 1783 and in August directed Marinus Willett,
by then a colonel of the New York Levies and
Militia, to build one or two blockhouses at the
portage between the river and Wood Creek. 117
Apparently three such structures were erected near
the site of the colonial Fort Williams near the river
landing-place.

In 1784, the United States negotiated one of
its first Indian treaties at old Fort Stanwix. The
settlement of western lands was one of the new
nation's most pressing problems. Efforts to reach a
solution produced the Ordinance of 1785, one of
the landmarks in American legislative and land
policy history. The Ordinance provided for the
division of western public lands into townships and
sections and for their sale by auction. The mini-
Tium price was set at one dollar per acre, and the
smallest plot to be sold at auction was one section,
540 acres. These terms effectively barred the fron-
:ier farmers from buying government land directly,
because they had to attend an auction in the east
ind because 640 acres at a dollar each exceeded
heir needs and resources. Thus, the door was
opened to speculators, who could purchase the
ands and then divide them for sale at a profit and
>n interest-bearing credit.

While surveys mandated by the Ordinance

vere started, Congress turned to the next step re-

|uired to open the West — Indian removal. One of

he chapters in that story is the Treaty of Stanwix

if 1784, by which the Iroquois surrendered all

laims to their old lands in return for a few cheap

iresents. Altogether, the Indians had few reasons

3 remember the fort with affection. Yet, there are

;w historic sites whose story more nearly repre-

! ent the history of the western frontier. Trade.

! sttlements, war, diplomacy, heorism, cupidity, and

! uffering each played a role at the Oneida Carry-

56 Fort Stanwix

fiS'iS

PLA \ C • l/l e rOK'l S , t i Wrf »*Jw . ..-,. 7 V,;, V. s„l r A ... Ur,« frtlL.JL* *£&*

. 'HiU, l».~Lm.*t -r.lt.- ■'■■ /.'.<~A~~6 <■ ':-( ■!"*■ "t.U {..-I/-* - -V '■■" *&T?'~-

. /rr*i I.

SKETCH J&«ctn*{~K

I
ET

-. f, *;.-., y^

U J~- ■•-

I - .U /A—,y* /- <- t:r..is O £*f..l.<

*C /mM)»M*/ r'rrl-A" '--ft j /-*-.'/ /^

*t*c*«

4» y*i .'v-r .-. «* —

. t ;

*w--

•-->'

*%*■-■ *

*!*■"< ^*&« ""*: « " *fi 1... -~«*^-V

* * t*. ; t.f ;

"««•

'Av fi'fi A~

t «- :- t **»•-»»'

y,-4- y.

Appendix fc "Plan of Forts at the Onoida [sic] or Great Carrying Place," British Museum, Crown Collection, no. XXX. Copy in Map
Division, Library of Congress.

Appendix II: "Return of His Majesty's Troops Detached from the Oneida Station — 15th
August 1758 under the Command of Lieut Colonel Bradstreet." Abercromby Papers,
Huntington Library.

f "T 1 — ' _ ^~ b

(?//?*/

■'■"/■■-_

*'■'"/■■

121

, . /.■ ..,./*„

t^tt:

.(■ rO.tr

"~r—,**-.

. .

. ■■*■„-

./«,/,

I/^vtX-,

&■-'■ ',

•

rf?

JtT

'■

•

History 57

Appendix lib "PLAN of Fort Stanwix Built at Oneida Station by Provincial Troops in 1758.- British Museum, Crown Collection CXX1, 99.
Copy in Map Division, Library of Congress.

58 Fort Stanwix

•mu* <t«. /i~. %_ n*4t^

■irn4*> dr-m ouTjttU of

»-W A .^.y >»•>«* MMIm, \

?n*£*. AacA <~~*

~* Aw "»* rt»Miy y, <jf ^«

•«*•-, y^>~ SUJ 1 ' ^^.

Appendix IV: "Plan of FORT STANWIX Showing what Works were done at that Post from July to December 1759.
British Museum. Crown Collection CXXI. 101. Copy in Map Division. Library of Congress.

History 59

Plan

Fo RT iSt.\NWUC

Built at iTic OmiicT*.
S ta.ti on yj.1 —

SoNi.r) ft*rr*cke.

Oluer* W.«f«.

T(nri*r M^jr*»»n«.

.S»ot» Vi -... i »

5 c a 1 * **• i *f * *o ©r»«

LnrK

C I- V

Appendix V: 'PLAN of FORT STANWIX Built at the Oneida Station 1758." British Museum, Crown Collection CXX1, 100. Copy in Map
Division, Library of Congress.

__ f-^^Tp

■i- t "

Appendix Vt "A Sketch of FORT
STANWIX, with its Buildings and Outworks
November 19, 1764," British Museum,
Crown Collection CXXI, 103. Copy in Map
Division, Library of Congress.

60 Fort Stanwix

/' AX 01
I'ORT STAXWIX

nlmiviuir vital inf iiiilLod nnl

10 In- Join- 10 < mm-!.' ti ti .
• 7*4

I ht . t .
CTCeflt fin m flkfi

f/rr Hn "isjit'tfit.i,

,/ /A w/iv:r Pfntffrm,
■■•: r/fe

ill noli

:€

Appendix VII: "PLAN of FORT STANWIX, Showing what is finished and what is to be done to compleat it." 1974. British Museum Crown
Collection CXX1, 102. Copy in Map Division, Library of Congress.

Appendix VIII: Francois de Fleury.

"A Sketch of the siege of FORT
SCHUYLER," Copied By G H.
Bowen; Sparks Collection, Cornell
University Library.

*>. ? f

ft*

* *

History 61

Appendix IX: "Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix." New York Public Library.

62 Fort Stanwix

Cedar Posts

Fraise

Picket

APPENDIX X

"Plan showino the Putative Layout of Fort stanwix
in August 1777.

Key:
A.

Headquarter and Officers* Quarters

B. Barracks

C. Guard House

D. Store-House

E. Bombproof (Magazine)

F. Flag Staff

G. Parade
H. Salients
I. Jridge

J. Pickets

K. 3ridge

1. Glacis

K, Ditch

0. Main Gate

P. Gate

Appendix X; "Plan Showing the Putative Layout of Fort Stanwix in August 1777."

APPENDIX XI

Construction and Military History Thoughts for Conducting the War

(from John Burgoyne, State of the Expedition, Appendix No. Ill)

When the last ships came from Quebec, a re-
ort prevailed in Canada, said to have been founded
pon positive evidence that the rebels had laid the
eels of several large vessels at Skenesborough and
iconderoga, and were resolved to exert their ut-
lost powers, to construct a new and formidable
eet during the winter.

I will not, however, give credit to their exer-
ons, in such a degree as to imagine the King's
oops will be prevented passing Lake Champlain
irly in the summer, but will suppose the operations
f the army to begin at Crown Point.

But as the present means to form effectual
ans to lay down every possible difficulty, I will
ippose the enemy in great force at Ticonderoga;
ie different works there are capable of admitting
/elve thousand men.

I will suppose him also to occupy Lake George

ith considerable naval strength, in order to secure

s retreat, and afterwards to retard the campaign;

id it is natural to expect that he will take meas-

i es to block up the roads from Ticonderoga to

& lbany by way of Skenesborough, by fortifying the

I'ong ground at different places, and thereby

) >liging the King's army to carry a weight of artil-

e ry with it, and felling trees, breaking bridges, and

i her obvious impediments, to delay, though it

1 ould not have the power or spirit to finally resist

t progress.

The enemy thus disposed upon this side of
^inada, it is to be considered what troops will be
l< cessary, and what disposition of them will be
n ">st proper to prosecute the campaign with vigor
i d effect.

I humbly conceive the operating army (I
an exclusively of the troops left for the security
f Canada) ought not to consist of less than eight

thousnd regulars, rank and file. The artillery re-
quired in the memorandums of General Carleton,
a corps of watermen, two thousand Canidians, in-
cluding hatchetmen and other workmen, and one
thousand or more savages.

It is to be hoped that the reinforcements and
victuall ships may all be ready to sail from the
Channel and from Corke on the last day of March.
I am persuaded that to sail with a fleet of trans-
ports earliers, is to subject government to loss and
disappointment. It may reasonably be expected
that they will reach Quebec before the 20th of
May, a period in full time for the opening of the
campaign. The roads, and the rivers and lakes, by
the melting and running off of the snows, are in
common years impracticable sooner.

But as the weather long before that time will
have admitted of labour in the docks, I will take
for granted that the fleet of last year, as well as
bateaux as armed vessels, will be found repaired,
augmented and fit for immediate service. The
magazines that remain of provision, I believe them
not to be abundant, will probably be formed at
Montreal, Sorel and Chamblee.

I conceive the first business for those entrusted
with the chief powers, should be to select and post
the troops destined to remain in Canada; to throw
up the military stores and provisions with all possi-
ble dispatch, in which service the above mentioned
troops, if for operation to cantonments, within a
few days march of St. John's as conveniently may
be. I should prefer cantonments at that season of
the year to encampment, as the ground is very
damp, and consequently very pernicious to the men,
and more especially as they will have been for many
months used to lodgings, heated with stoves, or
between decks of ships; all these operations may

64 Fort Stanwix

be put in motion together, but they severally require
some observation.

I should wish that the troops left in Canada,
supposing the number mentioned in my former
memorandum to be approved, might be made as
follows.

Rank and File
The 31st regiment, British,
exclusive of their light company
of grenadiers 448

Maclean's corps 300

The 29th regiment 448

The ten additional companies from
Great Britain 560

Brunswick and Hesse Hanau to be taken
from detachments or complete corps, as
Major General Riedesel shall recommend,
leaving the grenadiers, light infantry
and dragoons compleat 650

Detachments from the other British
brigades, leaving the grenadiers and
lights infantry companies complete and
squaring the battalions equally 600

3.006

My reason for selecting the 31st regiment for
this duty is, that when I saw it last it was not
equally in order with other regiments for services of
activity.

I propose the 29th regiment as it is not pres-
ently brigaded.

I propose Maclean's corps, because I very
much apprehend desertion from such parts of it as
arc composed of Americans, should they come near
the enemy.

In Canada, whatsoever may be their disposi-
tion, it is not easy to effect it.

And I propose making up the residue by de-
tachment, because selecting the men least calculated
to fatigue or least accustomed to it. which may be
equally good soldiers in more confined movements
and belter provided situations, the effective strength
for operations is much greater and defensive
strength not impaired.

I must beg to leave the expeditious convey-
ance of provisions and stores from Quebec, and the
several depositories, in order to form ample maga-
zines at Crown Point, as one of the most impor-
tant operations of the campaign, because it is upon
that which most of the rest will depend. If sailing

\ essels up the St. Lawrence are alone to be em-
ployed, the accident of contrary winds may delay
them two months before they pass the rapids of
Richelieu, and afterwards St. Peter's Lake; delays
to that extent are not uncommon and they are
only to be obviated by having a quantity of small
craft in readiness to work with oars. From the
mouth of the Sorrel to Chamblee, rowing and tack-
ing is a sure conveyance if sufficient hands are
found. From Chamblee to St. Therese (which is
just above the Rapids) land-carriage must be used,
and great authority will be requisite to supply the
quantity necessary.

A business as complicated, in arrangement, in
some parts unusual in practice, and in other diffi-
cult, can only be carried to the desired effect by
the peremptory powers, warm zeal, and consonant
opinion of the governor; and through the former
are not to be doubted, a failure of the latter, vin-
dicated, or seeming to be vindicated, by the plausi-
ble obstructions that will not fail to be suggested
by others, will be sufficient to crush such exertions
as an officer of sanguine temper, entrusted with the
future conduct of the campaign and whose personal
interest and fame therefore consequently depend
upon timely out-set, would lead to make.

The assembly of the savages and Canadians
will also depend entirely upon the governor.

Under these considerations, it is presumed,
that the general officer employed to proceed with
the army will be held out of reach of any possible
blame till he is clear of the province of Canada,
and furnished with the proposed supplies.

The navigation of Lake Champlain, secured
by the superiority of our naval force, and the ar-
rangements for forming proper magazines so estab-
lished as to make the execution certain. I would not
lose a day to take possession of Crown Point with
Brigadier Fraser"s corps, a large body of savages,
a bod) of Canadians, both for scouts and works.
and the best of our engineers and artificers well
supplied with entrenching tools.

The brigade will be sufficient to prevent insult
during the time necessary for collecting the stores,
forming magazines, and fortifying posts; all ol
which should be done to a certain degree, previous
to proceeding in force to Ticonderoga; to such r
degree I mean as may be supposed to be effecte(
in time of transporting artillery, preparing fascines
and other necessaries for artillery operation: am

History 65

y keeping the rest of the army back during that
'eriod, the transport of provisions will be lessened,
nd the soldiers made use of in forwarding the
onvoys.

But there would only be one brigade at Crown
'oint at that time, it does not follow that the enemy
hould remain in a state of tranquility. Corps of
avages, supported by detachments of light regulars,
hould be continually on foot to keep them in
larm, and within their works to cover the recon-
oitering of general officers and engineers, and to
btain the best intelligence of their strength, posi-
on, and design.

If due exertion is made in the preparations
:ated above, it may be hoped that Ticonderoga
'ill then become a more proper place for arms
lan Crown Point.

The next measure must depend upon those
iken by the enemy, and upon the general plan of
le campaign as concerted at home. If it be de-
rmined that General Howe's whole forces should
:t upon Hudson's River, and to the southward of
, and the only object of the Canada army to be
i effect a junction with that force, the immediate
)ssession of Lake George would be of great con-
quence, as the most expeditious and most corn-
odious route to Albany; and should the enemy be
force upon that lake, which is very probable,
ery effort should be tried, by throwing savages
id light troops around it, to oblige them to quit it
thout waiting for naval preparation. Should these
'orts fail, the route by South Bay and Skenes-
irough might be attempted, but considerable
faculties may be expected, as the narrow parts of
e river may be easily choaked up and rendered
passable, and at best there will be necessity for
great deal of land carriage for the artillery, pro-
.ions, &c. which can only be supplied from
.nada. In case of success also by that route, and
: enemy not removed from Lake George, it will
necessary to leave a chain of posts, as the army
>ceeds, for the securities of your communications,
j ich may too weaken so small an army.

Lest all these attempts should unavoidably
i I, and it become indispensible to attack the enemy
^ water upon Lake George, the army at the outset
ji >uld be provided with carriages, implements and
jh ificers, for conveying armed vessels from Ticon-
oga to the lake.
These ideas are formed upon the supposition.

that it be the sole purpose of the Canada army to
effect a junction with Lord Howe, or after co-
operating so far as to get possession of Albany and
open the communication with New-York, to re-
main upon Hudson's River, and thereby enable
that general to act with his whole force to the
southward.

But should the strength of the main American
army be such as to admit of the corps of troops
now at Rhode Island remaining there during the
winter, and acting separately in the spring, it may
be highly worthy consideration, whether the most
important purpose to which the Canada army could
be employed, supposing it is possession of Ticon-
deroga, would not be to gain the Connecticut
River.

The extent of the country from Ticonderoga
to the inhabited country upon the river, opposite
Charles Town, is about sixty miles, and though to
convey artillery and provision so far by land would
be attended with difficulties perhaps more than those
suggested, upon a progress to Skenesborough,
should the object appear worthy, it is hoped re-
sources might be found; in that case it would be
advisable to fortify with one or two strong redoubts
the heights opposite Charles Town, and establish
posts of savages upon the passage from Ticonder-
oga to those heights, to preserve the communica-
tions and at tho same time to prevent any attempt
from the country above Charles Town, which is
very populous, from molesting the rear or inter-
rupting the convoys of supply, while the army
proceeded down the Connecticut. Should the junc-
tion between the Canada and Rhode Island armies
be effected upon the Connecticut, it is not too
sanguine an expectation that all the New England
provinces will be reduced by their operations.

To avoid breaking in upon the matter, I
omitted in the beginning of these papers to state
the idea of the expedition at the outset of the cam-
paign by the Lake Ontario and Oswego to the Mo-
hawk River, which, as a diversion to facilitate every
proposed operation, would be highly desirable, pro-
vided the army should be reinforced sufficiently to
afford it.

66 Fort Stanvvix

the advanced season and unavoidable delay of
preparation for the lakes being the reduction of
Crown Point and Ticonderoga, unless the success
of my expedition had opened the road to Albany,
no greater numbers were necessary than for those
first operations. The case of the present year dif-
fers; because the season of the year affording a
prospect of very extensive operation and conse-
quently the establishment of many posts, patroles,
&c. will become necessary. The army ought to be
in a state of number to bear those drains, and still

remain sufficient to attack anything that probabh

can be opposed to it Should it appear, upon

examination of the really effective numbers of the
Canada army, that the force is not sufficient foi
proceeding upon the above ideas with a fair pros-
pect of success, the alternative remains of embark-
ing the army at Quebec, in order to effect a junc-
tion with General Howe by sea, or to be employee
separately to co-operate with the main designs, b}
such means as should be within their strength upoi
other parts of the continent.

Notes

The Construction and Military History of Fort Stamvix

Chapter I

1. Edmund B. O'Callaghan, Documents Relating to
The Colonial History of the State of New York (10 vols.,
Albany. 1854). IV, 979, 981.

2. Ibid.. V, 726 ft".

3. Ibid.. VI, 858 (London Document xxxi)

4. William Livingston, A Review of the Military
Operations in North America (London, 1757). 42-43.

5. John A. Schutz, William Shirley, King's Governor
of Massachusetts (Chapel Hill. 1961), 209.

6. Colonial Office 5/135.

7. Schutz, William Shirley, 214-15.

8. C. O. 5/46, 425-28.

9. "Plan of the Forts at the Onoida [sic] or Great
Carrying Place." British Museum, Crown Collection, no.
xxx. Copy in Map Division, Library of Congress.
APPENDIX I.

10. O'Callaghan, Documents, X, 403-05 (Paris
Document XII).

11. C. O. 5/47, 97-98; "Plan of the Forts at the
Oneida or Great Carrying Pl,ace."

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. James Sullivan and A. C. Flick, eds.. William
Johnson Papers, New York State Library (10 vols.,
Albany, 1921-1951). IX, 434.

15. C. O. 5/46, 236.

16. Schutz, William Shirley, 233; Francis Parkman.
Montcalm and Wolfe (2 vols., Boston, 1931), I. 396.

17. "Plan of the Forts at the Oneida Carrying
Place;" Appendix 1. Parkman. Montcalm and Wolfe, I,
419-20.

Chapter II

1. Parkman. Montcalm and Wolfe, I. 8-9; Bougan
ville, "Journal. Summary of M. dc Beletre's Campaign." in
O'Callaghan. Documents. X, 672.

2. Parkman. Montcalm and Wolfe. 90-91.

3. Ibid. 94-118; 137-70.

4. C. O. 5/50, ltr., Abercromby to William Pitt
July 12. 1758.

5. "Report of Proceedings with the Confederate Na
tions of Indians at a Conference at Canajohary;" ltr.
Johnson to the Lords of Trade. November 13, 1763, ii
O'Callaghan, Documents. VII. 378 ff.

6. James Abercromby Papers, Huntington Library
"Captain Green's Observations on Col. Montressor's Plai
for a Post at the Oneida Carrying Place." n. d.

7. Ibid.

8. O'Callaghan. Documents, IV, 525-26.

9. Abercromby Papers, ltrs.. Stanwix to Abercomby
July 20, 1758; Abercromby to Stanwix, July 23, 1758.

10. Ibid., ltrs., Stanwix to Abercromby, July 20 anc
24. 1758.

11. Ibid., ltr., Abercromby to Stanwix. 27 July, 1758

12. Ibid., ltr.. Stanwix to Abercromby, July 20. 1758

13. Ibid., ltr.. Stanwix to Abercromby, Aug. 20, 1758
"Return of His Majesty's Troops Detchd from the Oneidi
Station — 1 5th August 1758 under the Command of Lieu
Colonel Bradstreet." Appendix II.

14. Ibid., ltr. Stanwix to Abercromby, Aug. 20. 175$

15. Ibid., ltr., Stanwix to Abercromby, Sept. 5, 175?

16. Ibid., ltr.. Stanwix to Abercromby. Sept. 7. 175f

17. Ibid., ltr.. Stanwix to Abercromby, Sept. 7. 175f

18. Ibid., ltr., Abercromby to Stanwix, Sept. 12, 175*

19. Ibid., ltr., Stanwix to Abercromby. Sept. 29, 175!:

20. Ibid.; William Johnson Papers. New York Star
I ibrary, Albany, ltrs. Johnson to Abercromby, Sept. 3
and Oct. 3, 1758.

21. Abercromby Papers, ltr. Abercromby to Stanwi
Oct. 7. 1758.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., ltr.. Abercromby to Stanwix, Oct. 13, 175

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., ltr.. Stanwix to Abercromby, Oct. 22. 175,
lb. Ibid.

27. Ibid. ltr.. Abercromby to Stanwix. October 31
1758.

28 En Barbette — built in such a manner that fi t
would be directed over a parapet rather than throu r
embrasures

History 67

29. CO. 5/50.

30. Ibid. See plan opposite.

31. Abercromby Papers, ltr., Stanwix to Abercromb>,
October 22, 1758.

32. British Museum, Crown Map Collection, CXXI,
99. Copy in Map Division, Library of Congress. Appendix
III.

33. British Museum, Crown Map Collection, CXXI,
101. Appendix IV.

34. Ibid.. CXXXI. 100. Appendix V.

35. Sir William Johnson Papers.

36. Crown Collection, CXXI. 103, "A Sketch of Fort
Stanwix, with its Buildings & Outworks, November 18th.
1764." Appendix VI.

37. Supra., 19.

38. Francis Parkman's The Conspiracy of Pontiac is
an old but beautifully written and generally useful study
of the broad story of this rather neglected subject.

39. Crown Map CXXI, 103. Appendix VI.

40. Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa, Audit Office
Records (M. G. 12, EI, Bundle 2531, Roll 662).

41. See Crown Map CXXI, 102, Sections A.B. and
CD. Appendix VII.

42. Ibid.

43. O'Callaghan. Documents, VII, 985, 989.

44. British Museum. Additional Manuscripts, 21661,
Haldimand Papers from Canadian Archives Report, 1884.
'Correspondence of General Haldimand to General Jeffrey
Amherst," Doc. 28605. "Journal of J.L. [John Lees] of
Quebec Merchant."

45. Oliver M. Dickerson, American Colonial Govcrn-
nent 1696-1765 (New York, 1962), 22-57; Ray Allen
Billington, Westward Expansion, A History of the Ameri-

an Frontier (New York, 1967), 137-140; Cecil B.
Zurrey, Road To Revolution, Benjamin Franklin in
England, 1765-1775 (Garden City, 1968), 380, 392.

46. Currey, op. cit., 237-240; Jack Sosin. Whitehall
ind the Wilderness (Lincoln, 1962), 172-73; Nicholas B.
.Vainwright, George Croghan, Wilderness Diplomat
Chapel Hill, 1959), 260-67.

47. O'Callaghan, Documents, I, 765, London Docu-
nent XLIV.

Chapter III

1. Papers of the Continental Congress, National
archives, ltr., Schuyler to President of Congress, June 8,
776.

2. Schuyler Papers, New York Public Library, ltr.,
: chuyler to Washington. June 11. 1776.

3. Worthington C. Ford, et. al.. eds.. Journals of the
Continental Congress (33 vols., Washinston, 1904-36), V.
•42.

4. Schuyler Papers, Itrs, Washington to Schuyler,
. Jne 16 and June 26, 1776.

5. Ibid., ltr., Schuyler to Dayton. June 27, 1776; ltr.,
5 chuyler to Washington, July 2. 1776.

6. Ibid.. Letters and Orders, Albany, June 26, 1776;
1 r., Schuyler to Washington. July 1, 1776.

7. Ibid.. ltr., Schuyler to Washington, July 17. 1776.

8. O'Callaghan, Documents, VIII, 451.

9. Schuyler Papers, Letters and Orders, Schuyler to
I ayton, July 16, 1776.

10. Francois de Fleury, "A Sketch of the siege of
ORT SCHUYLER," copied by G. H. Bowen. Sparks

Collection, Cornell University Library. Appendix XIII.

11. Schuyler Papers, ltr., Hubbell to Schuyler, July
25. 1776.

12. Ibid., ltr., Schuyler to Washington, August 1,
1776. Italics the writer's.

13. Ibid., ltr.. Dayton to Schuyler, August 1, 1776.

14. Gates Papers, New York Public Library, ltr.,
Schuyler to Gates, August 3, 1776.

15. Schuyler Papers, ltr., Dayton to Schuyler, August
30. 1776.

16. Schuyler Papers, ltrs., Dayton to Schuyler, July 8,
1776; August 1, 1776; Sept. 1, 1776; Schuyler to Dayton,
August 2. 1776; Ebeneezer Elmer, Journal, New Jersey
Historical Society. August 26-September 5, 1776.

17. Ibid., ltr.. Dayton to Schuyler, September 14,
1776.

18. Ibid., ltr., Dayton to Schuyler, September 17
1776.

19. Ibid., ltrs., Henry Glen to Schuyler, July 8. 1776;
Schuyler to Washington, Aug. 1, 1776; Glen to Schuyler.
September 25, 1776.

20. Ibid., ltr , Dayton to Schuyler. October 5. 1776.

21. Ibid., Letters and Orders. Schuyler to Elmore,
October 9 and November 12, 1776; Eberneezer Elmer,
Journal. New Jersey Historical Society. October 17, 1776.

22. Ibid., to Henry Glen, ADQM Genl., Dec. 21,
1776.

23. Journals of the Continental Congress, VI, 1048.

24. Schuyler Papers, ltr.. de Lamarquise to Schuyler.
March 13. 1777; Letters and Orders, to de Lamarquise,
March 18, 1777.

25. Ibid.. Letters and Orders, To Elmore, March
18. 1777.

26. Ibid.. To Col. Van Schaick. March 25, 1777.

27. William Colbrath, Journal of the most material
occurrences preceding the Siege of Fort Schuyler (formerly
Fort Stanwix) with an account of that siege, etc.. negative
photostat. New York Public Library.

28. Gates Papers., memo, Lamarquise to Gates, n.d.

29. Ibid., ltr., Lamarquise to Gates, May 19, 1777.

30. Ibid., ltr., Gansevoort to Gates, n.d.

31. Journal of the Continental Congress, May 22,
1777.

32. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book; Colbrath's
Journal May 28, 1777.

33. Marinus Willett, Narrative.

34. Schuyler Papers, ltrs.. Schuyler to Gansevoort.
June 9; Gansevoort to Schuyler. June 15.

35. Ibid., Schuyler to Gansevoort. July 10. 1777.

36. Gates Papers, ltr.. Lamarquise to Gates. May
17, 1777.

37. Ibid., memorandum, Lamarquise to Gates, n.d.

38. Schuyler Papers, Letters and Orders. to
Gansevoort. June 8, 1777.

39. Ibid., ltrs.. Gansevoort to Schuyler, June 26,
1777; Colbrath, Journal.

40. Ibid.

41. William L. Stone, Life of Brant (2 vols, New
York, 1838) II, 227-8.

42. Francois de Fleury, "A Sketch of the siege of
FORT SCHUYLER," copied by G. H. Bowen. Sparks
Collection, Cornell University Library; "Fleury's Map."
Appendix VIII; Peter J. Guthorn, American Maps and
Map Makers of The Revolution (Monmouth Beach, N. J.,
1966), 22; Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix, New York
Public Library, Appendix IX.

43. Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa, Transcripts
of Colonial Records, ltr.. St. Leger to Carleton. August
27, 1777.

68 Fort Stanwix

44. Plan Showing the Putative Layout of Fort
Stanwix in August 1777, Appendix X.

Chapter IV

1. C. O. 51 272-74.

2. C. O. 512812.

3. John Fortesque. Correspondence of George III.
6 vols, (London, 1927-28), II, 44, 56; John Fortesque,
History of the British Army, 13 vols (London, 1899-1930),
III. 204.

4. Jane Clark, "1 he Command of the Canadian
Army in 1777," Canadian Historical Review, vol. X
(1928), 133-35; Fortesque. Correspondence of Ceorge
III, III. 421. 427.

5. C. O. 5/253 ff; John Burgoyne, 'Thoughts for
Conducting the War from this Side of Canada." copy in
Germain Papers, Wm. L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor,
Michigan, and in John Burgoyne, A State of the Expedi-
tion, Appendix No. III.

6. Canadian Archieves. Ottawa, Transcript of Colonial
Records, ltr.. Burgoyne to Germain, Jan. 1. 1777.

7. William B. Willcox, ed.. American Rebellion: Sir
Henry Clinton's Narrative of His Campaigns, 1775-82,
with an Appendix of Original Documents (New Haven.
1954), 25. n. 14. Hereafter cited as Clinton. Narrative.

8. Piers Mackesy. The War for America, 1775-1783
(Cambridge, Mass, 1964), 113.

9. Sec Appendix XI for complete text.

10. Italics added.

11. C. O. 5/94, 201, ltr.. Howe to Germain, January
20, 1777.

12. E. B. DeFonblanque, Political and Military
Episodes in in the Latter Half of the Eighteenth Century
Derived from the Life and Correspondence of the Right
Hon. John Burgoyne, General, Statesman, Diamatist
(I ondon, 1876), 486-7. Italics added.

13. Italics added.

14. Germain Papers, William L. Clements Library,
ltr., Germain to Carleton, March 26. 1777; "Colonel
Clans' Account of the Battle of Oriskany and the Defeat
of St. Leger's Expedition ... in an Original Letter to
William Knox, British Undersecretary of State for the
Northern Department, dated at Montreal, October 11.
1777," New York State Library, hereinafter cited as
Clans' Account.

15. HolTman Nickerson, The Turning Point of the
Rev, Nation (Cambridge. Mass.. 1928), 195. 444. N. B.:
I he Indians joined the expedition at Oswego.

16. Claus' Account.

17. Ensign Spoor's party. Supra.. 76.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid

20. Public Archives of Canada. Transcripts of Colonial
Records, ltr. John Butler to Carleton. July 28. 1777.

21. Schuyler Papers, ltr., Schuyler to Herkimer. July.
1777.

22. Ibid., ltr.. Schuyler to Herkimer. June 29. 1777.

23. Ibid., ltr.. Schuylei to Gansevoort, June 30. 1777.

24. Colbrath's Journal, May 28. 1777.

25. Schuyler Papers, ltr.. Gansevoort to Schuyler,
lulv 4, 1777.

26. Ibid., ltr.. Schuyler to Herkimer. July 8. 1777.

27. Ibid., ltr.. Schuyler to the Tryon County Com-
mittee of Safety. July 10, 1777.

28. [bid in Herkimei to Schuyler, lulv [5, 1777.

19 Ibid., ltr., Schuyler to John Barclay et. al.. July

18, 1777.

30. Colbrath's Journal, May 19. 1777.

31. Gansevoort Papers, New York Public Library
ltr.. can Schaick to Gansevoort. July 22. 1777.

32. Gansevoort Papers, ltr., Gansevoort to var
Schaick. July 28; Colbrath's Journal.

33. Colbrath's Journal.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Willett's Orderly Book. August 1, 1777.

37. Gansevoort Papers, from among the capturec
British papers. Bird to St. Leger.

38. Ibid., St. Leger to Bird.

39. Colbrath, Journal. Aug. 1. 1777.

40. Germain Papers. St. Leger to Germain. Augusl
27. 1777.

41. Office of the Chief of Military History. U.S
Army. Fort McNair. D. C. ltr.. Oswald P. Backus to
Capt. Gustave Villant. U. S. Army Historical Staff. Feb
10. 1927.

42. James Weise. Swartwout Chronicle (1899), 214

43. The New Lamed History (1923). IV. 3109

44. John Albert Scott. Fort Stanwix (Fort Schuyler,
and Oriskany ( Rome. 1927). 175.

45. Journal of the Continental Congress, Monday,
June 14. 1777.

46. James Thacher. A Military Journal During the
Revolutionary War (Boston, 1823)

47. Pennsylvania Evening Post (Philadelphia), Vol
III. Number 398, 453.

48. Milo M. Quaife, Melvin J- Weig. and Roy E.
Appleman. The History of the United States Fla%
(Philadelphia. 1961). 30.

49. Colbrath. Journal. August 3. 1777.

50. The Remembrancer: or. Impartial Repository oj
Public Events for the Year 1777 (London. 1778). 448-49.
ltr.. Willett to Jonathan Trumbull. Jr.. August 11, 1777;
The Independent Chronicle and Universal Advertiser
I Boston) August 28. 1777: "Colonel Willett's Orderly
Book February 18th 1777 — ." New York Historical
Society.

51. Marinas Willett. "Narrative." Tomlinson Collec-
tion, New York Public Library.

52. Ibid.

53. National Archives, Revolutionary War Service
Records, James Mc draw.

54. Francis B. Heitman. Historical Register of Officer;
of the Continental Army During the War of the Resolu-
tion. April 1775-Dcc. 1783 (Wash.. D.C.. 1914), 312.

55. Samuel E. Smith. A Revolutionary War Powder
horn. Hobbies Vol 56. No. 3. May. 1951.

56. Washington Papers, ltr.. Peters to Washington
May 10. 1779. Italics added: Quaife and others, op. cit.
33-34.

57. Washington Papers, I tt. Peters to Washington
September 1779.

58. John Spargo, The Stars and Stripes in 1777: At'
\ccount of the Birth of the Flag and Its First Baptism o

Victorious Fire (Bennington. 1928). 37-47.

59. Quaife and others, op. cit.. 50-51.

60. Ibid.

61. Nickerson. op. cit.. 199 200.

62. Christopher Ward, The War of the Revoltttio
(2 Vols., New York, 1952). II. 483.

63. Colbrath. Journal. August 3, 1777.

64. Ibid.

65. Stone, op. cit.. 230-31.

66. Claus' Account; Colbrath, Journal. August '
1777.

History 69

67. Colbrath, Journal, August 5, 1777.

68. Claus' Account; Canadian Archives, Itr., St.
Leger to Burgoyne, August 11, 1777; ibid., Itr., Butler to
Carleton, August 15, 1777; Colbrath, Journal, August 6,
1777; Remembrancer, "Extract of a letter from a gentle-
man at Quebec, dated Sept. 7," 452-3; ibid., "Extract of
a letter from Albany, Aug. 18."; ibid, "Extract of letter
from a gentleman in Quebec to his friend at Cork, dated
Sept. 6, 1777."

69. Colbrath, Journal, August 6, 1777.
Ibid.

Remembrancer, "Itr., Willette to Trumbull,
II, 1777," 448-49.
Ibid.

Ibid; Colbrath, Journal, August 6, 1777; Clinton
'Deposition of Adam Hellmer, Albany, August

70.

71.
August

72.

73.
Papers
11, 1777."

74. Ibid.

75. Burgoyne
Account.

76. Canadian Archives
August 11, 1777.

77. Colbrath. Journal, August 7, 1777.

78. Ibid., August 8, 1777.

79. Willett, Narrative.

80. Gansevoort Papers, Itr., Bellinger and Frey to

81. Remembrancer, Mil, op.cit., 450.

82. The Independent Chronicle and Universal Ad-

op.cit., Appendix, No. XII; Claus'
Itr., St. Leger to Burgoyne,

1777, Library of Congress.
August 8, 1777; Willett,

veriiser, Boston, August 28,

83. Claus Account.

84. Colbrath, Journal,
Narrative.

85. Remembrancer, Mil, St. Leger to Ganservoort,
August 9, 1777; Gansevoort Papers, 445-46.

86. Gansevoort Papers, Gansevoort to St. Leger,
August 9, 1777.

87. Colbrath, Journal, August 9-16, 1777.

88. Burgoyne, op.cit.

89. See Appendix VIII.

90. Colbrath, Journal, August 21 and 22. 1777.

91. Ibid.. August 21, 22, 1777.

92. Claus Account.

93. Remembrancer, Mil, 451.

94. Claus Account.

95. Schuyler Papers, ltrs., Schuyler to Herkimer,
August 9, 1777; Schuyler to Tryon Committee of Safety,
August 12, 1777; Willett, Narrative.

96. Nickerson, op.cit., 211-12.

97. Isaac N. Arnold. Life of Arnold His Patriotism
and Treason (Chicago, 1880), 154.

98. Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Arnold, Stillwater,
August 13, 1777.

99. Ibid.. Itr., Washington to Schuyler, July 24, 1777.

100. Ibid., Itr., Schuyler to Washington, August 13,
1777.

101. Gates Papers, "Report of Council of War of
jerman Flatts, August 21, 1777." Gates has succeeded
■ichuyler to command of the Northern Department.

102. The size of Gansevoort's garrison is difficult to
letermine. Two hundred men arrived with Willett, 200
vith Badlam, 100 with Mellon. The number that ac-
ompanied Gansevoort is unknown, but was at least 200,
naking a total of 700. This is at odds with a return for
irovisions for Aug. 13 for 467 soldiers, but except for
he contingent that arrived with Gansevoort, the numbers
>f the other elements are precisely documented.

103. Remembrancer, Mil, 396-97.

104. Gates Papers, Itr., Arnold to Gates, August 21.
777.

105. Nickerson, op.cit., 273-74.

106. Claus Account.

107. Colbrath, Journal, August 22-23, 1777.

108. Gasevoort Papeis, Itr., Gansevoort to Arnold,
August 22, 1777.

109. Gates Papers, "A return to ammunition and
artillery stores taken at the camp before Fort Schuyler,
August 21st, 1777."

1 10. Ibid., ltrs., Arnold to Gates, August 23 and 24,
1777.

111.

I I.

Supra, 84.

C. O. 5/253, 286.

113. John F. Luzader, "The Burgoyne Campaign to
September 19, Mil,'''' Saratoga National Historical Park,
1958; John F. Luzader, "The Burgoyne Campaign From
October 8-October 16, Mil" Saratoga National Historical
Park, 1959.

1 14. Don Higginbotham, The War of American In-
dependence, Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice,
1763-1789 (New York, 1971), 328-29; Alexander Flick,
The American Revolution in New York (Albany, 1926),
169; See also. Division of Archives and History, University
of the State of New York, The Sullivan-Clinton Campaign
in 1779, Chronology and Selected Documents (Albany,
1929).

115. Files of the Fort
N. Y., Itr., Lt. Col. Cornelius
Van Schaick. April 17, 1780.

116. Washington Papers,
dent of the Congress, May 27,

117.
118.

Stanwix Museum,
Van Dyke to Col.

Rome,
Goose

Itr., Washington to Presi-

1781.
Ibid., Itr.. Washington to Willett, August 4, 1783.
Oiville Carroll, Historic Structure Report,

Architectural Data Section, Fort Stanwix, (Denver Service
Center, National Park Service, 1973), 16-7.

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(London, 1884).
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1904-36).
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from 1760 to December 1783 (6 vols., London,

1927-28).
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the State of New York (10 vols., Albany. ISM)
Sullivan, James, and A. C. Flick, eds., William Johnson

Papers ( 10 vols.. Albany. 1921-51).
Thacher, James, A Military Journal During the

Revolutionary War (Boston, 1823).
Wilcox, William B., ed., American Rebellion: Sir Henry

Clinton's Narrative of His Campaigns, 1775-82.

with our Appendix of Original Documents (New

Haven. 1954).
Willett. William, ed.. A Narrative of the Militar)

Actions of Colonel Marinus Willett (New Yorl

1831).

Maps and Plans

Oflicial Papers

British Headquarters Papers. Microfilm. Colonial

Williamsburg.
Colonial Office Records, Public Records Office (trans-

British Museum, Crown Map Collection:

(XXI. no. 99. "PLAN OF FORT STANWL
at Oneida Station by Provincial Troops in 1758.'
CXXI. no. 100. "PLAN OF FORT ST AN' WE .

Built at the Onnida Station 1758 ."

CXXI, No. 101. "PLAN OF FORT STANWD .

Showing what Works were done at that Post from

July to December 1759."

CXXI, no. 102. "PLAN OF FORT STANWIX,

Showing what is finished and what is to be done

to compleat it. 1764."

CXXI, no. 103. "A Sketch of FORT STANWIX,

with its Buildings and Outworks November 19th

1764."

CXXI, no. XXX. "PLAN of the FORTS at the

Onoida or Great Carrying Place in the Province

of New York in America built by Major Charles

Craven by Order of General Shirley Commander

in Chief of all His Majesty's Forces in North

America."

Francois de Flcury, "A Sketch of the siege of FORT
SCHUYLER," copied by G. H. Bowen, Sparks
Collection, Cornell University Library.

"Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix," New York Public
Library.

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Revolution ( Cambridge, 1928).
Parkman, Francis, Montcalm and Wolfe (2 vols.,

Boston, 1921).
Quaife, Milo M., Melvin J. Weig, Roy E. Appleman,

The History of the United States Flag (Phila-
delphia, 1960).
Schutz, John A., William Shirley, King's Governor of

Massachusetts (Chapel Hill, 1961).
Scott, John Albert, Fort Stanwix (Fort Schuyler) and

Oriskany (Rome, 1927).
Sosin, Jack, Whitehall and the Wilderness (Lincoln,

1962).
Stone, William L., Sr.. Life of Joseph Brant-Thayen-

dancgea. Including the Indian Wars of the

Revolution (2 vols., New York, 1838).
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Campaign in 1779, Chronology and Selected

Documents (Albany, 1929).
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Diplomat (Chapel Hill, 1959).
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vols., New York, 1952).

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Arnold, Isaac N., Life of Benedict Arnold, His
Patriotism and Treason (Chicago, 1880).

Billington, Ray Allen, Westward Expansion, A History
of the American Frontier (New York, 1967).

Burgoync, The State of the Expedition (London,
1780).

Currey, Cecil B., Road to Revolution, Benjamin
Franklin in England, 1765-1775 (Garden City,
1968).

De Fonblanque, E. B., Political and Military Episodes
in the latter Half of the Eighteenth Century
Derived from the Life and Correspondence of the
Right Hon. John Burgoyne, General, Statesman,
Dramatist (London, 1876).

Flick, Alexander, The American Revolution in New
York (Albany, 1926).

Higginbotham, Don, The War of American Inde-
pendence, Military Attitudes, Policies, and
Practices, 1763-1789 (New York, 1971).

Oickerson, Oliver M., American Colonial Govern-
ment, 1696-1765 (New York, 1962).

"ortesque, John W., History of the British Army (13

vols., London, 1899-1930).
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of the Revolution (Monmouth Beach, 1966).
.ivingston, William, A Review of the Military Opera-
tions in North America (London, 1757).
4ackesy, Piers, The War for America, 1775-1783
(Cambridge, 1964).

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in Mil," Canadian Historical Review, vol. X
(1928).

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Events For the Year 1777 (London, 1778).

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Luzader, John F., "The Burgoyne Campaign to Sep-
tember 19, 1777," Saratoga National Historical
Park, 1958.

Luzader, John F., "The Burgoyne Campaign From
October 8-October 16, 1777," Saratoga National
Historical Park, 1959.

(

FORT STANWIX

HISTORIC FURNISHING STUDY

Louis Torres

Preface 74
Introduction 75
I Provisions 77
II Arms and Accouterments 82

III Clothing 86

IV Indian Supplies 89
V Livestock 90

VI Hardware, Utensils, Furniture, and Accessories 91
VII The Furnished Areas 94

A. Parade Ground and Bastions 94

B. Bombproofs 99

C. Guardhouse 102

D. Headquarters 102

E. East Barracks 104

F. Casemates 107
Illustrations 109

Revolutionary War Fireplace 109

Fireplace in Reconstructed Military Hut 109
Appendix: The "Stars and Stripes" at Fort Stanwix. A Summary of the Evidence 110
Notes 1 1 4
Bibliography 119

PREFACE

This furnishing study is the last of several
studies undertaken in order to reconstruct Fort
Stanwix. Its illustrious predecessors consist of "The
Construction and Military History of Fort Stanwix"
(1969), by John F. Luzader; Historic Structure
Report: Fort Stanwix, Architectural Data Section
(1973) by Orville W. Carroll; and "Casemates and
Cannonballs: Archeological Investigations at Fort
Stanwix, 1758-1781" (1973), NPS typescript by
Lee Hanson and Dick Ping Hsu.

The scope of this study focuses upon the siege
and repulse of Barry St. Lcgcr's British forces in
August 1777, the major theme of the interpretive
program. In addition, its attention focuses pri-
marily on those areas of the fort scheduled by the
interpretative prospectus for complete or partial
furnishing. These areas consist of the parade
ground, bastions, southwest and northwest bomb-
proofs, bakehouse, guardhouse, headquarters, cast
barracks, and north, southeast, and west casemates.

This study is limited by a dearth of sources
containing data on furnishings directly associated
with Fort Stanwix. Where this scarcity has oc-
curred, I have sought those sources that contain
data on furnishings of other mlitiary posts of the
period, particularly those in New York State.
These sources proved of inestimable value. Archeo-
logical studies of Fort Stanwix and of other mili-
tary posts of the period also proved to be valuable,
although the basis for conclusions for a study of
this nature must ultimately rest with the historical
record. Obviously, because this study relys on much
documentation not directly associated with the fort.
many conclusions must necessarily be conjectural.

In preparing this study. I have first sought to
identify furnishings that did. or might have, be-
longed to Fort Stanwix during the siege. These are

treated in Chapters I through VI. In Chapter VII,
I have brought all these furnishings together in an
attempt to describe the appearance of those areas
scheduled to be furnished.

For the sake of continuity and to avoid any
confusion in the text, I have retained the name of
Fort Stanwix throughout, even when sources have
referred to the alternate name of Fort Schuyler.

My thanks go to many persons who have
helped to make this study possible, but I wish
especially to express my appreciation to Messrs.
Luzader, Carroll, Hanson, and Hsu. Their knowl-
edge, background, and long association with Fort
Stanwix have produced scholarly studies and re-
search without which the author would have been
at a serious disadvantage. I would also like to
thank the staffs of the following organizations for
the assistance they gave me in seeking out possible
sources: the New York Public Library, the New-
York Historical Society, the New York State Li-
brary, the William L. Clements Library of the
University of Michigan, the American Antiquarian
Society, the Sterling Memorial Library of Yale
University, the New Haven Colony Historical So-
ciety, the National Archives, the Connecticut His-
torical Society, the United States Military Academy,
and the Queens Borough Public Library in Ja-
maica, New York. Finally, a word of thanks goet
to the main individuals, too numerous to mention
here, who were so kind as to answer my mam
queries.

Louis Torre

INTRODUCTION

Fort Stanwix is known in history for its dra-
matic role during the British siege of August 1777.
In defeating the designs of Barry St. Leger, it was
able to contribute to the defeat of General Bur-
goyne, leading to new developments in the Revo-
lution. Nevertheless, its significance cannot be
fully appreciated without first realizing the strategic
position it commanded on the frontier — first as a
British post and later as an American possession.
Located in central New York State, in an area
:ommonly known as the Oneida Carrying Place, it
oecame the connecting link between the several
western posts on the Great Lakes and those posts
on Lake Champlain and the Hudson River. Gen.
Thomas Gage appreciated its strategic importance
vhen he noted that, because of Fort Stanwix, the
4ohawk River and all points eastward as far as
>chenectady were well secured against any attempt
>y the French. In regard to the role it would play
n supporting communications westward. Gage
toted that the fort would give "assistance to every
erson going with stores [and] refreshments to the
: everal posts ... to Niagara." 7

After the French and Indian War had ended

; nd after fears of French incursions had subsided,

lere was no longer any need for a fully garrisoned

)rt. In recommending that Fort Stanwix be de-

jl lilitarized. General Gage argued that the fort had

pased to serve its oricinal purpose. He said that:

1 he use of Fort Stanwix was, that being Situated upon

a Carrying Place, the Garrison assisted in the Trans-

I station of the Boats and Stores: but as the Stores

|f' rmerly demanded are now greatly reduced I am of

>inion that the Service can be carried on in the

1 anner proposed, without being at the Expence of
5 ipporting a Fort, and Maintaining a Garrison at so
# eat a Distance. 2

Soon after the outbreak of the Revolution, the
fort's strategic importance was again realized. With
the failure of the American campaign in Canada
in 1776, Fort Stanwix along with all those posts
on Lake Champlain and the Hudson River began
to attract attention. Encouraged by their success in
Canada, the British would almost certainly begin
a drive southward to cut off the New England colo-
nies. Gen. Philip Schuyler, who commanded the
Northern Department, saw the possible conse-
quences of an enemy drive eastward along the
Mohawk Valley and the need to retain the loyalty
of the Oneidas, the only family of the Six Nations
of the Iroquois to remain neutral. Prompted by the
fears of the inhabitants of Tryon County, he or-
dered the reopening of Fort Stanwix. 3

During the Revolution, Fort Stanwix remained
a frontier fort isolated from Albany and Schenec-
tady, from which it received its direction and major
supplies, by more than 90 miles. It found itself in
the midst of Tories and unfriendly Iroquois. Be-
cause of this isolation it suffered more than its
share of desertions. 4 In 1776 the post commander
complained that he was "not able to get any publick
intelligence, unless I make Particular application
for it at some place more publick." To remedy
the situation, he appointed a post rider to ride be-
tween Fort Stanwix and Albany once a week. His
appeal for intelligence of any kind was almost
desperate. 5

General Schuyler was convinced that the
enemy would one day make its strength felt by
way of the Mohawk Valley, and he resisted any
attempt to weaken that part of th; country. He
objected strenuously to a request from Gen. Horatio
Gates to transfer troops from Fort Stanwix to the
Champlain region. "I cannot think," he said, "of

76 Fort Stanwix

moving Colonel Dayton's Corps from Fort Stan-
wix. If I had any troops to spare I would strengthen
that Quarter as all my Intelligence agrees that some
Blow is Meditated." ,;

Schuyler worked feverishly to strengthen the
fort with much-needed supplies. Unfortunately,
the results were not always equal to the effort.
Although Col. Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Commander
of the 3 New York Regiment, found it "extremely
pleasant and agreeable" when he first arrived, he
soon showed his annoyance at the lack of progress
being made to strengthen the fort. He complained
that construction was moving very slowly. Only
two months before the siege, he noted with some
disgust that "Nothing of any importance [had] yet
been done toward the Strengthening [of] the Forti-
fications which at present has little more than the
name of a Fortification." 7

By the time the siege got underway, the fort
was still largely unprepared. While the garrison
expanded to an approximate strength of 700 on
the eve of the siege, the same could not be said
for the heavy guns that were promised. Although
ordnance supplies were being shipped daily to Fort
Stanwix, Schuyler was finally compelled to admit
to Washington that the garrison was weak and
poorly supplied with cannon. 8 Meanwhile, the siege
had come and gone, but the fort remained without
adequate facilities and supplies.

In the final analysis, the British were largely
to blame for their unsuccessful attempt against Fort
Stanwix. Although they outnumbered the garrison,
they had underestimated their task; by not bringing
guns of a larger caliber with them, they missed an
excellent opportunity. The problems they faced
with a restless and uncertain ally in the Indian was
another factor contributing to their defeat.

Although the records are silent. Fort Stanwix
must have presented a chaotic scene during the
siege. Sleeping quarters were inadequate to house
the normal complement of 400 men. These facili-
ties had been planned but never completed. On
top of this, the garrison suddenly expanded to
about 700 men just before the siege. Although
supplies of all kinds were arriving daily, there
were many shortages, from clothing and eating
utensils to big guns. Faced with a shortage of nor-
mal day-to-day supplies, the men were forced to
improvise, borrow, and share. They slept on floors
and possibly in tents with little bedding and a mini-

mum of comfort, sharing their cooking and eating
utensils and wearing tattered clothes. Fortunately
it was summer, but the cool nights of that region
must have produced considerable discomfort.

Inadequate facilities and lack of supplies must
have seemed intolerable at times, but they were not
the only problems. The garrison during the siege
was made up of Yorkers and Yankees, as well as
continentals and militia. Such a combination must
have produced more than the normal amount of
factionalism and jealousies. Mistrust of the Tryon
County militia (whose members, after all, did come
from an area where loyalties were divided) was
inevitable, and must have added fuel to the fire.

The siege went on for 22 days under these
conditions. In the final analysis, the fact that the
siege was finally raised with the loss of so few men
must be credited to the bravery, courage, and in-
genuity of the garrison.

PROVISIONS

Providing food and supplies for the garrison
at Fort Stanwix proved to be a job of considerable
magnitude, frequently exhausting the patience of
those who commanded the fort. All the logistical
problems faced by Fort Stanwix were common to
any frontier fort. The fort was separated from
Albany and Schenectady by more than 90 miles
of heavily wooded areas. In the spring, summer,
and fall, provisions were loaded onto bateaux, which
sailed westward on the Mohawk River. In the
winter, when the river was not navigable, supplies
were shipped on wagons and sleighs over inland
routes that often proved treacherous. Even when
the elements were conquered, supplies en route
faced the uncertainties of the Tories and their allies,
I the Iroquois, who thrived in large numbers, par-
ticularly in Tryon County.

Nor was the enemy the worst offender; the
men hired to operate the bateaux frequently proved
to be untrustworthy, and often stole the supplies.
General Schuyler decried these practices in the
most vehement language, and when these thieves
were caught redhanded, punishment was severely
meted out.

When the provisions finally did arrive, the
garrison had to contend with other problems. Often
food would either arrive spoiled or would spoil
shortly after its arrival, especially if packaging or
storage facilities were inadequate. The quantity
}f food and supplies available at the fort was fre-
quently insufficient because it was affected by the
luctuating number of men at the fort. Despite
lieneral Schuyler's attempts to make sure that sup-
)lics followed new assignments to the garrison, the
omplicated supply line made this difficult. Then
here was the extensive pilfering at the fort itself.
)ne member of the garrison noted that men fre-
quently broke into the stores and stole provisions. 1

The inconsistency of the supply system often
led to an imbalance in the diet of the soldier. As
early as 1759, complaints were heard from Fort
Stanwix that the "Scurvy begins to make its Ap-
pearance upon some .. . men, who have now been
reduced some time to pork and Flower [sic]." -

The food supplies consumed at Fort Stanwix
consisted largely of salted pork and beef. At times
when cattle were abundant, in an effort to avoid the
ill-effects of too much salted meat, fresh beef was
issued. Thus, in July 1776, while he was command-
ing the Northern Department, General Gates or-
dered his commissary to issue a 4-day ration of
fresh meat and a 3-day ration oi salted meat. As
the number of cattle increased, the commissary
was directed to issue a 5-day ration of fresh meat
and a 2-day ration of salted meat a week. 3

Most important among the foods eaten at Fort
Stanwix were beef, pork, bread, flour, oatmeal, rice,
peas, butter, and salt. Of lesser importance were
cheese, bacon, suet, fish, raisins, and molasses.
Occasionally, different kinds of vegetables were
shipped to the fort, such as potatoes, parsnips, car-
rots, turnips, cabbage, and onions, but these were
intended mainly for the sick. Vegetable seeds were
also sent to the fort to encourage soldiers to plant
their own gardens, and, as a result, several gardens
flourished outside the fort. Beverages usually seen
at Fort Stanwix consisted of beer, cider, rum, and
wine. Rum was a significant part of the soldier's
ration, particularly while he was on fatigue duty.

With spring approaching in 1777, it became
more apparent that the enemy would strike from
the west through Fort Stanwix. The garrison
worked feverishly to make the fort defensible. In
the meantime, Schuyler had reported as early as
August 1776 to Washington that almost 80 days
worth of pork and flour were in store for the garri-

78 Fort Stanwix

son. Moreover, a considerable quantity of flour
was also being shipped from Schenectady, and be-
cause the garrison had 23 head of beef cattle,
Schuyler believed it would have a constant supply
of fresh meat on hand. "I am under no apprehen-
sions," he concluded with some optimism, "that the
garrison will be under any Difficulty in the article of
provision." *

In spite of these words of optimism and the
effort made to supply the garrison with provisions,
the desired goal was never reached. In fairness to
Schuyler, however, it should be noted that at the
time he made his statement the garrison numbered
no more than 400 men, whereas the garrison con-
tinued to grow until mid- 1777, when it reached
almost 700. By June 1777 Schuyler had changed
his tune, and he was now complaining that the
quantity of provisions at Fort Stanwix was "very in-
adequate." He directed his subordinates to take
the proper measures without further delay to con-
vey to the fort whatever was needed. 5 Colonel Gan-
sevoort, meanwhile, noted on the eve of the siege
that although his garrison was small, it was too
large for the amount of provisions in store. ,;

Salt provisions, such as salt beef and salt pork,
were especially needed, and condemning more than
20,000 pounds of spoiled salt meat at Fort Stanwix
did not help matters any. Nevertheless, every effort
was being made to supply the fort. On July 10,
1777, John Lansing, aid to Schuyler, wrote to the
commissary of the Northern Department that "The
General wishes you to take the most effectual
Measures to throw into Fort [Stanwix] as much
provisions as will compleat what is now at that post
to a Sufficiency for four hundred men for two
months." At the same time Schuyler reassured
Gansevoort that he would give him all the assistance
in his power. 7

At the beginning of the siege, the commissary
stores at Fort Stanwix consisted of 500 barrels of
Hour. 60 barrels of salted provisions, a quantity of
peas, and 20 head of cattle. In addition. Colonel
Gansevoort had procured 50 head of cattle from
the inhabitants around the fort. s

Salted meat was always at a premium, and
frequently reliance was placed upon livestock,
which was not always plentiful. 1 ' One month after
the siege. I.t. Col. Marinus Willett, second in com-
mand of the garrison, complained about the dismal
situation due to the garrison's lack of provisions.

The garrison, he said, had only an 8-day supply of
salted pork. He had employed every possible
method in his power to supply the garrison with
provisions, but without effect. 10 Although the prob-
lem had somewhat ameliorated with the promise
of a shipment of 40 head of cattle and a quantity of
salt, 11 months later Colonel Gansevoort was com-
plaining that ever

since my Command at this place since the 6th Day of
May last I have been only Supply'd from hand to
mouth and during the Siege [sic] obliged to kill Milch
Cows Hoggs [sic] etc & which I had retained in the
Fort Ditch being the property of the late Inhabitants
of this place when the Enemy opened the Seige [sic]:
from whence this neglect proceeds I cannot tell. 12

A return of the provisions at Fort Stanwix in
May 1778, only eight months after the siege, noted
that the commissary stores consisted of the follow-
ing items: 13

106 barrels of beef

160 "

' pork

470 "

" flour

3i/4

" salt

' soap

5 boxes

>» ))

21/2

" candles

5 hogsheads

rum

16 bushels

beef

4V2 tierces

rice

13 fat cattle

A return of provisions made 7 weeks later by
John Hansen, commissary at Fort Stanwix, noted
the following items on hand:

5 barrels of beef

128 " " pork

433 " " flour

2 " " salt

24 boxes " soap

7 boxes of candles

7 " " rice

an unknown quantity of peas

" fat cattlt
30 gallons hogsheads of rum
% hogshead of brand}
% " rum for the

Indian Department ' '

One may conclude from these two returns th; t
the items were more or less the same as those th; t

Historic Furnishing 79

were probably on hand at the time of the siege.
The quantity of some of these items might have
been larger during the siege, since at that time there
were about 700 people in the fort, whereas by May
1778 the number had been reduced to 45 1. 15

To appreciate fully in what quantities provi-
sions were consumed at Fort Stanwix, a brief word
should be said about rationing. It was evident that
those soldiers on heavy duty were entitled to more
of the commissary stores. In 1780 garrison orders
read:

The several Issuing Commissaries at this post and its
Dependencies, are to Issue provisions as follows Viz,
to Artificers waggoners, Colleirs [sic], Boatmen, wood
Cutters, on Constant hard Duty 24 oz of Bread or
flower [sic], 24 ditto of Beef or 18 oz of pork or fish,
one Jill of Rum [per] Day if it be had, Eight lb of
Soape [perl hundred men, [per] Week one Quart of
salt to Every hundred lb of Beef.

To the troops one lb of Bread or flour and one lb of
Beef Soape salt and Candles as usual, one Jill of Rum
to men on fatigue When to be had.

When there is Vegitables in store, the Rations of flour
is to be Reduced on Quarter of a lb and for every
hundred Weight of flour so Reduced, two and half
iBushells of peas or two and half ditto Beans or Eight
ditto potatoes or twelve ditto Turnips, are to be issued
in proportion for a Greater or Less Quantity.

If at any times the Commissaries are Destitute of flour
at such times a half lb Beef is to be Added to the
Ration of meat aggreable to the Orders of the 2nd
Instant."''

Rum was a major part of the provisions at
Fort Stanwix. As early as 1759 the importance of
rum was clearly recognized when General Gage,
;peaking of bringing supplies through Wood Creek
n November, complained that the garrison at Fort
>tanwix "will not be well pleased to have their
nen up to the middle in Water at that season of the
'ear & not a drop of rum to give them [and] I fear
he King's Troops will suffer greatly from such
iervice." 1T In 1777, at the height of construction,
^olonel Gansevoort appealed to General Gates to
lave a "quantity of Rum . . . sent up immediately
s our fatigue [details] have already been 7 Days
with what little is left." 18 Three days later he
! igned an order for the purchase of 25 gills of rum
1 )r fatigue parties under the engineer's supervi-
i, on. 1 ' 1 In 1776 and 1777, men on fatigue duty —
i inch of which consisted of cutting down trees and

clearing the forest surrounding the fort — wagoners
bringing up supplies, and artificers working on the
fort were always first to get whatever rum was
available.

The quantity of rum issued to each man de-
pended upon whether they were on fatigue duty,
construction work, or some lighter detail. More-
over, the quantity issued to each man varied from
time to time depending upon the quantity of rum
on hand. Reflecting the shortage of rum, in August
1776 General Schuyler directed the commander of
Fort Stanwix to distribute rum "at such times [and]
in such portions as you may think proper to Fa-
tigue men," but cautioned that it should not exceed
one gill a day "unless upon very Extraordinary oc-
casions." -° In October 1777 the commissary was
ordered to deliver a half gill of rum to each man
before he went on fatigue duty and another after
such duty. In Feberuary 1778 fatigue men engaged
in cutting two cords of wood a day were permitted
to have a half pint of rum a day. 21

Although commissary provisions represented
the major par; of a soldier's rations at Fort Stan-
wix. they were not by any means the sole source of
his nourishment. Sutlers who made their way to
the fort and farmers living in the neighborhood of
the fort sold their vegetables, alcoholic beverages,
and wares to the commissary and to the soldiers
directly. Receipts signed by Colonel Gansevoort
on December 13, 1777, and March 7, 1778, reveal
that he purchased peas, oats, and other grain for
the use of his garrison.-- In addition to these items,
cider, turnips, potatoes, cabbage, apples, sugar,
fowl, geese, turkeys, butter, cheese, onions, and
tobacco were also purchased from sutlers and
farmers.

Because abuses in the sale of these items were
flagrant, Colonel Gansevoort felt constrained to
convene a "Court of Regulations" to fix prices on
all items brought to the garrison for sale. Hence-
forth, no farmer, officer, soldier, or anyone else
would be permitted to sell his articles at a price
higher than that set by the court. 23

An item that never appeared in the commis-
sary stores, but which was sought by some men of
the garrison, was milk. The milk was sold to the
soldiers by farmers and even by the inhabitants of
the fort who owned cows. Even in this instance
there was price gouging, and the commandant of
the fort was forced to issue a warning to these per-

SO Fort Stanwix

sons. He reminded them that since "they receive
their Feed from the Publick," 6 pence a quart was
the highest price they could receive for milk. If
any person violated this rule, his cows were to be
expropriated for the use of the sick at the hospital. -■'

There was a variety of items that were either
purchased from sutlers or received directly from
home which retlected the personal preferences of
the soldier. In this respect, officers, many of whom
were from the upper class of society and financially
able, had a greater selection of provisions to choose
from. So good was this source of supply to Colonel
Ganscvoort that in June 1777. while he was com-
plaining of serious shortages of commissary pro-
visions for his men, he wrote to his future wife:
"I must inform you that I have Exceeding [sic]
good living here [with] plenty of Veal Pigions and
Fish of Different Sorts." '-'•"' There is little doubt
that these delicacies were purchased by Colonel
Gansevoort through local sources. Another time
Gansevoort upbraided his brother for not sending
him some lemons when he had asked for them.- r '

While rum was usually a part of the commis-
sary stores and the most common alcoholic bever-
age of the enlisted man, wine, brandy, and other
fine spirits were usually the drinks of the privileged
officer. General Schuyler, a wealthy aristocrat, was
careful to specify imported brandy when he ordered
five kegs for himself and "a Gallon or two for Mrs.
Schuyler at Saratoga." -"

Another means of obtaining provisions, other
than through the commissary, was by growing a
garden. Gardens were encouraged at all times by
providing the commissary at the fort with bushels
of garden seed. At times the commissary ran low
on seed, but when this happened individuals were
able to acquire it by other means. JS Before the
siege took place, guards were posted at the gardens
to prevent anyone from stealing the crops.-' 1 ' Dur-
ing the siege, potatoes were growing in the garden/" 1

Medicines also comprised part of the provi-
sions at Fort Stanwix. A fairly large hospital ex-
isted outside the fort, 31 but once the si -ge gol
underway, this facility was no longer practical.
Although some of the sick were confined to their
quarters, the more serious eases, as well as the
wounded, were sent to the southwest bombproof
where a hospital had been set up.

Although it is difficult to give a precise de-
scription of the medicines that were employed at

Fort Stanwix, there is a very interesting document,
albeit illegible, prepared several months before the
siege, which provides a good picture of what the
situation probably was like. This document is
significant not only because it gives us some idea
of the medicines used, but also because it indicates
the serious shortage of medicines that existed. A
doctor who was at Fort Dayton in the German
Flatts as part of a detachment from Fort Stanwix
(and who later was stationed at Fort Stanwix)
had requested medicines for one of his patients
from Dr. Lewis F. Dunham, the surgeon at Fort
Stanwix. Dr. Dunham was somewhat reluctant to
part with them, but sent them nevertheless with the
following advice:

By the Bearer you have Such Medicines as you men-
tioned, though 1 assure you I know not how to part
with them being half of the kind I have with me and
know not where to get any more this side of New
York. For Mr. Giffords [billious] complaints I send
you a few Pills Composed of [aloes] Soap [gum
ammonia] & Squills three of which [are] to be taken
night & morning Drastic carthart [sic] : [composed] of
Aloes Soap and Calomel [is] to be taken as often as
you may think necessary without paying any Respect
to the Pills. Horse Radish [sic] [is] very essential with
his Diet. . . . My Respect to Mr. Gifford and hope
the Medicines may prove a Balsam to his Complaints.
a Sweet Cordial to my Desires. . . .

If any Bayherry hark Could be procured with you &
[kept] in Cyder [sic] or mild Vinegar a TeaCup full of
[which] now and then might be of the utmost Service
to Mr. Gilford. :! -

Just before the siege. Fort Stanwix received a
supply of medicines. In June 1777 Colonel Ganse-j
voort's brother Leonard, who was then in Albany,
wrote to the Colonel that a Doctor Williams was
headed for the fort with medicines and hospital
supplies. x; Despite this heartening news and a later
shipment, medicines continued to be at such a
premium that only the most serious cases would
get to use them. :|

There are several references in documents
pertaining to other posts in the Northern Depart-
ment which also describe medicines and related
hospital supplies. There is no doubt that these
medicines were also used at Fort Stanwix at one
time or another. At Fort Ticonderoga, the doctoi
ordered chocolate and sugar for the sick in the hos-
pital, and one-half the beef or other meat that ;
soldier normally drew. He also ordered the com

Historic Furnishing 81

missary to purchase sheep for the sick. At the
general hospital in Albany, an inventory of the
stores, revealed, among other things, a gallon of
rum, a gallon of wine, a gallon of molasses, choco-
late, corn, and turnips. 35

As in all logistical operations involving long
supply lines, containers and packages in which food
was stored played a major role. Numerous refer-
ences to different types of containers are made in
the manuscripts of this period. Barrels, bushels,
boxes, bags, and hogsheads, and to a lesser degree,
casks, tierces, firkins, and puncheons, were all con-
tainers in which provisions were shipped to and
stored at the fort in bulk. Glass containers, such
as gallon, quart, and pint bottles, though only
mentioned as units of measurement, must also have
existed in large quantities at Fort Stanwix.

Salted beef and salted pork, two large items,
were usually stored in barrels, but occasionally a
reference is made to "bushels of beef." Other items
that also appeared in barrels were flour, rum, wine,
salt, and even soap. Usually stored in bushels
were corn grain, and peas, and sometimes salt.
The hogshead usually contained rum and brandy.
Rice containers were referred to as "tierces of
rice." References are also made to "flour casks."
Although no references were found to the employ-
ment of bags, the latter must have been used be-
muse the British Army constantly shipped bread
ind peas in bags. Similarly, though no references
vere found to the use of the firkin, it must have
)een used because the British Army shipped and
;tored its butter in firkins.

Glass containers, such as gallons, quarts, and
lints, were probably used to hold rum, brandy,
vine, beer, cider, and other liquids. Frequently,
hese containers stored liquids purchased from sut-
ers or farmers.

Food spoilage represented a very serious logis-

i ical problem to both sides in the Revolution. The

1 )nger the lines of communication, the greater the

j{ roblem. It took several days by boat or wagon to

I lip provisions and supplies to Fort Stanwix from

\t .lbany and Schenectady. Such a long journey

X ithout modern refrigeration caused considerable

Is railage. Proper containers and proper packaging

f) ere imperative if spoilage, particularly of meat,

as to be avoided. In July 1777, on the eve of

e siege, Fort Stanwix found itself with more than

),000 pounds of spoiled salted meat. 30 Such in-

stances of spoilage must have been frequent, be-
cause in April 1778 Lt. Col. Willett issued orders
to fit up the southwest and northwest bombproofs
for the storage of beef and pork provisions. He
further instructed the commissary to take the neces-
sary precautions to see that the beef and pork were
properly examined and well coopered before they
were stored in the bombproofs. 37

ARMS AND ACCOUTERMENTS

A. Large Armaments

Although Fort Stanwix was a solidly built fort
for its clay, it was actually never fully armed with
the proper number of cannon.

In 1758, while it was under construction, 50
cannon and mortars were proposed for the fort.
Each of the four bastions was to carry eight can-
non; the remainder were to grace the curtains and
other sections of the fort. The type and size of
guns to be employed were as follows:

6 eighteen pound iron cannons
12 twelve
12 nine
10 six

2 eight inch Howitzers

2 " mortars

2 thirteen "

4 four and three-fifths iron coehorns

Total : 50 >

This plan to arm the fort with 50 guns was
never realized. About a year later General Gage,
who was superintending the construction of other
forts on the Great Lakes and was desperately in
need of any kind of assistance from Fort Stanwix,
reluctantly admitted that the latter could provide
little help in the way of guns having only one 12-
pounder two 9-pounders, two 6-pounders, four
3-pounders, and two small mortars.- One traveller
through North America in 1765 noted that while
Fort Stanwix was "calculated" for a good many
guns, it had only 18 mounted.' 1 While the fort was
undergoing reconstruction in 1776. an effort was
made to supply it with the necessary guns, but the
attempt was not any more successful than in 1758.

Anticpating the shipment of heavy guns, and
before a detachment of artillerymen could be as-
signed, General Schuyler directed the commander
of Fort Stanwix to

furnish the Officer of Artillery with such a Number of
Men. as will be fully sufficient to work the Cannon in
case of an Attack & they should be constantly exer-
cised in that Business. This will not only be an
advantage to the Regiment In case they [sic] should
be no Artillery men may be at hand, but be of service
to the cause in general, that, one or more of your
Officers, should also be instructed in the Management
of Cannon. 4

It was not until January 1777 that a company
of artillery was dispatched to Fort Stanwix."' In the
meantime, cannon and other guns, including related
equipment and ammunition, were being shipped to
Fort Stanwix. By June 1777 these supplies were
leav ing the quartermaster depot at Schenectady
almost on a daily basis.

In spite of all this activity, however, a report
issued the same month noted that the fort had only
six "small" cannon and two field pieces to defend
it. Schuyler unhappily complained to Washington
that the fort was poorly supplied with cannon. r '

After learning that the enemy had reached
Oswego and was soon to threaten Fort Stanwix.
Schuyler quickly set about sending provisions and
ammunition to the fort, but the effort, unfortun-
ately, bore little fruit. 7 At the end of the siege.
one member of the garrison reported in his journal
that Fort Stanwix had 13 cannon on hand besides
several guns of varying sizes and types taken from
the enemy. 8

Manuscripts reveal that from March through
June 1778 the number and types of cannon at Fort

Stanwix remained essential!) the same. During this

period, the fort had three 9-pounders, four 6-
pounders, and four 3-pounders — a total of 1 1 can-
non. In addition, it had four 4-2/5 caliber Royal
mortars. 1 ' It is very likely that the above cannon
were at least the same type of guns, if not the same
ones, used during the siege.

An excellent inventory of the ordnance, in-
cluding the cannon and mortars noted above, in
store at Fort Stanwix in May 1778 revealed the
following items in the quantities indicated:
1 1 cannon (three 9-pounders, four 6-
pounders, four 3-pounders)

4 Royals, 4-2/5 caliber

4 traveling carriages for 3-pound cannon
9 garrison carriages for 6- and 9-pound

cannon
2,269 round shot
31 cannister shot
393 case shot fixed with flannel cartridges (shot

were in all 3 caliber)
148 grapeshot (for 6- and 9-pounders)
640 wads (for 3-, 6-, and 9-pounders)
360 tubes damaged (3- and 6-pounders)
450 paper cartridges filled (3-, 6-, and 9-

pounders)
849 empty paper cartridges (3-, 6-, 9-
pounders)
40 handspikes (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)
14 spunges (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)
8 ladles (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)
10 wad hooks (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)
14 caps for spunges (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)
1 1 aprons for cannon (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)
8 priming wires (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)
1 1 tompkins (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)
12 lind stocks (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)
8 tube boxes (3-, 6-, 9-pounders)
1 gin ropes
1 set of men's harness
1 coil of rope

5 spunges for Royals
4 aprons for Royals
4 trail spikes
8 post fire stocks
3 dozens of post fires

10 powder horns
1 pincher

1 hammer

2 gimblets
20 coils of slow match

16'/2

4
5
1

63
18

127
3,000

rheems of cartridge paper

sets of dragropes for 3-pounders

haversacks

set of spare wheels for 9-pound carriages

spare carriage for 9-pounders

spare carriage for 6-pounders

gin

boxes of musket balls

oilcloths

hairclothes

shells for Royals

flints

barrels of powder "'

It may be of interest to compare the similarity
of the following partial list of heavy armament and
ordnance supplies, which appeared in a return of
ordnance needed in the Northern Departemnt in
August 1777, with the preceding list of items:
7 tons of 3-pound shot
4 tons of 4-pound shot
3 tons of 6-pound shot
3 dozens of large horns suitable for priming,
cannon, with belts, bits, priming wires,
etc.
12 dozen post fires
Vi ton of slow match
2000 tubes suitable for 3-, 4-, and 6-pounders
200 3-pound flannel cartridges
400 4-pound
200 6-pound

1000 paper cartridges for 4-pounders
1000 " " " 3-pounders

1000 " " 6-pounders

20 sets of men's harnesses

4
2
2

" dragropes
dozen scissors for the laboratory
dozen pairs of pinchers
dozen hammers
500 sheets of lead

2 dozen tube boxes with belts
100 yards of oil cloth for covering
ammunition n

B. Small Arms and Ammunition

Although the written evidence is meager, the
musket was probably the most common small
weapon employed at Fort Stanwix during the

84 Fort Stanwix

siege. Whether the Brown Bess or some other Eng-
lish musket was used is not known, but in all prob-
ability, an English musket was extensively utilized.
On the other hand, there is some concrete evidence
that a French type of musket was also used, in
June 1777, Leonard Gansevoort again wrote to his
brother that "Lieut. Mc Clallen has desired me to
inform you that he has drawn out of the Store sixty
good new French muskets and the like number of
Quality Bayonets, Cartouch Boxes and Bayonet
belts." This written evidence may be corroborated
by the discovery by archeologists of a single iron
forward band said to have probably come from a
French weapon. 12

Although there are few direct references to
the use of the musket at Fort Stanwix, there are
several references to musket ball and musket
cartridges.' n

There arc several documents pertaining to
the Northern Department and to posts in other
parts of the colonies that make references to small
arms and related items. From these documents we
can conclude that generally the same arms and
related equipment were probably employed at Fort
Stanwix. A resolution passed by the New York
Provincial Congress in August 1776 directed that
every person in the military, including the city and
county of Albany and Tryon County, was to fur-
nish himself with a

good Musket or firelock & Bayonet Sword or Toma-
hawk, a Steel Ramrod Worm, Priming Wire and Brush
fitted thereto, a Cartouch Box to contain 32 rounds of
cartridges, 12 flints and a knapsack agreeable to the
directions of the Continental Congress. . . . That every
man shall at his place of abode be also provided with
one pound of powder and three pounds of bullets of
proper size to his musket or firelock."

Pistols, usually carried by officers, were also
used at Fort Stanwix. Reference to such a weapon
appears in a letter from Jermiah Van Rensselaer to
Willett. 15 Swivel guns also might have been items in
use at the fort, but if they were, they were in small
numbers. These guns, along with musket balls,
powder, bullet molds, cartridge paper, and fuzes.
were requested of the New York Provincial Con-
gress by General Schuyler for the Northern Depart-
ment in 1775. 16 A return of ordnance at Fort
Ticondcroga in July 1777 noted, among other types
of supplies on hand, reams of musket cartridge
paper, powder (in whole or half barrels), swivels

(guns), wall pieces (guns), muskets, bayonets,
pistols, bayonet belts, cartouch boxes, bullet molds,
musket cartridges, priming wires, flints, boxes of
musket ball, powder horns, and hand grenades. 17
That same month General Schuyler appealed to
Washington to send him, among other much-needed
items, "a Quantity of fixed Musquet [sic] Am-
munition, cartridge paper." 1 s The following month,
while Fort Stanwix was under siege, the Northern
Department made a note of ordnance stores needed.
Among these items were lead for musket balls,
bullet molds, reams of musket cartridge paper, and
molds for buckshot. 1!)

C. Edged Weapons

There is little documentation, other than on
bayonets and spears, regarding the use of edged
weapons at Fort Stanwix. In July 1777 a soldier
at Fort Stanwix was punished for stealing a bay-
onet.-" The use of bayonets is corroborated by the
discovery of bayonets (one marked "U.S.") by
archeologists in 1972. L>1

In describing his famous raid, Willett noted
that in order not to be encumbered with too many
weapons, his men left the fort with no other weap-
on "but a spear for each, 8 feet in length, which
was intended to serve as a staff as well as a weapon
of defense." Again, this evidence is supported
by the archeologists who found six spear tips in
1972.- :! A source dated May 24. 1781, refers to
spears being thrown "out of their places." 24

The small hatchet or tomahawk may have
been a common weapon at Fort Stanwix, particu-
larly in the hands of the militia. The New York
Provincial Congress provided its troops with small
hatchets, and insisted that each member of the
militia be furnished with either a bayonet or
tomahawk.- 5

Swords, knives, and daggers were probably
also common weapons at Fort Stanwix. although
no specific references in documents have been
found. There were probably a variety of swords
used by officers, and noncommissioned officers must
have used short sabers. Knives and daggers were
especially plentiful, since th \ could be used for
cutting food and other objects, as well as for in-
close fighting. The Massachusetts and Tryon Countj
militias were most likely to be seen with them.

). Accouterments

Historic Furnishing 85

As in the case of small arms and edged
/eapons, specific documentation attesting to the
xistence of accouterments of various sorts is also
ery meager. Nevertheless, the use of tents at Fort
tanwix seems to be established as early as 1759,
nd in 1776 one officer took umbrage at the fact
hat he was obliged to "lye in the tents along with
le men whilst" his superior officer slept quietly
ldoors.-"

Because the tent was indispensable during the
eriods that construction was going on, it is prob-
ble that it may have played a significant role in
ousing some of the men during the siege, when the
arrison was overcrowded. Overcrowding at the
)rt was inevitable, although sources are silent on
lis subject. No doubt some room for the over-
ow was made available in barracks and casemates,
ut it is not unreasonable to suppose that the tent
as employed within the fort in order to absorb
imc of this increase.

The knapsack and canteen were two items

irely mentioned in documents; it is possible that

cy may not have been as plentiful as one would

ive liked. In fact, in April 1778, Lt. Col. Willett

writing to Colonel Gansevoort, who was tem-

orarily away from Fort Stanwix, asked, "Don't

hi think the men ought to have each a Napsack

1 c] of some kind or other in case anything should

l rn up to require us to march, as well as can-

,n. . . ." - 7 The conclusion that there were knap-

cks and canteens is reinforced by the fact that just

fore the siege, men were arriving almost daily

1 the garrison. These men must have carried such

i nis, because a long march was unthinkable with-

t them.

Other accouterments that were undoubtedly
: Fort Stanwix were the powder horn, flints, and
i "touch or cartridge boxes. It is inconceiveable
: t to imagine these items at Fort Stanwix during
i siege. In 1776 the New York Provincial Con-
ss set down what each member of the militia
>uld have in addition to weapons. It directed
; t each man furnish himself with a steel ramrod.
t rm, priming wire (with a brush attached there-
, and a cartouch box containing 23 cartridges,
flints, and a knapsack. 28

Ill

CLOTHING

As late as August 1776, while construction
was underway, the garrison was experiencing a seri-
ous shortage of clothing. Col. Elias Dayton, then
commanding the garrison, reported to General
Schuyler that there were at least 250 men, more
than half the garrison, without shoes, stockings, and
shirts; facing the approaching winter without these
basic items left him somewhat apprehensive. 1 A
year later the situation had hardly ameliorated —
many of the men were still in dire need of some of
these items. To partially relieve this situation, an
inventory was ordered of all hides at the post, pre-
sumably for the purpose of providing substitutes
for shoes. -

Lack of adequate clothing continued to plague
the garrison to the point of affecting morale. It
seemed as if the problem would never improve,
since the shortage was prevalent throughout the
Northern Department. After a strong appeal for
clothing in 1780, the commander at Fort Stanwix
was told that there was not enough clothing in the
public stores, and he was urged to use sparingly
what he had. In order to magnify the seriousness
of this shortage, soldiers were warned that any de-
liberate misconduct that led to the neglect of one's
uniform would lead to severe punishment/'

From time to time clothing supplies arrived
at Fort Stanwix, but frequently they were not in
the quantities desired. In the spring of 1778 Wil-
lett wrote with some pleasure that:

This day we had the pleasing satisfaction of receiving
a number of shirts shoes etc for our soldiers. The
shirts however arc not quite sufficient to enable every
man to be supplied with two. . . .'

shipped consisted of 205 coats, 205 jackets, 400
shirts, 410 pairs of shoes, 274 pairs of stockings,
283 pairs of mittens, 205 hats, and a quantity of
breeches and blankets."'

It may be of value to review several docu-
ments, which, although not directly related to Fort
Stanwix, may have some bearing on the under-
standing of clothing worn at that post. One of
these documents is a letter to General Gates in-
forming him that James Mease, Clothier General
of the Continental Army, was shipping to the
Northern Department, 1,000 coats and 380 shirts.
This letter is important because it reveals the great
variation in outer garments that existed in the Con-
tinental Army. The following types of coats are
quoted verbatim:

300 privates brown faced red

16 sergeants do.

24 privates blue faced red

10 sergeants do.
100 privates brown faced white

95 brown turned green

19 sergeants do. do.
126 privates blue faced red

10 sergeants do. do.
50 privates drab faced red
10 sergeants do. do.

96 privates faced green

20 drummers & fifers green faced blue
18 privates brown faced white

36 brown faced white 6

Bj the end of 1780 a fair amount of clothing In all likelihood some of these coats eventual!

had arrived in Albany, some of which was sched- found their way to Fort Stanwix in time for the col
uled for shipment to Fort Stanwix. Items to be weather.

,86

Another document not directly related to Fort
jtanwix but that might shed light on the type of
Nothing worn contains a list of clothing allowed the
rontinental soldier by an Act of Congress. This
ist, dated September 6, 1777, included coats, vests,
)reeches, shirts, hose, shoes, blankets, linen overalls
for warm weather), woolen overalls (for cold
veather), hats, and hunting shirts. 7

It might be of interest to compare this docu-
nent with one issued in 1781, a resolution passed
)y the Continental Congress directing that all non-
:ommissioned officers and soldiers who are or may
lereafter be enlisted during the war be annually
urnished with:

One Regimental Coat full made
One Cloth Vest
One pair of Cloth Breeches
One pair of Woolen Overalls
Two pairfs] of Woolen Hose
Two pairfs] of Woolen Socks
One Tall Hat or Leathercap
Four Shirts

Two Pairs of Linen Overalls
Four pairs of Strong Shoes
One Blanket
One Rifle Shirt &
One pair of Woolen Gloves
Also one pair of Shoe Buckles and one
Clasp every two years. 8

At this point it might be well to inject several

ieces of evidence which may provide us with clues

mcerning the regimental uniform of the 3 New

ork Regiment. Just prior to the siege. Colonel

ansevoort received one of his frequent letters

|1 Dm his brother reassuring him that the commis-

'|< ry clothier for the Northern Department was in

e process of sending him "76 Coats blue with

;d facings and white lining just your Uniform

gether with the like Number of Infantry Hats." 9

f 1778 an officer at Fort Stanwix wrote to Colonel

S insevoort, who happened to be temporarily in

i bany, to order 8 yards of broadcloth, for him

t the commissary for clothing because his "blue

;l'>ak" had been used for colors at Fort Stanwix. 10

:'] is written evidence suggests that the uniform

jf the 3 New York Regiment was largely blue. The

t' dence produced by Mr. Frederick P. Todd, an

J hority on early American uniforms, appears to

i >stantiate this conclusion, as does Colonel Gan-

sevoort's uniform, presently in the Smithsonian In-
stitution. Dated 1776 the uniform is blue with a
red facing. On the other hand, a portrait of Mari-
nus Willett painted by Ralph Earl sometime be-
tween 1784 and 1795 and owned by the Metro-
politan Museum of Art depicts the uniform as blue
with a white facing. 11

Another document sheds some light on the
clothing worn by the militia in New York. The
Provincial Congress of New York ordered the com-
missary to purchase coarse broadcloth for making
712 short coats, and crimson cloth for making cuffs
and facing. In addition, the commissary was to
purchase light brown coarse broadcloth to make
7 1 2 short coats, with blue cloth for cuffs and fac-
ings, and dark brown coarse broadcloth for making
712 short coats, with scarlet cloth for cuffs and
facings. 12

Watch coats were used at Fort Stanwix in
1781. These were heavy coats worn by the guard
while on sentry duty. One watch coat, for which
the corporal of the guard was accountable, was
furnished each sentry box. 13 Each guard that came
on duty would use the same coat.

Snowshoes were also important items em-
ployed at Fort Stanwix during the winter months.
Snowshoes were made at Fort Stanwix in fairly
large quantities. In early 1777, General Schuyler
ordered Colonel Elmore to "please to cause fifty
pairs of Snow Shoes to be made." 14 When the
guardhouse was consumed by fire in 1780, all the
snowshoes stored there were destroyed. 15

There were several items of clothing worn by
members of the garrison which were not issued by
the commissary. These were personal items either
acquired from families or purchased from sutlers.
The officers were usually in a better position to
acquire these items because they had the money to
buy them and the room to store them. Because of
this fact, officers' clothing was superior to that
worn by the enlisted man. An excellent case in
point was the clothing worn by the Army chaplain
at Fort George. His inventory of clothing seemed
endless, and it was apparent that much of it was
not commissary issue. It consisted of:

hat

cloak

greatcoat

coat

jacket and breeches (thick cloth)

88 Fort Stanwix

coat and jacket

knit breeches

striped jacket

blue waistcoat

2 pairs of black stockings

" " " grey

" " blue yarns

1 pair of Indian stockings

2 pairs of shoes

1 pair of boots

7 shirts

3 bands

3 long neck cloths

3 stocks

1 silk handkerchief

1 white

1 check

Gloves, mittens

buckles, etc.

1 bed of wool

1 Check woolen blanket

1 white

•

1 pair of linen sheets

1 woolen sheet

1 pillow

2 pillow coats

2 towels 1(i

INDIAN SUPPLIES

Situated in the midst of the Iroquois Confed-
-acy, Fort Stanwix was literally at the crossroads
f Indian traffic. Treaties were made there and
idians frequently visited. General Schuyler
orked incessantly to improve relations with the
ioquois, and he used Fort Stanwix as his base of
Derations. He attached considerable importance
i having goods for the Indians, either for purchase
• gifts, a precedent long ago established by the
ritish. He took special pains to see that all his
)sts in the Northern Department, especially Fort
anwix, were adequately supplied with goods for
is purpose. In 1776 Schuyler wrote to Congress
at:

should order to the value of about fifteen hundred
i ainds in Indian goods to Fort Stanwix to be there
I sposed of at such a price as to give no umbrage to
I e Indians and that the States may not lose above four
i indred pounds upon them. . . - 1

In January 1777, Schuyler ordered Colonel
I more to purchase 20 pounds of goods as gifts
Br the Indians. Fifteen months later the Board of
i dian Commissioners for Indian Affairs at Albany
I it a quantity of goods to Fort Stanwix, also to be
! ed as gifts for the Indians. Meanwhile, members
1 the garrison were warned not to purchase these

ods from the Indians on pain of being punished. 2

So significant was this activity at Fort Stanwix

it in December 1776 John Hansen, the commis-

a y at the fort, requested Colonel Elmore to set

s de a room for Indian goods. The room he re-

ved adjoined the one in which he resided. His

plans were to connect the two rooms by means of
a doorway so that there would be only one door
from the outside leading to both rooms. Appar-
ently he decided upon this plan in order to have
better control over the supply in his charge. Han-
sen immediately sent word to Reverend Kirkland,
who was both chaplain to the garrison at Fort Stan-
wix and missionary among the Indians, to pass on
to the friendly Oneidas that he had received large
quantities of supplies for them/'

From the sources on hand it is difficult to
identify all the supplies available to the Indians,
but rum was a major item. One Officer in Colonel
Dayton's regiment said that "Rum is an Article
we are obliged to give them [viz Indians] & many
of them cannot be pacified till quite drunk." 4

Next to rum, clothing and blankets were also
widely sought by the Indians, particularly during
the cold weather. General Schuyler told Congress
that there were Indians in Albany who complained
constantly because of lack of clothing and blankets.
Schuyler said with some despair that "To transact
Business with Indians at any Time is a most dis-
agreeable Task. To do it with empty hands greatly
increases the Difficulties." 5

Schuyler sought assistance from every quarter
in obtaining Indian supplies, and in 1777 he re-
quested blankets, blue strands, vermillion, knives,
long and short pipes, and coarse white linen for
shirts from Boston through an agent of Congress.
Some of these items were destined for Fort Stan-
wix/' Other items provided the Indians at Fort

Stanwix were bread and beef.'
were other provisions.

No doubt there

LIVESTOCK

Livestock was employed in two ways at Fort
Stanwix: first, as food, and second, as draft ani-
mals. Horses, beef cattle, milk cows, and hogs
were found at the fort during the siege, and in all
probability poultry was there also.

Beef cattle were a major food of the garrison,
and were usually found in the commissary's re-
turns. The number of cattle often fluctuated de-
pending upon the number of people in the garrison
and upon the erratic behavior of the supply line.
In August 1776 the fort had about 23 head of
cattle to provide fresh meat for the garrison. 1

One year later, soon after the siege. Fort Stan-
wix complained about the shortage of provisions,
but the general commissary in Albany could not
understand the justification for this complaint
when the latest commissary return revealed that the
garrison had 42 head of cattle. He conceded, how-
ever, that the cattle "must have been small." - De-
spite what might have been a misunderstanding.
2 months later 40 head of cattle were on their way
to Fort Stanwix.' 5 Meanwhile, as late as December
1 780, 47 head of cattle were shipped to the garri-
son, but this was probably the last big shipment
before the fort was evacuated.'

The cattle that were sent to Fort Stanwix
were eventually slaughtered, salted, and barreled.
Several barrels of salt were usually on hand for
barreling cattle. The barrels were often made at
the fort. Thus the commander was ordered in 1780
"to get at least 300 Beef Barrels made instantly." "'
The British often shipped staves, hoops and back-
ings, along with other provisions, to their forces in
America where barrels were then made. The same
procedure was probably employed by the
Americans.

Some of the cattle were served as fresh meat,
and officers usually reaped the benefits. An order
issued in 1780 directed the commissary at Fort
Stanwix to issue a 3-day ration of fresh meat for
the officers of the carrison. ,:

Milch cows and hogs also made up part ol
the livestock, but these were probably small ir
number. Moreover, this livestock was usually pri-
vately owned, either by members of the garrison
itself or by neighboring farmers. During the siege
Colonel Gansevoort was forced to slaughter milch
cows and hogs, "the property of the late inhabi-
tants" of Fort Stanwix, in order to supplement hi
inadequate provisions. 7

The owners of milch cows sometimes pre-
sented problems to the garrison. Although miU
was always welcomed, they often sold it at ex-
orbitant prices. In September 1777 the commandei
was compelled to put a ceiling on the price ol
milk, setting it at 6 pence a quart. He reminded
these owners that their cows received feed from the
public lands, and he cautioned them that if the
price ceiling was violated, he would have their cows
expropriated and turned over to the hospital. 8

Hogs proved to be a nuisance; they were fre-
quently let loose about the fort, injuring the works
At one point owners of these animals were ordered
to have their hogs "ringed" on penalty of havinc
them expropriated."

Records dating as early as 1765 indicate thai
horses as well as oxen were employed at Fort Stan-
wix for pulling wagons transporting boats and sup-
plies from the Mohawk River to Wood Creek."
Horses were also used for carrying couriers and the
commander of the fort. In late 1776 there were
sufficient horses to warrant the assignment of r
blacksmith to the fort. 11

.lust prior to the siege. Colonel Ganse\oon
requested two horses to be kept at "My Place foi
any Sudden Emergency." 12 Whether they wen.
finally made available to Colonel Gansevoort is not
clear, but it is certain that at least seven horse;
were at Fort Stanwix during the siege, and the)
were used for pulling wagons. In Willett's famous
raid, seven supply wagons from the fort were usee
to cart away the plunder. 1 ' 5

HARDWARE, UTENSILS, FURNITURE,
AND ACCESSORIES

jf. Engineer Stores

Engineer stores, as at many forts of the pe-
iod, made up a very large segment of the furnish-
ngs at Fort Stanwix. Since the time of its
eoccupation by the Americans and long after the
iege, it was constantly under construction. The
esult was that there were always large quantities
"f tools and construction materials at the site.'

The situation was similar at almost every post
i l the Northern Department where the construction
i f fortifications was going on in contemplation of
lie attack that was expected from Canada. Tools
i uch as axes (including the pickaxe, wood axe,
; nd broadaxe), spades, and shovels, were always
i 1 great demand. So desperate was General Schuy-
| t for axes at one time that he wrote to the com-
t littees of several towns and districts in the counties
I: f Albany, Berkshire, and Bennington entreating
| lem to procure whatever axes could be spared
om the inhabitants. 2

Perhaps the best available document, which

;tails the kinds and quantities of engineer stores at

f ort Stanwix close to the period of the siege, is an

. ventory of May 1, 1778. The following tools and

lilding materials are listed:

Item

picks

bill hooks

cross cut saws

iron wedges

grapling irons

axes

spades

crow bars

Number

280
105

133

broad axes

bars of iron

bars of steel

barrels of nails

barrels of spikes

chest of carpenters tools

iron squares

adzes

barrels of tar

set of blacksmith tools

wagons

grindstones

whip saws

7 3

It is very probable that other types of tools
were at Fort Stanwix besides those classified as
engineer stores, but they may have been personal
items. For example, because many of the gardens
were maintained as an individual preference,
it is quite likely that garden tools were private
belongings.

There are other documents not directly as-
sociated with Fort Stanwix, but relating to other
posts in the Northern Department, which provide
additional examples of engineer stores that might
have been employed at Fort Stanwix. Some of
these consist of hoes, hammers, mill saws, trowels,
and wheel barrows. The following items appeared
at many posts in the Northern Department, and
may also have been found in varying degrees at
Fort Stanwix before, during, and after the siege:
casks of penny nails and spike nails, oakum, bar-
rels of pitch, bar iron, steel, twine, casks of tin
plates, paint brushes, barrels of oil, boxes of tin,
kegs of white lead, gimlets, gin blocks, and wire. 4

92 Fort Stanwix

15. Housewares, Utensils, and Glassware C. Furniture and Accessories

There arc few historical records that specifi-
cally refer to the housewares and utensils used at
Fort Stanwix. Nevertheless, we are able to deter-
mine what was probably used at the fort by ex-
amining documents pertaining to other forts of
the period.

The members of the garrison did most of their
own cooking in their rooms and they needed pots,
kettles, and pans in addition to plates, bowls, plat-
ters, cups, knives, spoons, and forks. They also
probably had salt and pepper shakers, as well as
vinegar to spice their food. As early as 1776 when
construction was begun to retore Fort Stanwix, the
garrison suffered from a shortage of cooking
equipment. Almost on the eve of the siege,
Colonel Gansevoort complained to General Schuy-
ler that his garrison was so destitute of utensils for
cooking that the men either had to double up on
the use of utensils, and thus wait a long time to eat,
or else they had to cook by other less sanitary
means. He attributed the large number of sick
men in his garrison to the unsanitary preparation
of food. 5

A document originating in 1768 describes
the cooking and eating utensils employed by sol-
diers in South Carolina and notes that each room
occupied by soldiers was to have a pot, frying pan,
ladle, flesh fork (fleshook). trivet, pothook, platters,
bowls, pitchers, mugs, and trenchers." Because it
was shared by several persons in a room, the brass
kettle was very much in demand and received con-
siderable attention at Fort Stanwix, as well as at
other posts. 7

Little is known about the kind of spoons,
forks, knives, cups, and plates employed at Fort
Stanwix. Some of these items may have been made
of tin, pewter, wood, and earthenware. Fortun-
ately, there is a 1778 reference to the use of one-
pint tin cups at Fort Stanwix. s Documents relating
to other posts generally refer to wooden bowls and
wooden spoons. This later reference may have
been intended to describe ladles rather than spoons.
Ceramic dishes were also common, but such items
were probably found in the officers' quarters, where
many may have been personal items. In archco-
logical explorations conducted at Fort Stanwix.
rcstorablc plates, bottles, and cutlery were
discovered.

Those items of furniture that were made of
wood are difficult to document at Fort Stanwix.
On the other hand, those items made of iron are
easier to trace. Despite the paucity of documents
related to Fort Stanwix on this subject, however,
there are documents relating to other posts that
may lead to some reasonable conclusions.

In 1776 General Schuyler issued orders to his
deputy quartermaster general to make available to
garrisons at all posts in the Northern Department
undergoing construction, including Fort Stanwix.
sufficient "bedding or straw." "firewood," and
"barrack utensils," the latter to include items such
as pails, tongs, shovels, and trammels. These items
were to be delivered to the barrack master of each
garrison, who was to be accountable for them. 10

Several other documents make isolated references
to bedding, straw, bunks, pails, "benches" or a
bench bed," and to gridirons, but the information
is far too meager to obtain a comprehensive pic-
ture of the furnishings of rooms in Fort Stanwix.
In 1768 South Carolina provided each room
with 1 pair of dog irons, 1 shovel. 1 pair of tongs,

1 broom, 1 tub or box to carry out dirt. 1 long
table, 2 forms (chairs). 12 trenchers. 1 hatchet. 1
candlestick, a rack for firearms, wooden pees to
hang knapsacks or clothing, 2 chamber pots, and for
every two men 1 bedstead. 1 bed. 1 bolster, and
3 blankets. 11

Another source originating in 1767 describes
an almost identical list of furniture and accessories
in use at posts in the northern region. This docu-
ment lists such items as 36 beds. 36 bolsters. 107
blankets, 24 berths, 3 tables, 7 forms, 12 pairs ol
dog irons, 12 pairs of tongs. 12 fire shovels. 12
candlesticks, 12 iron pots (possibly chamber pots).

2 chimney ropes. 123'/2 cords of wood, candles
and hay. The reference to 12 pairs of dog irons
and tongs, and to 1 2 shovels, candlesticks, and iror
pots may be an indication that there were 1.
rooms. 1 '-'

A return of furniture for the same post t
months later noted that there were 48 beds. 4f
bolsters. 12 rugs. 131 blankets. 26 berths. 3 tables
7 forms. 12 pairs of dog irons. 12 pairs of tones. 1'
fire shovels. 12 candlesticks. 12 iron pots. an(
2 chimney ropes. 18

In 1776 the Committee of War of New Yorl

Historic Furnishing 93

State instructed its barrack masters to furnish each
officer's room with one pair of andirons, one pair
of tongs, one table, two chairs, and one candlestick.
For each noncommissioned officer's and soldier's
room containing 20 men, he was to furnish 10
cribs (2 men to a crib), 10 bedcases, and 10 bol-
sters (to be filled with straw every 3 months), 2 iron
pots, 2 trammels, 1 pair of tongs, 1 wood axe, 1
iron candlestick, 1 table, 2 benches, and 1
bucket." It is obvious from these sources, even
taking into account the difference of 8 or 9 years
between them, that the general furnishings of mili-
tary posts in South Carolina were not materially
different from those in New York.

That same year the Committee of Safety in
New York delivered barrack furniture to Conti-
nental troops amounting to a total of 680 benches.
393 tables, 8516 cords of wood, 261 cots, some
anterns, 249' - { pounds of candles, and 65 candle-
stick s. 15

From what has been learned of the furniture
»nd accessories in use at various posts within the
:olonies, a convincing picture can be established
:>f the furniture employed at Fort Stanwix.

Personal items of furniture, although few.
night well have adorned parts of the fort, but in
ill probability if any such furniture did exist, it
vould have been found in the officers' quarters,
t is known, for example, that Colonel Gansevoort
lad his "camp stool" sent to him at Fort Stanwix
w his mother. 1,;

VII

THE FURNISHED AREAS

A. Parade Ground and Bastions

For purposes of this study the parade ground
includes not only the square of the fort, but the
four bastions as well. In order to describe the
appearance of this extensive part of the fort's ex-
terior surface, an attempt should be made to lo-
cate the large guns, the sentry boxes, the flagpole
and its flag (or flags), the whipping post, wells,
woodpiles, haystacks, wagons, sleighs, animal life,
and any other object, short of buildings, existing
on the fort's surface, particularly during the siege.

1. Guns

In addition to the buildings within the fort,
cannon were perhaps the most conspicuous objects.
Although the fort had been constructed with as
many as 35 embrasures to receive an equal num-
ber of cannon (6 to each of the 4 bastions, 2 to
each of the 4 curtains, and 3 in the ravelin), there
never were that many fixed, because cannon were
always extremely difficult to acquire in the North-
ern Department. 1

Although there is some doubt as to whether
all four bastions were completed at the time of the
siege, there is every reason to believe that all four
bastions were manned at the beginning of the bat-
tle. Hence. Willett records that 1 captain, 3 lieu-
tenants, 4 sergeants, 1 drummer, and 80 privates
were to man the bastions in case of an alarm — 1
officer, 1 sergeant, I corporal, and 20 privates to a
bastion.- If there was a total of 80 privates to man
the bastions — 20 to a bastion — then there had to
be 4 bastions manned. The captain, who was the
fourth officer, in addition to commanding the whole
detachment, also assumed charge of one of the

bastions. The orders issued at this time also directed
that in case of alarm the whole garrison was to turn
out immediately and assume their posts as follows:

Major Bedlams Detachment to man the S. E. Bastion
and adjacent Curtain, Captains Aorson and Jansen to
man the S. W. Bastion, Capt. Benshousen and Tiebout
to man the N.W. Bastion Captains Dewitt Swartout
and Bleeker to man the N. E. Bastion. Capt. Greggs
Company to repair on the Parade till further Orders. 3

Even if a fourth bastion had not been com-
pleted, 4 the evidence is fairly conclusive that there
were probably cannon on all four bastions. There
might have been a difference, however, in the type
of carriages employed in the unfinished bastion.
Whereas the three completed bastions probably
had stationary carriages mounted on platforms, the
unfinished one might have had cannon mounted
on movable carriages.

Although several documents record the num-
ber and types of large guns at Fort Stanwick, there
is one that, because of its timeliness, is of great
importance. This document, dated August 23.
1777. immediately after the siege was lifted, rec-
ords that "mortars formerly the Enemys, and all
the Cannon from the Bastions amounting in the
whole to 13" were fired as a salute to General
Benedict Arnold and his troops upon their arrival
at the fort."'

The same source noted that in the early days
oi the siege "Two Cannon from the S W Bastion
loaded with Grape Shott (sic] were Fired at the
Barnes [sic] to drive of [f] the Enemys Indians that
might have been Sculking [sic] About." ,; This in-
dicates that there were at least two cannon on the
southwest bastion.

Six months after the siege had been lifted.
Fort Stanwix reported in its ordnance returns three

v>4

9-pounders, four 6-pounders, and four 3-pounders
— a total of 1 1 cannon in addition to four 4-2/5
caliber mortar Royals. 7

A contemporary map of Fort Stanwix depicts
the southwest bastion with 3 cannon, the northwest
bastion with 4 cannon, the northeast bastion with 3
cannon, and the southeast bastion with 4 cannon — a
total of 14 guns. 8 This map appears to be in conflict
with other contemporary sources. The two ord-
nance returns of March and May 1 778 show 1 1
cannon, whereas the de Fleury map delineates 14.
It should be noted, however, that the ordnance
returns were prepared from seven to nine months
after the siege, while de Fleury's map, though pre-
pared sometime after the siege (possibly 1778),
was actually depicting the situation as it was during
the siege, albeit from memory. Nevertheless, the
map comes closest to corroborating Colbraith's
journal.

In 1780 orders were issued directing that a

'Brass Field Piece" be placed in the center of the

parade ground opposite the main gate. 5 ' The impli-

:ation is that the gun had been at another location

within the fort. Thus, while it was customary in

nost forts to place the brass field cannon in the

;enter of the parade ground facing the sally port,

it would appear that at Fort Stanwix the practice

vas to place it at other points within the fort. From

his it can be assumed that the same practice of

noving the field piece could have prevailed during

he siege. In view of the cannon shortage, it is

lifficult to conceive of this one cannon being sta-

ioned in the center of the parade ground at the

ime of the siege, when it could have served a

nore active role on a bastion, curtain, or ravelin.

t may be that this cannon was employed on the

nfinished bastion where embrasures were yet to be

onstructed.

The precise size of cannon during the siege
; difficult to determine in the absence of more
t mely documentation. It is known, however, that
j ist before the siege there were only small cannon.
he returns of ordnances of March and May 1778
jr :veal that there were 3-pounders, 6-pounders, and
p -pounders. It is very likely that the 1 3 or 14 guns
t lat were at the fort during the siege were not
'l igger.

To place the guns in their exact locations is
B so difficult without more precise documentation.
1 he de Fleury map does show that 1 1 guns were

distributed among the four bastions. The other
two or three were probably near the curtains or
ravelin of the fort. The three or four mortars that
were at the fort during the siege may have filled
in the more critical gaps along the curtains.

Most of the cannon were stationary, their
carriages constructed of oak and iron. They were
probably painted black with the cannon resting on
a platform. The cannon balls were mounted on
the ground in a pyramidal shape alongside the
cannon. The cannon balls, including the powder
kegs, might have been covered with oilcloth when
not in use to protect them from the weather. Ar-
tillery equipment needed to operate the cannon,
much of which is listed in Chapter II, also remained
in readiness alongside the cannon.

2. Sentry Boxes

There are several early references to sentry
boxes at Fort Stanwix. A statement by the engi-
neer in 1777 indicates that he had sentry boxes
constructed, 1 " although he did not say how many
or where they were built. An order in May 1778
directs the "Superintendent of the Engineers De-
partment" to see that all sentry boxes were in
good order and fixed so that they could not be
blown down." Once again, there is no hint of the
number or the location of such structures, although
one might infer from this last reference that they
might have been located in areas subject to strong
winds.

The first reference to the number of sentry
boxes appears in January 1781, although in-
directly, in an entry in an orderly book. It read
as follows.

A watch Coate [sic] will be furnished for Each Sentry
Box on the Basteens [sic] for which the Corpl of the
Guard is to be Accountable. 12

This statement infers that there were at least
four sentry boxes, one on each bastion, but sentry
boxes may also have been located in other areas, as
for example adjacent to the guardhouse, at the en-
trance to the sally port, or even at the entrance
to the headquarters. There is evidence that guards
and sentries were posted at these locations.™ A
drawing on a powder horn belonging to James Wil-
son, depicting Fort Stanwix in 1779-80, while
Wilson was stationed there, shows five sentry boxes
— one on each of the bastions and one in front of

96 Fort Stanwix

the entrance to the main gate." According to this
very crude illustration, the sentry boxes were lo-
cated at the extreme points of the bastions.

The sentry boxes were probably very plainly
furnished with few comforts for the soldier per-
forming sentry duty. There was one item, how-
ever, furnished each sentry box — a watch coat to
be used by soldiers on sentry duty — although the
evidence may not be contemporary with the siege.
A watch coat was a fairly common item employed
throughout the Northern Department where the
climate was extremely cold.

3. Wells and Water Barrels

A reference from a contemporary account
leaves some idea as to how the garrison got its
water. Written midway in the siege, this account
says that:

This Day the Enemy having Observed that we brought
water from the Creek altered its Course so that it
became dry. This would have done us much Damage
had we not been able to open two wells in the Gar-
rison which with one We had already proved a
Sufficient Supply. 1 "'

It is obvious from this account that before the
siege the garrison obtained its water from the
creek. In anticipation of what actually happened,
the garrison wisely constructed two wells. The very
same day that Colbraith recorded this event in his
journal, orders were issued to keep barrels con-
stantly filled with water, presumably not only for
drinking but for cooking and washing."'

Undoubtedly there were three wells at the time
of the siege, but their manner of construction and
location cannot be precisely determined on the
basis of written evidence. An original bank note
issued by the Bank of Rome. Rome, New York,
in 1832 depicts an oversimplified Fort Stanwix.
with a blockhouse and a magazine, and with one
well near the center of the north casemate. 17
Judging from this very simplified version, this evi-
dence cannot be taken as the last word.

Mr. John Luzader may have the answer to
the other part of the question, that is. the wells'
construction. He says that

While it would be easy to generalize, we can be safe

in assuming that the wells mentioned in documents
relating to the fort referred to relatively shallow ones.

perhaps lined, at least near the top, with local stone
and capped by a wooden pump. Pumps were relatively
easy to construct and were capable of a steadier supply
of water in case of fire or other emergency. If a pump
was not used, the well was equipped with a windlass
and well-box. In connection with the lining, there were
occasions when, in the absence of adequate stone,
barrels were employed. 1 s

The wording in the directive of August 11,
1777, clearly suggests that barrels filled with water
were used extensively at the fort. These were
located as close as possible to sites where groups
congregated, inside or outside of buildings. There
were probably one on each of the bastions, one or
two inside the guardhouse, one in the storeroom,
one in the headquarters, one or two in each of the
barracks and casemates, and some located around
the ramparts of the fort.

4. Whipping Post

Punishment at Fort Stanwix took many forms
— confinement, running the gauntlet, performing
heavy duty with their legs bound with blocks and
chains, and flogging. Aside from confinement.
Hogging was perhaps the most common form of
punishment. There are several references to Hog-
ging at the whipping post in contemporary accounts.
Unfortunately, no mention is made of such punish-
ment during the siege, maybe because Hogging was
done on the parade ground in the presence of a
formal review of the garrison, and the siege did
not permit this. Instead, men punished for a viola-
tion were confined.

Because flogging took place in full view of
the garrison, the whipping post was probably in
the center of the parade ground. There is no his-
torical evidence showing the whipping post's ap-
pearance, but one document related to Fort Stanwix
notes that

4 [men] were brought in and sentenced by the I.ieut.
Col. to stand 1 hour stripped and tied altogether at
the whipping post, which was immediately put in
execution. 19

From this account it can be concluded that
the whipping post was constructed to facilitate the
whipping of at least four men at one time. Mr
Orville W. Carroll has researched the details of
a whipping post and may therefore have the
solution.-'"

Historic Furnishing 97

5. Woodpiles and Haystacks

Firewood for cooking and heating and hay for
feeding livestock were two important items fre-
quently mentioned at Fort Stanwix. In January
1777, General Schuyler, very much aware of the
cold winters at Fort Stanwix, ordered the deputy
quartermaster general "to take Measures for pro-
viding" the garrison with firewood. 21 Fatigue
parties, at least before and after the siege, were
always getting firewood in great quantities. The
following will give some idea as to how fatigue
parties worked: the officers who commanded these
details daily divided their men into three groups —
the first to cut trees, the second to split logs with
wedges, 2 - and the third to pile the wood. At one
time, men assigned to cut wood were given orders
that each man was to cut at least 1 V2 cords of
wood a day, and "Whoever is found Deficient of
that Quantity Shall be Mult [sic] of their whole pay
from the time they first began to Cutt." 23

Even while the siege was underway, fatigue
parties were sent out in the middle of the night to
bring in firewood, sometimes in great quantities. 24
The distance they went could not have been very
far for obvious reasons, and moreover it was sound
policy to clear the ground around the fort of trees
as much as possible. 25

The trees around the fort were of several
kinds. The swamp on the southwest side of the fort
consisted largely of pine and white cedar. There
were also white pines in the swamp on the east side
of the fort. The rest of the woods surrounding the
fort consisted of elm, beech, rock maple, birch,
poplar, and a few wild cherries. 20

There is considerable evidence to show that
after the wood was cut, it was driven by wagon or
sleigh, depending on the time of the year, to the
fort. 27 There is no historical evidence, however,
to indicate whether the wood was piled inside or
outside the fort. It can be concluded that during
the siege there probably existed one or more wood-
piles centrally located within the fort, because, as
with water, the garrison had to make sure it would
be continually supplied with this important pro-
vision. In this respect it may be of interest to note
hat in November 1780 the quartermaster sergeant
vas directed to distribute firewood every other day
'to Enable him to Make a Beginning for a Maga-
:ine," and because the weather was moderate, a

small quantity of wood was sufficient for each
room. 2S Although this source is dated well after the
siege, it provides sufficient evidence that a magazine
for firewood was probably nothing new inside the
fort. It is fairly reasonable to suppose that one or
more woodpiles were probably placed close enough
to the buildings to make firewood easily available.

Hay, like firewood and water, needed to be on
the inside of the fort in sufficient quantities to feed
the horses. This was especially true during the
siege. However, there are several references to hay
stacked outside the fort during and after the siege.
This was logical because haystacks would have
taken up too much room on the parade ground.
In an entry of August 3, 1777, Colbraith recorded
in his journal that on that afternoon the enemy
carried off some hay from a field near the fort.
Again on August 10, 1777, he recorded that around
3 o'clock that afternoon the enemy was seen
running across a field adjoining the fort and setting
fire to some haystacks. In still another entry of
August 4, 1777. Colbraith noted that on that night
a party from the garrison was sent out to bring
back 27 stacks of hay, which were then placed in
the "trench" (probably the ditch), setting a house
and barn on fire so that the enemy could not use
them to its advantage.

One month after the siege Willett referred to
a party of men collecting hay "which lies in the
fields"' and having it properly stacked for use of
the garrison. 29

Evidence of haystacks outside the fort is con-
clusive. Nevertheless the situation being what it
was — the fort under siege and several horses and
possibly other animals confined inside — logic would
have dictated that haystacks should have been
stored on the inside. Some attempt must have been
made either prior to or during the siege to keep
enough hay inside the fort. At least one sizeable
haystack must have been close to where the horses
stood.

6. Temporary Storage of Provisions and
Ammunition

From time to time the parade ground became
the temporary storage place for provisions and
ammunition. Ammunition and equipment em-
ployed in the firing of a cannon were located next
to each gun, where they could be quickly reached.

98 Fort Stanwix

In order to protect the exposed ammunition and
powder, they were sometimes covered by oil-
cloths. 1 "

A most unusual event occurred on August 9,
1777. Colbraith tells us that on "This Day the
[Colonel] ordered all the Provisions to be brought
upon the Parade for fear of the Shells Setting Fire
to the Barracks and thereby destroying it . . ." 31
How long the provisions remained on the parade
ground is not known, but apparently the practice
was not an unusual one. Several months later Wil-
lett records a similar incident:

Garrison being destitute of proper Stores for the
provisions, Lieut Tapp is to see, that a Number of
spars are provided and Laid along the Parade in
Order to Roll the Beef and Pork upon, which are
to be Cover'd with Boards in the best manner possible,
until proper stores are provided for that purpose.
The Adjutant will Supply him with a Sufficient
Number of Men for this Business. :i -

How often such incidents happened is hard to
say. It is not too difficult to envision in the midst
of the siege, when the fort was so congested, a
parade ground covered with provisions, arms, and
ammunition sometimes in complete disorder.

7. Wagons and Sleighs

In a previous section, it was explained how
horses were used at Fort Stanwix chiefly for pull-
ing wagons and sleighs loaded with supplies.
Colonel Gansevoort felt it necessary to request two
horses for himself and his staff in the event of a
"sudden emergency." 33 Willett wrote several
years after the siege that there were seven wagons
with horses in the fort during the battle.' 5 '
Wagons and sleighs were used extensively for bring-
ing in firewood and hay gathered from the sur-
rounding woods and fields. They were also used
extensively for bringing in supplies brought up by
bateaux on the Mohawk River. In one instance
horses ami wagons were sent as far as Oriskany—
some 20 miles — to pick up hay. :ir>

Sleighs were used when snow prevented the
use of wagons. i,! Frequently sleighs, which brought
up supplies from the east when the river was un-
navigable, were temporarily housed at the fort,
adding to the congestion. These sleighs were im-
mediately put to use by the garrison in bringing in

firewood. In February 1781 a caravan of 50
sleighs arrived at the fort, and these were quickly
employed for the next few weeks in carrying wood
for the garrison.'' 7

Records reveal that before and after the siege,
horses and wagons as well as cows were kept in-
side the fort. In September 1777 the Officer in
charge of the guard was ordered to see that no
horses or cattle "are Suffered to go in the Ditch." 38

Of far greater interest is a later directive is-
sued to the Officer in charge of the guard to see
that "all the Slays [sic]. Horses & Cows are turn'd
out of the Garrison, before the Gates are shut as
they are a Nusance [sic] to the Garrison." :!!l One
can interpret this to mean that up to this time
horses, cows, and wagons were kept inside the
fort. It can also be concluded after reviewing the
evidence that horses, cows, and wagons were kept
outside as well as inside the fort, depending on cir-
cumstances and the whims of those in command.
Logic certainly dictated that during the siege they
would have been kept inside the fort.

8. Tents

There is no historical evidence that tents were
used inside the fort during the siege. There is con-
siderable evidence, however, indicating they were
used before and after the siege. There are several
references to the use of "markees" in late 1776.
Ebeneezer Elmer, a member of the 3 New Jersey
Continentals, records that he retired to "Colo.
Whites Markee & to Rest." Several weeks later he
again recorded with some resentment, that he was
"obliged to lye in the Tents along with the men
whilst the [his commanding officer] in quietude
sleeps etc. in House." 4 " Several days later Elmer
was still sleeping in a markee. and he noted that
as many as 51 men were "employed in getting &
Hailing [sic] Shingles & Wood etc. — Besides the
Artificers & Sawyers [sic] Lodged in the Markee
with the Serjiants [sic] etc as Usual." 41

In 1780 orders were issued to "Collect the
tents and put them in Store." This can be in-
terpreted to mean that tents had probably been used
from time to time within the fort, although these
tents may also have been used after a King march.

I here was always a shortage of sleeping quar-
ters in 1776, and General Schuyler was deeplj con-
cerned about the approaching winter.'- On the

Historic Furnishing 99

other hand, as long as the weather was relatively
mild, as during the summer months when the siege
took place, tents could readily be used. Moreover,
the 700 or more people at the fort during the siege
were too many for permanent facilities to absorb,
and tents were the best substitute. In the several
references to crowding in the barracks at Fort Ti-
conderoga. General Schuyler made a strong plea
to Congress for more tents to relieve the
congestion. 43

9. Necessary

Historical evidence clearly indicates the ex-
istence of a necessary outside the fort's ramparts
and elevated above the ditch. 44 Of greater interest
to this study is that some evidence reveals the
existence of at least one additional necessary within
the fort. The question is whether or not this neces-
sary existed at the time of the siege. A reference
dated September 17, 1777, notes that the quarter-
master was directed "to have another Necessary
built within the Fort to be set about directly." He
was to consult with Major Hubble, the engineer,
concerning the best place to have it erected. 4 "' A
directive issued only 3 days later cautioned the
garrison "not to make use of the Necessary House
within the Fort in the Day Time. The one in the
Ditch being designated for that Purpose." 4(!

A quick consideration of this statement might
lead one to the hasty conclusion that the necessary
the men were prohibited from using in the daytime
was the one referred to in the directive of Septem-
ber 17. But upon more serious reflection it would
>eem unlikely that the necessary ordered to be
^uilt on September 17 would have been completed
n 3 days. It would seem more likely that a neces-
;ary had already existed in the fort before Septem-
ber 17 — probably during the siege — and that a
;econd one had been ordered.

A garrison consisting of about 700 men dur-
ng the siege could not rely solely on the necessary
levated above the ditch, particularly when that
lecessary was exposed to enemy fire. Moreover it
s known that there were women who sought refuge
vithin the fort. Considering these circumstances,
herefore, it is more likely that at least two neces-
arys existed at the time of the siege — one elevated
bove the ditch and a second within the fort.

Having experienced difficulties during the siege be-
cause of inadequate facilities, those who com-
manded the garrison may have given orders after
the siege to construct a third necessary (a second
one inside the fort).

10. Flagpole and Flags

The location of the flagpole in 1777 has been
established as being at the tip of the salient angle
of the southwest bastion. For a description of its
appearance reference to the architectural data sec-
tion of the Fort Stanwix historic structure report
must be made. 47

The question of which flag flew over Fort
Stanwix during the siege is a controversial one.
The proponents of the traditional account are very
strong in their conviction that the flag was the offi-
cial standard of the United States, and consequently
the first official standard to fly in battle. Historian
John F. Luzader of the National Park Service has
taken the opposite view. His study of the flag at
Fort Stanwix is so exhaustive that it is fruitless to
carry the research further. It seems that Mr. Lu-
zader's research — both that which appears in
The Construction and Military History of Fort
Stanwix and in his typewritten manuscript "The
'Stars and Stripes' at Fort Stanwix: A Summary of
The Evidence" — establishes beyond any doubt that
the flag which flew during the siege was not the
official standard of the United States. Instead, a
"locally made version of the Grand Union" flew
over Fort Stanwix. 48

B. Bombproofs

The interpretive prospectus proposes to re-
furnish only three of the four bombproofs at Fort
Stanwix: the southwest, southeast, and northwest
ones. Hence, this section is only concerned with
the furnishings of these three structures.

During the years of their existence, the bomb-
proofs were used for many different purposes —
sometimes for brief intervals, at other times for
more extensive periods. An attempt will be made
to establish the more permanent uses made of the
bombproofs, particularly during the siege.

100 Fort Stanwix

1. Southwest Bombproof

Historical evidence has proven that there were
at least two structures both inside and outside the
fort that were used for hospitals, although perhaps
not simultaneously. One hospital that is clearly
identifiable in records existed outside the fort and
was marked "Hospital" on the "Gansevoort Map
of Fort Stanwix." ''•' There are several references to
a hospital in manuscripts practically up to the time
of the siege. An entry in the journal kept by Ebe-
neezer Elmer refers to a visit he made to the "old
lousy hospital, which represents such a scene of
wretchedness that one could hardly bear to behold
the abject souls therein confined." ■"'" Another
manuscript speaks of a sergeant "being sick in the
barracks and being carried to the hospital and
there remaining sick for some time and being some-
what recovered of sickness was returned to his
barracks being still unfit for duty." 51

There seems little doubt that the hospital re-
ferred to in these manuscripts was the hospital
located outside of the fort. Yet, there is also evi-
dence of a hospital inside the fort at the time of
the siege. During the battle one officer reported
that a "woman was wounded with a shell last Night
was brought to bed in our [southwest] Bombproof
| giving birth to] a Daughter." "'-' It would seem
that before the siege the hospital outside the fort
was used. When it became impossible to use this
facility during the fighting, a place inside the fort —
the southwest bombproof — was used to handle the
sick and wounded.

Consistent with the practice of employing the
bombproofs to serve several purposes, the south-
west bombproof was also used to store official
papers and provisions. In the midst of the siege.
and thus while the southwest bombproof was being
used as a hospital, it was felt necessary to store
valuable papers in this bombproof for their pro-
tection against shell fire. The order directing this
read:

all the public papers and money in the hands ol Mr
Hansen, and the papers in the hands ol Mr. \ an
Vechten belonging to the paymaster to be lodged in
the bombproofs in the southwest bastion. 53

The amount of room used for these records is
hard to say. but it is obvious that the bombproof
served two purposes.

If the southwest bombproof was largely a hos-
pital, what did it look like? First of all, it had to
contain beds and bedding for the sick and wounded,
similar perhaps to those in the barracks. The mat-
tresses, or "sacks" as they were sometimes called,
held straw "for the Sick to lay on." and whenever
a sick person died or was discharged from the hos-
pital, the sack with all its straw would be burned/' 4

In addition to beds and bedding, the hospital
probably contained a doctor's bench and an
operating table. There were also medicine chests
containing drugs and supplies. Medical kits, con-
taining scissors, scalpels, drugs, needles, suture
materials, scales and weights, and mortar and leg
splints, as well as an operating kit, containing for-
ceps, bullet extractor, retractors, and amputating
knives, might also have been found in the hospital.
Other significant items that probably appeared in
the hospital were a barrel of water, firewood, and
pails."''"'

There is a very interesting document, which
although not directly related to Fort Stanwix,
nevertheless gives some idea of the furnishings of a
post hospital. This document consists of an inven-
tory of supplies belonging to the general hospital at
Albany in 1777. Because of the documents' time-
liness and the geographic location it concerns, a
very convincing argument can be made for the
hospital furnishings employed at Fort Stanwix, but
perhaps with one reservation. Because Fort Stanwix
was a frontier fort, it probably did not possess all
the items on this inventory, which contained: 50

178 blankets in wards: 40 in store
70 bed tucks in wards; 94 in store
195 pillows in store
41 bed gowns
5 1 caps in store
324 wooden bowls; 67 in the wards
4 water buckets; 13 in the wards
3 rugs in store
54 camp kettles: 18 in wards
3 bedpans
I c ) chamber pots
1 branding iron
1 box of soap
15 gallons of rum
15 " '" wine
15 "" " molasses

candles

Historic Furnishing 101

chocolate
Indian meal
turnips

Chocolate and sugar were important items in
a hospital, and at Fort Ticonderoga the doctor or-
dered them for the sick and "Such other suitable
Regimens as may be on the ground & one half the
Beef, or other Meat." 57

One last question concerning the furnishings
of the southwest bombproof should be resolved
and that is the source of heat the hospital needed
for its sick. Unlike the freestanding structures or
casemates in the fort, the bombproofs had no
chimneys for fireplaces. How then did the hospital
get its heat? The answer might well have been an
iron stove, although there is no mention of one at
Fort Stanwix. Iron stoves were employed through-
out the Northern Department, although it was a
difficult item to acquire. In November 1776 Gen-
eral Schuyler made a strong plea for 50 stoves for
barracks in his department. :,s

2. Northwest Bombproof

Historical and archelogical evidence indicates
the magazine was placed in the northwest bomb-
proof after the Americans reoccupied the fort in
1776.' r>! ' Like its location, we know little about the
appearance of the powder magazine when the fort
was occupied by the Americans. As a place of
storage it was probably simply furnished. For-
tunately an early map, is available, albeit drawn
during the British occupation, which clearly depicts
the shelving employed in the powder magazine.
Shelves were off to one side of the bombproof, and
they were sufficient to hold 2,000 barrels of
powder. ,i0

The rest of the magazine must have contained
various ordnance stores. A document dated August
19, 1777, lists a number of different ordnance
pieces in the Northern Department, besides powder,
which might have been stored in the magazine at
Fort Stanwix. They are: 01

bars of lead for musket balls

bullet molds

large powder horns for priming cannon, with

belts, bits, priming wires
post fires
tubes for 3, 4. and 6-pounders

3-pound flannel cartridges
4-pound flannel cartridges
6-pound flannel cartridges
paper cartridges for 4-pounders

' 6-pounders

' 3-pounders
scissors for the laboratory
molds for buckshot
paint brushes of different sizes
pinchers
hammers

sheep skins for covering spunges
gun flints

grape shot for quilting cannon
Spanish brown paint
oil cloth for covering ammunition

Another document originating in the Northern
Department provides additional information on
what might have been stored in the powder maga-
zine. Paint, apparently, was used to identify spe-
cific ordnance items. Thus such paints as were
"ground ... of the proper colour for painting
Cannon carriage . . . Spanish Brown for Painting
the Boxes which Contains the Cannons Cartridges
in the Laboratory, & Vi of white Lead for painting
& numbering those Boxes to lay them on" were
ordered." 2

3. Southeast Bombproof (Bakehouse)

Like the northwest bombproof, there is prac-
tically no written evidence to indicate what the
southeast bombproof was used for. It is known,
however, that it was once the powder magazine
used by the British, which by 1764 had fallen into
ruin. A bakehouse was built in its place, and al-
though it is not known exactly when, it is certain
that it existed in the southeast bombproof at the
time of the siege. Archeological studies conducted
in 1965 and 1971 show beyond any doubt that the
bakehouse was located there." 8

There are several references to a bakehouse
and bakers at Fort Stanwix. One document refers
to the baking of bread. Baking bread was probably
a sizeable function since there were at least three
bakers at one time.' 1 ' A later document noted that
a soldier was tried by a court-martial for taking
ovenwood for his own private use while pretending
he was taking it to the bakehouse. 05

The bakehouse was probably simply furnished.

102 Fort Stanwix

Besides a brick oven sufficiently large to supply
bread for as many as 700 people during the siege,
it must have contained barrels of flour, pails of
water, tables for rolling dough, benches, candles,
brooms, scales, weights, and other equipment and
supplies essential for baking bread.

C. Guardhouse

A new guardhouse was constructed around
April 1777. (i(i The guardhouse appears frequently
in contemporary accounts and maps. 07

The new guardhouse consisted of two sec-
tions: one for the confinement of prisoners, and
the other, a lean-to, for housing the main guard.
The section used for confining prisoners consisted
of two rooms separated by a partition in which a
central fireplace stood to heat both rooms. r,s The
two rooms together measured 16 by 20 feet, and
probably housed several prisoners. One document
referred to two prisoners, and another referred to a
court-martial that was to take place for "all the
prisoners in the guardhouse." 6{)

There is little historical evidence to indicate
what the guardhouse furnishings looked like. Thus
many conclusions are conjectural and arc based
upon the little information extracted from archeo-
logical studies and historical documents. The main
guardroom, or place of confinement, was probably
simply furnished, containing the barest of necessi-
ties. Since most confinements were brief, prisoners
had few clothes with them. Probably the only
clothing they had were fatigues.

The two fireplaces had andirons, tongs, tram-
mels, and a kettle hung over a fire. A frying pan
and the usual eating utensils (fork, spoon, possibly
knife, dish, and cup) made up a prisoner's eating
equipment. Simple bunks or cribs, containing two
men to a bed, and chamber pots made up the
furniture. In all probability, the bedding may have
consisted of only a blanket without sacks, straw,
or bolsters. The rooms probably had no tables or
benches. In short, they contained few comforts.

The guardroom, which housed the guard while
on duty, was perhaps no more lavishly furnished
than the prisoners' room, although one might ex-
pect more comforts. Since it was only a temporary
quarter for the soldier, one could hardly expect to
find the furnishings normally seen in a permanent
quarter like the barracks. Arms, possibly muskets.

were no doubt stored in this room in some sort of
gunrack. Besides guns there were blocks and
chains stored here. The block consisted of a piece
of heavy wood, two feet long by six inches in di-
ameter. The block was chained to the legs of the
prisoner to prevent his escape when on a work-
detail. 70

In addition to the normal equipment found in
a fireplace (that is, andirons, tongs, trammels,
shovels, and pail) and some eating utensils, there
were also bunks, possibly each holding two men.
Unlike those used by the prisoners, however, these
bunks may have had straw for mattresses, or
maybe even sacks, blankets, and bolsters. One
document contains a reference to an officer sleep-
ing on a "Bench in the Guard Room" at Johns-
town, New York. The following morning the same
officer noted that he arose from "my Bench Bed
as much refreshed as [though] I had Slept on a Bed
of fdownfeathers] in a King's Palace." "' A "bench"
and a "bench bed" are probably the same as the
bunks or cribs found in barracks.

The guardhouse at Fort Stanwix, particularly
the room occupied by the guard, was also used to
post general orders, garrison orders, and instruc-
tions of a general nature. Marinus Willett noted
this practice at a number of posts to which he was
assigned. In Fishkill, New York, he noted that
general orders "are to be placed in the Main Gaurd
Room, And Officers arc hereby Requested to have
all their Men acquainted with it." " 2 Because all
soldiers went on guard duty, all could see the
orders. At a later date, while at Fort Constitution
and just before leaving for Fort Stanwix, Willett
issued strict orders prohibiting anyone from "tear-
ing down any Orders that may be placed up in any
Guard House." 7:! These orders were probably
hung by a nail on the inside of the room occupied
by the guard.

D. Headquarters

A headquarters building at Fort Stanwix is
clearly established in six contemporary drawings
made between 1777 and 1781. and in one or two
drawings made much later from memory. More-
over there are at least two references in documents
to the word "headquarters. '" 7 ' Much of what can
be determined concerning the arrangement of rooms
and furnishings must be conjectural.

Historic Furnishing 103

Architect Orville Carroll of the National Park
Service, after studying the features of this building,
has concluded that it was divided into four rooms
of equal size. One room was for the commander,
another room was occupied by the second in com-
mand, a third was a dining room doubling as a
staff room, and a fourth was occupied by two staff
officers. A lean-to room was used either for a
woodshed or an officer's privy, or both, or for
lodging an orderly, or finally, for the storage of
supplies for the staff officers. 7r '

The commander's room, Colonel Ganse-
voort's, was probably neatly furnished with a writ-
ing table, two or three chairs, and a bed bunk of
the type used by officers. 7 " His bedding was prob-
ably complete, consisting of a sack, blankets, and
bolster. Colonel Gansevoort would also have had
personal items received from home. Two of these
items were a silver spoon and campstool, which
(lis mother had sent to him. 77 Other objects lying
about his room may have been items that his
? amily had requested of him from time to time.
At one point his mother had requested "Oswego
Oil" and his brother wanted beaver fur to make a
iat. 7S Colonel Gansevoort may have had these
terns in his room waiting to be shipped.

His fireplace probably had the usual tools, for
sxample, andirons, tongs, trammels, a shovel, and
i broom. Several pieces of firewood would prob-
ibly have been piled next to the fireplace.

Usually high-ranking officers had their own
>ersonal chests containing liquors and wines. Pegs
hi which to hang clothing, a sword, a holster, and
ither accouterments must have adorned the walls,
>erhaps close to his bunk.

It is not certain whether Colonel Gansevoort

moked, but if he did, clay pipes would have been

ound on his table or above his fireplace. One, or

, ossibly two, candesticks on his table provided

grit. Several pieces of writing paper, quills, and

i ikwell would also be found on his table.

The room occupied by the second in com-
nand, Lt. Col. Marinus Willett, would not have
I een too different from the first. In addition his
1 imous orderly book might be seen on the table,
> here he made entries from time to time.

The third room — the dining room — might
I ave been furnished with items present on that
c Jspicious occasion when the British submitted
t leir surrender terms to the garrison. There is an

excellent account of this event in Willett's
"Narrative":

The afternoon of the next day, the chimade and the
appearance of a white flag, was followed by a request
that Colonel Butler, who commanded the Indians,
with two other officers, might enter the fort, with a
message to the Commanding Officer. Permission hav-
ing been granted, they were conducted blindfolded
into the fort, and received by Colonel Gansevoort in
his dining room. The windows of the room were shut
and candles lighted; the table also was spread with
crackers, cheese and wine. Three chairs placed at one
end of the table, were occupied by Colonel Butler and
the other two officers who had come with them; at
the other end, Colonel Gansevoort. Colonel Mellon
and Colonel Willett were seated. Seats were also placed
around the table for as many officers as could be
accommodated, while the rest of the room was nearly
filled with the other officers of the garrison indis-
criminately; it being desirable that the officers in
general, should be witness to all that might take
place. 71 '

There can be little doubt that this meeting took
place in the headquarters, because it was the most
logical place for a meeting of such importance.
The dining room could be in no other place but
the headquarters.

Based upon the account given by Willett, it
can be assumed that in the dining room was a large
table surrounded by chairs. On the table were
candlesticks, writing paper, quills and inkwells,
crackers, cheese, wine, and glasses. The room
might have had a rug, although this kind of luxury
may not have existed at a frontier fort like Fort
Stanwix. A dining room would have contained
dishes, utensils, and glasses, as well as servers.
These were probably stored in a cupboard some-
where in the room, although shelves might have
served the same purpose.

The fireplace, meanwhile, would have con-
tained the usual tools, including a large brass kettle
hanging over the fire. Firewood would be piled
alongside the fireplace in addition to a pail, shovel,
and broom.

The fourth room, which was probably oc-
cupied by staff officers, was perhaps not too differ-
ent from the first two, except that there were two of
nearly everything — two beds, two tables, at least
two chairs, etc. Each table would have had a
candlestick, writing paper, quill, and inkwell.

In January 1777 General Schuyler gave com-
missions to members of Colonel Elmore's regi-

104 Fort Stanwix

merit, one of whom was the adjutant and the other
the quartermaster. 4 " A contemporary publication
outlining military instructions for soldiers during
the Revolution describes official books kept by the
adjutant and quartermaster of a post. It instructs
the adjutant to keep a "regimental book wherein
should be entered the name and rank of every offi-
cer, the date of his commission, and the time he
joined the regiment, etc." Finally, it states that the
quartermaster "is to make out all returns for camp
equipage, arms accountrements, ammunition, pro-
visions, and forage, and receive and distribute
them to the regiment taking the necessary vouchers
for the delivery, and entering all receipts and deliv-
eries in a book kept by him for that purpose." Sl

Such books were probably kept by staff offi-
cers at Fort Stanwix, and could therefore be found
in this room. The regimental book would have
been on the adjutant's table, and the book kept by
the quartermaster would have been on his table.

Each officer would have had a bed bunk with
such bedding as a sack, blanket, and bolsters.
Next to his bunk on the wall would have been
pegs for hanging clothing, swords, and accounter-
ments. The fireplace would have had the usual
tools plus a pail, shovel, broom, and firewood next
to it. Personal items would probably be seen every-
where. Clay pipes, for example, would be found
on tables or over fireplaces.

The furnishings of the lean-to must depend
upon what the room was used for. If it was used
for storage, then it would have contained firewood
and supplies of various kinds. It might also con-
tain a privy for the commander and his staff. Be-
cause it had no fireplace, it is unlikely that this
room would have housed an orderly, unless it had
an iron stove.

E. East Barracks

According to early documents and recent
archeological studies, the east barracks measured
approximately 20 by 120 feet. From the architec-
tural features of the structure. Mr. Carroll has been
able to conclude that the building contained seven
rooms in addition to a hallway about 4 feet wide
which divided the structure into almost two equal
parts. s - Hue to the absence of written ami archeo-
logical evidence, il is not possible to determine the
si/e of each room. The sizes must therefore be
conjectural, but since both officers and enlisted

men occupied these rooms, it may be logical t(
assume that because the enlisted men made up b;
far the largest number, they probably occupied th<
larger rooms. In any case, the difference may no
have been too great. All seven rooms must hav<
varied anywhere from 20 by 19.3 feet to 20 by 14.!
feet, assuming the existence of a 4-foot-wide hall
The interior walls of each room contained ;
fireplace.

Like the sizes of the rooms, the number o
beds occupied by enlisted men must be conjectural
It is very likely that because of the crowded condi
tions of the fort during the siege, there were no
enough beds or bunks for everyone. Consequently
some people may have slept on the floors of th(
barrack when not sleeping in tents on the parad(
round. Several months after the siege, complaint!
were heard that the garrison had never been sup
plied with sufficient beds."

The bunks that were in the enlisted men';
rooms would hold two men. They were lined up
against and parallel to the walls of the room. Thi<
arrangement was adopted from the time that the
fort was first constructed. Straw or sacks, bu
probably the former, made up the mattresses foi
the enlisted men. During the siege, sacks may have
been a luxury, which only officers could afford
Because hay was the simplest form of mattress, i
was an object sorely needed; however, it was no'
always available in sufficient quantities to serve
both the personal needs of the men. and as fooc
for livestock. The result was that at one poin
orders were given to the quartermaster to main
tain a strict account of the hay by not permittin
it to fall into the hands of anyone without hi
approval. V|

The rest of the bedding consisted of bolstei
and blankets, but like sacks, even these were ii
short supply.

The fireplaces in the enlisted men's roon*
probably contained the barest of necessities. sino£
just before the siege there were serious shortage
of tools. General Schuyler directed the quarte ■
master general in Albanv to supply, withoul furth I
delay, Fort Stanwix and other posts in the Northe r
Department with "Fire Wood & Barrack Utensi*
such as pails. Tongs. Shovels. Trammels, axes \
kettles." 8 - 1

Other supplies mav have also been authoriz <
for enlised men's rooms at Fori Stanwix. In 17'

Historic Furnishing 105

each room occupied by provincial troops in South
Carolina was allowed 1 pot, 1 frying pan, 1 ladle,
1 flesh fork, 1 trivet or pot hook, 1 pair of dog-
irons, 1 shovel, 1 pair of tongs, 1 broom, ' tub or
box to carry out dirt, 1 long table, 2 forms, 2 plat-
ters, 2 bowls, 12 trenchers, 2 pitchers, 2 mugs,

1 hatchet, 1 candlestick, 2 chamber pots, a rack
for arms, and wooden pegs to hang knapsacks,
haversacks, and clothing. Every two men were to
be given 1 bedstead, 1 bed, 1 bolster, 3 blankets,
and a reasonable amount of firewood, candles, beer,
pepper, salt, and vinegar. 8(i

In 1776 the New York Provincial Congress
authorized for its enlisted men's rooms almost simi-
lar items. For each room containing 20 men, it
allowed 10 cribs, 10 bedcases, 10 bolsters "to be
filled with straw every 3 months," 2 iron pots
(probably chamber pots), 2 trammels, 1 pair of
tongs, 1 wood axe, 1 iron candlestick, 1 table,

2 benches, and 1 bucket. In addition each room
was supplied with three-eights of a cord of wood
each week between October 1 and April 1. For
the five weeks preceding October 1 and the 5 weeks
following April 1 , three-sixteenths of a cord of
wood was to be supplied each week. For the re-
maining 16 weeks of the year, only one-eighth of
a cord was to be supplied each week. KT

In 1775 and 1776 New York's Committee
of Safety delivered the following furniture and
equipment: 88

680 benches
393 tables
85 Va cords of wood
261 cots

a quantity of lanterns
249 Vi pounds of candles
65 candlesticks
1 68 spoons
650 bails of straw

A return of barrack furniture in 1767 at such
posts as Oswegatchie and Fort William Augustus
listed such items as beds, bolsters, blankets, berths,
tables, forms, dog irons, tongs, fire shovels, candle-
sticks, iron pots, and rugs. 8!)

It is apparent from the foregoing discussion
that whether the authorization of supplies origi-
nated in South Carolina or in New York, the fur-
nishings allowed the enlisted men's barracks were
similar. Because of shortages, these items were not
always present in each enlisted men's room.

As close to the time of the siege as June 15,
1777, Colonel Gansevoort complained to General
Schuyler about how destitute his garrison was of
cooking utensils. The men, he said, were frequently
obliged to wait for their meals because they had to
share equipment. So much improvising was going
on that he attributed to the unsanitary practices
in cooking the high number of men being sick. 90
A shortage of pails in barracks prompted the com-
mander of the fort to order cedar pails made. 01

Chamber pots were common items in Army
barracks and other areas where men slept. How-
ever, there was a shortage of these pots at Fort
Stanwix, and the few that existed were probably
in the officers' quarters. Finding themselves with-
out such essentials, and the necessarys being too
inconveniently located, enlisted men relieved them-
selves in various parts of the fort. Although the
men were warned that if caught they would be
severely punished, the practice continued for sev-
eral months. The quartermaster sergeant was
finally instructed to have "Tubs placed at the Sev-
eral Corners of the Barracks for the Men to make
Water in which are to be Emptied and Washed
every Morning." 92

Shortages of many items frequently led sol-
diers to improvise. It has already been demon-
strated how a shortage of cooking utensils led some
to cook their meals in unsanitary ways. At huts
uncovered in the Washington Heights section of
New York City it was found that soldiers employed
barrel hoops for holding kettles in fireplaces. 93
This practice might well have been prevalent at
Fort Stanwix.

Gunracks, like other conveniences, were prob-
ably not common at Fort Stanwix, and in many
cases muskets were stacked in a pyramidal fash-
ion in various parts of the room. The enlisted
man had few items of clothing, and the few he had
were probably hung on pegs just above his bunk.
Unlike officers, the enlisted man had few personal
items that could make life a little more bearable.

Of some interest, particularly since it was
issued at the height of the siege, was an order to
the quartermaster to have barrels constantly filled
with water. 04 This water was used for drinking,
washing, and fighting fires, and the barrels were
placed at various locations, wherever people slept
or congregated. They may have been seen on the
parade ground and bastions as well as in barracks.

106 Fort Stanwix

casemates, and bombproofs. A local place for such
a barrel in the east barracks would have been in
the hall, where it was centrally located and quickly
reached.

The four officers' rooms in the barracks rep-
resented a more orderly appearance than the rooms
occupied by the enlisted men. There was little
crowding in these rooms, even at the height of the
siege. At most there were probably three or four
officers assigned to each room. A summary of a
few contemporary accounts will give us some gen-
eral idea of the number of officers quartered in each
room. On October 17, 1776, Dr. Ebencezcr Elm:r
records in his journal that Captain Walker and his
subalterns lodged in the room that he and another
officer occupied. The following day Elmer notes
that Captain Walker "liveth with us in the Room
[that] we have all along occupied." ° 5 It is obvious
from these accounts that only two officers were
permanently quartered in one room, while Captain
Walker and his subordinates were only temporarily
quartered in the same room.

In a much later document one officer records
that soon after his arrival at Fort Stanwix he
"drew for the Rooms and Lieut Hyatt and I drew
No. 1 on the Left of the North Side of the Fort." '•"''

One week later the following appeared, again
establishing beyond doubt that there were two
officers to a room in 1780:

the Duty being so Very heavy in the Garrison the
Commandant is Reduced to the Necessity to Direct
that Wherever there is two officers in A Room together;
one visitor must he Detailed in his proper ftour] to
do Duty only on Couvcring fsicl parties. 97

While the written evidence may be strong in
establishing that there were two officers to a room
at Fort Stanwix before and after the siege, the
crowded conditions of the post during the siege
made it very likely that there were three and some-
times four officers in one room. Even with an in-
creased number of officers during the siege, the
rooms presented a much more orderly appearance
than the enlisted men's rooms. Moreover, if any
of the more scarce items of furniture were available,
it is certain that the officers got them.

In 1776 the New York Provincial Congress
had each officer's room furnished with one pair of
andirons, one pair of tongs, one table, two chairs.
and one candlestick. In addition, it allotted the
same amount of firewood to officers as it had to
the enlisted men. 08

Officers usually enjoyed greater conveniences
than the enlisted man. They probably slept on
single bunks, and in most instances their mattresses
consisted of sacks, with bolsters and blankets avail-
able. One chamber pot was provided for each room.
The tables contained writing paper, quills, and ink-
wells, as well as candlesticks. Clay pipes might
be seen on tables or hanging above the fireplaces.
In addition to the usual fireplace tools and cooking
and eating utensils, officers frequently kept personal
items. Chests containing liquor and wine were
probably among these personal items. There are
several references to parties and gatherings among
officers in their rooms, which attest to the abund-
ant use of alcohol beverages. One such reference
notes that:

After they had concluded the Business Laid before
them heing a number of Colts among them; they
began upon Drinking wine which they Continued
Successfully till about Ten o Clock at Night. With a
good Creature many of them got very Happy upon
[which] appointing Capts. Dickinson & Potter & Major
Barher Sachins [sic] they Knocked up an Indian
Dance at [which] they yelled much. . . ." "

One month later the same person reported
that "At Evening Colo. White & Dr. Dunham came
into our Room Drank & Conversed." ino Another
officer in later years reported a "Frolick [sic] at our
Room" on Christmas Day. 1 " 1 The same officer,
at the New Year's Day dinner which he and at
least 10 others attended, noted that several toasts
were given. '"-

Other personal items kept in the officers'
rooms were beaver, otter, martin, and deer skins —
articles usually purchased from the Indians. In
January 1777 John Hansen, the quartermaster at
Fort Stanwix, complained to General Schuyler that
he had been unsuccessful in getting Colonel
Elmer

to stop his officers and men from Inning anything
from the Indians. He at last . . . put a Notice on the
Front gate which I think has never been adhered to.
The men in the Sight of their officers daily carrying
them in their rooms & buying of them at a much
larger price. ... In several of the Officers Rooms you
will find Beaver, Otters. Martins. Deer Skins etc. 10 '' 1

Buying from the Indians and indeed from
sutlers was certainly not prevalent during the siege.
but there can be little doubt that the practice had
been c rried on up to the time o( the siege, and

Historic Furnishing 107

that therefore many of these items may have still
been in their rooms.

Swords, holsters, accounterments, and various
objects of clothing were probably hung on pegs
within the rooms.

Archeologists Lee Hanson and Dick Hsu of
the National Park Service have concluded in their
studies that there were four cellars under the east
barracks."" There is only one piece of historical
evidence that shows provisions were stored in bar-
racks. On August 9, 1777, Colonel Gansevoort
"ordered all the provisions to be brought upon the
parade for fear of shells setting fire to the barracks
and destroying it." 105 Whether he was speaking
about the east barracks or west barracks is not
clear. Nor is it clear in what part of the barracks
the provisions were stored; however, the cool cel-
lars were the most logical place for storing provi-
sions. Messrs. Hanson and Hsu have reported
finding charred oats and wheat in one celler of the
.vest barracks — evidence that it was used exten-
sively as a grainary."" 5 It might well be that the
:ellars in the east barracks were also used for
storing provisions.

The containers in which the provisions were
racked have been discussed at some length in an
.'arlier chapter, and it would be redundant to de-
scribe them here. Suffice it to say that most provi-
sions stored in cellars were packed in one kind or
size of container or another. One final word should
oe said about these containers. At Fort George
n the Northern Department, it was customary to
)aint the word "Stores" on all barrels. 107 It may
)e that a similar procedure was employed at Fort
>tanwix.

Archeologists have found the remains of sev-
eral cannon balls, mortar bombs, cannister shot,
md flints in the cellars of the east barracks, an
ndication that the cellers may also have been used
is a magazine or laboratory. 108

■. Casemates

According to an early definition, a casemate
vas a "work made under the rampart, like a cellar

< r cave with loop-holes, to place guns in it." 109
before the Revolution, however, this concept was
aodified so that the casemate became primarily

1 ither a soldiers' quarters or a place for storing

provisions and ordnance. 110 The casemates at Fort
Stanwix conformed to this principal.

The interpretive prospectus proposes to fur-
nish two rooms (on the west side) of the north
casemate as officers' quarters, the whole southeast
casemate as enlisted men's quarters, and about one-
third of the west casemate as enlisted men's
quarters.

1. North Casemate (Officer's Quarters)

There is no written evidence that shows the
number of rooms in the north casemate; however,
archeological studies have indicated that there were
six fireplaces equally spaced, which leads to the
conclusion that there were probably six rooms of
equal size. 111 Both the artifacts that were un-
covered and the evidence of one document indicate
that this casemate was used as an officer's quar-
ters. A diary notes in 1780 that its owner "drew
for the Rooms and Lieut. Hyatt and I drew No. 1
on the Left of the North Side of the Fort." 11L> Un-
doubtedly this room was the one on the left of the
north casemate.

The furnishings of these rooms were essen-
tially the same as those in the officers' rooms of the
east barracks, with single bunks or beds, and sacks
to give the officer extra comfort. Occasionally, the
arrangement of an officer's room may have been
improvised during the siege because of the increase
in people. Some officers may have simply slept on
loose straw on the floor, since there were not
enough cribs. At least one chamber pot could be
found in each room.

A table was in the middle of the room with
at least two chairs or campstools around it. The
table held a candlestick, inkwell, and quill. There
were the usual cooking and eating utensils to be
seen. Junior officers may have had the cheaper
variety of utensils, whereas senior officers might
boast of something better. The latter might have
had porcelain dishes. Rum and wine bottles could
also be seen on these tables, if not an occasional
liquor chest.

The fireplaces contained the usual assortment
of tools and accessories such as andirons, tongs,
trammels, kettle, firewood, pail, and shovel. Cloth-
ing as well as weapons and accounterments were
hung on pegs near the bunks. Finally, personal

108 Fort Stanwix

items such as clay pipes and skins of various sorts
could be seen on tables, bunks, stools, and
fireplaces.

2. Southeast and West Casemates
(Enlisted Men's Quarters)

Life in the casemates for the enlisted men
may have been a little more severe than in a bar-
racks, but the furnishings were essentially the
same. At the time of the siege there were probably
more men assigned to a room than normally, with-
out sufficient beds, bedding, utensils, and dishes to
take care of everyone's needs Field beds, two to a
crib, were lined up against and parallel to the
walls.

The casemates were designed to house 400
men, and the sizes of the east and north casemates
were approximately 20 feet deep by 132 feet long
(measured from center to center lengthwise.)"''
We also know that the three rooms in the west
casemate were of equal size, which made the north
room (the room to be furnished) about 20 by 44
feet. A room of this size probably had about 20
cribs around its four walls, holding two men to a
crib, or a total of 40 men. During the siege this
number may have been higher, with people sleeping
on the floor.

The southeast casemate was 58 by 60 feet.'"
This casemate had two rooms utilizing a double
fireplace. The two rooms in the southeast casemate
together had about 50 cribs, sleeping 100 men.

Bedding was probably similar to that of the
enlisted men's quarters in the barracks; those more
fortunate than others had sacks, the rest had only
straw. Blankets and bolsters may have been in-
suflicient in number for everyone during the siege.
The room in the west casemate probably had one
table surrounded by benches, and since the south-
east casemate was divided into two areas by a dou-
ble fireplace, there were two tables, one for each
area. Benches also surrounded these tables. Each
table had a candlestick as well as eating utensils,
dishes, cups, and bottles.

The few clothes the enlisted men had. as well
as their accounterments, were hung on pegs when-
ever available, but some clothing may also have
lain on bunks. Personal items were few, but
whatever was available was kept out of sight for
fear it might be stolen.

Gunracks might have been located in these
areas, but more often than not muskets were
stacked in pyramidal fashion in various parts of
the room. Chamber pots may have been rare items
in enlisted men's quarters, although an occasional
one might be found.

Fireplaces contained the usual tools, firewood,
and cooking utensils. Although large kettles may
have hung over the fire, frying pans, when not in
use, were hung on the wall above the fireplace.

All in all, the rooms occupied by enlisted men,
especially during the siege, presented a chaotic and
disorderly scene.

Historic Furnishing 109

1. Revolutionary war fireplace. Hut 34,
Hut Camp of the 17th Regiment of Foot,
Dyckman House Park, New York City,
prior to reconstruction. New York
Historical Society.

2. Fireplace in reconstructed military hut.
Dyckman House Park, New York City.
New York Historical Society.

APPENDIX

The "Stars and Stripes" at Fort Stanwix
A Summary of the Evidence

by John F. Luzader

Introduction

The purpose of this brief report is to present the
results of a study of the evidence concerning
whether the flag flown at Fort Stanwix during tfr
siege of August 1777 was the first "Stars and
Stripes" flown in combat. This is not a history of
the genesis of the national flag; nor is it an evalu-
ation of the claims put forth in support of the
Bennington and Guilford Courthouse flags.

The Tradition

Briefly stated, the traditional association of
the flag that became the national standard with
the Siege of Fort Stanwix is that the news of the
passage of the "Flag Resolution" by the Conti-
nental Congress on June 14 was brought to the
fort either in the form of a personal letter to
Colonel Peter Gansevoort, the post's commanding
officers, or in a newspaper by the batteaux that de-
livered a 100-man reinforcement from Wesson's
Regiment at Fort Dayton under Lieutenant Colonel
Mcllen. Upon receiving the dramatic and impor-
tant news, some of the people in the fort prepared
a flag of thirteen stripes, alternating red and white,
and thirteen stars on a blue field in compliance
with congressional resolution. Early in the morn-
ing of Sunday, August 3, the first day of the siege,
this flag was raised on one of the fort's bastions
and a salute was fired, marking the first time the
new national emblem was flown over American
troops. If true, this was one of the most dramatic-
ally important events of the American Revolution.

One of the early champions of this interpre-
tation was Pomeroy Jones, a local student whose

interest in the fort had a lasting influence on the
work of later scholars. Jones was born several
years after the siege; but he knew a number of
veterans of the Revolution, and he cited their
recollections to the effect that the flag at Fort Stan-
wix was indeed the "Stars and Stripes." ' Jones's
stories were the basis of a number of 19th century
assertions concerning the flag, including Dr. James
Weise's account that the new national flag was un-
furled, a salute fired, and that an adjutant read the
Congress's resolution from the newspaper the bat-
teaux detail had brought to the fort on August 2. 2
Dr. Weise's account was picked up by The New
Lamed History, in which the following appears.

. . . Journal of Capt. Swartwout of Col. Gansevoort
regiment written August 3, 1777 in Ft. Schuyler shows
beyond cavil when the first flag of Stars and Stripes of
which we have record was made and hoisted, but it
was in a fort (Schuyler), not in the field, or at the
head of a regiment. 3

John Albert Scott's popular Fort Stanwix,
(Fort Schuyler) and Orixkany repeats the story of
the newspaper report and the raising of the '"first
Stars and Stripes." 4 Although Fort Stanwix's
claims were frequently disputed in favor of other
sites such as Bennington. Cooch's Bridge. Brandy-
vine and Guilford Courthouse, many writers have
perpetuated the tradition.

Evidence

let us now take a look at the evidence upon
which an evaluation of the tradition must be based.
The basic document for the origin of the "Stars
and Stripes" is the so-called Flag Resolution of

rune 14, 1777, which reads: "RESOLVED: that
he flag of the United States be made of thirteen
;tripes, alternate red and white; that the union be
hirteen stars, white in a blue field representing a
lew constellation." 5 The resolution was preceded
md followed by matters brought to the Congress's
ittention by its Marine Committee. Since the reso-
ution was converting the unofficial Grand Union
7 lag into an official standard, substituting thirteen
;tars upon a blue field for the canton derived from
he British Union, which combined the crosses of
Jaints George and Andrew, it was appropriate that
t emanate from that committee. This was the case
>ecause, following British precedent, flying of the
jrand Union had been normally limited to ships
ind permanent land installations. Thus, what
Tongress was providing for was a new marine flag,
lot a national military standard.

Crucial to the story of the Fort Stanwix flag
s the record of what happened immediately after
he passage of the Flag Resolution. Thacher's
Military Journal's entry for August 3, 1777, notes
hat: "It appears by the papers that Congress re-
olvcd on 14 June last, that the flag of the thirteen
Jnited States be thirteen stripes, alternate red and
vhite, that the union be thirteen stars, white in
i blue field. . . ." ,: So far as this writer has been
ble to determine, and this has been supported by
he findings of other students, the first public
lotice of the resolution appeared in the Pennsyl-
ania Evening Post on August 30 in the following
tern: "In Congress, June 14, 1777. Resolved That
he FLAG of the United States be THIRTEEN
TRIPES alternate red and white; that the union
>e THIRTEEN STARS white in a blue field. Ex-
ract from minutes, CHARLES THOMSON, sec." 7

Other papers printed the resolution from Sep-
ember 3 to October 2, and the first New York
apers to print it were the September 8 issue of the
Jew York Journal and General Advertiser and
•eptember 1 1 issue of the New York Patent and
he American Advertiser.

The papers to which Dr. Thacher at Albany
/as most likely to have access were the two New
'ork and two Boston papers, the Gazette and the
py, in which the story appeared in the September
5 and 1 8 issues respectively. 8

There is an obvious conflict in evidence that
< an only be explained by acknowledging that the
1 octor may have had access to a newspaper that

is unknown to historians or, more likely that when
the Journal was prepared for publication prior to
January 1, 1823, this was one of the instances in
which alterations were made in the organization
of the original manuscript.

More immediately pertinent to the Fort Stan-
wix problems are the testimonies of Lt. William
Colbrath and Lt. Col. Marinus Willett. In his
Journal, Colbrath noted in the entry for August 3:
"Early this morning a Continental Flagg made by
the officers of Col. Gansevoort's Regiment was
hoisted and a cannon levelled at the Enemies Camp
was fired on the occasion." 9 It is important to
note that the lieutenant called the standard a "Con-
tinental Flagg," a term frequently applied to the
Grand Union. It is also significant that he did not
refer to the flag as a new one, as might be ex-
pected if he was witnessing such a memorable event.

Lt. Col. Marinus Willett wrote of the earliest
accounts of the siege on August 1 1 in a letter to
Jonathan Trumbull, Jr. He was also probably the
author of another account entitled "Extract of a
Letter from a Officer of Distinction" that appeared
in the August 28 issue of the Boston paper, The
Independent Chronicle and Universal Advertiser.
In neither of these did he refer to the Fort Stanwix
flag, a surprising oversight if it was as historically
important as such a "first" wouid have been. His
Orderly Book is equally silent on the subject. 10

A quarter of a century after the siege, Willett
wrote his "Narrative," which his son edited and
published after the colonel's death. This is what
the father wrote concerning the flag:

The Fort had never been supplied with a Flagg — The
importance of having one on the arrival of the Enemy
had set our Ingenuity to work, and a respectable one
was formed the white stripes were cut out of ammuni-
tion shirts and blue strips out of the Cloak formerly
mentioned taken from the Enemy at Peeks-hill. The
red stripes out of different pieces of stuff collected
from sundry persons. The Flagg was sufficiently large
and a general Exhilaration of spirits appeared on
beholding it Wave the morning after the arrival of the
enemy. 11

When William Willett edited his father's manu-
script, he altered the wording of the sentence de-
scribing the flag's components to read:

"The white strips were cut out of ammunition shirts,
the blue of the cloak taken from the enemy at Peeksill;
while the red stripes were made of different pieces of
stuff procured from one or another of the garrison." 12

111

1 12 Fort Stanwix

Marinus Willett's manuscript had this to say
about the cloak from which the blue portion of the
flag derived:

What Baggage the enemy had they left it consisting of
only a few Blankets and Cloaks — A blue Comblot
Cloak taken here afterwards served to enable us to
use it for the blue strips of a Flagg which was after-
wards hoisted during the siege of Fort Schuyler. . . . ,:i

Willett's statement about red, white stripes
and blue stripes can only have referrence to a
Grand Union Flag, because a "Stars and Stripes"
would have had a blue field, not blue stripes.

Two powder horns that are purported to date
from the historic period at Fort Stanwix have been
offered in evidence concerning the flag. I have seen
neither of the specimens, my knowledge of them
being limited to photographs and written descrip-
tions. At the same time, I would have to say that
seeing them probably would not materially increase
my knowledge, because in spite of several years
of experience in museum work, I would not be able
to date them with much precision, beyond noting
whether the horns and their lettering conform to
types representing a period, or to determine whether
the engravings are contemporaneous with the pur-
ported date or are more recent additions. I have
seen specimens whose provenience has been docu-
mented alongside known fakes whose workmanship
resembles the authentic so closely that no "expert"
could have identified the genuine. Thus I suspect
that most other students share my limitations.

One of the horns is rather elaborately carved
with a stylized representation of a fort that con-
forms to the general outlines of Fort Stanwix and
bears the inscription "Fort Schuyler; Dec'r 25,
1777, J. McGraw." Flying from the northwest
bastion is a flag that, except for the absence of the
St. George, resembles the Grand Union. John Al-
bert Scott dismissed the powder horn's evidence,
largely on the basis that John McGraw, whom Scott
identified as the man who did the carving, was
enrolled in Visschcr's regiment of New York levies,
which was not posted at the fort in December 1777.
However, there was a James McGraw in the 3rd
New York, which was there, and this man may
have made the powder horn." If the horn is genu-
ine and if John McGraw carved it. the evidence
that it presents argues strongly that ihe Fort Stan-
wix flag was a copy of the Grand Union.

The other powder horn is attributed to Ft.

Christopher Hutton on the Third New York Regi-
ment of the Continental Line. If it is authentic,
this specimen is the strongest piece of evidence
that I know of in favor of the Stars and Stripes
tradition. Several subjects have been carved on
the horn's sides. These include: Chris. Hutton
1777; a diagrammatic sketch of Mohawk and
Schoharie Rivers; Ft. Schuyler III REGT; Ft.
EDW (small and shallow cut), a field cannon
with a pyramidal stack of six balls; an Indian
armed with a musket and tomahawk; a man
mounted on a horse with a caption PETER, and
most important to this study — a flag that shows
stripes and a field of stars.

Some questions are appropriate concerning
the Hutton powder horn. The most obvious is
whether it is what it is purported to be. Since
there arc no conclusive authentications, the ques-
tion remains moot; although on the basis of design.
lettering, and general appearance, I am inclined to
accept it as a late 18th century specimen. The
second is, what was the designer's objective? Was
he using the characters as symbols to interpret the
events that occurred at the fort in 1777? If thai
was his purpose, why was the small legend "Fl
Edw.," which must refer to Fort Edward, included'.
That fort was located at the carrying place on th<
Hudson River between that river and Wood Creek
Why did the maker locate the flag where he did'
It, obviously, was not intended to mark the fort'
location in relation to the river. The answer V
what his purpose was cannot be found in the char
acters, even the equestrian figure, who probabl
was intended to represent the Third's commande;.
Peter Gansevoort.

On the other hand, the characters may merel
be decorative, a form of doodling. But that sti 1
does not solve the problem of the flag. And tl :
question of when the carvings were executed n -
mains. Do they date from 1777. or are the) late
done after the war as an exercise in nostalgii ]
There seems to be no satisfactory answer. Ho\
ever, after all the questions have been asked, oi '
must conclude that, whatever its merits, the e>
dence offered by the horn contradicts that offer c
by the McGraw specimen, which has as good ;
claim to authenticity, and more significantly it is i
odds with the documentary evidence. Perhaps. *i
should not afford either horn much credit and n I
exclusively upon documentary evidence. Neitt :

Historic Furnishing 113

iorn can really be authenticated in a manner that
/ill satisfy all the canons of evidence. With the
ocuments, we are on safer ground. Their histories
an be traced beyond reasonable doubt, and they
an be tested by standards of internal and external
riticism. So, let us continue to consult them.

As has been noted, the congressional resolu-
on of June 14 concerned a maritime flag and was
ot intended to provide a national standard for
se by troops in the field. This is borne out by sub-
;quent events.

Almost two years after the siege, Richard
eters, secretary of the Board of War, wrote to
leneral Washington that regimental requisition for
rums and colors had not been filled because "we
avc not the materials to make either in sufficient
umbers." He went on to say concerning the
ag:

. . as to the Colour, we have refused them for another
:ason. The Baron Steuben mentioned when he was
ere that he would settle with your Excellency some
Ian as to the Colours. It was intended that every
egiment should have two Colours — one the Standard
f the United States, which should be the same
iroughout the Army, and the other a Regimental
olour which should vary according to the facings of
le Regiment. But it is not yet settled what is the
tandard of the U. States. If your Excellency will
lerefore favour us with your Opinion on the Subject
e will report to Congress and request them to
>tablish a Standard and as soon as this is done we
ill endeavour to get materials and order a Number
lade sufficient for the Army. 15

Peter's letter makes it so clear as to be obvi-
us that the resolution of June 14 did not author-
e a National military standard, that as of May 10,
779, no such standard had been chosen, and that
ongress would be requested to establish one after
/ashington had expressed his opinion on the
latter.

The Board of War continued to consider the
asign during the summer of 1779, and by Septem-
:r had apparently narrowed its choice to between
ane with the Union and Emblem in the middle"
id a variant of the marine flag authorized by the
777 resolution. Between the two, the Board pre-
rred the former. 16

The matter was not settled by the time fight-
g ended in 1781, and Congress never supplied
ie troops with a national color. This does not

mean that no variants of the "Star and Stripes"
motif appeared on the field. The Bennington and
Guilford Courthouse flags may have been carried
in those engagements, but they were not the prod-
ucts of Congressional authorization, nor were they
copies of a national standard, because none existed.
They were local products that used an unofficial
design that enjoyed a degree of popularity. But
even in those instances, the evidences for their
authenticity, while stronger than the Stanwix case,
fall short of being conclusive.

It might be argued that the flag flown at Fort
Stanwix was, like the Bennington and Guilford
ones, an unofficial standard, designed independ-
ently of Congressional authority. However, that
contradicts Culbrath's identifying it as a "Conti-
nental Flagg" and strains Willett's statment that
the cloak was the source of the flag's blue stripes,
to say nothing of the testimony, for what it is
worth, of the McGraw powder-horn.

Negative evidence may be adduced from the
absence of any reference to the appearance of a
new flag in any of the German or British docu-
ments that have been studied. Of course, that
omission is not conclusive evidence, but one could
expect that at least some member of the besieging
force would have been sufficiently impressed by the
event to have noted it in some form. 17

For what it is worth, and that is not much.
Lieutenants Digbley and Anburey wrote that the
new American flag was flown at Ticonderoga and
Fort Anne before the siege of Fort Stanwix took
place. Their testimonies in this matter can be dis-
missed because they compiled their accounts, partly
from notes made in the field and partly from other
sources, some of which were post-war, sometime
after the war. ,s

Conclusions

On the basis of the documentary evidence,
identifying the Fort Stanwix flag as the "first Stars
and Stripes to fly over American troops in combat"
had its origins in 19th century local tradition; it is
not supported by contemporary evidence; such evi-
dence contravenes it; and there is no conclusive
evidence identifying the first instance of the flag's
use in combat.

1 14 Fort Stanwix

Notes

Historic Furnishing Report

Introduction

1. Thomas Gage Papers. William L. Clements
Library, University of Michigan, Gage to Johnson, Feb.
1, 1759; ibid., Gage to Massey, Nov. 12, 1759.

2. Clarence Edion Carter, ed.. The Correspondence
of General Thomas Gage with the Secretaries of State
1763-1775, 2 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1931), 1:141.

3. Philip Schuyler Papers, New York Public Library,
Caldwell to Schuyler, June 27, 1776; ibid., Schuyler to
Committee of Tryon County, July 1, 1776.

4. Thomas Gage Papers, Gage to Campbell, May 13,
1764.

5. Jonathan Trumbull, Jr.. Papers, Connecticut His-
torical Society, Elmore to Trumbull, Jr., Nov. 21. 1776.

6. Horatio Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society,
Schuyler to Gates, Oct. 3, 1776.

7. Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Military Papers. New York
Public Library, Gansevoort to Van Shaick, May 5, 1777;
ibid., Gansevoort to Schuyler, ca. May 1777.

8. Henry Glen Letter Book 1776-80, New York State
Library, Schuyler to Morgan, June 19, 1777; Schuyler
Papers, Schuyler to Washington, June 30, 1777.

Chapter I

1. Almond W. Lauber, comp., Orderly Books of the
Fourth New York Regiment, 1778-1783 by Samuel
Tallmadge and others with Diaries of Samuel Tallmadge,
1780-1782 and John Burr, 1779-1782, (Albany: The
University of the State of New York, 1932), p. 545
(hereafter cited as Orderly Books of the Fourth New
York Regiment).

2. Thomas Gage Papers, Gage to Amherst, Feb. 18,
1759.

3. Horatio Gates Papers, Orderly Book, July 26,
1776.

4. Philip Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Washington,
ca. Aug. 1776.

5. Ibid., Schuyler to Lewis, June 6, 1777.

6. Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Military Papers. Gansevoort
id Schuyler, July 3, 1777.

7. Philip Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Congress. July
5. 1777; ibid., Dayton to Schuyler, Sept. 4. 1776: Philip
Schuyler Orderly Book. American Antiquarian Society.
Lansing to Lewis. July 8, 1777; ibid., Lansing to Cuyler.
July 10. 1777; ibid., Schuyler to Gansevoort. July 10.
1777. Schuyler complained to Congress that great sickness
prevailed in the Army as a result of relying too much on
fresh meat and not enough on salted meat. He noted that
there was practically no salted meat in the Northern
Department, and the little that was available was retained
for scouting parties only. The problem, therefore, was
not just common to Fort Stanwix. but was present at all
posts in the Northern Department. Sec Schuyler Papers.
Schuyler to Congress. Aug. 8. 1777.

8. Philip Schuyler Papers, Schuvler to Congress,
Aug. 8. 1777.

9. Schuyler complained that it was impossible to
obtain much fresh beef because of high prices. See
Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Trumbull. June 29, 1777.

10. Thomas Gates Papers. Willett to Gates, Sept. 22,
1777.

11. Peter Gansevoort, Jr.. Military Papers. Cuyler to
Gansevoort, Nov. 28, 1777.

12. Ihid., Gansevoort to Gates, Dec. 12. 1777.

13. "A Monthly Return of the State of the Garrison
Fort Schyler fsic] May 1st. 1778." Queens Borough Public
Library, Jamaica, N.Y.

14. Philip Schuyler Papers. "Return of Provisions
under care of John Hansen. Esqr. A D Corny Issues at
Ft. Schuyler on 21st Day June 1778."

15. This number consisted of 402 men of the 3rd
New York Battalion. 32 men of the artillery detachment,
and 17 civilians, who were listed as artificers. See "A
Monthly Return of the State of the Garrison at Fort
Schyler [sic] May 1st. 1778."

16. Lauber, Orderly Books of the Fourth New York
Regiment, p. 549.

17. Thomas Gage Papers. Gage to Amherst. August
21. 1759.

18. Peter Gansevoort. Jr.. Military Papers. Gansevoort
to Gates, May 23, 1777.

19. Miscellaneous American Revolution. New York
State Library. Order signed by Col. P. Gansevoort. May
26. 1777.

20. Philip Schuyler Papers. Schuyler to Dayton. Aug.
3, 1776.

21. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book. New-York'
Historical Society. Oct. 22. 1777; ibid., Feb. 23, 1778.

22. Henry Glen Papers. 1770-1801. New York.
Public Library, Glen to Fonda, ca. Nov. 1777; Peter
Gansevoort. Jr.. Military Papers, a small booklet showing
various accounts.

23. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book. Feb. 7. 1778.

24. Ibid.. Sept. 23. 1777.

25. Peter Gansevoort, Jr.. Military Papers. Ganse
voort to Caty Van Schaik, June 1, 1777.

26. Ibid., Gansevoort to Gansevoort. Dec. 16. 1777

27. Philip Schuyler Papers. Schuyler to Bleeker. Aug>
19. 1775.

28. Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Military Papers. Willett t'
(iatisevoort. Apr. 20. 1778; Miscellaneous America'
Revolution (Wendell Family Papers), Lendder to Brad
Apr. 6. 1779.

29. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book, June 24. 177'

30. William Colbraith, "Journal of the most materii
occurrences preceding the Siege of Fort Schuyler (former]
Fort Stanwix) with an account of the siege, etc.." negath
photostat. New York Public Library, Aug. 2. 1777. (hen-
after cited as Colbraith. "Journal").

31. "Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix." New Yott
Public Library, copy in John F. Luzader, "The Constru -
tion and Military History of Fort Stanwix." (Washingto

Historic Furnishing 115

D.C.: Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation,
National Park Service, 1969), Appendix IX.

32. Journal of Ebeneezer Elmer, New Jersey Histori-
cal Society, Dunham to Elmer, Aug. 23, 1776.

33. Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Military Papers, Gansevoort
to Gansevoort, June 13, 1777.

34. Ibid., Glen to Gansevoort, Dec. 5. 1777.

35. Journal of Ebeneezer Elmer, Nov. 19. 1776;
United States Revolution Collection, "Inventory of all
Stores Belonging to the General Hospital at Albany etc
March 29th 1777," American Antiquarian Society.

36. Philip Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Congress.
July 5, 1777.

37. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book, Apr. 16, 1778.

Chapter II

1. James Abercromby Papers. Huntington Library,
Stanwix to Abercromby, Sept. 7, 1758, cited in Luzader.
"Construction and Military History of Fort Stanwix," pp.
28-29; James Abercromby Papers, Stanwix to Aber-
cromby, Sept. 18, 1758, cited in Orville W. Carroll's
personal research file on Fort Stanwix, Minute Man
National Historical Park, Concord. Mass.

2. Thomas Gage Papers, Gage to Amherst, Aug.
21. 1759.

3. Newton D. Mereness, ed.. "Journal of An Officer
Who Travelled in America and the West Indies in 1764
and 1765." Travels in the American Colonics (New
York: Macmillan Company, 1916), p. 369.

4. Philip Schuyler Papers. Schuyler to Dayton, Aug.
8, 1776.

5. Ibid., General Orders. Dec. 30. 1776.

6. Ibid., Schuyler to Washington, June 30, 1777:
Henry Glen Letter Book, 1776-80, Schuyler to Morgan,
June 19, 1777; Diary of Jonathan Lawrence, May 27-
lune 28, 1777, New York State Library.

7. Philip Schuyler's Orderly Book, Schuyler to
jansevoort, July 10, 1777; Colbraith, "Journal," July
tO, 1777.

8. Ibid., Aug. 23, 1777.

9. State of New York Public Papers of George
Clinton, 10 vols. (Albany: State of New York, 1900),
1:510; "A Monthly Return of the State of the Garrison
=brt Schyler [sic] May 1st 1778."

10. Ibid.

11. Thomas Gates Papers, "A Return of Ordnance
; Stores wanted in the Northern Department," Aug. 19,
'■ 111.

12. Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Military Papers, Ganse-
< oort, June 13. 1777; Lee Hanson and Dick Ping Hsu.
> Casemates and Cannonballs: Archeological Investigations

t Fort Stanwix. 1758-1781," 1:128 Fort Stanwix Archeol-

!igical Project (New York District, 1973).
13. Philip Schuyler's Orderly Book, Lansing to
-ewis. July 8, 1777; "A Monthly Return of the State
f the Garrison Fort Schyler [sic] May 1st 1778."

14. State of New York, New York In the Revolution
Albany: J. B. Lyon Company. 1904). p. 31.

15. Marinus Willed Miscellaneous MSS.. New-York
listorical Society Apr. 1, 1778.

16. Philip Schuyler Papers, "An Estimate of Military
i tores. Provisions etc. to be sent to Albany," Schuyler to

few York Provincial Congress, July 3, 1775.

17. Horatio Gates Papers, "A General Return of
1 'rdnance and Stores at Ticonderoga. Mount Inde-
lendence . . . ," July 4. 1778.

18. Philip Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Washington,
July 6, 1777.

19. Horatio Gates Papers, "A Return of Ordnance
Stores wanted in the Northern Department," Aug. 19,
1777.

20. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book, July 19, 1777.

21. Memorandum, Lee H. Hanson, Jr., to Director,
New York District. National Park Service, June 1, 1972,
copy filed in Denver Service Center, NPS, under A2615.

22. Marinus Willett's "Narrative," cited in John
Albert Scott, Fort Stanwix (Fort Schuyler) and Oriskany
(Rome, N.Y.: Rome Sentinel, 1927), p. 243.

23. Memorandum, Lee H. Hanson, June 1, 1972.

24. Lauber, Orderly Books of The Fourth New
York Regiment, p. 583.

25. State of New York, New York In the Revolution,
pp. 13, 31.

26. Miscellaneous American Revolution, Colin Camp-
bell's "Account of Disbursements Fort Stanwix 1st June
1759"; Journal of Ebenezer Elmer, Oct. 8. 1776.

27. Ibid., Sept. 10, 1776; Peter Gansevoort, Jr.,
Military Papers, Willett to Gansevoort, Apr. 20, 1778.

28. State of New York, New York in the Revolution.

Chapter III

1. Philip Schuyler Papers, Dayton to Schuyler, Aug.
30, 1776.

2. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book, Oct. 12, 1777.

3. John Lamb Papers, New-York Historical Society,
Willett to Lamb, Feb. 24, 1778; Miscellaneous American
Revolution, Van Schaik to Van Dyck, May 7, 1780;
Lauber, Orderly Books of The Fourth New York Regiment,
p. 559.

4. Peter Gansevoort. Jr., Military Papers, Willett to
Gansevoort, Apr. 20, 1778.

5. Orderly Books of The Fourth New York Regiment,
p. 549.

6. It may be of interest that while this letter indicated
that coats and shirts were to be shipped, it also revealed
that such was not the case with shoes. See Horatio Gates
Papers, Mease to Gates, Aug. 21, 1777.

7. Miscellaneous American Revolution, "An Estimate
of the Average Price in December 1778 of the different
Articles of Clothing allowed the Soldiery by the Act of
Congress, September 6th 1777."

8. Ibid., "Resolution of Congress of the Clothing
Department," June 18, 1781.

9. Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Military Papers, Gansevoort
to Gansevoort, August 29, 1778.

10. Ibid., Swartwout to Gansevoort, Aug. 29, 1778.

11. Fredrick P. Todd, Cornwall-on-Hudson N.Y., to
author, Apr. 22, 1974, in author's file.

12. Historical data on Fort Stanwix collected by
Orville W. Carroll. Denver Service Center, National Park
Service. Mr. Frederick P. Todd is fully convinced that
the militia wore no uniforms. See letter to author, Apr.
22. 1974.

13. Lauber, Orderly Books of the Fourth New York
Regiment, p. 556.

14. Philip Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Elmore,
Jan. 5, 1777.

15. V. Dyck to Van Schaik, Apr. 17, 1780. furnished
by Lee Hanson. Archeologist, NPS.

16. Robbins Family Papers, Sterling Memorial
Library. Yale University, Journal of the Rev. Ammi R
Robbins: A Chaplain In the American Army In The

1 16 Fort Stanwix

Northern Campaign of 1776 (New Haven: Printed by
B. L. Hamlen, 1850).

Chapter IV

1. Philip Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Congress.
Nov. 19, 1776.

2. Ibid., Schuyler to Elmore, Jan. 5. 1777; Marinus
Willett's Orderly Book, Apr. 23, 1778.

3. Philip Schuyler Papers, Hansen to Schuyler Dec.
30, 1776. In a document dated Jan. 31. 1777, mention is
made of a "store where Mr. John Hansen has the disposal
of Indian Goods." The room set aside for this purpose
was probably a lean-to connected to the store, a building
standing next to the guardhouse. See ibid., certificate
signed by John Post et al., Jan. 31, 1777, with letter,
Hansen to Schuyler, Feb. 1, 1777.

4. Journal of Ebeneezer Elmer, July 11. 1776.

5. Philip Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Congress, Jan.
25, 1777.

6. Ibid., Schuyler to Livingston, Feb. 7. 1777.

7. Miscellaneous American Revolution, Order of
Colonel Gansevoort, May 23, 1777.

Chapter V

1. Philip Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Washington.
Aug. 16. 1776. On July 24. 1777, Willett made reference
in his Orderly Book to cattle belonging to the garrison.

2. Marinus Willett Miscellaneous MSS., Cuyler to
Willett, Sept. 20, 1777.

3. Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Military Papers, Cuyler to
Gansevoort, Nov. 28, 1777.

4. "John Barr's Diary," Dec. 4. 1780, in Lauber,
Orderly Hooks of The Fourth New York Regiment, p.
844.

5. Fort Schuyler Miscellaneous MSS., New-York
Historical Society, "Plan for the relief and provisioning
of Fort Schuyler." ca. 1780.

6. Lauber, Orderly Hooks of the Fourth New York
Regiment, p. 553.

7. Peter Gansevoort, Jr.. Military Papers. Gansevoort
to Gates, Dec. 12, 1777.

8. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book. Sept. 23. 1777.

9. Ibid., Apr. 5, 1778.

10. Mereness, "Journal of An Officer Who Travelled
in America and the West Indies in 1764 and 1765." p. 369.

I I. Horatio Gates Papers. Schuyler to Gates, Oct. 3.
1776.

12. Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Military Papers. Gansevoort
to Gates, May 2.3, 1777.

13. William Willett, cd.. A Narrative of the Military
Actions <<i Colonel Marinas Willett (New York, 1831).
p. 195.

Chapter VI

l It may help one to understand a little about the
kinds of tools employed at Fori Stanwix bj learning what
kinds of artificers, both military and civilian, were em-
ployed there. In early 1778 there were 15 carpenters, 6
sawyers. 12 brickmakers, 4 colliers. 2 coopers. 2 gardners,

2 blacksmiths, and 2 armorers. See "A Monthly Return of
the State of the Garrison Fort Schuyler May 1st 1778."

2. Miscellaneous American Revolution, Schuyler to
Committees in Albany et al.. July 14, 1776; ibid., Schuyler
to Gansevoort, Oct. 27, 1776.

3. "A Monthly Return of the State of the Garrison
Fort Schuyler May 1st 1778."

4. Miscellaneous American Revolution. "Capt. Baker's
Return of Camp Equipage." n.d.: Philip Schuyler Papers,
"An Estimate of Military Stores, Provisions etc. to be
sent to Albany," enclosed with letter, Schuyler to N. Y.
Provincial Congress, July 3. 1775; Gates Papers, "A
General Return of Ordnance and Stores at Ticonderoga.
Mount Independence . . . ," July 4. 1777.

5. Peter Gansevoort, Jr., Military Papers, Gansevoort
to Schuyler, June 15, 1777.

6. Charles M. Stotz. Drums in the Forest (1958),
p. 106.

7. Philip Schuyler Papers. Schuyler to Lewis. Dec. 17,
1776. These 2 items frequently appeared in the returns of
post commissaries. See Miscellaneous American Revolu-
tion. "Return of Barrack Bedding and furniture etc at
Oswegatchie and Fort Wm. Augustus 25 Sept 1767";
ibid., Capt. Baker's Return of Camp Equipage; ibid!
"Return of Barrack Bedding and Furniture etc. at
Oswegatchi and Fort William Augustus 25th March 1768."

8. Marinus Willett Miscellaneous MSS.. Van Renselaer
to Willett, Apr. 1, 1778.

9. Hanson and Hsu, "Casemates and Cannonballs."
passim.

10. Philip Schuyler Papers. Schuyler to Lewis. Nov.
9. 1776.

11. Stotz. Drams in the Forest, p. 106.

12. Miscellaneous American Revolution. "Return of
Barrack Bedding and Furniture etc at Oswegatchie and
Fort Wm. Augustus 25 Sept. 1767."

13. Ibid., "Return of Barrack Bedding and Furniture
etc at Oswagatchi and Fort William Augustus 25th
March 1768."

14. State of New York. New York in The Revolution
p. 81.

15. Ibid., p. 47.

16. Peter Gansevoort. Jr.. Military Papers. Gansevoor'
to Gansevoort, Mav 17, 1777.

Chapter VII

1. Orville W. Carroll. Historic Structure Report. Foi
Stanwix Architectural Data Section (Denver Servic
( enter: NPS, 1973). pp. 61-62.

2. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book. Aug. 1. 1777.

3. Ibid.

4. Carroll. Fort Stanwix, p. 41.

5. Colbraith, "Journal." Aug. 23. 1777.

6. [bid., Aug. 2. 1777.

7. "A Monthly Return of the State of the Garrisc I
I mt Schyler [sic] May 1st 1778"; State of Nev. Yoi
Public Papers of George Clinton. 3:510.

8. "A Sketch of the siege of Fort Schuyler," ly
Frances dc Fleury. cited in Luzader. "Construction and
Military Histor) of Fori Stanwix," Appendix VIII.

9. Lauber. Orderly Hooks of the Fourth New )',>>•
Regiment. Nov. 23, IS^O p. 541.

10. Carroll, Fort Stanwix. p. 117.

11. Marinus Willett's Ouleih Hook. Maj 1 <. 1771

12. lauber. Orderly Hooks of the Fourth New )'< '
Regiment, p. 556.

Historic Furnishing 117

13. Carroll. Fort Stanwix, p. 118.

14. "Hobbies: The Magazine for Collectors," cited in
Carroll, Fort Stanwix, pp. 117. 158-59.

15. Colbraith, "Journal." Aug. 11, 1777.

16. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book, Aug. II, 1777.

17. Rome Directory, 1857, p. 31, cited in Carroll.
Fort Stanwix, pp. 125, 162-3.

18. John F. I.uzader to Orville W. Carroll, Jan. 1971.
in Carroll's research file, "Glossary, Fort Stanwix,"
Minute Man National Historical Park. Concord, Mass.

19. Journal of Ebeneezer Elmer, July 3, 1776.

20. Carroll, Fort Stanwix, p. 126.

22. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book. Dec. 2, 1777.

23. Lauber, Orderly Books of the Fourth New York
IRegiment, p. 551.

24. Colbraith, "Journal," Aug. 21. 1777.

25. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book. Mar. 10, 1778.

26. Edmund B. O'Callaghan. The Documentary His-
tory of the State of New York, 4 vols. (Albany. 1850),
II. p. 526.

27. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book, Jan. 3. 1778;
"Journal of Samuel Tallmadge," in Lauber. Orderly Book.\
of the Fourth New York Regiment, Feb. 26, 1781. p. 744;
Lauber. Orderly Book of the Fourth New York Regiment,
Jan. 22. 1781. p. 559; Journal of Ebeneezer Elmer, Oct.
4, 1776.

28. Lauber, Orderly Book of the Fourth New York
Regiment, Nov. 24, 1780, p. 542.

29. Colbraith, "Journal," Aug. 3, 4, and 10. 1777:
Marinus Willett's Orderly Book. Sept. 28, 1777.

30. Philip Schuyler Papers. Glen to Schuyler, July
8, 1776.

31. Colbraith, "Journal," Aug. 9, 1777.

32. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book, Mar. 15. 1778.

33. Peter Gansevoort. Jr., Military Papers, Gansevoort
'to Gates, May 23, 1777.

34. Willett, A Narrative of the Military Actions of
Colonel Marinus Willett, p. 195.

35. Willett's Orderly Book, Sept. 28, 1777.

36. Ibid., Jan. 3, 1778; Lauber, Orderly Book of the
Fourth New York Regiment, p. 559.

37. "Journal of Samuel Tallmadge." Feb. 26, 27, 28.
and Mar. 13, 1781, in Lauber, Orderly Books of the
Fourth New York Regiment, pp. 744-46.

38. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book, Sept. 22. 1777.

39. Ibid., Feb. 6, 1778.

40. Journal of Ebeneezer Elmer, Aug. 29, 1776;
ibid., Oct. 8. 1776.

41. Ibid., Oct. 10, 11. and 12. 1776. In later entries
Elmer notes that he occupied a room, presumably in the
barracks or casemates, an indication that some construction
tiad been completed. See ibid., and also Oct. 14. 17. and
18. 1776.

42. Philip Schuyler Papers. Schuyler to Congress.
Sept. 8. 1776; ibid., Schuyler to Elmore. Nov. 12. 1776.

43. Ibid., passim.

44. Carroll, Fort Stanwix, pp. 86-90.

45. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book. Sept. 17. 1777.

46. Ibid., Sept. 20, 1777.

47. Carroll, Fort Stanwix, pp. 63-6.

48. Luzader, "Construction and Military History of
^ort Stanwix," pp. 110-18; Luzader. "The 'Stars and
>tripes' at Fort Stanwix: A Summary of the Evidence."
>ee Appendix A.

49. Luzader. "Construction and Military History of
| -ort Stanwix." Appendix IX.

50. Journal of Ebeneezer Elmer. Oct. 5. 1776.

51. Philip Schuyler Papers. "The Proceedings of a

Court of Enquiry held at Fort Schuyler February 28,
1777. . . ."

52. Colbraith. "Journal". Aug. 22. 1777.

53. Colbraith, "Journal," Aug. 9, 1777.

54. Journal of Ebeneezer Elmer, Dec. 5. 1776.

55. On Mar. 13, 1778, six men were directed to
collect cedar wood in order to make pails for the garrison.
Pails had many uses and were mostly found in quarters.
See Marinus Willett's Orderly Book, Mar. 13, 1778.

56. Journal of Ebeneezer Elmer, Nov. 19. 1776.

57. United States Revolution Collection, "Inventory
of all Stores Belonging to the General Hospital at Albany
etc. March 29th 1777."

58. Philip Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Livingston.
Nov. 2, 1776; ibid., Extract of Minutes by John M.
Nelson. Sec. Committee to Safety for State of N.Y.,
Nov. 13, 1776.

59. Willett, A Narrative of the Military Actions of
Colonel Marinus Willett, p. 49; Hanson and Hsu.
"Casemates and Cannonballs," 1:53.

60. "Plan of Fort Stanwix Built at Oneida Station by
Provincial Troops in 1758." British Museum. Crown
Collection CXXI. 99, copy in Library of Congress, cited
in Luzader, "Construction and Military History of Fort
Stanwix," Appendix III.

61. Horatio Gates Papers, "A Return of Ordnance
Stores wanted in the Northern Department. Albany, N.Y.
by Eben Stevens, Commandant of Aitillery."

62. Philip Schuyler Papers. Trumbull to Varick, July
29, 1776.

63. Hanson and Hsu. "Casemates and Cannonballs,"
1:37-42.

64. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book, Dec. 4, 1777;
Lauber, Orderly Books of the Fourth New York Regi-
ment, p. 543.

65. Lauber. Orderly Books of the Fourth New York
Regiment, p. 577.

66. Scott, Fort Stanwix (Fort Schuyler) and Oriskany,
p. 100.

67. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book, June 5, 1777;
ibid., June 9. 1777; ibid., June 12, 1777; ibid., March 22.
1778; "Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix," cited in Luzader
"Construction and Military History of Fort Stanwix,"
Appendix II.

68. For a detailed description of this building, see
Carroll, Fort Stanwix, pp. 78-79; A return of the main
guard at Fort Stanwix in Nov. 1778 noted that there were
2 prisoners in confinement and a guard consisting of 1
subaltern, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, 2 drum and fife, and
39 privates. There were also 13 daytime sentinals and 12
nighttime sentinals. See Philip Schuyler Papers. "Report
of Main Guard. November 1, 1778."

69. Philip Schuyler Papers. "Report of Main Guard.
November 1. 1778."; Marinus Willett's Orderly Book.
March 22. 1778; State of New York. Public Papers of
George Clinton, 4:131-33.

70. Lauber, Orderly Books of the Fourth New York
Regiment, p. 577.

71. Journal of Ebeneezer Elmer. June 14. 1776:
ibid., June 15. 1776.

72. Marinus Willet's Orderly Book, Mar. 6. 1777.

73. Ibid., May 7. 1777.

74. The 6 drawings are the McGraw powder horn.
1777: De Witt powder horn. 1778: Cornelius Chatfield
power horn. 1780; De Fleury map; Gransevoort map; and
the map accompanying Willett's narrative of 1831, all cited
in Carroll. Fort Stanwix, p. 80. fig. 135. One written
reference appears in Scott, p. 95 and another on the
Gansevoort map. also cited in Carroll, p. 80, fig. 136.

1 18 Fort Stanwix

75. Carroll. Fort Stanwix, p. 81.

76. Gansevoort's field bed. which he might have
used at Fort Stanwix, is preserved at the Smithsonian
Institution. See letter, Lee Hanson, Fort Stanwix, N. M.,
to Manager. Historic Preservation Team. Denver Service
Center, NPS. May 23, 1974.

77. Peter Gansevoort. Jr., Military Papers. Gan-
sevoort to Gansevoort, May 17, 1777.

78. Ibid., Gansevoort to Gansevoort, June 2. 1777.

79. Willett's "Narrative." MSS., cited in Luzader.
"Construction and Military History of Fort Stanwix," pp.
132-33.

80. Philip Schuyler Papers. Schuyler to Flmore,
January 5, 1777.

8 1 . Revolutionary War Military Instructions for
Soldiers n.d., pp. 81, 83, owned by the New Haven Colony
Historical Society.

82. Carroll, Fort Stanwix, pp. 36-37.

83. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book, Feb. 24, 1778.

84. Ibid., Nov. 8, 1777: ibid., Dec. 31, 1777.

85. Philip Schuyler Papers, Schuyler to Lewis,
November 9. 1776.

86. Stotz, Drums in the Forest, p. 106.

87. State of New York. New York In the Revolution,
2:81.

88. Ibid., p. 47.

89. Miscellaneous American Revolution, "Return of
Barrack Bedding and Furniture etc at Oswegatchie and
Fort William Augustus 25 Sept. 1767."

90. Peter Gansevoort. Jr., Military Papers. Gensevoort
to Schuyler, June 15, 1777.

91. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book. Mar. 13. 1778.

92. Ibid., Sept. 15. 1777; ibid., May 21. 1778.

93. Photograph. Revolutionary War fireplace. Hut 34.
Hut Camp of 17th Regiment of Foot, prior to recon-
struction (negative 5486), New-York Historical Society:
photograph, fireplace in reconstructed military hut,
Dyckman House Park (negative 2644), New-York His-
torical Society, see Illustrations Nos. 1 and 2.

94. Marinus Willett's Orderly Book, Aug. 11. 1777.

95. Journal of Fbeneezer Elmer, Oct. 17. 1776; ibid.,
Oct. 18, 1776.

96. "John Ban's Diary." Nov. 24, 1780. in Lauber,
Orderly Books of the Fourth New York Regiment, p. 843.

97. Lauber. Orderly Books of the Fourth New York
Reg! merit, Dec. 2. 1780. p. 547.

98. State of New York. New York In the Revolution,
2:81; Lauber, Orderly Books of the Fourth New York
Regiment, pp. 83-84.

99. Journal of Ebeneezer Elmer. Sept. 12. 1776.

100. Ibid., Oct. 14. 1776.

101. "John Barr's Diary." Dec. 25. 1780. in Lauber.
Orderly Books of the Fourth New York Regiment, p. 846.

102. Ibid., Jan. 1. 1781. p. 848.

103. Philip Schuyler Papers. Hansen to Schuyler.
January 28. 1777.

104. Hanson and Hsu. "Casemates and Cannonballs,"
1:45.

105. Colbraith. "Journal." Aug. 9. 1777.

106. Dr. John Cotter to Manager. Historic Preserva-
tion Team, subject: Report for July 1972 Northeast
Region, n.d.. in NPS files.

107. Philip Schuyler Papers, Van Rensselaer to Fitz,
October 6. 1775.

108. Hanson and Hsu. "Casemates and Cannonballs."
1:147. 151.

109. John Muller. I Treatise Containing the Ele-
mentary Part of Fortification. Regular and Irregular

(London: Printed for J. Nourse. 1746), p. 214, reprinted
by Museum Restoration Service. Ottawa, 1968.

110. Carroll. Fort Stanwix. p. 49.

111. Hanson and Hsu. "Casemates and Cannonballs,"
1:60.

112. "John Barr's Diary," Nov. 24, 1780, in Lauber,
Orderly Books of the Fourth New York Regiment, p. 843.

113. Luzader. "Construction and Military History of
Fort Stanwix," p. 43.

114. Ibid.

Appendix

1. Ltr.. Oswald . Backus to Captain Gustave Villant.
U.S. Army Historical Staff 10 February, 1927, files of the
Office of the Chief of Military History, Ft. McNair,
Washington. D.C.

2. James Weise, Swartwout Chronicle (1899). 214.

3. The New Lamed History, 1923 edition, IV, 3109.
Swartwout did not leave a journal and his letter to
Gansevoort concerning the cloak does not discuss the
flag design.

4. John Albert Scott, Fort Stanwix (Fort Schuyler)
and Oriskany (Rome. 1927), 175.

5. Journal of the Continental Congress, Monday,
June 14. 1777.

6. James Thacher, Military Journal, (Boston, 1823).

7. Pennsylvania Evening Post, Philadelphia, Vol III,
Number 398. 453.

8. Milo M. Qualife, Melvin J. Weig, Roy E. Apple-
man. The History of the United States Flag (Philadelphia.
1966), 30.

9. William Colbrath. "Journal of the most material
occurences preceding the Siege of Fort Schuyler (formerly
Fort Stanwix) with an account of the siege, etc.," micro-
film. New York Public Library.

10. The Remembrances; or, Impartial Repository of
Public Events For the Year 1777 (London 1778), 448-49;
ltr. Willed to Jonathan Trumbull. Jr.. August 11, 1777;
The Independent Chronicle and Universal Advertiser,
(Boston), August 28, 1777; Marinus Willett. "Orderly
Book." New York Public Library.

11. Marinus Willett. "Narrative," MSS., Tomlinson
Collection. New York Public Library.

12. William Willett. ed., A Narrative of the Military
Actions of Colonel Marinus Willett (New York, 1831),
132.

13. Willett. "Narrative."

14. Revolutionary Service Record. John McGraWj
National Archives.

15. Washington Papers. Library of Congress, ltr.
Peters to Washington. May 10. 1779.

16. Ibid, ltr. Peters to Washington. September. P79

17. "Colonel [Daniel] Claus' Account of the Battle
of Oriskany and the Defeat of St. Leger's expedition,'
New York State Library; Colonial Office Records. Publii
Records Officer. London: Hessi-Hanan Urkunden am
Brifen, copies of Hessi-Hanan documents in possession o
Dr. Joachin Lischer. Stadtarchivist. Frankfurt am Main
Hessische Stratsarchiv. Marburg am Lahn.

18. William Digby. Journal. MSS. British Museum
Thomas Anburcy. Travels Through the Interior Paris o

tmerit a. 1 1 ondon, 1789).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Manuscript Materials

Albany, New York. New York State Library. Henry

Glen Letter Book 1776-80.
. New York State Library. Diary of Jonathan

Lawrence, May 27-June 28, 1777 [by Jonathan

Lawrence].
. New York State Library, Miscellaneous

American Revolution.
Ann Arbor, Mich. William L. Clements Library,

University of Michigan. Thomas Gage Papers.
Hartford, Conn. Connecticut Historical Society.

Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., Papers.
Jamaica, New York. Queens Borough Public Library.

"Monthly Return of the State of the Garrison

Fort Schyler [sic] May 1st, 1778."
Newark, New Jersey. New Jersey Historical Society.

"Journal of Ebeneezer Elmer" fby Ebeneezer

Elmer].
^Jew Haven, Conn. Sterling Memorial Library. Yale

University. Robbins Family Papers,
^ew York City, New York. New-York Historical

Society. Horatio Gates Papers.
New-York Historical Society. Fort Schuyler

Miscellaneous Manuscripts.
. New-York Historical Society. John Lamb

Papers.
New-York Historical Society. Marinus

Willett Miscellaneous Manuscripts.
- . New-York Historical Society. Marinus

Willett Orderly Book.
New York Public Library. "Journal of the

most material occurrences preceding the Siege of

Fort Schuyler (formerly Fort Stanwix) with an

account of the siege, etc." [by William Colbraith].

negative photostat.

. New York Public Library. Peter Gansevoort,

Jr., Military Papers.

New York Public Library. Henry Glen

Papers 1770-1801.

_. New York Public Library. Philip Schuyler
Papers.
Worcester, Mass. American Antiquarian Society.
Philip Schuyler Orderly Book.

. American Antiquarian Society. United States
Revolution Collection.

Printed Sources

Carter, Clarence Edion, ed. The Correspondence of
General Thomas Gage with the Secretaries of
State 1763-1775. 2 vols. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1931.

I.auber, Almon W., comp. Orderly Books of The
Fourth New York Regiment, 1778-1780 The
Second New York Regiment, 1780-1783 by
Samuel Tallmadge and Others with Diaries of
Samuel Tallmadge, 1780-1782. Albany: The
University of the State of New York, 1932.

Mereness, Newton D., ed. Travels in the American
Colonies. New York: Macmillan Company, 1916.

O'Callaghan, Edmund B., and Fernow, Berthold, ed.
Documents Relating to the Colonial History of
the State of New York. 10 vols. Albany: Weed,
Parsons and Co., 1854.

O'Callaghan, Edmund B., The Documentary History
of the State of New York. 4 vols. Albany, 1851.

State of New York. New York In the Revolution.
J. B. Lyon Company, 1904,

. Public Papers of George Clinton. 10 vols.

Albany: State of New York, 1900.

Willett, William, ed. A Narrative of the Military
Actions of Colonel Marinus Willett. 1831. Re-
print. New York: Arno Press, 1969.

119

I 20 Fort Stanvvix

Secondary Sources

Books

Scott, John Albert. Fort Stanwix (Fort Schuyler) and
Oriskany. Rome, New York: Rome Sentinel,
1917.

Stotz, Charles M. Drums in the Forest. 1958.

National Park Service Studies

Carroll, Orville W. Historic Structure Report, Fort
Stanwix, Architectural Data Section. Denver
Service Center, 1973.

Hanson, Lee and Hsu, Dick Ping, Casemates and
Cannonhalls: Archeological Investigations at Fort
Stanwix, 1758-1781 . Fort Stanwix Archeological
Project. New York District, 1973.

Luzader, John F. "The Construction and Military
History of Fort Stanwix." Historic Structure Re-
port. Washington, D.C.: Office of Archeology and
Historic Preservation, 1969.

. "The 'Stars and Stripes' at Fort Stanwix: A

Summary of The Evidence." typescript. Denver
Service Center, 1973.

FORT STANWIX

HISTORIC STRUCTURE REPORT

Orville W. Carroll

I Summary 122
It Studies Completed to Date 123

III Historical Background of Fort Stanwix 125

IV Proposed Use of the Fort Structures 129

V Proposed Reconstruction Work with Military Glossary 131
Illustration: Proposed Use of Buildings 165
Appendices 166

A. The Fort Stanwix Historical Center — A Preliminary Report 166

B. Class C— Cost Estimate 171

C. Addendum — Lumber Procurement and Preservation 176
Illustrations 177

Plan of Fort Stanwise 1758 177

Plan of Fort Stanwix Built at Onieda Station by Provincial Troops in 1758 178

Plan of Fort Stanwix, Built at the Onnida Station 1758 179

Plan of Fort Stanwix 1764 181

A Sketch of Fort Stanwix 1764 182

Fort Schuyler, Dec. 25, 1777 182

James Wilson Powder Horn 183

Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix 184

Plan of Fort Stanwix 184

Plan of Fort Stanwix 1 802 1 84

Plan of Fort Stanwix 1810 185

Plan of Fort Stanwix 1832 185

Drawing of Fort Stanwix 1793 186

Artist's Interpretation of Fort Stanwix 1777 186

"Sunrise at Fort Stanwix". Aug. 3, 1777 187

Sketch of Fort Upon Great Island, New Hamphire 187

Reconstructed Drawbridge, Fort Erie, Ontario 188

Plan of Fort Edward, N.Y. 189

Drawing of French Sentry Box 189
Preliminary Drawings 190

Site Plan, Fort Stanwix National Monument 190

Perspective view of Fort Stanwix, 1776-1781 191

Ground Plan, Fort Stanwix 1758-1781 192

West-East, South-North Profiles 193
Notes 1 94

121

SUMMARY

Fort Stanwix was originally constructed by
British forces in 1758, during the French and
Indian wars. Like most of the British fortifications
it was of timber and earth construction, and always
required a great deal of repair work in order to
prevent decay.

The fort was repaired and remodeled by the
British troops in 1 764; three years later the garrison
was withdrawn. When the American troops arrived
in 1 776, they found only a rotted shell of fortification
works remaining.

We have good documentation in the form of
engineer's drawings for 1758. 1759, and 1764, but
very little documentation done on a professional
level for the years following 1776. Drawings were
completed but seem to have been lost. The in-
formation on hand is contradictory at times.

Archeological explorations of the site during
1970-72 have turned up invaluable evidence re-
lating to the ground plan of the fort, but fall short
of providing the needed information to plan the
structure above ground level. Additional research
was carried out by the writer and John Luzader,
N.P.S. historian, in an attempt to find documents
relating to other Revolutionary war forts. While
this effort was helpful, it did not produce the great
reservoir of information anticipated.

In determining the fort plan the evidence pre-
sented by the archeologists concerning the location

and basic shape of the fort features has taken
precedence. Documentation surviving from the
letters, orderly books, journals and diaries kept
during the American occupation of Fort Stanwix,
1776-1781, has been the secondary source of
information. Where information is lacking from the
American occupation, the fort plans drawn by the
British engineers in 1758, 1759, and 1764 have
been employed.

There will still be much conjecture and there-
fore some possibilities for disagreement regarding
the appearance of the proposed fort. The current
plans are to reconstruct the fort using building de-
tails from several sources: Crown Maps Nos.
99-103, the McGraw and Wilson powder horns,
the "Gransevoort Map of Fort Stanwix," and addi-
tional drawings from other contemporary forts. The
reconstruction will therefore have log ramparts and
parapets, surrounded on three sides by a ditch,
covered way and glacis. Other major features will
be a log ravelin, a wooden bridge with a draw span,
an elevated "necessary" or latrine outside the fort
walls, five free-standing buildings on the parade,
casemates at the curtain walls, filled bastions having
three underground bombproofs, and a bakehouse.

It is hoped that one or more of the three wells,
the location of the whipping post, and possibly
other features will be located when grading of the
parade ground begins.

12:

STUDIES COMPLETED TO DATE

A. Architect's Preliminary Report of 1963

Plans were renewed once again by the citizens
of Rome, in the early 1960's to reconstruct at least
a portion of Fort Stanwix. The site was classified
by Congress as a National Monument in 1935,
although the original intent of the bill was not to
rebuild the fort.

One thrust in this direction was initiated by
Gilbert Hagerty, curator of the Fort Stanwix
Museum. In 1963 Mr. Hagerty contacted Charles
M. Stotz, a practicing architect in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. Since the early 1940s Mr. Stotz had
been involved in extensive research on pre-
revolutionary war forts in western Pennsylvania,
and in 1947 he was commissioned by the Fort Ligo-
nier Memorial Foundation to supervise the research
and planning for the reconstruction of Fort Ligo-
nier. With this background in military fortifications,
Mr. Stotz was a likely candidate to choose for con-
sultation on the proposed reconstruction of Fort
Stanwix.

Messrs. Stotz and Hagerty spent several days
together traveling through New York State and the
lower Canadian provinces studying military forts of
this area. Utilizing this information and the mili-
tary maps from the "Crown Collection," Stotz and
Hagerty worked out a preliminary design concept
for the development of the Fort Stanwix site. Mr.
Stotz' report, dated November 18, 1963, is included
in the Appendices of this report.

B. Archeologist's Report of 1965

In 1965, the Urban Renewal Agency of Rome
authorized Col. Duncan Campbell, Director of the

William Penn Museum at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,
to conduct a spot exploratory study on the site of
Fort Stanwix to determine the feasibility of carrying
out a full-scale archeological project.

The results of Colonel Campbell's efforts can
be read in two reports: "Archeological Survey Site
of Fort Stanwix" by J. Duncan Campbell, August
20, 1965, containing 14 pages of typescript and six
sheets of drawings; and "Illustrative Report of 1965
Archeological Explorations at Fort Stanwix,"
having a preface written by John R. Hurley,
Director, Rome Urban Renewal Agency, dated
September 17, 1965, and containing eight progress
photographs and one sheet of drawings. Both
reports can be seen at the Jervis Library in Rome.

C. N.P.S. Archeologists' Reports, 1970-73

A program of full-scale archeological excava-
tions on the site was begun by the National Park
Service in July 1970 and continued through
November 13, 1972. The archeological report was
published by the National Park Service as No. 14
in th" series Publications in Archeoloy, by Lee
Hanson and Dick Ping Hsu.

D. The Master Plan of 1967

A Master Plan for Fort Stanwix National
Monument was developed by the National Park
Service at the request of the City of Rome in 1964.
This Master Plan, issued in 8" x IOV2" booklet
form, was approved on March 14, 1967, by
Associate Director Howard W. Baker.

123

1 24 Fort Stanwix

Because the Master Plan was prepared prior
to N.P.S. ownership and before the historical and
archeological research was completed, its contents
regarding the fort and its construction features are
vague and partially inaccurate. Presumably the
1967 Master Plan will be revised, utilizing all the
new information gathered since 1967.

E. The Historian's Report of 1969

Archival research, concentrating on the story
of Fort Stanwix (1758-1781), was conducted by
N.P.S. historian John F. Luzader.

The results of this research can be read in his
1 82-page report entitled "The Construction and
Military History of Fort Stanwix," printed in
1969 by the Office of Archeology and Historic
Preservation, N.P.S.

Included in the text of the report are seven
contemporary British plans of the fort, two Ameri-
can drawn plans (post-siege of 1777), and one
diagram showing the layout of Fort Stanwix in
August of 1777, as hypothecated by Mr. Luzader
according to date available to him at the time.

F. H.A.B.S. Survey of 1970

In the spring of 1970. the Rome Urban
Renewal Agency contracted with the Historic
American Buildings Survey to prepare a historical-
architectural report entitled "History of the 19th
Century Urban Complex on the Site of Fort
Stanwix." This report was researched and written
by Diana S. Waite of Albany, New York, and was
submitted in typescript form in June of 1970.
Photographs included with the text were taken by
Jack E. Boucher for H.A.B.S. After final editing
and arrangement of subject matter, the report was
published in 1972 by the New York State Historic
Trust.

the glacis opposite the southwest bastion of the fort
and, traditionally, the small two-story wing was said
to have been built around 1796. There were some
persons interested in saving this part of the house if
it were actually old. Conclusive documentation was
not found during Mrs. Waite's research.

In August 1971 the Urban Renewal Agency
contracted with Mr. Charles E. Peterson of Phila-
delphia. Pennsylvania, to investigate the fabric of
the Empire House in order to determine its date of
construction. Mr. Peterson examined the structure
on August 11-12 and found it to date from the
19th century. His report was mailed to the URA
and Fort Stanwix NM on August 25, 1971.

H. Interpretive Development Concept, 1971

An eight page report was written by Nan V.
Rickey, Interpretive Planner. N.P.S., for the Eastern
Service Center, Office of Environmental Planning
and Design, in March 1971.

This report, based on the information available
in 1971, attempts to establish guidelines for the
future interpretation and use of the site. Continued
excavation work on the site by the archeologists in
1972 and additional research into the historical
documents by several interested persons have culled
much new data. The guidelines of 1971 will be
revised to incorporate these findings.

(■. Further Research on the Empire House
in 1971

The Empire House had a reputation for being
the oldest standing structure in Rome. Il stood on

Ill

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF
FORT STANWLX

A. The British Occupation, 1758-1775

On July 16, 1758, General Abercromby
ordered Brig. Gen. John Stanwix to build a "post"
at the Oneida Carrying Place, according to a plan
drawn up by Col. James Montresor. 1

General Stanwix arrived with his troops at the
Carrying Place shortly after August 1, accompanied
by at least three engineers — Maj. William Eyre.
Capt. William Green, and Lt. Thomas Sowers.-'

The first order of business was for Major
Eyre to mark out and supervise the construction of
i an entrenchment surrounding the site of the pro-
posed post.' 5 These outer fortifications, consisting of
trenches protected by log breastworks, were later
dismantled when the fort works were sufficiently
completed. 4

Major Eyre and Lt. Sowers left the area
shortly after the entrenchments were finished,
leaving Captain Green in charge of constructing
the new fort. Due to Captain Green's ill health he
could not fully cope with the situation; thus Lt.
John Williams was dispatched to the Carrying
Place by General Abercromby. After Williams'

' arrival on August 14, he and Capt. Green conferred
together and revised the Montresor plan to fit the
existing terrain. Later Lt. Williams "marked out a
small fort within the/Intrenchment marked out by
Majr Eyer's. . . . ""' On August 23, 1758, the first
foundation log for the new fort was laid/' Two
months later Gen. Stanwix wrote that he expected
to have the fort completed en barbette before winter

I set in. '

The original fort was laid out in the form of a
square measuring approximately 220 feet x 220
feet. Pentagonal bastions with flanks of 36 feet
and faces of 90 feet were planned off each corner.
This gave the fort an overall measurement from

bastion tip to bastion tip of 330 feet. s The initial
intent of the engineers was to orient the square of
the fort precisely north-south and east-west. Today
the fort walls have an inclination of 15° east of
true north.

The fort of 1758 was intended to garrison
400 men in the casemates located under the ter-
repleins of the curtain walls, while the officers were
quartered in small houses built on the east half of
the parade ground. An underground powder maga-
zine was constructed parallel to the east face of the
southeast bastion. In this somewhat tenable posi-
tion, the British army weathered the winter of
1758-59.

Work on the fort resumed in July 1759 and
continued until December." Still the fort was not
completed. Sir William Johnson, writing in 1761,
stated that "The fort [Stanwix] . . . will require
another summer to finish it. . . ." 10 In the mean-
time, the fort was deteriorating and in 1764 condi-
tions became so bad that an effort was made to
repair and remodel the works. A total of <£ 140.5.10
of New York currency was expended for work
completed between July 1 and December 3 1 ,
1764." Crown Maps Nos. 102 and 103 show the
extent of repair work accomplished. Some of the
construction work must have been supervised by
Lt. George Dernier, an engineer, who signed his
name to Crown Map No. 103. Demler had been
ordered to Fort Stanwix in May of 1759 by Col.
Montresor. '-

An important change was made to the parade
ground prior to 1764, which gave the fort a formal
military air. The loosely arranged officers' houses
were removed and in their place three buildings
were erected within ten feet of the casemate walls
(in the north, east, and west sides of the parade
ground. These buildings are not identified on the

125

I 26 Fort Stanwix

Crown Maps but were probably a headquarters
building and two combination storehouse-officers'
quarters. These buildings scale 20 feet x 120 feet
off the Crown Maps and are identical in size
to the east and west barracks found in the recent
archeological explorations. ' ;t

In addition to the erection of barracks build-
ings, three other major changes were made to the
fort prior to 1764: a ravelin, main bridge, and
caponiere or covered passageway off the east end
of the sally port were added. A slight modification
was also made to the earth embankment along the
east side of the fort. With a few exceptions, no
further repairs or alterations were made to the fort
during the final 12 years of British occupation.

American troops, under the command of Col. Elias
Dayton, started immediate repair work on the fort.
By October 3. the barracks had been partially re-
built but not finished off on the inside. 1 " Nails,
boards, and other building materials were in short
demand and had to be boated up the Mohawk Rivei
from as far away as Albany.

Jonathan Lawrence, passing through Fort
Stanwix on June 8. 1777, found it "... to be a
palizaded Fort with an Intrenchment round it and
piqueted round, with six sm[all] Canon and two
pieses of Field A[rtillcry] to Defend it the Fort
forming a square with Barrack[s] all around the
parade which is large a[nd] looked very neat." n

The Fire of 1774

In 1774, Fort Stanwix suffered a disastrous
fire which destroyed the barracks:

... I hope to be able to go and reside there [Fort
Stanwix] myself — the people who live on the ground
are one John Roof, Thomas Mayers, William Cloyne,
Bartholemew Broadhock — -John Steers and Stephanus
Delyrod a Frenchmen — who trades there for Major
Fonda — the Fort is all in ruins, and the barracks by an
accident last Fall was burnt to the ground, nothing
now remains — but a Room which the officers use to
mess in. . . . 14

B. The American Colonists Take Over

American troops arrived at Fort Stanwix on
July 13, 1776, as the result of a rumor that the
westward passageway through the Mohawk Valley
was about to be invaded by British troops advancing
toward Albany. The American plan was to fortify
and occupy old Fort Stanwix, thereby effecting a
blockade of the British forces.

When the American troops arrived, they found
the fort in poor condition. Lt. Elmer recorded in
his journal on August 27, 1776: "The ruins of five
houses and barracks in the inside, built for the
accomodations of the stores, officers and soldiery. " ,r>
This description suggests that at least two more
buildings were erected on the parade ground after
1764, unless Elmer was referring to the five
casemates as houses.

Aided by "artificers of every kind," the

C. The Fires of 1780 and 1781

Fort Stanwix was the victim of fires in 1780
and 1781. The fire of 1780 destroyed the guard-
house and threatened the barracks before it was
brought under control. Part of the barracks standing
next to the guardhouse was torn down by the
garrison to prevent the fire from spreading. Tht
next day, according to reports from the com-
mandant, the barracks had been repaired and th<
following Saturday a new guardhouse was to bf
rebuilt. 1S

A heavy rain, which did considerable damag<
to the fort, preceded the fire of May 14, 1781. Thi
fire consumed all the barracks buildings, but th
powder magazine, the cannons, and part of th
provisions were saved. The extent of the damag
by fire and flood was such that repair work woul I
have meant reducing the remaining works to tm
ground and beginning with new foundations. 19

On May 27. 1781. General Washington ir
formed the President of Congress:

There has been a necessity of abandoning the post ( f
Fort Schuyler (Stanwix) and removing the Garrisc J
and Stores to German Flats. The Barracks had bet
the beginning of this month consumed by fire and tit
Works so exceedingly damaged by the heavy ra f
storm that they were rendered indefensible, nor cou t
they be repaired in any reasonable time by the numb I
of Men who can be spared as a Garrison. 20

Orders arrived on June 1 for the garrison
evacuate the post. The women and children h
alreadj been taken by boat to German Flats <|
May 21. On June 3. the convoy set out in bos l

Historic Structure 127

down the Mohawk River for Fort Herkimer,
arriving there the next day. On June 6, a convoy
left Fort Herkimer destined for Fort Stanwix, where
it arrived the following day at 4:00 p.m. The next
two days were spent demolishing the fort, after
which the troops returned to Fort Herkimer 21

D. The Blockhouses of 1783 and 1794

General Washington visited the site of Fort
Stanwix in 1783.-'- In August of that year he
ordered Col. Marinus Willett to build ". . . one or
two small Block Houses, at the Portage between
the Mohawk River and the Wood Creek. . . ."
Orders filtered down from Col. Willett through
Capt. Pearsce to Capt. Newell, who was eventually
assigned the job of superintending the construction
work. The project got under way early in October,
hindered by the age-old problem of procuring
necessary supplies.-" 1

Eventually the project was completed. Ap-
parently, three blockhouses were built about one
: half mile below the site of Fort Stanwix, probably
, near the upper landing site on the Mohawk River
] near old Fort Williams. 21 When a meeting with
, the Indians was held at Fort Stanwix in 1784, the
casks of liquor were locked up in one of these
, blockhouses. - r '

In 1794, a committee consisting of local
, inhabitants sent a petition to Governor Clinton
; bating:

' esolved . . . that a Fort should be erected at Fort
Stanwix as a place of rendezvous for the Troops
ind Inhabitants and as a deposit for Stores. . . .
. . it would be proper for us only to erect Palissadoes
ic round, and a Block house within the Body of
he Place. . . . The ditch, the Ramparts and the Glacis
tre yet in good preservation. . . , 26

Sufficient information is on hand to be sure
hat the blockhouse was constructed, although no
widence of its construction was found in the
ircheological exploration work. Rev. John Taylor,
elating his visit to Rome in 1802, stated: "The
)ld Fort Stanwix stands about 30 rods from the
iver. It is regularly built, the intrenchment is very
leep. In the center of the Fort stands the old
>lockhouse." 27

The blockhouse was still standing in 1815.
vhen William Dunlap visited Rome. He reported

that from a window in James Lynch's house he
". . . made a drawing of the remains of the fort.
The block house still occupies the centre of the
fortification, and the mounds of earth which
formerly made the ramparts of the fort, were
beyond." 2R

No record has been found to date that pin-
points the exact year when the blockhouse was
razed but by ". . . 1830 the whole fort was levelled
sic & ditches filled up." 29

E. Powder Horns and Related Pictorial
Matter

Quite a few powder horns have survived from
the mid-eighteenth century that were engraved with
regional maps showing towns and forts of the New
York area. Of special interest to the project are
the powder horns which have the plan of Fort
Stanwix engraved on them. Not all of the powder
horns carved at Fort Stanwix (or Schuyler) have
been located and examined. Bui of those either
examined personally or through drawings and
photographs, the most convincing are those identi-
fied as belonging to: Christophe* - Hutton, 1777;
James McGraw, December 25, 1777; Thomas
DeWitt, 1778; James Wilson, c. 1779; and Cornelius
Chatfield, November 5, 1780.

The authenticity of the McGraw powder horn
is the most convincing to the author. James (or
Alexander) McGraw enlisted in July of 1775. He
was with Capt. Thomas Dorsey's Company in the
battle for Quebec and was shot through the leg on
the retreat from Canada.

McGraw then enlisted on April 13, 1777,
in Capt. Bleecker's Company under Colonel Peter
Gansevoort. 30 This company arrived at Fort
Stanwix on May 26, 1777, and stayed until ap-
proximately Dec. 31, 1779. 31 A return of the sick
in the garrison at Fort Stanwix on March 1, 1778,
states [James] McGraw, Capt. Bleecker's Company,
was confined to his quarters with an ulcerous leg. 32
It seems very likely that James McGraw's old war
wound became infected and that during this time
of convalescence he had time to engrave the plan
of Fort Stanwix on his powder horn.

In 1897, P. F. Hugunine of Rome completed
a painting of Fort Stanwix, based upon his im-
pressions following an extensive period of research
on the subject. He arrived at the conclusion that the

128 Fort Stanwix

fort was square, had bastions, and was located in
the general area where later archeology proved it
to be.

A copy of the Hugunine painting has been
included in the Appendices of this report. Hugunine
described his fort in the following way:

The earthwork around the fortification is the silent or
covert way, a dry ditch, 12 to 14 feet deep, with
perpendicular pickets in its center, and 24 feet wide
to the walls of the Fort. The parallel pickets project
from the rampart and follow around the walls. The
parapets are made of heavy sods cut from the swamps,
which form the outer part of the wall. The inner parts
are logs and filled between with earth. The whole
construction is of earth for the exterior and logs for
the interior. :t:!

The Hugunine painting differs in many aspects
from what is proposed for the reconstruction. The
chief differences are: sod rampart walls and para-
pets vs. log construction; open passageways vs.
covered; pickets located in the ditch vs. on the
covered way; no buildings on the parade ground
vs. five structures; no ravelin vs. a ravelin.

In 1 897 a new twist to the Fort Stanwix story
took place. Apparently unimpressed by the efforts
of Mr. Hugunine's research, Mr. Thomas H. Stryker
of Rome was instrumental in getting Charles C.
Hopkins, an engineer with the Stanwix Engineering
Company in Rome, to study all the existing records
pertaining to the actual construction of the fort.
Mr. Hopkins then drew up a plan of the fort as he
understood it to exist, not as it was actually pro-
posed. His plan, submitted with a signed affidavit,
was presented before the Rome Common Council,
the D.A.R., and the S.A.R. on September 1 5, 1 899.™

The revised plan of 1 899 is reasonably ac-
curate in locating two of the fort's bastions and
curtain walls, but it distorts the angles and lengths
of the northeast and southeast bastions and curtain
walls. This contorted plan of the fort received wide-
spread support publicly and has been used ever
since as the symbolic representation of Fort
Stanwix.

Public interest in the fort was aroused during
the 1 50th year observance of the siege of Fort
Stanwix. John Albert Scott, editor of the Rome
Sentinel newspaper, prepared a series of articles for
the sesquicentennial edition entitled Fori Stanwh
and Oriskany, published in book form in 1927.
There is very little information omitted from this
book pertaining to the siege; it probably represents

the best effort to date to present the history of Fort
Stanwix during 1 777.

Another project finished in time for the
sesquicentennial was a painting of Fort Stanwix
done by Edward Buyck. The theme of the painting
is the purported first raising of the "Stars and
Stripes" by the American troops in battle against
enemy fire on August 3, 1777. :in

Like the Hugunine painting of 1897, the fort
is shown as an earthen fortification faced with sod.
In order to achieve the dramatic effect of the
garrison standing at attention on the parade ground,
the five free-standing buildings were left out of
the picture.

PROPOSED USE OF THE FORT
STRUCTURES

On January 22-24, 1973, representatives from
the Denver Service Center, the Northeast Regional
Office, the New York District Office and the
Harpers Ferry Center met in Rome, New York, to
formulate plans for the interpretation of Fort
Stanwix.

It was generally agreed that the guidelines to
be used in the reconstruction of the fort structures
would be as follows:

( 1 ) The major theme of the interpretive pro-
gram at Fort Stanwix would center about the siege
of the fort and the repulse of the British forces
commanded by St. Leger. This would encompass a
short period of time on each side of August 2-22,
I 1777, when the seige took place, or from May
through December 1777.

(2) Fort Stanwix should be totally recon-
structed on the exterior with all visible construction
adhering to the historic scene. In other words, there
should be no deviation on the exterior from the
building details and dimensions as found in the
historic period of 1758-1781.

(3) All structures found within the fort area
related to the historic period should be recon-
structed either for visitor interpretation or use by
management.

A tentative plan was developed for the utiliza-
tion of the structures proposed in the forthcoming
reconstruction of Fort Stanwix. The following
recommendations for building use were proposed:

(1) Totally reconstructed areas would be as
follows:

a. Glacis, covered way, picket line, ditch,
and log ramparts.

b. Ravelin, ravelin gates, picket gates
and bridge over the covered way.

c. Main bridge, draw span, and main
gates.

d. Elevated necessary with connecting
bridge.

e. Restore the stream bed on the east
side of the fort.

f. Sally port (covered communication,
redoubt and gate.)

g. Parade ground with whipping post,
gun platform, and wells.

h. Guardhouse (used in the winter
months for interpretative station).

i. East barracks with four officers'
rooms and two soldier's rooms.

j. Headquarters building with a Com-
mandant's room, combination dining
room and headquarters, and two staff
officer's rooms.

k. Bakehouse and passageway in south-
east bastion.

I. Southwest bombproof and passage-
way. Used during the siege as a
hospital and for the safekeeping of
valuable papers (Colbraith Diary).

m. Northwest bombproof and passage-
way. May have been used for a
powder magazine during the siege.

n. Northeast bombproof and passage-
way. Not to be exhibited unless
visitation requires an additional
underground exhibit.

o. All bastions to be restored with
ramps, gun platforms, banquettes,
parapets, and embrasures.

p. The flagstaff on the southwest bastion.

q. Sentry boxes.

r. Southeast casemate to be shown as a
soldier's barracks.

129

130 Fort Stanwix

s. All exterior surfaces of the casemates,
the storehouse and west barracks to

be restored to plans.

(2) Partially restored areas and/or adaptive
use areas for management should be utilized as
follows:

a. The storehouse is to be used for a
visitor comfort station.

b. The west barracks is to be adapted
for use as an audio-visual station. A
heating plant could be located in
this building.

c. The southwest casemate, all or in
part, could be used for a cooperative
association sales area.

d. The west casemate should have the
north room restored as a soldier's
barracks and the south two-thirds of
the casemate adapted as office space
for management.

e. The east casemate should be adapted
for use by the park staff and should
contain an eating-lounge area; change
room, and storage area in the south
half of the casemate. Storage of the
artifacts excavated from the fort site
could be placed in this space.

f. The north casemate should have two
west end rooms restored as officer's
quarters. The remaining area should
not be used immediately.

(3) Lighting: A minimum of exterior lighting
is planned for the fort. It was recommended that
we floodlight the exterior of the bastions at night
for protection purposes. Also, it is possible that
lighting of the flagstaff will be required. One
recommendation was made that portable lighting
devices be used whenever evening activities
occurred.

(4) Proposed utilities:

a. Electrical service should be placed
underground into the fort area and
underground service or a conduit
should be laid to all fort structures.

b. Telephone service should be placed
underground into the fort area, sales
area, management and staff areas.

c. Fire and smoke detection system

should be placed throughout the for
and connected to underground tele
phone wires relayed to the Fin
Department.

d. Burglar detection system. A possibli
combination of audio and silent alarn
systems could be connected by under
ground telephone wires to the loca
police station.

e. Water system. Underground wate
pipes should be connected to existinj
city water lines and extended into th<
fort area. A fire fighting-water hos<
and stand pipe system could possibb
be placed on the parade grounc
utilizing the rain barrels as points o:
concealment.

f. Sewer lines should be connected tc
the city system. City-owned storrr
sewer lines can be used if needed.

g. Heating. There should be one cen-
trally located heating plant consisting
of a boiler and one standby plant foi
use within the fort area. Hot watei
would be circulated in undergrounc
pipes to the various areas that wt
propose to heat. It is recommende<
that the following restored exhibi
areas not be heated east barrack*
headquarters building, elevated neceJ
sary, sally port, guardhouse (only on
room to be heated), the three bonuV
proofs, bakehouse, southeast cum •
mate, north room of west casemat'
west two rooms of north casemat .
(remaining part of north casema t
not to be heated), north half of ea
casemate, the sentry boxes ai |
ravelin.

(5) Maintenance. It is recommended that
small maintenance area be set aside within the ft
area for storing supplies, cleaning equipment a l
small tools. A room in one of the casemates
well as one or more of the lean-tos belonging t
the storehouse would be suitable for this purpo-i
Heavy equipment should be kept outside the f>
area and be brought in only when needed.

PROPOSED RECONSTRUCTION WORK
WITH MILITARY GLOSSARY

A glossary of military terms as they apply to
:he proposed construction work at Fort Stanwix is
ncorporated into this section of the report. These
:erms are listed in alphabetical order and do not,
)y any means, represent the full complement of
erms found in a military engineer's vocabulary.

A. Bakehouse

The bakehouse site was first excavated in
965, and again in 1971. :,<1 The archeologists have

i oncluded from a study of their excavations that

iiSiis structure was built by the Americans after
776. :!T We have reference to a bakehouse in use

it Fort Stanwix in 1781, but no solid evidence as

p where it was located. 1 *

The bakehouse occupied the center of the
! Dutheast bastion. At least five other contemporary
1 )rts of this period have been found with a bake-
1 ouse built within a bastion.™ When the powder
i lagazine of 1758 collapsed sometime after 1764,
t le earth fill surrounding this structure fell into the
\ riginal excavated area. After the Americans ar-
i ved, they apparently completed the filling in of

I 't ie old magazine, leveled off the ground, and

I I instructed a bakehouse over part of the filled area.
■ t vidence is on hand that the bakehouse structure

k ood completely below the terreplein of the
tistion. 40 Its floor level started at 450.05 feet, or
I '. inches below the parade ground. With its ceiling
i ight of seven feet, roof thickness of two feet, plus
t' 'o feet of earth fill, the elevation of the terreplein
i Ifl ove should be close to 461.00 feet.

The bakehouse measured 18.5 feet x 20 feet.
^ doorway, 3.75 feet wide, was located in the
'•» nter of the west wall. Three wooden steps were

found at the entrance: the first step started outside
the wall of the structure and was elevated six inches
above the parade ground, the second step was
located within the wall, and the third step was built
entirely within the room. In the 1965 excavations
portions of a door and door jamb with two pintles
in place were found in their fallen position on the
floor. 4 '

A brick fireplace and hearth were uncovered
in the center of the east wall. Immediately in back
of the fireplace, 1.6 feet above the hearth, a bee-
hive oven was constructed measuring 10 feet wide
and 12 feet long. It was built of brick and had a
brick lined floor. Flues to serve the fireplace and
oven were probably combined into one chimney
that extended through the roof and earth fill and
terminated in a chimney cap just above the terre-
plein. 4 -

According to the archeologists' report of 1965.
the corners of the bakehouse were built with a sad-
dle and notch type construction, indicating that the
structure was made from either round or squared
logs. The report also implied that the exterior walls
were covered with clapboards (actually boards
measuring 1 inch X 11 inches). Window glass frag-
ments and shutter pintles were reported found in
the excavations along the east wall. If the bake-
house were completely backfilled with earth, the
only logical location for a window would be in the
door.

The roof of the original structure was probably
covered with two tiers of 12-inch squared timbers,
sloped to one side to provide drainage. The floor
of the bakehouse, except for the brick hearth, was
thought to be of hard packed earth.

No evidence was found during the excavations
to indicate passageways, etc., in front of the bake-
house. It is assumed that a short passageway was

131

32 Fort Stanwix

built off the steps, turning to the south and con-
tinuing another 30 feet. The passageway roof would
have been covered with heavy timbers and earth
would have been placed over the roof whenever
it was needed to fill out the terreplein surroundin
the gun platforms.

B. Banquette

Banquette, whether single or double, is a kind
of step made on the rampart of a work near the
parapet, for the troops to stand upon, in order to fire
over the parapet: it is generally 3 feet high when
double, and 1 Vi when single, and about 3 feet broad,
and AVi feet lower than the parapet. 4:t

. . . the surface should slope backwards 2 inches
in 3 ft., 3 inches in the 5 ft., so as to discharge water
freely and keep the banquette dry. . . .' 4

Banquettes first appear on the plans of 1764.
in the northeast and northwest bastions, in the
ravelin and in the redoubt of the sally port. 45 In
the cross section through the redoubt, the banquette
appears as an earthen firing step having a ramp to
the rear. They may be similarly constructed in the
bastions where the terreplein is of earth construc-
tion, but on the timber terrepleins of the curtain
walls and over the wooden platform of the ravelin,
they would be constructed of wood. Sod or clay
would have been used to stabilize the surface of
the earthen banquettes.

Plank construction was probably used in
building the wooden banquettes running along the
curtatin walls. These would be three feet wide, and
1 Vi feet high with a two inch slope toward the
rear. All of the banquettes would be canted back
at a 40 angle whenever they stopped at an
embrasure. No construction details for wooden
banquettes have been found up to the present time
except for those built along the walls of the sally
port passageway.""' These appear in sections A-B
and C-D, Crown Map No. 102. It is assumed that
the banquettes running along the curtain walls of
the fort and on the ravelin would be constructed in
a similar manner.

C. Barracks
Background Information

There were no free-standing barracks built for
the soldiers at Fort Stanwix in 1 758— 59. ,7 Case-

mates to house 400 soldiers were constructet
under the terreplein of the four curtain walls
while twenty-one "Hutts for Officers" were built or
the east half of the parade ground. The roon
arrangement of the casemates and the plan locatior
of the officers' huts can be seen in Crown Map;
Nos. 99, 100. and 101.

Prior to November 1764, the officers' huts hae
been removed from the parade ground, and in theii
place three buildings were constructed around the
perimeter of the parade ground. While the build-
ings are not identified on the plan, they weri
probably two barrack buildings and a command
ant's house. 4S Crown Map No. 102 shows the
chimney arrangement and hip roof construction ol
the barracks, which scale 20 feet X 120 feet.

By 1767 the fort was described as being in 2
ruinous situation and not worth the expense ol
repairing and of maintaining a garrison there. The
British government did see fit. however, to retair
at least two half-pay officers to take care of the
buildings, in the event they should be required foi
the King's use. 49

In 1774 the fort suffered a disastrous fire
which consumed all the buildings except a "Roorr
which the officers used to mess in. . . .'" "'" Thi<
was the situation confronting the American Army
under Col. Flias Dayton, when it arrived at Fori
Stanwix on July 13. 1776. The above descriptioi
given of the fort's condition tallies with that writtei
by Dr. Ebenezer Elmer in August of 1776:

Fort Stanwix. so called after the General who built i
in I 758. is large and well situated, having a glacij
breastwork, ditch and a picquet fort before the wall!
which are also well guarded with sharp sticks of timbe
shooting over the walls, on which is four bastions. Th
fort also has a sally port, covert way. bridge an 1
ravelin before the gate at the entrance. The ruins cl
five houses and barracks in the inside, built for if :
accommodation of the stores, officers and soldiery. '

Dr. Elmer implies in his journal that there we \
still not enough barracks to house the men 1 '
September 18, since he had to sleep outdoors,
was not until October 3 that Dr. Elmer was ab I
to move into the barracks, sharing a room with ;
captain."'-' This room was apparently only a vert \
division of space since the entry on October
states that there was no partition between ti
rooms. 53 Many of the artificers and soldi**
continued to lodge in tents after this date."' 4

Il is still not certain how much construct!')

Historic Structure 133

work was done on the fort under the direction of
Col. Dayton between July 13 and October 17.
There are conflicting reports written about the
condition of the fort at this time, one of which
stated that Fort Stanwix was the strongest fort on
the continent/' 5 Reports such as these must have
been gross exaggerations. It seems more likely that
a garrison of such small size could do little more
than maintain guard and fatigue duty during its
four month stay.

Colonel Dayton's regiment was replaced on
October 1 7 by Colonel Samuel Elmore's four com-
panies of Connecticut troops consisting of some 23
officers and 283 men. 56 According to the historian's
report, part of the garrison was returned to
German Flats to winter because not all the barracks
had been completed. 57 The period of time in which
Col. Elmore's regiment occupied Fort Stanwix —
October 17, 1776 to May 10, 1777 — must have
been one of inactivity as far as construction work
was concerned. However, there was probably a
great deal of future planning during the winter and
early spring months by the French engineer, Capt.
de Lamarquise, who had been sent by General
Schuyler to take charge of the fort works. Some-
time in late April, de Lamarquise reported that the

I barracks were able to house only 200 men, but
with alterations they could accommodate 400 to

! 500 men. 5s

After the arrival of Col. Gansevoort's 3rd New
York Regiment on May 3, construction activity
increased. Again there seems to be a difference of
opinion among the various reports of this time
regarding the condition of the fort buildings. On
May 19, the engineer wrote that it was absolutely
necessary to build new barracks. 5 " Colonel Marinus
Willett recalled many years later that the barracks

| within the fort were repaired, and another barrack
was erected outside the fort on the glacis. This
latter building was burned by the British army
during the siege.'"

Barrack Construction

There are several contemporary drawings that
depict the barracks at Fort Stanwix (Schuyler). 61
Six of these sources include in their delineation five
buildings standing on the parade ground; two of
the five structures were probably barracks, and
are in the same location as they are on the British
plan of 1764. Unfortunately, all of the drawings

disagree in detail and there is little indication of
how the buildings were constructed.

A number of references to barracks prior to
the siege can be found at Fort Stanwix, but only
one specifically uses the phrase "framing a
Barracks." ° 2 Four references to fetching, trans-
porting, and receiving boards suggest that boards
would have been used on "framed" buildings as
opposed to the long and heavy squared timbered
casemates incorporated into the ramparts. 63

A materials order submitted by B. Romans in
September of 1775 for the construction of bar-
racks on Constitution Island, N.Y., lists piece by
piece the dimensions and quantity of framing stock,
lumber, shingles, nails, bricks, etc., required for
this project. 64

Another material order submitted by Col.
Moylan to the Albany Committee of Correspondence
in September 1776 lists similar materials required
to build "Barracks for 20,000 men." B5 There are
also numerous references extracted from cor-
respondence written to other forts in the northeast
area that describe the building of barracks by
means of frames covered with boards. Thus it seems
that the majority of barracks buildings erected
during the Revolution were constructed of a post,
sill, and beam system with the walls covered with
boards and the roofs with shingles; fort Stanwix
was probably no exception.

East Barracks

Archeological excavations during the summer
of 1972 uncovered the foundation sills for the
north wall and portions of the east wall of this
barracks. Three cellar holes were also excavated,
two of which are thought to be related to the
American occupation. 6,; The dimensions of the
barracks measured approximately 20 feet X 120
feet, which corresponds to the size of the 1764
barracks. The foundations of the barracks were
found to be wooden sleepers set directly on the
ground; no stone was used and no evidence of fire-
place bases was uncovered. Portions of three
hinges, one door latch (?), six spikes, six nails, one
pintle having a threaded end with a nut, and a
half dozen other miscellaneous metal items were
retrieved from the cellar holes.

Since it has been assumed that the McGaw
powder horn is the most credible source of in-
formation regarding the exterior form of the

134 Fort Stanwix

barracks during the siege, the building would have
had the following characteristics:

(1) Foundation dimensions of 20 feet X 120
feet (from archeological findings).

(2) A frame structure consisting of sleepers,
posts, beams, and joists; walls covered with wide
horizontal feather-edged boards with lapped ends;
and a gable roof covered with wood shingles/' 7
The exterior weatherboarding would have been left
unpainted.

(3) Four chimney stacks as shown on the
powder horn.

(4) Eight doorway openings as shown on the
powder horn. We have plans from four other
contemporary forts that show a passageway running
through the barracks opposite the sally port. It is
believed that one of the eight doorway openings
represents a passageway, four feet wide, cut
through the barracks for easy access to the sally
port. Board and batten doors, hung on strap
hinges, were probably the type of entrance used,
each door supplied with hand wrought thumb
latches.

(5) Only one window is shown on the powder
horn and that is in the south gable end. Window
openings must have been an oversight on the part
of the artist. There were probably two or more
windows per room, depending upon the size of
each room. fiS It is likely that outside window
shutters were used to conserve heat during the cold
weather.

(6) The interior room arrangement is con-
jectural. Two officers' rooms on the south end and
two more on the north end are proposed. 89
Between these would be three rooms for soldiers
plus the passageway to the sally port. Each room
would be heated by a fireplace. The room arrange-
ment has been worked out by placing the fireplace
foundations beyond the edges of the cellar holes.

It is assumed that the cellars were dug out after
the barracks were constructed and were probably
used for the storage of dry provisions.

(7) The interior room finish is conjectural.
A garrison order issued on October 16. 1777, reads
in part: "The Commandant wou'd be very Glad
the Engineer wou'd carry on the Barracks with all
possible speed, as he is afraid the Inclemency of
the Weather, will much injure the Mens Constitu-
tions unless soon provided with good Quarters." '"
Assuming that the above order applies to the bar-
racks standing on the parade ground, then they

were still not completed nearly two months after
the siege was over.

On the basis of the scanty information cited
above, it is recommended that the interior walls of
the room occupied by the soldiers not be lined with
boards. Instead, the rough sawn weatherboards
nailed to the exterior wall studding should be the
completed finish. The ceiling can be finished off
by laying boards loosely over the top of the joists
without nailing. This would mean that the frame-
work of the barracks building, the posts, plates,
and ceiling beams would be hand hewn while the
wall studding, braces, ceiling joists, and boards
would be mill sawn.

The floors should be rough-sawn wide boards,
face-nailed into the joints with "T"-headed. hand-
wrought nails. According to garrison orders, the
floors were to be washed down every Saturday.

A different wall treatment is proposed for the
officers' rooms located within the barracks. These
walls should be lined with tongue and grooved
boards that have been hand planed and nailed with
small hand wrought "T" headed nails. The ceilings
should have hand planed boards laid loosely over
the top of the joists.

Closets in which the officers could hang their
uniforms, swords, etc., were probably built into
the rooms — a small luxury not afforded the com-
mon soldier. Lighting should be furnished by
candles, and shoe scrapers might be provided on
the outside wall of the officers' rooms.

(8) Possibly eave troughs could be used to
catch rainwater and funnel it into barrels.

West Barracks

Archeological excavations uncovered the foun-
dation sills of the south wall and a portion of the
east wall at the south end of the barracks. Six cellar
holes were excavated along the entire length.

The dimensions of the west barracks cor-
respond with those of the east barracks — about 20
feet X 1 20 feet. The construction of the two
buildings was similar. Wooden sleepers, used foi
the foundation, were set directly on the ground
Parts of ten sleepers, apparently used as joists, wen
uncovered at the south end. These were placec
approximately three feet on centers and set directlj
on the ground at parade ground level, 451.00 feet

Historic Structure 135

Excavation of the west barracks yielded only
one fireplace base, located in the south end wall of
the building, while the McGraw powder horn shows
five chimney stacks extending above the roof. Three
spikes, one pintle (with a threaded end), and two
staples were the only hardware recovered from the
site.

Using the McGraw powder horn again as the
source of information, the west barracks would
have appeared as follows:

(1) Foundation dimensions of 20 feet X 120
feet (from archeological findings).

(2) A frame structure identical in construction
to the east barracks as described earlier. (See item
No. 2 under east barracks.)

(3) Four chimney stacks (spaced to avoid the
six cellar holes).

(4) Four doorway openings.

(5) The powder horn shows two windows in
the east wall, but it seems certain that there would
have been two or more window openings into each
of the rooms. It is probable that exterior board and
batten shutters were used.

(6) The interior room arrangement is con-
jectural. 71 Two small rooms for officers at each
end of the barracks and two large rooms for
soldiers in the center of the building are proposed. "-
Each room would be heated by a fireplace and
lighted by candles. At least one cellar hole should
be excavated and shown as an exhibit. This could
be done by leaving the trap door open and covering
the opening with a metal grille.

(7) The interior room finish should be similar
to that proposed for the east barracks; that is, the
walls in the soldiers' rooms should be unlined on
the interior, while those in the officers' rooms
should be lined with boards. Ceiling boards should
be laid loosely over the joists. The framework
should be exposed mortice and tenoned timbers.
The floor should be wide boards throughout,
face-nailed with handwrought nails.

(8) As at the east barracks, eaves troughs
could have been used during the historic period for
catching and diverting rainwater from the roof into
rain barrels.

D. Bastions

Bastions are the pentagonal sections of the
ramparts which extend beyond the square of the
fort at each corner. At Fort Stanwix, the original

drawings show that the bastions were made full,
that is, filled with earth up to the base of the
parapet. Access to the terreplein of the bastion
from the parade ground was by means of a ramp
located in the throat or gorge of the bastion.

The terreplein of the bastions consisted mainly
of the sloping gun platforms with earthen banquettes
built along the base of the parapet between each
platform. Sod was probably laid between the plat-
forms and on the banquettes to prevent erosion of
the topsoil. Drains for catching rainwater were
usually dug into the terreplein at the lowest point
next to the parapet.

The outer part of the bastion beyond the
terreplein consisted of the parapet, built to a
height of six feet above the terreplein in its com-
pleted form or to a height of 2Vi feet when
finished en barbette. It was the usual military
practice to place a sentry box on the tip of each
bastion. Access to the superior slope of the parapet
where the sentry box stood must have been provided
by a set of steps.

There is good evidence to believe that only
three of the bastions at Fort Stanwix were com-
pleted at the time of the siege 7H and up until
February of 1778, when a report was written
describing the conditions of the fort. 74 Probably
the parapet of one bastion had not yet been raised
to its entire height of six feet.

Names were given to each bastion as it was
completed in 1758. Only the northwest bastion can
be positively identified, and it is designated as the
''Flag Bastion" on Crown Map No. 101. The re-
maining bastions were called the "Onida," the
"New York" and the "Rodisland." "' The Ameri-
cans apparently never gave names to their bastions,
since on August 1, 1777, orders were given to man
the S.E.. S.W., N.W., and N.E. bastions. 70 This
order was repeated on December 1 1. 77 By Novem-
ber of 1780, this designation was further simplified
by referring to the bastions as south, east, north,
and west. 7 * On December 30, 1780, "The Morning
Gun is to be fired in the Southeast Bastion to
Morrow Morning and at the Same place a New
Year Morning and Evening." 7n

Only one structure was built within the bastions
in 1758 and that was a powder magazine located
in the southeast bastion. It was built approximately
seven feet below the parade ground level, although
its bombproof roof extended some four feet above
grade and was topped with five feet of earth fill.

36 Fort Stanwix

In 1759, a small cellar was constructed in the same
bastion; both of these structures are shown on
Crown Map No. 101. By 1764 both the root cellar
and powder magazine had fallen into disrepair.
Whether the powder magazine was rebuilt as part
of the repair work done in 1764 is uncertain, but
when the Americans arrived in 1 776 the magazine
had probably fallen in and become filled over with
earth from the bastion.

At one time or another the Americans built a
structure under the terreplein of each bastion. This
fact has been established by evidence uncovered
during the archcological excavations and by docu-
mentation found in orderly books so and diaries.
What are certain to be bombproofs were found in
the northwest, northeast, and southwest bastions.
A bakehouse was uncovered in the southeast
bastion and is considered by the archeologists to
have been built during the American occupation.

The McGraw powder horn showns a rec-
tangular block located in the throat of each bastion.
These blocks can be interpreted in two ways —
either as bombproofs or ramps. Since ramps arc
usually indicated on plans by a different symbol, it
can almost be said that the powder horn artist was
showing underground bastion structures.

It is proposed to show the fort with the four
bastions completed, having full height parapets
containing embrasures, banquettes, fraise, gun
platforms, ramps and sentry boxes. It is recom-
mended that three bombproofs and passageways
be reconstructed.

A reconstruction of the bakehouse and pas-
sageway in the southeast bastion is recommended
based on the archcological evidence found in 1965
and 1971.

A berm is also shown on the three sectional draw-
ings appearing on Crown Map No. 99, dated 1758.
but no measurements are written in. Scaling di-
rectly off the drawings, these berms measure be-
tween seven and eight feet wide.

Archeologists have determined that the berms
constructed at Fort Stanwix were of the following
widths: six feet wide along the north and wesl
sides, five feet wide along the south side, and
seven feet wide along the east side. It appears that
the berm adjacent to the east rampart wall was
widened in 1764 when the pickets were moved
from the ditch to the berm. 83 In the proposed re-
construction, pickets should be placed on the bernj
along the east side of the fort, and sod used or
the berms.

F. Bombproofs and Passageways

As stated in the section entitled Bastions, il
appears that bombproofs were built under three
of the bastions — those to the northeast, northwest,
and southwest — and that a bakehouse was con-
structed under the southeast bastion.

Bombproofs were so constructed as to cnabk
them to withstand direct artillery fire. Furthe;
precautions were taken to ensure the safety o
their contents by covering their heavily constructec
roofs with three to four feet of earth fill. Each o
the bombproofs at Fort Stanwix was constructec
in a different manner. Archcological evidence oh
tuned from the northwest bombproof site suggest
that the construction features of this particula
building are very similar to those described in th
Willed Narrative. Sl

E. Berm

BFRM. in fortification, is a little space or path, of
about 4, 6, or 8 feet broad, according to the height and
breadth of the works, between the ditch and the
parapet, when made of turf, to prevent the earth from
rolling into the ditch: and serves likewise to pass and
repass.* 1

Berms were constructed to slope slightly
towards the ditch to provide good drainage away
from the ramparts. s -

I he 1759 plan of Fort Stanwix. Crown Map
No. 101, shows a measurement of 6'-0" written
directly above the berm on "Profill throu C # D."

Northwest Bombproof

This structure is probably the magazine th: t
Willett describes as having been built from it:
"seven spare feet which were left of the pickets
Round posts were found forming the walls of tic
bombproof and of the passageway into it. Tl i
shape of the structure was found to be irregul
with unequal lengths and angles to each wall. T! i
south end of the bombproof measures appro- i
match 13 feet, while the north end measures abo i
15 feet. The east and west walls measure 20 f6<3
and 21 feet respectively.

Historic Structure

The passageway enters the bombproof at the
northeast corner. Its overall width was found to
be approximately 5 feet, while the overall length
along the shortest side measured 55 feet. Ten feet
east of the bombproof, the passageway made a 42°
turn to the south and extended 45 feet until it
reached the end wall of the north casemate. A
pair of strap hinges was found at the beginning of
the passageway indicating that a door had been
located at the entrance way. Both bombproof
and passageway floors were found to be about
1.23 feet below the level of the parade ground.
This means that the height of the bombproof roof
determined the height of the terreplein within the
bastion. It also means that with a ramp running
alongside the passageway, most of the side walls
would be covered by the earth fill.

The passageway was Moored with planks (laid
over cross sleepers) running parallel to the walls,
and the roof was spanned by 5 foot beams. Floor
planks were found in the bombproof and its roof
was covered with an earth fill. There was no indi-
cation that interior posts were used to help support
the roof, whose timbers were probably sloped to
permit drainage.

Southwest Bombproof

This bombproof measures approximately 20
feet square with a passageway located at the cen-
ter of the east wall. As with the northeast bomb-
proof, this structure and its passageway were
constructed above the parade ground level. The
walls of the bombproof were built of horizontal
members, thought by the archeologists to be
squared timbers. A doorway was framed into the
east wall by means of two vertical posts mortised
into the foundation timber. The ends of the wall
timbers on each side of the opening were fastened
to the uprights, probably by mortise and tenon
work. This would also apply to the passageway
walls where the timbers seem to end against trr two
vertical posts.

As the passageway left the bombproof, it con-
tinued for 5 feet before turning north at a 60'
angle. Unfortunately, only 8 feet of the second
leg of the passageway have survived the many years
of modern construction work on the site. The
remaining length and direction are conjectural. The
overall width of the passageway measured 6 feet.

and it was floored with planks (nailed to cross
sleepers) laid parallel to the walls. The roof of the
passageway was probably covered with white pine
timbers, squared off and hand adzed, similar to
the heavy roof beams found in the bombproof.

Good evidence for a board floor in the bomb-
proof was found. The widths of the boards and
the directions that they were laid can be deter-
mined directly from the archeologists' drawings.

In 1778 this bombproof was described as
being "the most airy, and agreeable." Hn This state-
ment can be interpreted to mean that the bomb-
proof probably had a "funnel" or "air hole" built
through the roof extending a foot or two above the
terreplein of the bastion. The roof timbers were
probably sloped to permit good drainage.

Northeast Bombproof

The floor level of the northeast bombproof was
established at 448.00 feet, or three feet below the
parade ground level. The floor level of the pas-
sageway leading to the bombproof was found to
be 449.00 feet.

The northeast bombproof scales 15 feet X 17
feet off the archeologists' plan and had a passage-
way entering into the center of the south wall, of
which approximately 22 feet was found. Its walls
extended five feet to the southwest before turning
almost due west another 15 feet, where the passage
terminated approximately 14 feet from the east
wall of the north casemate. Three steps were found
just outside the entrance way into the passage.
The elevation of the top step was recorded at
451.68 feet or 8 inches above the parade ground.
This extra height probably created a curb which
kept ground water from running into the passage-
way.

Floor boards were found in the passageway
(nailed to cross sleepers) parallel to the side walls.
Above the floor, a collapsed section of wall was
found. It appears that the original wall was con-
structed of round posts spaced several feet apart
with horizontal boards nailed to the outside — not a
very substantial method of construction.

No evidence of floor boards were found in
th~ bombproof, although it would seem that a
wood floor had been used. Remains of the roof
timbers covering the passageway and bombproof
were found — cross timbers were used to span the

138 Fort Stanwix

six foot wide passageway, while the bombproof
timbers spanned 17 feet. These roof timbers were
probably sloped to permit good drainage.

G. Bricks

Bricks used in the fortifications at the Oneida
Carrying Place from 1756-58 were made near the
upper landing on the Mohawk River, where a brick
kiln was constructed. In 1756 General Craven
reported "40,000 Bricks made & burned to build
chimneys for the Barracks & Hospital." s,;

The practice of making bricks locally prob-
ably continued long after the Revolution ended.
Brickmakers were undoubtedly one of the many
kinds of artificers sent to Fort Stanwix between
1776-81 when the American troops occupied the
fort. A large supply of bricks was required to
build the many chimney blocks found in the course
of the excavation work.

There seems to be a similar quality and size
to all the bricks found on the site that were used
for fort features. The average size of the bricks is
2 inches X 4 inches X 8 inches (±1/4. inch). The
color is red running to gray depending upon kiln
conditions at the time of firing. The clay used
contained a heavy concentration of sand with some
pebble aggregate, and straw was introduced oc-
casionally as a binder. The final product was a
brick which had numerous air pockets, a very soft
consistency, and warped surfaces. 87

The mortar consisted of burned lime and sand
and was white in color due to the concentration of
lime to sand. Samples of the brick and mortar are
available at the site.

H. Bridge

Fort Stanwix was originally constructed
without a bridge at the main entrance to the fort.
I he ditch was stopped short on both sides of the
roadway which entered the fort through the south
curtain wall. (See Crown Maps Nos. 99 & 100.)
Sometime between 1759 and 1765 the road-
bed in front of the south curtain wall was exca-
vated as deep and as wide as the adjoining ditch.
This excavation may have been done in 1764
when work was carried on between July 1 and
December 31. The bridge first appeared on plans
drawn in 1764— Crown Maps Nos. 102 & 103—

but there is no indication on these plans that a
drawbridge was built at this time.

The "Ganesvoort Map of Fort Stanwix" and
the Cornelius Chatfield powder horn are two draw-
ings completed after 1777 that show a bridge with
supporting posts and braces. The deFleury map
lists a "draw bridge" which implies an existing
bridge structure to go with it. Except for three
other references cited under the section entitled
Drawbridge, the orderly books, journals, and
diaries all omit references to a bridge.

The ground in front of the south curtain wall
was excavated by the archeologists in 1972 and
parts of two sleepers, one of them 40 feet long,
that supported the bridge at the bottom of the ditch
were uncovered. At a higher level, four posts were
found that the archeologists interpret as being sup-
ports for the bridge. These were found in pairs
about 10 feet apart and approximately 10 to 12
feet in from each end of the bridge. The sleepers
in the bottom of the ditch were spaced 10 feet 6
inches apart, outside dimensions. This measure-
ment was used to determine the width of the bridge
and to establish the positions of the two outer posts.

By determining the slopes of the scarp (43 )
and counterscarp (37 ). the archeologists have de-
termined the length of the bridge to have been
74 feet. Approximately 1.5 feet of the south end
rested on the covered way.

Further information on the design of the bridge
will have to be gleaned from the post-siege drawing.
This drawing also includes a detailed sketch of the
bridge to the necessary. One bridge drawing done
at Fort Niagara in 1769 is helpful in understanding
the construction techniques used in the building of
bridges.

The proposed bridge is supported by six posts
anchored to the sleepers and stringers by diagonal
braces. A 3'/2 inch plank deck is laid over eighl
inch stringers which in turn are supported by 10-
inch beams. A handrail, which shows up on the
post-siege plan, should be built along both sides of
the bridge and a. wood curb placed along the base
of the posts. At the north end. a draw span should
be constructed, 10 feet 6 inches X 12 feet. A ramp
is required off the south end to ease the bridge
elevation of 450.60 feet down to 448.00 feet at the
base of the ravelin.

It is recommended that the bridge be made
from squared timbers and planks that have a hand

Historic Structure 139

adzed finish. The handrail may have had a plane
finish on its posts, rails, and cap pieces. The bridge
should be left unpainted but all the pieces should
be pressure treated after final cutting and fitting.
The major joints of the bridge should be mor-
tised and tenoned and pegged, while the bridge
planks should be nailed with lOOd spikes having
rose heads.

I. Casemates

A casemate, according to Muller, "is a work
made under the rampart, like a cellar or cave with
loopholes to place guns in it." HH Casemates built
by the British and American armies, prior to and
during the Revolution, were slightly modified from
the above description. They were not built to
hold guns, nor did they have loopholes or em-
brasures, but were used primarily as soldiers' bar-
racks or as a place for the storage of provisions
and ordnance.""

Early in 1758 a proposal for the construction
of Fort Stanwix was submitted by Lt. Col. John
Montresor, a British engineer. He proposed "Bar-
racks to be made underneath the Rampart, with
!the Flues of the Chimneys, to come thr'o the
Top." !l " Capt. William Green commented that a
"Reasonable Breadth for the Barracks underneath
cannot be less than 20 ft." 01

Writing in November 1758, Col. Montresor
described the completed work as follows: "The
loggs of w ch the fort is built are generally 2 F f
thick, flatted on the upper and under sides. The
Casemates (at present Barracks) are covered w (
two teer of Square timber from 12 to 24 Tn s
broad by 12 In s thick as Represented in the
Profil." ° 2 This description agrees with the plans
and drawings completed in 1758 and 1759.

An elevation drawing and a cross section taken
through the north casemate are shown on Crown
Map. No. 99, while another cross section taken
through the north casemate is shown on Crown
Map No. 101. These plans included building de-
tails for the casemates. A description of the four
:asemate areas shown on these early plans can be
read in the historian's report of 1969. 03

Very little evidence of the casemate founda-
tion walls was found during the archeological work.
Sufficient portions of the wall foundations of all
:asemates except the one on the east were un-

covered to establish their relationship to the ram-
part walls.

According to the historian's report, the case-
mates were rebuilt in 1764.'' 4 If this was the case,
it might account for the differences that were noted
between the plans of 1758-64 and what was ac-
tually found as archeological evidence. There is
also the possibility that these changes were made
between 1776 and 1781 when the Americans oc-
cupied the fort. A letter written by Col. Ganse-
voort in October of 1777 was concerned about the
proposed building of bombproof barracks (possibly
casemates) :

Major Hubbell the present Engineer is now busy to
lay the Foundation of a bombproof Barrack, the
Timber he has brought in for that purpose in my
opinion is insufficient against a 13 Inch Shell. . . , 95

If the above timber was to be used for case-
mates, it would seem that no work was accom-
plished that winter. Another account written on
February 3, 1778, describes the condition of the
fort :

The Fortification is far From coir.pleat. The Curtains
& one Bastion remain to be finished, Magazines &
Casements are to he built, the Ditch to be Picqueted
and the present Barracks must necessarily be pulled
down. . . . ; " ; (Emphasis added.)

If the above account is an accurate description
of the fort, it leaves the impression that the case-
mates, at least in part, were not completed in 1777.
Because of a lack of solid documentation for
identifying the uncompleted parts of the fort, it is
recommended that all casemates be reconstructed
as they might have appeared in a completed fort.

General Construction Details for all Casemates:

(1) Walls should be constructed six logs high
with their upper and lower faces flatted. The foun-
dation log should be not less than 24 inches in
diameter and pressure treated to refusal after all
joints are cut and fitted. The remaining five logs
should measure approximately 23, 21, 20, 19, and
17 inches in diameter from bottom to top. Two
additional wall logs along the front wall should be
squared into 8 inches X 12 inches timbers with a
hand adzed finish on the exposed sides. Splicing at
the ends of logs and timbers should be done with

140 Fort Stanwix

half-lapped joints, and dove-tailed at the corners.
Partitions should be constructed of 6 inches thick
squared logs, 22 feet long; exposed surfaces should
be hand adzed and the ends half-lapped and fas-
tened to the front and rear walls.

(2) Doors and windows should be cut through
the log walls. Doors should be board and batten,
hung with strap hinges on pintles and have thumb
latches. They would measure four feet wide and
five feet high (as scaled off the 1758 drawing).
Window openings are based on a glass size of
7 inches X 9 inches (as assembled by the archc-
ologists from window glass fragments). Using this
glass size, the casemate window openings measure
2434 inches X 3114 inches based on a nine-light
casement-hung sash. Exterior shutters should be
board and batten, hung on strap hinges.

(3) Roofs of the casemates should be com-
posed of two tiers of squared timbers, each tier
12 inches thick, 8 inches to 24 inches wide and 23
feet long — all pressure treated to point of refusal.
A waterproof membrane is proposed between the
two tiers with the surface joints and weather checks
caulked with oakum and pitch. Banquettes with a
concealed drainage system should be built on the
roof of the casemate against the parapet. The case-
mate roofs slope 9 inches down to the parapet from
9 feet to 6 inches to 8 feet 9 inches interior ceiling
heights should be 2 feet lower.

North Casemate

The basic shape of the north casemate, as
uncovered by the archeologists. conforms to that
found on the historic drawings. Pieces of wood
foundation (logs) were uncovered along the entire
length of the north wall, and along the west end
wall. The location of the south wall was based
on evidence related to changes in soil levels and
color graduation. A number of evenly spaced cross
trenches were found that were thought to be sleeper
locations for the support of floor boards.

The archeologists discovered that a major
deviation from the floor plans drawn in 1758-59
was the number and placement of fireplaces. Six
brick bases for fireplaces were uncovered in a line
abutting the north log wall.

Since all of the fireplace bases were practi-
cally identical in size, and evenly spaced, the
archeologists have assumed that the casemate was
divided into six rooms of nearly equal size.

The archeologists have determined that the
floor level throughout the casemate was approxi-
mately the same as the hearths. No evidence was
found by the archeologists to indicate that bricks
were used either for the floor of the fireplaces or of
the hearths; it is assumed that packed soil or clay
was used for this purpose.

In order to minimize the danger of weaken-
ing the exterior log wall by cutting a door opening
into each of the six rooms, it is proposed to use
only three openings with air locks or enclosed en-
tries on the interior. The use of air locks in this
instance is conjectural, but three contemporary
fort drawings have been located that illustrate this
feature. 1 ' 7

After evaluating the artifacts found in the
north casemate, archeologists have concluded that
these rooms were occupied by officers rather than
by soldiers. An entry from John Barr's diary for
1780. reads "drew for the Rooms and Lieu' Hyatt
and I drew N" 1 on the Left of the North Side of
the Fort." ' ,s

Based upon the number of officers stationed at
Fort Stanwix. there would be three rooms with
three officers (Ensigns) and three rooms with two
officers of a higher rank. Closets are a feature
that have been found in other fort plans and should
probably be included in these six rooms.

East Casemate

No trace of this casemate was found during
the excavation work. About midway between the
northeast and southeast bastions, a trench was
found that related to a drain running through the
rampart walls and into the extended passageway of
the sally port located in the ditch. The archeolo-
gists seem certain that the drain also paralleled the
sally port passageway through the casemate.

The Hoot plan of the proposed east ease-
mate is based on that found in the drawings of
1758-59; that is. two rooms of about equal size
on both sides of the sally port passageway. Each
room should have a centrally located chimnej
with a double fireplace and a sand floor for both
fireplace and hearth. These rooms are shown on
the original plans as having field beds (bench beds)
built in alone two sides of the room. Two exterior
doors and eight windows are drawn on the plan
of 1758-59. and this number is proposed for the

Historic Structure 141

reconstruction. A planked floor throughout is also
suggested.

South Casemate

Because the main entrance (12 feet 6 inches
wide) into the fort passed through the south curtain
wall, the proposed south casemate is subdivided
into southwest and southeast rooms. Traces of the
wood foundation forming the entrance passageway
were found as well as the west end of the south-
west room. The archeologists' report should be
consulted for a complete description of this area.

The remains of a centrally located brick fire-
place were found in the southwest casemate, the
only evidence remaining of any of these early
chimney blocks built in the 1758-59 period. Re-
construction of the two south casemates is based on
the plan of 1758-59, which incorporates the central
chimney as found.

The two reconstructed casemates are approxi-
mately the same size, each one having a centrally
located chimney block containing two back-to-
back fireplaces. According to the early drawings,
there should be one exterior door and six window
openings in each casemate. Field beds should be
built along the side walls as shown on the plans of
1758. The floor in the southeast casemate should
be wood, but the floor in the southwest casemate
was found to be packed clay.

West Casemate

Portions of the log foundation were found at
the north end of this casemate, although modern
building foundations had intruded into this area
and eliminated practically all of the structure at
parade ground level. The reconstructed floor plan
of the west casemate agrees with that shown on
the plans of 1758-59. The casemate should be
divided by squared log partitions into three rooms,
each room containing a centrally located chimney
block with back to back fireplaces. The fireplaces
and hearths should be of sand and the floors of
the casemates should be made of planks.

In accordance with the original plans there
should be one exterior door and three window
openings into each room. Field beds should be
built along the west wall of the three rooms and
across the end walls of the north and south rooms.

J. Covered Way

The covered way was a shelf of ground run-
ning along the counterscarp or outer edge of the
ditch, and was protected from enemy fire by the
parapet of the glacis. It was used as a place to sta-
tion sentries and as a first line of defense.

The term "Cover'd way" appears on Crown
Map No. 102, dated 1764. The earlier plans of the
fort, if drawn to scale outside the ditch, show a
covered way measuring two feet wide on Section
E-F, Crown Map No. 99, but only one foot wide
on Section E-F, Crown Map No. 101. The covered
way must have been extensively widened by 1764,
since these plans indicate a width of 10 feet in
addition to what appears to be two firing steps
built into the parapet of the glacis.

The covered way occurred only on three sides
of the fort where the ditch was dug. although the
deFleury post-siege map and the "Gansevoort Map
of Fort Stanwix" show it on all sides. A portion
of the covered way opposite the southwest bastion
was exposed by the archeologists. A distinct ledge.
10 feet wide, was found between the counterscarp
of the ditch and the parapet of the glacis. At the
base of the glacis, a trench, 2'/2 feet deep and ap-
proximately 3 feet wide, was excavated and inter-
preted to be the location of the picket line,
although no trace of the pickets were found. No
evidence of the 1764 firing steps was left in the
parapet at this location.

Based on the evidence submitted by the
archeologists, the proposed covered way is 10
feet wide. It follows the counterscarp of the ditch
on the north, west and south sides of the fort.
Opposite the tips of the northeast and southeast
bastion, it angles directly toward the rampart walls
and connects to the berm on an elevation of 451 .00
feet. The picket line should also turn and follow
the covered way. then continue along the berm on
the east side of the fort.

A covered way is shown on the old plans in
front of the ravelin and so it is proposed to run a
covered way, 10 feet wide, along the exterior faces
of the ravelin. The picket line should also turn
and follow the base of the glacis surrounding the
ravelin. At the intersection of the road into the
ravelin, there should be a picket gate and a small
bridge spanning a shallow ditch eight feet wide.
The covered way should be finished off with sod
and sloped toward the ditch to provide drainage.

142 Fort Stanwix

K. Curtain Wall

CURTAIN, in fortification, is that part of the body of
a place, which joins the flank of one bastion to that of
the next. '•''•'

The curtain walls are part of the ramparts.
At Fort Stanwix the curtain walls were constructed
to include casemates under the terreplein. A sally
port was built through the center of the east curtain
wall and the main entrance into the fort was built
through the center of the south curtain wall. Em-
brasures were possibly built into the parapet of the
curtain walls. For a discussion of how the curtain
walls were constructed, see the sections entitled
Ramparts and Casemates.

L. Ditch

The idea of a ditch surrounding a fort was a
holdover from the moats around the medieval forti-
fied towns and castles. This principle was kept in
use by military engineers because it served to ex-
tend the exterior slope of the ramparts without
adding height to the construction relief of the
works.

A natural scrap occurring in the land forma-
tion to the east must have influenced the selection
of the original site of Fort Stanwix. The military
engineers could easily see the advantage of placing
the rampart walls along the edge of this scarp and
thus avoiding the construction of a ditch and glacis
along the east side. A study of the plans and written
documents seems to verify this approach.

After the trace of the fort was laid out. the
construction of the cribbing for the rampart walls
was begun. Earth from the ditch was then taken out
and thrown into the cribbing as it was being raised,
until the proper height of the rampart walls was
reached. The remaining earth from the ditch was
removed to fill the inner part of the bastions (ter-
replein and ramp) and the parapet walls, and to
construct the glacis beyond the ditch.

An original drawing of 1758 (Crown Map No.
99) indicates, in plan and section, a ditch extend-
ing around four sides of Fort Stanwix. Section
A-B shows how poorly the counterscarp of the
ditch along the east wall was constructed. The
ditch ended in plan when it reached the face of the
northeast bastion.

The building of a ditch along the east side of
the fort probably represents an attempt on the part

of the engineer to carry out the principles of forti-
fied works as listed in military handbooks. Appar-
ently, by 1764. the poorly constructed ditch had
deteriorated to the point where it was considered
not worth restoring, since it does not appear on
the plans from this period.

The ditch on the south side of the fort was
enlarged in 1759 (see note F on Crown Map No.
101). By 1764, the open end of the ditch at the
southeast bastion was closed off by an earthen
counterscarp and covered way which were built
across the gap. The open end at the northeast bas-
tion may have been closed in a similar manner.

Several angles of the scarp and counterscarp
were measured after they were exposed during the
excavation work. These angles varied from 37°
to 44°. The archeologists established 40° as the
angle to use for the scarp and counterscarp of the
ditch, and for the scarp of the glacis and sally port,
while the angle of the scarp under the drawbridge
was found to be 43°.

The following widths have been proposed for
the ditch on the north and south sides: 42 feet
across the top and 18 feet at the bottom opposite
the bastions, 58 feet across the top and 34 feet at
the bottom opposite the center of the curtain walls.
On the west side of the fort the widths of the ditch
are: 39 feet across the top and 15 feet at the bottom
opposite the bastions. 55 feet across the top and 31
feet at the bottom opposite the curtain walls. An
indentation of 10 feet into the scarp was found at
the entrance to the fort. Depth of the ditch is 10
feet, or at an elevation of 441.00 feet.

The ditch is circular opposite the salient an-
gles of the northwest and southwest bastions. The
radii of the two arcs that define the inner and outer
limits of the counterscarp scale 20 feet and 32 feet
off the tip of the scarp of the bastion.

It is proposed to sod the scarp and counter-
scarp. The bottom of the ditch should be left with
its natural soil exposed. The archeologists feel
certain that with the type of pebbly soil found at
the bottom of the ditch, there will be no drainage
problem.

M. Drawbridge

Draw-Bridge, that which is fastened with hinges at
one end only, so that the other may be drawn up: in
which case the bridge is almost perpendicular, to
hinder the passage of a ditch, &c. ,no

Historic Structure 143

The earliest known use of drawbridges in mili-
tary fortification is obscure. By the thirteenth cen-
tury, entranceways into fortified castles and towns
of Europe were protected by one or more draw-
bridges."" Several methods of raising and lower-
ing drawbridges, which were employed by the
medieval engineer, survived into the 18th century
and were put to use at military posts in America. U) '-

Eighteenth century military handbooks usu-
ally included a description of several types of
bridges, including the drawbridge. Descriptions of
drawbridges were published as late as 1862, and
military installations in use during the American
Civil War were frequently equipped with this
feature.

Drawbridges appear more often on fort plans
drawn during the French and Indian War than on
those drawn at the time of the American Revolu-
tion. The writer has found a total of 22 draw-
bridges in use between 1739 and 1781. 103

Only four references were found on the draw-
bridge at Fort Stanwix during the Revolution. The
post-siege deFleury map includes "J-a draw
bridge," in its legend, while Willett's Narrative
makes only a brief mention of such a feature: "In
front of the gate there had been a drawbridge, cov-
ered by a salient angle, raised in front of it on the
glacis." "" There is no mention of a drawbridge
in either the Willett Orderly Book or Colbraith's
Diary, but two references to a drawbridge can be
found in the Orderly Books for the 4th and 2nd
New York Regiments in 1780:

p. 541: the Outside Gate and the Draw Bridge are
to be shut at Retreat Beating, and the Sallee post at
Dusk.

p. 542: the officer of the Guard is to Instruct the
Sentinals at the Draw Bridge and Sallee port not to
Suffer any Strangers nor Indians to Enter the Fort
without the Command ts permission.

Based upon the above four references to
drawbridges at Fort Stanwix, it is proposed to in-
corporate this feature as part of the main bridge
at the north end adjacent to the rampart passage-
way. The draw span would measure roughly
10 feet 6 inches X 12 feet and have a double tier
of 3 inches planks supported over stringers. A
hurter or curb should be laid along each side and
bolted through the construction work. Reproduction
hinges should be made to match the large pintle type

hinges found during the excavation work and these
should be driven into the end of the hurter, then
bolted in place. 105

The lifting mechanism for the drawbridge
has not been designed yet, but will probably in-
corporate a set of counterweights, pulleys, and a
winch operating a wrought iron chain connected to
the draw span.

N. Embrasures

General Stanwix, writing in 1758, envisioned
his fort with eight embrasures in each bastion and
three embrasures in two of the curtain walls. 106
He left the outpost in November of that year with-
out completing this part of the fortification. Work
continued the following year, but by the end of
December only the northwest bastion was finished
off with a parapet containing six gun embrasures,
as shown on Crown Map No. 101.

Work on the parapet must have continued
sporadically throughout the ensuing years. Crown
Map No. 103, dated November 19, 1764, shows
an uneven number of embrasures in the four bas-
tions and curtain walls. On Crown Map No. 102.
dated the same year, the embrasures are omitted
from the plan, although other work is listed as
having been completed. For the first time in plan,
three embrasures appear in the ravelin that pro-
tected the main entrance. These are mentioned in
the Willett Narrative.

It can only be assumed that with the size of
cannon anticipated to be used by the Americans
at Fort Stanwix after 1776, a substantial parapet
with embrasures would have been built to protect
not only the cannon but also the artillerymen.
This fact seems to be substantiated by studying the
thre? powder horn plans carved in 1777 and the
"Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix," because em-
brasures are shown in each one of these plans,
although their number varies. The Thomson and
McGraw powder horns and the Gansevoort Map
show six embrasures in each of the bastions.
Thomson and Gansevoort also place two em-
brasures in each of the four curtain walls. A fort
plan published in Willett's Narrative in 1831 places
two embrasures in the north and west curtain walls
and three embrasures in the ravelin. This same plan
shows ten embrasures in each of the bastions, a
condition which would not meet the specifications
for the spacing of embrasures (10 to 12 feet apart).

144 Fort Stanwix

The only written source located to date men-
tioning embrasures is Willett's Narrative:

The engineer had begun to erect a salient angle to the
gate, with two cmbasures in it. He was also engaged
in erecting pickets along the covert way. The pickets
were placed about three feet from the parapet of the
glacis. Two of them were framed together with cross-
pieces, and formed a kind of porthole which were
intended to be placed opposite the embrasures. . . . 10T

By the first day of August the wall around the whole
of the fort was repaired: the parapets were nearly
raised: embrasures made on three of the bastions:
horizontal pickets fixed around the walls, and per-
pendicular pickets around the covert way. The gate
and the bridge were also made secure, though the
time had been too short to make any material altera-
tion in the salient angle, so as to derive any benefit
from it. The garrison had just finished laying the
horizontal pickets at night, as the enemy invested the
fort the next day: but at the time of the arrival of the
enemy, none of the parapets had been completed. It
was necessary, therefore, to finish these after the fori
was regularly invested. . . . 108

Willett seems to imply that the parapets were
completed after the siege had begun, but he fails
to mention if embrasures were used throughout the
ramparts.

The embrasures should include the following:
the genouillere, the sole or glacis, the throat, and
the cheeks or side walls. Embrasure shutters were
also used on occasion. Embrasures were built either
direct or oblique to the parapet walls. Oblique em-
brasures were to be avoided whenever possible as
they were prone to weaken the parapets.

The writer envisions the embrasures con-
structed much like those at Fort Edward, (see
Illustration No. 18 in the Appendices). The log
work of the rampart walls should continue another
six feet above the tcrreplein to form the interior
slope of the parapet. From this point, the top
surface of the parapet slopes down 12 inches to
the front rampart wall to form the superior slope.
Within this construction the embrasures should be
laid out from 10 to 12 feet apart, with their 2 feet
wide throats starting 2Vi feet above the gun plat-
forms or tcrreplein. The width of the embrasures
at the exterior slope is 9 feet. The sole or glacis
should be given a slope of I ' 2 feet to the outside
or slightk steeper than the angle of the superior
slope. It was usually sodded. The cheek walls
should be built with loi>s dovetailed into the outer

and inner parapet walls. As a result of the logs
being stacked up one on another, these side wall*
should be nearly vertical and not splayed as we
see in some reconstructions.

If embrasure shutters are used, they should be
constructed at one side of the throat and either
hinged to swing or made to slide in front of the
embrasure, theoretically to protect the artillery-
men while loading the cannon.

O. Flagstaff

Location of the Flagstaff

The earliest known location of the flagstaff
at Fort Stanwix is shown on the plan of c. 1759. In
this drawing the northwest bastion is designated on
the plan as "C . . . Flag Bastion. . . ." The small
circle located in the extreme tip of the sailant angle
may be interpreted as representing the flagstaff. inn

By 1777, however, the location of the flagstaff
had changed to the southwest bastion, a position
much closer to the main entrance of the fort. Docu-
mentary evidence found to support the fact that
the flagstaff was located in the southwest bastion
comes from at least six sources: the post-siege
deFleury map and the five carved horns. 1 "' Four
of the five powder horn sketches place the flagstaff
directly on the southwest bastion, while the fifth
horn, belonging to James Wilson, places the staff

near the southwest bastion, but on the parade
ground. The artist may have taken a certain lib-
erty and moved the pole aside in order to show a
sentry box. The McGraw and DeWitt powder
horns appear to be the most decisive of the lot in
locating the flagstaff at the tip of the sailent angle.
a position identical to that shown on the plan of
c. 1754.

Design of the Flagstaff

Contemporary sketches of the period indi-
cate that many of the military posts used a flagstafl
consisting of an upper and lower pole."' Then,
appears to be a marked similarity between a ship";
masts and flagstaffs. It has been concluded tha
Hagstaffs were originally built by ship's carpenters
This would account for the carryover of the basii
design of an upper and lower pole, complete will
cheek boards, trestle trees, cross trees, caps, trucks
etc. — all component parts of a ship's mast."-

Historic Structure 145

The flagstaff used at Fort Stanwix apparently
was no exception. The double-masted staff shows
up on four powder horn carvings, the most dis-
tinctive of these being that of James McGraw.
McGraw depicts the flagstaff as having an upper
and lower mast with the flag supported by ropes
(rather than lashed to the mast). One feature
shown on the McGraw flagstaff which does not
conform to period construction drawings is a truck-
like object appearing just above the top of the
lower mast. This would seem to indicate that a
truck was used on both upper and lower masts.

The James Wilson powder horn is less illustra-
tive than the McGraw horn. It portrays another
element found on a ship's masts — the cheek boards
— but other essential parts of the pole's construc-
tion arc omitted. The flag is shown supported by
a rope running to the base of the pole, a feature
found on all the other powder horn carvings.

Assuming that flagstaff's were constructed on
the order of ships' masts, the component parts
would be as follows: the main mast; the top mast
with its truck and sheave; and the connection be-
tween the two masts comprised of trestle trees,
cross trees, bibs and cheek boards, bolsters, and
cap piece.

The height of a ship's main mast was de-
termined on the basis of an arithmetical relation-
ship; it was equal to one half the sum of the
length of the ship plus its width. All other masts
were of proportional length to the main mast.
Thus, the lop mast should be three fifths of the
main mast in height. Diameters of the masts were
computed in the same manner. The main mast
was sized according to the type of ship it served
and the remaining masts were sized proportionately
to the main mast. 11 '

Flagstaff's at military posts would, by their
very nature of being secured in the ground, have a
different base than that of ships' masts. The flag-
staff base found at Fort McHenry in 1958 was in
the shape of a "Christmas tree stand.' Possibly
two of these cross piece frames were used at Fort
; Stanwix, one at parade ground level, +451 feet,
and the other nearer the terreplein level of the bas-
tion, at +458 feet.

P. Fraise

"The fraise is a horizontal or very inclined
palisading, placed on the sides of the work or on

their exterior slopes." m Its purpose was to pre-
vent a direct escalation of the rampart walls by
enemy foot soldiers.

A fraise was first used at Fort Stanwix in
1759. It appears on Crown Map No. 101 as part
of Profile A-B, taken through the northeast bas-
tion. Since the fraise does not appear in the other
two profile drawings, it is assumed that only the
northeast bastion was completed in this manner.
The fraise is shown in profile at the top of the
rampart wall where the parapet ends en barbette.
It was placed at the same angle as the superior
slope and must have been nailed or pegged into the
top logs of the rampart walls. The fraise projected
slightly beyond the berm width of six feet.

The fraise appears in one other plan of Fort
Stanwix, Crown Map No. 102. Section A-B, taken
through the rampart walls at the sally port, shows a
pointed fraise anchored to the superior slope (12°)
of a seven foot high parapet. The projection of the
fraise measures six feet beyond the rampart walls.
It is possible that the parapet was elevated an
additional 12 inches as it passed over the roof
of the sally port in order to provide more height
between the roof and fraise. This could also be
the case in the south curtain wall as the fraise ap-
proached the main entrance way. It may have to
be elevated to the superior slope in order to clear
the drawbridge and gateway.

There are several written accounts after the
American occupation mentioning a fraise at Fort
Stanwix. 11 "' There are no drawings or powder
horn engravings from this period that show the
fraise; therefore, the position of the fraise along
the rampart wall is conjectural.

At the present, it can be assumed that the
fraise will be placed about 12 inches below the
sole of the gun embrasures. This location will
permit sod to be laid on the soles of the em-
brasures and will keep the fraise concealed within
the ramparts. The fraise was probably elevated to
the level of the superior slope over the main en-
trance way and sally port.

The fraise should be constructed from pointed
poles (without the bark) about five inches in di-
ameter, spaced 5 to 6 inches apart, and project
beyond the rampart walls seven feet. The overall
length of the fraise will depend upon how the poles
are secured in place. After cutting and shaping

146 Fort Stanwix

of the pointed ends are completed, the poles should
be pressure treated.

Q. Gates

GATE, in a military sense, is made of strong planks
with iron bars to oppose an enemy. They are generally
made in the middle of the curtain, from whence they
are seen and defended by the 2 flanks of the bastions.
They should be covered with a good ravelin, that they
may not be seen or enfiladed by the enemy. The
palisades and barriers before the gates within the
town are often of great use. 1 " 1

Most military posts observed a regular routine
in the opening and closing of gates, which was
usually outlined very thoroughly in the military
handbooks." 7

Outer Gate

The outer gate was also referred to as a bar-
rier or "picquet" gate and was usually constructed
as part of the palisades or picket wall that sur-
rounded the ramparts. The pickets of the gate
were generally spaced three to four inches apart
and were held in place by an upper and lower
horizontal rail and diagonal strut. Outer gates were
either made singly or in double sections hinged to
side posts. "* Most outer gates were secured with
one or more horizontal wood bars slipped into
staples or the like. Additional locks would be used,
either a chain and padlock or an iron rim lock
with a keeper.

A picket gate such as the one described above
was probably used at Fort Stanwix. Crown Maps
Nos. 99 and 101 both indicate where the outer
gate was located in the picketed redan. Unfor-
tunately, the symbol for a gate does not appear on
either plan so there is no way of knowing whether
it was built singly or in double sections. Crown
Map No. 102 also has outer gate posts shown near
the crest of the parapet cutting through the glacis
southeast of the ravelin. Again no gate symbol is
shown but one can assume that a gate was hung
in this location.

The Americans found Fort Stanwix without
a gate in 1776. 110 but by August 27 of that year
gates had been erected.'-" While it is uncertain
where these gates were located, word association
of "pickets and gate" suggests one gate made of
pickets was erected.

A garrison order written in the Willett Orderly
Book on September 2. 1777. states:

The out Gates to be shut at Dusk on beating the Kong
Roll. . . . The Keys of the Gates to be delivered to the
Captain of the Day as soon as Tattooe beating is over,
who is to be careful in observing that the Gates are
well locked

On September 20, 1777. another garrison
order read:

The Piquet Gates are to be shut at Dusk & the inner
Gates of the Fort immediately after Tattooe beating
and not to be Open'd untill the Revallee is beat, nor
the Piquet Gates untill the seating of the Troop in
the Morning — which is to beat at Sun Rise.

Still another garrison order issued on November
3. 1777, reads:

Order'd that the outside Gates be shut every Time for
the future by dusk in the Evening and not be Opened
till Roll call in the Morning, at all Times the Guards
are to parade before the Gates are Open'd.

Based upon the foregoing information, it is
proposed to place a picket gate in the picket line
running around the ravelin in order to close off the
roadway entrance into the fort. The pickets used
in the outer gate should be five to six inches in
diameter, seven feet long, pointed at the top and
spaced 3 l A to 4 inches apart. The pickets should
be nailed to two horizontal rails and a diagonal
strut partly let in. The nails should also be driven
through the strap hinges mounted to the rails and
clinched on the outside. The gate should be built
in two five foot sections and hung on oversize
pickets. Two horizontal wood bars are proposed
for obstruction purposes in addition to a chain
which should be threaded around the pickets of the
gate, the hinge post, and the horizontal bar. and
then padlocked in place.

Ravelin Gate

Although no ravelin gates are mentioned as
such, from a military point of view it would be
desirable to have a solidly planked gate hung in the
passageway through the ravelin opposite the outer
picket gate.'-' When this inner gate was closed it
would protect the stairway entrance to the gun plat-
forms overhead. This gate would be constructed in
a manner similar to the main gate discussed below.

Historic Structure 147

Main Gate

The writer is almost certain that there were
main gates located within the passageway through
the ramparts. The most conclusive proof of this that
we have is found in a garrison order dated Novem-
ber 23, 1780: ". . . and the Brass Field Piece, is to
be placed in the Center of the parade opposite the
Gate. . . ." '-- The Willett Orderly Book mentions
on September 20, 1777, an inner fort gate but it is
less definitive as to its location: "The Piquet Gates
are to be shut at Dusk & the inner Gates of the
!Fort immediately after Tattooe beating. . . ."

A number of existing forts built after the Revo-
lution have two sets of doors located within the
main passageway. Some of these are: Fort Mc-
Henry, Md.; Forts Warren, Independence, and
Pickering, Mass.; and Fort Ontario, N.Y. (although
the second set was never hung, there were provi-
sions made for this action). The stone blockhouse
Duilt near the entranceway to Fort Niagara was
Equipped with two sets of gates in 1770. While this
■nay not be conclusive proof that double sets of
jates were used at Fort Stanwix, we can be rea-
ionably sure that one set of gates was hung. The
vriter assumes that the proposed drawbridge would
>;erve the same purpose as the second set of gates
vhen it was raised against the outside wall of the
amparts.

When the main entrance way and bridge area
vas excavated in 1972, 97 handwrought nails were
ound, concentrated primarily in two areas located
under the proposed drawbridge. There were two
inds of nails, clinched and straight, with chisel
>oints and somewhat of rose head. The majority
)f nails (63) were clinched over between 6%
iches and 7 inches in length. Those nails were
robably used in the construction of the main gate
/hich would, in effect, make each leaf of the gate
inches thick.

A similar gate construction was found in the

xcavations at Fort Beausejour. a British built fort

l Nova Scotia. Much of the gate remains un-

Dvered in situ: strap hinges, dead bolts, bolt keep-

rs. staples, spikes and planking. The gate was

uilt with two leaves, each five feet wide and five

iches thick. Each leaf appeared to be constructed

cf two layers of 2Vi inch thick plank laid perpen-

< icular to one another, then spiked together with

\i l A inch Ions rose headed nails, double clinched on

one side. The strap hinges were fabricated in a
"U" shape to slip over the back of the door. Large
flat headed nails were driven through both oppos-
ing hinges and clinched against the metal on one
side. The hinges were made of 5/16 inch thick
stock, AVi inches wide and 4 feet 4 inches long.
Two dead bolts were used on the doors, one with a
hasp-like handle that slipped over a staple, permit-
ting padlock to be used.

A smaller T-strap hinge was also found in the
Beausejour excavation, suggesting that a wicket
door was built into one leaf of the main gate.
Wicket doors provided access through the main
gate and at the same time provided more security
for the fort by allowing the main gates to remain
closed. 123 At least two other accounts have been
found of wicket doors used in the 18th century
fortifications. 1 - 4

The following construction is proposed for the
main gates: planks V/i inches thick should be used,
with leaves approximately 6 feet 3 inches wide and
10 feet high, composed of two layers of plank held
together by nails clinched through on six inch in-
tervals; a wicket door, 24 inches X 48 inches,
should b: cut into one leaf and the main leaves
hung with "U" shaped strap hinges, measuring
% inches X 4Vi inches ± 5 feet 3 inches. The
wicket door should be hung with a pair of "T" strap
hinges and furnished with sliding metal dead bolts.
Two wooden bars should be used to secure the
main gates after they are closed and a large iron
rim lock should be mounted on the interior of the
main gate.

Sally Port Gate

A single picket gate is proposed for the gap
shown in the redan which protects the sally port.
This gate should be constructed from 6 inches
diameter pickets held together by two rails and a
diagonal strut, and should be hung to the side
picket post by strap hinges. This gate should be
barred and secured with a chain and padlock much
like the outer picket gate.

R. Gate Locks

Some sort of locks were used on the gates at
Fort Stanwix. An entry in Willett's Orderly Book
on September 2. 1777, reads: "The Keys of the

148 Fort Stanwix

Gates to be delivered to the Captain of the Day
as soon as Tattooe beating is over, who is to be
carefull in observing that the Gates are well locked.
..." A garrison order issued by the 4th New York
Regiment on November 27, 1780, reads: ". . . the
Command' Expects that the Officers Appointed for
Duty will be Very Circumspect in Examining the
works. Gate Locks, and Everything Which may
come under their Inspection. . . ." 125

Six or more keys, two of which were small
(padlock?) keys, were uncovered in the excavation.
One of these smaller keys was found at the ravelin
passageway and one near the redan of the sally
port, which tends to support the theory that pad-
locks were used on the outer picket gates. One
seven inch key was found in the trench fronting
the ravelin and appears to have been made for a
large iron rim lock which would had to have been
mounted on a reasonably smooth surface such as
that of the plank gates proposed for the passage-
way through the ravelin and ramparts (the main
gates). As a result of these discoveries it is pro-
posed to use large iron rim locks on the ravelin
gates and the main gates, and a smaller iron rim
lock on the east door to the sally port passageway.
In most instances small wood cased stock locks
could be substituted for the iron rim locks. In
fact the wooden stock lock would be more appro-
priate on the doors opening into bombproofs where
powder might be stored.

S. Glacis

The glacis is that part of the sloping earthworks
built outside the ditch surrounding the ramparts
The purpose of the glacis was to provide a long
uninterrupted section of ground which faced the
fortifications, was easily observable by the sentries,
and was capable of being covered by gunfire from
within.

Only one section of the glacis was located
during the excavation work. The parapet o\' the
glacis started ten feet away from the counterscarp
of the ditch and rose to a height of si\ feet IL ' ,;
at an angle of 40 .'-'• From the crest of the para-
pet the earth was gradually sloped down to the
original mound level in a distance of 75 feet (as
scaled off Crown Map No. 102).

In the early plans of Fort Stanwix. the glacis
is shown only on three sides of the fort: north.

west, and south. The engineers apparently selected
this site because the land to the east dropped off
some 19 feet to the lowlands fronting the banks
of the Mohawk River, and this sharp drop-off of
land eliminated the need for a glacis on the east
side of the fort. Plans drawn in 1 764 show that the
glacis terminated in a blunt end as it reached the
tips of the northeast and southeast bastions.

The glacis was also built around the salient
angle of the ravelin that protected the main en-
trance to the fort. A roadway was cut through the
glacis on the southeast side of the salient angle
to provide the only means of access into the fort
other than the sally port.

A secondary glacis was constructed around
the small triangular redoubt protecting the sally-
port and scaled about 32 feet in width off the north
and south flanks of the picket line (Crown Map No.
102). The parapet or scarp of the glacis began at
the top surface of the interior earth banquette and
rose 4'/2 feet in height at an angle of 40V- S

According to the notes found on Crown Map
No. 102, the scarps and covered way were sodded.
After the glacis has been built up with earth, it is
proposed to sod its scarp (or parapet) and seed
the remaining ground.

T. Guardhouse

This building stood on the left or west side of
the main entrance gate on the parade ground, but
no physical evidence of the structure was found
during the archeological work. The first known
written reference to a guardhouse at Fort Stanwix
is that found on October 6. 1776:
The Colonel expects for the future the relief will turn
out without so much noise, as every one is to keep at
the guard house and turn out at the first call. 129

The above garrison order is interpreted as
specifying a guardhouse where the change of guard
sta\s while on duty, not where prisoners are con-
lined.

The second mention o\' a guardhouse is earlj
in 1777 in an engineer's report to General Gates:
". . . has made a guard house at the entrj of the
Fort which before his arrival was behind." ,:! "
This report suggests that a new guardhouse was
creeled at the entry to the fort possibl) in the same
location as that shown on the various post-sieee

Historic Structure 149

maps and powder house — that is, on the west or left
hand side of the main entrance.

It is not clear how the new guardhouse was
used. According to Willett's Orderly Book, kept
for the 3rd N.Y. Regiment, the building was used
in part for confining soldiers who were sentenced
by the military court. ,::1 During the occupation of
Fort Stanwix by the 4th and 2nd N.Y. Regiments,
sometime between November 20, 1780, to June 10.
1781, soldiers under sentence were apparently
confined to one of the bombproofs. i:iL ' The explana-
tion for this change in usage might be attributed
to the burning of the guardhouse in April 1780 and
the rebuilding of a new structure within two weeks
time. 15 ' Perhaps the new guardhouse was too
small to confine soldiers and still provide room for
those on guard duty.

The pictorial evidence found on the James
McGraw powder horn has been used as the basis
for the design of the exterior of the guardhouse:

(1) Foundation dimensions of the main build-
ing should be 16 feet X 20 feet; dimensions of the
west lean-to, 8 feet X 12 feet. (Conjectural
•Measurements.)

(2) The building should be frame, utilizing
ioost and sill construction; walls should be covered

vith weatherboards and the gable roof with wood
ihingles; there should be a central chimney in the
nain building and a single end wall chimney in
he lean-to; wood sleepers should be used for un-
lerpinning (based in part on the powder horn).

(3) There should be three exterior doorways
vith board and batten doors; five windows with
)utside shutters (based in part on the powder horn);
ind two interior doors.

(4) As suggested by the location of the cen-
ral chimney, the interior of the main guardhouse
hould be divided into two rooms separated by a
louble fireplace, while the lean-to would consist
if one room with a fireplace against the west wall.
"he powder horn shows a gabled roof over the
ian-to which is a determining factor when figuring
he width and height of the addition.

(5) The interior room finish should be similar
3 that of the barracks, with the walls and ceilings
ned with unpainted horizontal boards. Each room

| hould have a fireplace and lighting should be fur-
) ish by candles. The floor should be covered with
Wide floor boards, and planed and face nailed with
' L" or "T"-headed, handwrought nails. vu There

should be access to an attic room (probably a wall
ladder and trap door were used) according to the
description available of the guardhouse fire in 1780.
See footnote No. 133.

(6) The use of eave troughs is recommended
for catching rainwater and diverting it into rain
barrels.

I . Headquarters Building

No remains of this building were found during
the excavation period, but two written references
to the headquarters have been found, in addition
to the six drawings. 115 The exterior appearance, at
least on the south and east walls, is based on the
McGraw powder horn drawing and should be as
follows;

( 1 ) Foundation dimensions of 20 feet X 56
feet with a lean-to 10 feet X 14 feet (conjectural
measurements).

(2) It should be a frame building with a gable
roof and two chimney stacks as shown on the
powder horn. (See Item No. 2 under East Bar-
racks.) Sleepers should be set directly on the
ground for the underpinning.

(3) There should be four doorways into the
main building and one doorway into the lean-to
along the south wall as shown on the powder
horn.

(4) No windows are shown on the powder
horn drawing but there is mention of closing win-
dows in the Gansevoort's dining room.'" 1 Two win-
dow openings equipped with board and batten shut-
ters are proposed for each room.

(5) The interior room arrangement is con-
jectural. The chimney stacks suggest four rooms
in this building: one room for the commandant,
one for the officer second in command, one dining
room doubling as a staff room, and one room for
two staff officers. The lean-to room could have
one or more uses: for wood storage and an officers'
privy; for lodging of an orderly assigned to the
commandant (although it is not heated); or for
storage of supplies for the staff officers.

(6) The interior room finish is conjectural,
but as suggested for the barracks building, the
walls and ceilings could be lined with horizontal
boards; hand planed and unpainted. Perhaps the
wall posts and ceiling beams (summers) could also
be encased with smoothed boards having a small

1 50 Fort Stanwix

beaded edge. Closets should be provided in these
rooms on one side of the chimney stack at least.
Lighting should be furnished by candles and
lanterns.

(7) The use of eave troughs to catch rain-
water is recommended.

V. Hospital

HOSPITAL, a place appointed for the sick and
wounded men, provided with a number of physicians,
surgeons, nurses, servants, medicines, beds, &c.

Regimental-Hospitals are frequently in barns, stables,
graneries, and other out-houses. . . , 187

The first mention after 1758 ' !S of a hospital
at Fort Stanwix is in 1776: "Visited the sick in
their old lousy hospital, which represents such a
scene of wretchedness that one could hardly bear
to behold the abject souls therein confined." 139
Another reference to a hospital was found on June
2, 1777: "No provisions to be issued to the Sick
belonging to the Hospital but by the Orders of the
Surgeon." "°

It is thought that the southwest bombproof
served as a temporary hospital during the siege
of the fort. Colbrath's Dairy reads on August 22:
"While they were out the woman that was wounded
with a shell last Night was brought to Bed in our
S W Bomb proof of a Daughter She and child are
like to do well with the Blessing of God." ,41

Copies of two returns list the sick in the gar-
rison at Fort Stanwix for March and April of 1778.
The March return lists 10 men sick in the "Hos-
pital" and 22 men sick and confined to quarters. "'-'
The April term lists 8 men sick in the "Garrison
Hospital." 12 sick in "Genl. Hospital." and 22
men sick in Quarters. 143

A garrison order for 1781 reads in part: "The
Drummers and Fifers are ordered to practise in
the old hospital from the hours of ten in the morn-
ing till twelve OCIock, and from three in the After-
noon till four, when not on Duty, Sundays
excepted." ' "

The post-siege "Ganscvoort May of Fort Stan-
wix" shows a building marked "Hospital" standing
at the foot of the glacis opposite the southeast
bastion. It appears that this is the only building
that can be positively identified as a hospital. The
1778 return for the sick lists a garrison hospital

and a general hospital. More information is needed
on the period of fort occupancy from 1776-1781
before areas within the fort can be designated as
hospital rooms.

W. Laboratory

LABORATORY, signifies the Place where the Fire-
Works and Bombardeers prepare their Stores. 145

Laboratory and armory were terms used in-
terchangeably by the military engineers. They de-
noted a place where bullets were molded, mortar
shells and grenades filled and fuses prepared.
The deFleury map is our only source of documen-
tation that uses the word laboratory, referring in
the legend to a "G-Laboratory" which occupied
part of the west barracks. Other than a brick
hearth, no evidence was found during the excava-
tions to support the statement that a laboratory
was located in this building.

More conclusive evidence was found in the
southwest bombproof where sprue was uncovered
at the floor level. A laboratory could also have
been located in the southwest casemate, where
there was a hard packed clay floor and a centrally
located double fireplace, both useful in the manu-
facture of musket balls, etc.

Lacking sufficient evidence, the archeologists
have not been able to designate any particular area
or room as a laboratory. Perhaps more evidence
will be found at a later date to substantiate its
location.

X. Merlon

MERLON, in fortification, that part of the parapet
which is terminated by 2 embrasures of a battery, so
that its height and thickness are the same with those
of the parapet. It serves to cover those on the battery
from the enemy, and is better when made of earth,
well rammed and beat close, than of stone, because
these fly about, and wound those it should defend. ,4fi
The construction of merlons is discussed un-
der the headings Embrasures and Parapet.

Y. Mess

"The men of each Company should be divided
into messes, each mess consisting of four or six men
or according to the number in each room. . . ." u

The practice of dividing soldiers up into smal
groups or messes, in which each man would tak<

Historic Structure 151

his turn cooking, continued after the Revolution.
Provisions were issued one day each week to the
garrison. 14 * Food was cooked in the fireplaces
and the men were expected to eat their meals in
the barracks. Each room was to be provided with
2 iron pots, 2 trammels, 1 pair tongs, 1 wood axe,
1 iron candlestick, 1 table, 2 benches and 1
bucket. U! '

The officers were assigned "waiters" who
were responsible for cooking their food, 1 "'" which
was probably prepared for most of the officers in
the barrack room where each of the "waiters" was
assigned. The Commandant and his top staff mem-
1 bers probably ate together in a dining room located
in the headquarters building. 1 "' 1

Iron pots with bails and "S" shaped hooks
were found in the excavations. Although no tram-
mels were found, the pots and hooks uncovered
imply that trammels were used to suspend the
iron pots over a fire. All fireplaces should have an
iron bar placed across their throat from which to
hang cooking utensils.

Z. Necessary

One, if not two, necessaries appear on
ithe initial plan of Fort Stanwix drawn in 1758. lr> -
The smallest of the 19 buildings shown no the pa-
rade ground is interpreted as being an officers'
privy. It is located near the center of the small
"huts" built "for officers" and is drawn with a floor
plan similar to that of the second necessary, that
is, with a seat containing two holes. The structure
may have lasted until c. 1764, when the interior
r ort buildings were removed and two new barracks
md possibly a headquarters building were con-
structed. 1V ' None of the other plans drawn during
he British occupation of 1758-c. 1772 record the
existence of a necessary.

The second necessary shown on the plan of
1758 is the one of greater concern. Although its
:xistence is not recorded in other plans dated be-
ween 1758 and 1764, this structure could have
'ery easily survived the nineteen-year span from
! 758 to 1777 without a great deal of deterioration.
This is because the structure was built completely
tbove the ground where little rotting would occur
ind secondly, it would have been important for
he garrison to keep this particular building in good
epair. Even though the British army dismantled
ts regular garrison at Fort Stanwix in I 767, two or

more soldiers were stationed here as late as
1771, 1 "' 4 and probably gave some attention to the
maintenance of this building.

The 1758 plan shows this necessary as pro-
jecting beyond the east rampart wall of the south-
east bastion. The building scales 12 feet X 22 feet
and it was apparently divided into two compart-
ments, possibly for use by both officers and soldiers.
Included in the same drawing is an elevation view
of the structure that shows it to have been built
20 feet above the ground and reached by a foot-
bridge, scaling 7 feet wide and 58 feet long.

The colonial draftsman does not provide
enough information in his drawing to make it
possible to distinguish if the structure was of
squared logs or frame construction. It appears to
have had a bombproof ceiling constructed of
planks about eight inches thick. The only indica-
tions of wall and roof construction are the double
lines drawn at the two building corners and those
drawn parallel to the roof slope. They could mean
that the walls, including the gable ends, were con-
structed of squared logs, ,r,r ' or that the building was
framed in the traditional way using the sill, post,
and girt system. If the walls were built with
squared logs, the artist has failed to show the dove-
tail jointing at the corners that appears in the
accompanying casemate drawing. Yet if the ceil-
ing was bombproof it would seem logical that the
walls were made equally as strong. This was the
construction method used when the sally port
passageway was built in c. 1764. ir,,; It seems to
be a matter of choice between log and frame
construction.

At the base of the necessary, a small run of
water was apparently diverted from one of the
nearby prevailing streams and channeled directly
under the structure to provide a continuous flush-
ing away of human discharge. During the siege of
1777, the British managed to block off this stream
of water and probably prevented the use of the
necessary, even possibly to the point of destroying
it.'"' 7

Three weeks after the siege ended, another
necessary was ordered to be built within the fort. ir,K
Soldiers were forbidden to use the "Necessary
House within the Fort in the day time, the one in
the Ditch being designed for that Purpose. . . ." 158
While this garrison order does not explicitly refer

I 52 Fort Stanwix

to the elevated necessary, it does suggest that there
was one located outside the rampart walls.

At least three documented sources exist that
either suggest or prove that an elevated privy ex-
isted after the siege. The most conclusive evidence
on hand is a perspective plan drawing of Fort Stan-
wix executed some time after the siege. " ;0 An
elevated structure connected by a footbridge to
the east rampart wall of the southeast bastion is
identified as a "Necessary House." The drawing
shows a much longer and more complicated bridge
structure than does the plan of 1758. and the privy
itself has just a simple shed roof. This difference
could mean a second construction.

The James Wilson powder horn, dated be-
tween November, 1778. and November. 1780. also
shows an elevated necessary projecting off the
same bastion." 11 Like the post-siege drawing men-
tioned above, it shows a long footbridge, but the
privy building is drawn with a gable roof, not a
shed roof. Both drawings depict two doorways
which indicates the interior was divided into two
compartments. The powder horn carving reveals
another significant feature — a sentry box located
near the entrance to the footbridge. All soldiers
using the necessary after 9 p.m. were required to
identify themselves to the sentry on duty." - ' 2 This
garrison order would not have been needed if the
privy had been located on the parade ground.

There is precedent in military fortifications
for building necessary houses beyond the protec-
tion of the rampart walls. Early French fortifica-
tions in Europe were commonly built with latrines
overhanging the exterior walls, as was Fort Char-
ties, the French built fortification located in the
Illinois country. 183 One early Fnglish built fort
having a necessary overhanging the parapet was
William and Mary, erected in 170?. and two ele-
vated necessaries having an almost identical ap-
pearance to the ones built at Fort Stanwix were
located at Fort Fdward (1756) and at Saratoga
(1757) ."■■'

A A. Parade

The parade within a fort is the open area
where troops are assembled for mounting guard,
for exercising, for reviewing the guard, for in-
specting arms, for holding divine services, or for
witnessing the execution of punishment. Artificers
were also assembled on the parade and at times

parleys were held there with the Indians. During
1778, provisions were stacked on the parade
ground for want of room elsewhere. 10,3

It is probable that a gun platform existed on
the parade ground prior to and during the siege,
which would accommodate the three pound field
piece that was used on the two or more sallies
from the fort. In 1780 a new platform was directed
to be built for the brass field piece. In part, the
garrison order read:

Cap' Moody will Guard the Magazine by his men.
and the Brass Field Piece, is to be placed in the center
of the parade opposite the Gate. . . . 16fl

("apt Moody will apply to M r Tucker for to have a
platform made for the Brass field piece in the place
Directed." 17

Other features that must have been located
on the parade ground were two or more wells l6S
and a whipping post." ,!l The exact locations of
these features were not found during the excavation
work but there is a possibility that they may be
uncovered when construction work strips off the
present topsoil down to parade ground level.

On or more necessaries were located on the
parade ground either during the siege or shortly
thereafter. The archeologists have identified one
excavation near the center of the parade as a ne-
cessary pit.

The parade ground level has been established
by the archeologists as 45 1 .00 feet. As best as can
be judged, its top surface was the hard packed allu-
vial soil found at the site.

BB. Parapet

Parapet, in fortification, is a part of the rampart of a
work, of 18 or 20 feet broad, and raised 6 or 7 feet
above the rest of the rampart: it serves to cover the
troops placed there to defend the work against the fire
of the enemy.' 70

The first parapet at Fort Stanwix was built
around the northwest bastion. It was constructed
iif two walls of squared timbers, twenty feet wide,
held together by cross ties and filled with earth
topped off with sod t w ght of 5 feet 6 inches.

I he parapet in this instance was just an extension of
the basic log cribbing built from the ground up-
ward. 171 This same construction shows up in a
cross section through the sally port that was drawn
in I7o4. except that here the height of the parapet

Historic Structure 153

scales seven feet. A fraise is shown fixed to the
top of the parapet. 172

Without any construction drawings of the fort
after 1764, it can only be assumed that the Ameri-
cans would build their parapets in the same man-
ner as their former British compatriots. In late
April 1777, Capt. de Lamarquise wrote that "He
proposes to raise the parapet with cedar. . . ." ,7:!
Willett, writing from Fort Dayton on August 11,
1777, stated: "On the enemy's arrival before the
fort the parapet was still uncompleted and for
several days and nights the garrison labored at this
task as best it could. . . ." m In Willett's Narrative
(1831), he speaks of the engineer placing pickets
having framed portholes "opposite the neck of the
embrasures." 17r ' This statement would imply that
part of the parapet was constructed and possibly
completed before the siege began.

The "Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix" shows
embrasures in the bastions and curtain walls. Since
this plan was completed after the siege, it is less
reliable as to the condition of the fort prior to
August 22. The powder horns owned by Thomson
and McGraw show embrasures, again indicating the
existence of a parapet.

Because of a lack of conclusive evidence con-

I cerning the parapets during the siege, it is recom-
mended that the fort be presented in its completed
condition. This would mean raising the log cribbed
walls of the ramparts six feet above the terreplein.
Their thickness should correspond with that of the
log cribbing below (from ten to twenty feet). The
logs should be flatted on the upper and lower
surfaces, half-lapped and pegged at the splices,

1 but dovetailed at the interesection with the cheek
walls of the embrasures. The top surface or su-
perior slope should then be covered with sod.

CC. Pickets

Pickets were used to prevent the enemy foot
soldier from having direct access to the rampart
walls. Pickets at Fort Stanwix were first placed
in the center of the ditch in 1758. In 1764 when
repair work was done on the fort, the pickets were
left in the bottom of the l. ' except along the east
side of the fort, where they were placed on the
berm. ,7,i

In 1777, the French engineer assigned to the
works by General Schuyler decided that the proper
place for the pickets was on the covered way. Wil-

lett's Narrative carries a running account of the
difficulty encountered by the engineer in carrying
out his plans. Ultimately, the engineer was relieved
of his post as a result of his miscalculations.' 77

Good documentary evidence exists that the
pickets still stood on the covered way in 1781 when
the fort was destroyed, 17S although the post-siege
deFleury map is the only plan available of the
fort that shows the picket line standing here. It
even has one questionable feature — the covered
way and pickets are shown encircling all four sides
of the fort. However it is doubtful that a covered
way was ever built on the east side.

In 1862, a newspaper article was written de-
scribing Fort Stanwix. In part it states that the east
side of the fort was "not protected by earthworks;
but instead three rows of pickets, ten to 12 feet in
length and sharpened at the top were placed in the
ground. . . ." The article continues on to describe
the blockhouse that was built in 1792. 17!l It is
probable that the picketed east wall, if it ever
existed, was built at the same time as the block-
house. No evidence of a three row palisade
was found within the limited amount of ground
excavated on the east side of the fort.

The picket line of 1758 was located in the
bottom of the ditch on the north side of the fort
where the butt ends of forty-one pickets have been
found lined up near the center of the ditch. The
diameters of the pickets varied between 6 and
12 inches while the most common spacing between
post was found to be 6 inches.

The archeologists did not find any evidence of
the picket line built in 1777, although a short
section of the covered way was exposed opposite
the southeast bastion. The only clue found that
indicated where the picket line might have stood
on the covered way was a trench, 2.5 feet deep,
dug at the base of the scarp to the glacis. The
archeologists believe that this trench represents the
location of the palisade.

According to Willett's Narrative, the length of
the pickets was 10 feet. 180 This would leave 7.5
feet of the post extending above the ground, minus
whatever amount was axed to form a point on the
end. This would place the tip of the picket about
12 inches above the glacis, a height comparable
to that shown in Section A-B on Crown Map
No. 102.

Section A-B also shows the method used in
1 764 of setting up a picket line. In this particular

54 Fort Stanwix

drawing, the section is taken through the center
iine of the redoubt at the east end of the sally port.
The pickets measure 5'/2 feet high, are spaced
approximately six inches apart, and have a hori-
zontal ribband attached to them at a distance of
1 Vi feet below their pointed tips. The pickets may
have been notched to receive the ribband which
was cither nailed or pegged to each post.

Eleven of the pickets used to form the redoubt
were found in a location very similar to that shown
on the 1764 plan. They measured about six inches
in diameter and were placed at random intervals
ranging from three to six inches apart. This irregular
spacing suggests that the pickets were placed in a
trench one at a time rather than erected in a pre-
fabricated panel. It should be noticed in the
engineer's drawing that the tops of the pickets are
shown at a uniform height above the ground and
about 12 inches above the crest of the glacis
scarp. 1SI

While the pickets of the sally port redoubt
were found to have random spacing, the archeol-
ogists believe (based on evidence found during
excavation of the 1758 picket line) that the pickets
placed on the covered way were spaced more
uniformly at six inches.

It is proposed to place the picket line on the
covered way around three sides of the fort — north,
south, and west — while along the east side the
pickets should be placed on the berm as shown on
Crown Map No. 103. The pickets should consist
of ten foot long, peeled poles, 6 to 8 inches in
diameter, with one end sharpened to a point with
an axe. They should be spaced approximately six
inches apart and held in place with a IV2 inches X
6 inches ribband let into the post AV2 feet above the
ground. The ribband should be rough sawn, show-
ing vertical saw marks, and should be fastened to
each picket with a treenail. Pickets, treenails, and
ribband should all be pressure treated to the point
of refusal after cutting and fitting is completed.
The pickets should be placed in a vertical position
rather than inclined.

DD. Platforms

Crown Map No. 101 is the only known draw-
ing that shows the type of gunnery platforms used
at Fort Stanwix. It indicates that six gun platforms
were built in each bastion during 1759. although
in the preceding year General Stanwix had ordered

a total of 40 iron guns, 8 mortars, and 2 howitzers
to be sent to the fort. A note added to this ordnance
demand lists 8 embrasures in each bastion and 3
embrasures in two of the curtain walls, making a
total of 38 pieces. 1 s - It is unlikely that the fort was
ever equipped with such a formidable arsenal.

Crown Map No. 102, drawn in 1764, has a
reference note that reads: "The Bastions 1 and 2
are compleatly finished, at the others, Platforms
must be laid also the Banquets made." No infor-
mation is given as to whether the platforms were
to be made for cannon or mortars. If platforms
had been built in 1759, as stated, and needed
replacing by 1764, the life expectancy of the
exposed woodwork was only 5 years.

It is believed that the roofs of the casemates
were intended to be utilized as gun platforms. If
one examines the plans of 1758 and c. 1759, a
cross section through the casemate and curtain wall
can be seen which shows the roof sloped down
toward the parapet. If there was no intention of
using the top surface of the casemates as gun
platforms, it would seem likely that the roof slope
would pitch slightly away from the parapet to
permit drainage of water. The ordnance list men-
tioned above indicates that two of the curtain
walls were to have three embrasures.

Again, if we examine Crown Map No. 103,
dated 1764, which looks very much like a field
drawing, embrasures are shown in all of the curtain
walls. On Crown Map No. 102, also dated 1764,
a section drawn through the east curtain wall and
sally port shows the casemate roof (level rather
than sloped) at the same height above the
ground as in 1758. In 1764, all of the casemates
arc described as "in very bad order and mostly
irreparable."

The ravelin protecting the main gate and
bridge area is shown in 1764 as having embrasures
built into its parapet wall.

It appears to have a continuous wood platform
built around its inner salient angle with a stairway
shown at the north end. Very little information is
available on the ravelin or "salient angle" prior to
or after the siege of August 1777.

On November 24. 1780. Captain Moody,
officer in charge of the artillery, was instructed "to
have a platform made for the Brass field piece . . .
placed in the Center of the parade opposite the
(Kite. . . ." '" :; The placement of a field piece on
the parade ground pointing toward the main gate

Historic Structure 155

seems to have been a standard procedure carried
out by most military posts. There was probably a
platform built in this same location soon after the
occupation of the fort in July 1776; certainly by
the time of the siege in 1777, a platform must have
existed on which to station the field piece used in
the sallies outside the fort on August 2 and 6. 1S4

Gun platforms were still in use at Fort Stanwix
in 1781 when a garrison order was issued to the
officers ". . . to not suffer their men to incumber
the platforms or alarm posts in the Bastions." 185

The construction of gun platforms is well de-
scribed in several military dictionaries of the 1 8th
and early 19th centuries. 1 m

Platforms were of two kinds — "common plat-
forms for gun batteries" and "platforms for mortar
batteries" — both being built as separate units and
spaced according to the directions of the engineer
or artillerist in charge of the works.

A few military posts were planned with solidly
built platforms, in addition to these separately built
platforms, but they were the exception rather than
the rule. 187

Plantforms were of two basic shapes; trape-
zoidal forms used for gun batteries, and square
forms used for mortar batteries. There is no record
of mortars being used at Fort Stanwix from June
16, 1776, through August 23, 1777, at which time
four royals or mortars were captured from the
retreating British Army. 188 Therefore it is assumed
that all of the platforms built in the bastions would
have been trapezoidal in shape and used exclusively
for guns.

Dimensions given for gun platforms vary
somewhat in the military dictionaries, but generally
they were 18 feet long, 8 feet wide along the short
side near the embrasure, and 15 feet wide at the
opposite end. They consisted of five basic parts:
sleepers, stakes, the heurtoir, planks, and battery
nails.

The average sizes for these various component
parts are as follows: (1) sleepers, 6 inches square,
18 feet long, held in place by wooden stakes driven
on each side of each piece at both ends, then cut
off flush with the top surface of the sleeper; (2)
the heurtoir, 8 inch square, 8 feet long, laid on
top of the sleepers against the embrasure; (3) oak
plants, 2'/2 inches thick ± Vi inch), 12 inches wide
(±3 inches), and varying in length from 8 feet to
15 feet; (4) battery nails made from oak, 1 Vs inches

(±Ve inch) in diameter, tapered and about 9 inches
long.

Five or more sleepers, laid in trenches, were
used to support the planks. They were given a slope
of 9 inches from the back of the platform down
toward the embrasure, which afforded the proper
amount of resistance to the gun recoil and prevented
its rolling off the platform after firing. It also per-
mitted the artillerists to move the gun carriage back
into position when loading was completed. After
the sleepers were properly sloped and staked, earth
was rammed between the sleepers flush with the
top surface. This prevented further movement of
the platform and provided additional support under
the planks in ease the gun carriage had to be
shifted off its directrix.

The heurtoir was placed directly over the
sleepers and abutting the embrasure. The purpose
of the heurtoir was to prevent the gun carriage
wheels from damaging the parapet.

Oak planks were fastened directly to the
sleepers, with battery nails or treenails (tapered
wooden pins) used instead of iron spikes in order
to prevent sparks from the ironbound carriage
wheels. Ends of the planks were cut on a bias
conforming to the angular shape of the sleepers.
Earth was then tamped around the edges and ends
of the planks to give a smooth surface to the
platforms and terreplein.

Wherever it was found necessary to make an
embrasure oblique, the platform was so placed that
its center line would fall under the directrix of the
oblique embrasure. One end of the heutoir was
moved away from the embrasure and fixed with
stakes, and then the space between the embrasure
and the heurtoir was filled with rammed earth. 189

The earth between the platforms must be
smoothed over and if possible sloped to the rear of
the battery. If this is not possible, then drainage
must be provided at the base of the embrasure in
the form of cesspools — shallow holes filled with
stones, twigs, etc., into which surface water enters
and is absorbed by the earth. 100 Modern construc-
tion should incorporate a concealed catch basin and
drainage system as an integral part of each cesspool.

Midway of the space between each platform
and to the left side, a rack must be provided to
hold the implements used to service each cannon.
Two wooden frames, placed 9 feet apart, should be
constructed consisting of two stakes, 2Vi feet long,
driven about a foot into the ground and crossing

156 Fort Stanwix

each other at right angles approximately 9 inches
above the ground. A match rope should be used to
bind the two stakes together, 1111 Another type of
rack used was the tripod.

EE. Ramp

RAMPS, in fortification, are sloping communications,
or ways of very gentle ascent, leading from the inward
area, or lower part of a work, to the rampart or higher
part of it. 192

Ramps were usually constructed of earth, then
covered with sod to prevent erosion. They were
used principally in the throats of bastions where
their sloping surface provided the easiest way of
moving cannon in and out of the bastions. Ramps
also provided an unobstructed path for the artillery-
men to move from parade ground level to their
gunnery positions on the terreplcin. Earthen
banquettes required ramps as the most practical
and economical way of stabilizing the soil from
which they were built.

Symbols for ramp construction at the bastions
are shown on Crown Maps Nos. 99, 100, and 101,
for 1758 and 1759. All the ramps are depicted as
occupying the full throat of the bastion except at
the southeast bastion which contained a powder
magazine and root cellar. The ramp here was built
in the center of the throat between the entrance
ways to these two features.

Only one ramp symbol is shown on Crown
Map No. 102, drawn in 1764. None of the other
plans, including the powder horn engravings, show
ramps but it is assumed that they were used. The
Americans apparently erected bombproof structures
with long passageways in each bastion, thereby
complicating the construction of the ramps up to
the terreplein level. The proposed ramps will have
to he built around the walls and ceilings of the
bombproofs after they are finished.

If the sodded ramps start to erode after they
are built, there are two ways of correcting this
within the historical context: one method would be
to corrugate the ramp with small poles 3 inches
to 3'/2 inches in diameter, the second method would
be to place small oval shaped stones in the ground
2 or 3 inches apart and permit grass to grow in
between.

FF. Ramparts

By the 17th century, the high, fortified
masonry walls and towers used in European de-
fenses were giving way to lower but thicker earthen
walls more easily defended against cannon fire.
Ditches were dug around the exterior of the walls
and various other protective devices were intro-
duced that were intended to repel or impede the
opposing army during its siege of the fortification.
Changes were constantly required in all fortified
works as the nature of attack shifted from the
battering rams and engines to guns and mortars.
Military handbooks that explained in detail the
complexities of military warfare soon appeared in
large numbers during the 1 8th century. Many of
these handbooks were carried to America and
immediately became the basic guide used in all
fort construction. The classic textbook example of
a fortification was, however, very rarely carried to
its completion by the military engineer in America.

Fort Stanwix never required, in its construc-
tion, the complex geometrical designs and theorems
or the application of mathematical equations as
developed by Marshal de Vauban, Baron Coehom,
and other military experts. Instead, it was the
product of many minds and many plans, and a
result of the labor of many men.

Small military outposts, such as Fort Stanwix.
depended upon ramparts as their primary means
of protection against enemy attacks. Because the
ramparts formed the principal line of defense, their
composition can be broken down into individual
component parts for study purposes. The ramparts
for forming the four curtain walls and bastions can
be divided into the terreplein. the banquette, the
parapet, and the escarpe.

A study of the Crown Maps and other his-
torical documents reveals that the rampart walls of
Fort Stanwix from 1758 to 1767 were constructed
of logs in filled with earth. The thickness of thest
walls varied from ten to twenty feet depending
upon their degree of exposure to artillery fire. The
thickest rampart walls were constructed along thi
north and west side of the fort which ovcrlookei
the land approach from the west. The thinner walls
built along the remaining part of the fort, facet
lower and swampy ground to the south and east

Three nearly vertical walls formed th
ramparts. The two outer walls, spaced ten t i
twenty feet apart, were constructed of logs flatte I

Historic Structure 157

on their upper and lower surfaces and locked
together with cross ties. This log work was built
around the entire circuit of the fort's bastions and
curtain walls. The interior of this log cribbing was
filled with soil taken from the ditch and thrown
into the structure as the wall progressed in height.
When the final wall height was reached, the summit
was laid with sod to prevent erosion.

The third wall was constructed only along the
four curtains. It was spaced another twenty feet
away from the earth-filled cribbing and was also
built of logs flatted on two sides. The resultant
enclosed area formed the casemates that were in-
tended to house 400 men. Transverse partitions
were notched into the inner and outer walls to
provide the necessary lateral stability needed to
withstand the pressure exerted upon the wall by the
weight of the terreplein roof or that of any cannon
that might be mounted there. The roof of the
casemates was formed of a double tier of squared
timbers, each 12 inches thick and 20 feet to 22 feet
long. 1 " 1

The ramparts of 1758 were constructed en
barbette, 104 that is, without a parapet. Additional
work went ahead in July of 1759, resulting in a
permanent wooden parapet with six gun embrasures
around the northwest bastion on which the flagstaff
was placed. In addition, the remaining ramparts
were raised with a makeshift parapet consisting of
weighted wooden barrels and sandbags. Wooden
gun platforms were built in each of the four bastions
and where the temporary parapet existed, em-
brasures were formed by leaving an opening be-
tween the barrels and sandbags. Apparently a fraise
was built only around the northeast bastion, as the
fraise detail appears in only one profile drawing. 105

Very little information is available to date on
the activities of the British army stationed at Fort
Stanwix after 1759. Some construction work must
have been carried out each summer. Sir William
Johnson, writing in 1761, states that "The fort
[Stanwixl . . . will require another summer to
finish it." ''" ; Despite whatever work was done, the
fort was in poor condition in 1764. 107 The faces
of the southeast and southwest bastions with their
connecting curtain wall had rotted and were falling
down. The failure of the east rampart walls was
probably due in part to the periodic flooding of the
Mohawk River. In any event, if we can believe
another plan of Fort Stanwix prepared in 1764,

some repair work was accomplished producing
newly made bastions and curtain walls. 108

When the Americans occupied Fort Stanwix
in 1776, they immediately began to repair and
rebuild the fort using soldiers and "artificers of
every kind. . . ." 10 ° Work was carried on with
great diligence throughout August, until word
arrived on the 30th that the British forces were no
longer gathered at Oswego. After that date interest
lagged among the garrison, leaving the burden of
work up to the artificers.

The garrison became involved again in repair
work during the spring of 1777, and after the third
New York Regiment arrived under the command
of Col. Gansevoort and Lt. Col. Willett, this activity
continued at a steady rate from May until August.
After the siege, several buiidings were constructed
for the garrison's use outside the fort area, and
these buildings are identified on the "Gansevoort
Map of Fort Stanwix."

In the previous drawings mentioned, the
foundation logs of the rampart walls were laid
directly on the ground. Unfortunately, no outer
foundation logs of the ramparts were uncovered
during the archeological work. Undisturbed foun-
dation timbers were found laid directly on the
ground along the north and west walls of the north
casemates.

The rampart walls were built in a pyramidal
form. The outermost walls were begun with a log
between three to four feet in diameter, flatted on
the upper and lowr surfaces. As each successive
course of logs was laid up, their diameters got
progressively smaller in size until the desired height
of the rampart walls was reached. At Fort Stanwix
the height of the ramparts along the curtain walls was
determined by the height of the casemate roof
(terreplein) plus six feet added on for the parapet.
On the plan of 1759 the top surface of the terre-
plein scales 8 feet 9 inches above the ground at the
parapet; six feet more gives a total height of 14
feet 9 inches to the crest of the parapet. Allowing
a one foot drop for the superior slope, and exterior
wall of the rampart should be 1 3 feet 9 inches above
the elevation of the parade ground (451.00 feet)
or 464.75 feet. This agrees very closely with the
original specifications of 1758.- 00

The rampart walls of the bastions, particularly
of the northwest and southwest bastions, may have
to be raised higher than the adjoining curtain walls
due to the fact that the bombproofs were built

158 Fort Stanwix

above the parade ground level. In order to build
these structures with adequate headroom (6 feet 9
inches) and a protective shell around them, the top
surface of the terreplein will have to be at an eleva-
tion of 460.45 against the parapet. The crest eleva-
tion of a parapet, that is, with six more feet added
on, comes to 466.45 feet in these two bastions.

GG. Ravelin

RAVELINS [or demi-lunes], in fortification; are works
raised on the counterscarp before the curtain of the
place, and serve to cover the gates of a town, and
the bridges. They consist of two faces, forming a
salient angle, and are defended by the faces of the
neighbouring bastions. 201

A ravelin first appears at Fort Stanwix in
1764, and is shown on Crown Map No. 102. It
was constructed on the west side of the ditch
opposite the south curtain wall and took the place
of an earlier picketed redan built in 1758. The
purpose of the ravelin at this point was to protect
the main entrance gate and the newly built bridge
to the fort.

No sectional drawings are available showing
the construction details of the ravelin. Instead, our
interpretation of how the structure was built is
derived by comparing its plan details with the plan
and sectional details of the fort and the arche-
ological evidence found at the site.

The proposed reconstruction plans make one
major change in the ravelin of 1764, and that is to
increase the salient angle from 75° to 110° and to
extend the length of each face from 67 feet to 77
feet. This change was made to the 1764 plans by
the archeologists after they uncovered a trench
eight feet wide and approximately 50 feet long
running in an east-west direction in the vicinity of
the ravelin. The archeologists have used the longi-
tudinal axis of the trench to establish the direction
of the salient angle. They have also determined
that the trench was located in the covered way at
a point where the roadway passes through the
southeast face of the ravelin. All of the British and
American plans, without exception, are drawn with
the roadway located within a few feet of this
vicinity.

There is no positive information from the time
of the American occupation on the condition of
the ravelin before, during, or after the siege.

Elmer's eyewitness account of 1776 reads in part:
"The forth also has a sally port, covert way, bridge
and ravelin before the main gate at the en-
trance." - 02 On June 15, 1777, Col. Gansevoort
wrote General Schuyler that "The engineer at this
place has just laid the foundation of the salient
angle before the gate. . . ." 2m Willett's Narrative
of 1831 describes the construction of the ravelin
in this manner: "The engineer had begun to erect
a salient angle to the gate, with two embrasures in
it." -" 4 The plan of Fort Stanwix that accompanies
Willett's Narrative shows a ravelin containing three
embrasures — identical to what is shown on the
plan of 1764.

The post-siege deFleury map, while too small
to include significant details, not only shows a
ravelin but a significant "horn work begun" around
it. The Gansevoort Map shows only a salient
angle where the ravelin stands. The powder horn
engravings do not show the outer works.

It is proposed to reconstruct the ravelin much
as it appears on the plans of 1764, but using the
field evidence as submitted by the archeologists to
determine the size and direction of the salient angle.

The walls of the ravelin should be constructed
like the rampart walls, that is, with flatted logs
formed in a cribbing, eleven feet wide at the base.
The wall logs should be half lapped at the splices,
but dovetailed joins should be used at the corners
of the passageway and the flank or end walls. Cross
ties should be let into the inner and outer log walls
as the construction work progresses. These walls
should be raised to provide enough head room for
a rider mounted on a horse to pass through the
ravelin.

A wood platform is shown on the 1764 plans,
and it is proposed to reconstruct this feature along
the re-entrant angle as shown in the 1764 plans,
but with the length of the platform adjusted to the
new dimensions established. It should be con-
structed from one tier of twelve-inch squared
timbers supported by beams and posts and should
be sloped eight inches down toward the parapet.
The parapet should be raised six feet above the
platform and banquettes built along the base of the
parapet. One embrasure should be built into the
southeast face and two embrasures built into the
southwest face. A stairway is shown on the 1764
plans, located off the left or northwest side of the
platform; this should be rebuilt in the proposed
work.

Historic Structure 159

No mention has yet been found of how the
space under the ravelin platform was used, but it
might have been a storage area for wagons, gun
carriage wheels and parts, empty barrels, etc.; a
sentry box; or even a small guardhouse.

The archeologists have determined that the
elevation of the ravelin near its interior base is
448.00 feet or 2.6 feet lower than the bridge. The
ground would have to be sloped from the bridge
elevation of 450.60 feet down to the ground level
of the ravelin and covered way. Ground gutters or
drains would be required along the base of the
ravelin, then would be turned through the passage-
way to empty into the ditch fronting the ravelin.

HH. Sally Port

SALLY-ports, in fortification, or postern-gates, as they
are sometimes called, are those under-ground passages,
which lead from the inner works to the outward ones;
such as from the higher flank to the lower, or to the
tenailles, or the communication from the middle of
the curtain to the ravelin. When they are made for
men to go through only, they are made with steps at
the entrance, and going out. They are about 6 feet
wide, and 8V^ feet high. There is also a gutter or shore
made under the sally-ports, which are in the middle of
the curtains, for the water which runs down the streets
to pass into the ditch; but this can only be done when
there are wet ditches. 20 -"'

A sally port was included in the earliest plans
made for Fort Stanwix. It is shown midway in the
east curtain wall as an open passageway, five feet
wide, running perpendicular through the casemate
than turning and continuing through the rampart
wall at an angle of 21 o . L ' 0G

There is no indication on these plans of how
the scarp wall was extended from the berm to the
bottom of the ditch where a palisaded wall was
located. Gate posts are shown in the palisaded wall
opposite a covered way that led to a small stream
where water was obtained for use within the fort.

During the interim, probably in 1764, a
covered passageway, 10 feet wide, was constructed
against the east entrance of the sally port. 207 Start-
ing at the log rampart wall, it descended the slope
of the scarp by means of wooden steps, then ex-
tended eastward some 65 feet. A door located in
the east end wall was protected by a small triangular
shaped redoubt built from palisades. Earth was
banked up against the sides of the passageway and

extended around the redoubt to form a protective
glacis.

On Crown Map No. 102, further details of
the passageway can be seen in the transverse and
longitudinal sections: the 12 inch thick beams
forming the bombproof ceiling; the gable roof and
12 inch thick wall construction; the banquettes and
loopholes. A general idea of how the palisaded
redoubt was constructed can be obtained by study-
ing both plan and section. The drawings are done
rather accurately at a scale of 20 feet to the inch.

Archeological evidence of the sally port found
in 1972 compares favorably with the engineer's
drawing of 1764. This evidence suggested a struc-
ture 9 feet 6 inches wide and 60 feet long, with a
wall thickness of approximately eight inches. Two
additional posts were added to the passageway walls
by the archeologists as a result of their interpreta-
tion of the underground remains. The passageway
was built perpendicular to the rampart wall.

Evidence remaining from the log rampart and
casemate wall construction in this vicinity was
virtually non-existent. A short section of the sally
port floor and walls was found in the rampart area
starting at the berm at the 15° angle and extending
as far as the center casemate wall. From this point
the sally port seemingly took another turn at a 24°
angle and extended to the front or west wall of the
casemate. This apparent turn of the sally port
midway through the rampart walls is based on the
existence of a trench, four feet deep, which ran
parallel to the excavated sally port remains in the
outer wall.-" 8 It is assumed that the trench and
sally port ran somewhat parallel through the
casemate and that a wooden box drain was laid in
the bottom of the trench. The theory of a drain
running under the sally port floor can be supported
by directions given in military handbooks of the
day.

The width of the passageway running through
the casemate and rampart walls was found to have
an inside dimension of four feet. The wall con-
struction appears to be squared logs and evidence
of ground sleepers indicates that the passageway
was floored with planks.

The archeologists have determined that the
four foot passage extended past the exterior
rampart wall and into the covered passageway for
a distance of 3 feet 6 inches, but no military ap-
plication for this feature can be located.

Only the vaguest evidence of what might be

160 Fort Stanvvix

parts of four steps descending the scarp was found,
and this was used to determine where the steps
began. Ten steps are thought to have existed and
this agrees with the number drawn on Crown Map
No. 102. Each step had eight inch risers and
19 ! /2 inch treads within a height of 6.64 feet and a
horizontal distance of 14.67 feet. 20U

The lower two steps may have been cut away
along the north wall to permit the sally port drain
to enter the ditch above grade. The top of the drain
butting the steps probably would have been covered
with a board at this point rather than being left
open. The drain continued along the north wall
under the banquette for about 16 feet before
penetrating the north wall at a slight angle as
shown in the preliminary plans.

The 1 764 section shows six loopholes cut
through the side walls above the steps, so that
obviously the steps were also utilized as firing
platforms. These loopholes scale off the drawing
approximately 4 inches X 16 inches on the exterior
and 15 inches X 20 inches on the interior. The
top surfaces were level while the interior sides
splayed out and the bottoms splayed down.

A cross section drawn on the above plan
shows that 24 inches wide banquettes were built
against both side walls of the lower passageway.
Above the banquettes at a height of about five feet
off the floor a 10 inch space was left running the
length of the passageway. Soldiers thrust their
muskets through this space whenever it was ne-
cessary to enfilade the ditch. The drawing shows
that the bottom of the wall opening slopes down-
ward at the same angle as the earth embankment.

The roof structure of the c. 1764 passageway
seems to have been constructed of rafters spaced
four to seven feet apart and covered with boards.
It is possible that the final roof covering was
cither exposed lapped boards or roof boards
covered with shingles. Since the Americans were
making shingles at Fort Stanwix in 1776, the latter
theory seems more acceptable. 21 ° Protection against
leaks of the sloping roof which extends up the
angle of the scarp presents a problem using either
method of roof covering. By using shingles, how-
ever, the roof slope could be handled much like a
valley, that is, the shingles could be swirled in the
direction of the water runoff.

II. Scarp and Counterscarp

SCRAP, in fortification, is the interior talus or slope

of the ditch next the place, at the foot of the
rampart. 211

COUNTERSCARP, in fortification, is properly the
exterior talus, or slope of the ditch, on the farther side
from the place, and facing it. Sometimes the covert-
way and glacis are meant by this expression. 212

The scarp and counterscarp formed the
sloping sides of the ditch surrounding the rampart
walls. The term scarp was also applied to the
interior slope of the glacis. Three distinct profiles
of the scarp were found at the north, east, and
south curtain walls, while three scarp profiles were
measurable on the southeast, northeast, and north-
west bastions. The scarp and counterscarp were also
discernible under the main bridge. Only one coun-
terscarp angle was measurable, on the west side of
the fort ditch.

Small wood pickets or pegs, originally used to
hold the cut sod in place as it was laid on the
scarp and counterscarp, were found in the excava-
tions on the north flank of the northwest bastion.
They measured one inch in diameter and were
placed about 12 inches on centers in horizontal
rows spaced 1.0 to 1.8 feet apart. 213 Sod would
have been used on the scarps of the glacis sur-
rounding the ditch and sally port.

In the fall of 1970, the archcologists laid sod
on the flank of the northwest bastion as an experi-
ment in durability. Now into its third winter, the
sodded scarp seems to be holding its own. In the
reconstruction work, it is proposed to sod the
scarps, counterscarps and covered way, pegging
them down in a manner similar to that of 1777.
The angle of the scarp and counterscarp has been
determined by the archcologists as a 40° slope.

.1.1. Sentry Boxes
Pre-Rcvolution

The use of the sentry box, also called guirite
or echauguette, in fortifications predates the four-
teenth century and may even go back to the be-
ginning of warfare.-' 14 In America, by the late 16th
and early 1 7th centuries, the Spanish and French
had already begun the construction of fortresses
that incorporated the sentry box as a major element
in their overall design. The English-settled town of
Boston had authorized the "erecting of a wall or
wharf e upon the flatts [sic] before the town . . ." as
a defense precaution as early as 1673. These de-

Historic Structure 161

fenses became known as the "North and South
Battery," and sentry boxes were built as an integral
part of the masonry walls of these fortifications. 215

A number of English-built forts were con-
structed along the coast of New England in the late
17th and early 18th centuries. 2 " 1 Of particular in-
terest was the fort built on the Piscataqua River
in New Hampshire. One drawing of the fort labeled
as "The Fort upon Great Island. . . ." dated 1699,
shows sentry boxes standing on the atips of each
bastion. Another undated drawing, identified as a
". . . Prospect Draft of Fort William & Mary on
Piscataqua River. . . ." has listed in its explanation:
"B. The new made Centry boxes." 217 There seems
little doubt that the early military engineers in
America had universally adopted the methods of
fortification as perfected by their European
counterparts.

There were several military handbooks in use
at the time of the American Revolution, of which
some were more specific than others in describing
the use, location, and method of constructing sen-
sentry boxes. 2,s Very little written information has
been found about sentry boxes dating from this
period. A number of sketches, spanning the period
between 1673 and c. 1875, have been located that
include the sentry box as part of the overall scene.
One French draft, obtained from the Fortress of
Louisbourg NHP, was especially helpful, although
the drawing should be used with caution since its
publishing date was 1739. 21tl

Fort Stanwix

Only four references have been found to
sentry boxes at Fort Stanwix. Fortunately these
references date between early 1777 and January 8,
1781, and can be used as solid documentation
supporting the conclusion that sentry boxes were
used during the occupation of Fort Stanwix by the
American colonists. The first known reference to
sentry boxes is found in a letter written by the
French engineer, Capt. B. De Lamarquise to
General Gates, probably in April 1777. It simply
states that he fLamarquise] "has made sentry-boxes
where necessary to keep centinels." 22rt The second
reference is found in the Willett Orderly Book
which reads "The Superintendent of the Engineers
Department will see that all the Centries Boxes are
in good order and fix'd so as not to be blown down
with every trifling wind." 22] The third reference is

a drawing found on the James Wilson powder horn.
Wilson was stationed at Fort Stanwix between
November 1778 and November 1780; hence, it
has been assumed that the engraving was done
during this time. 222 The fort plan is depicted in a
very elementary form but the artist has shown five
sentry boxes, one placed on each of the four
bastions and the fifth located at the ravelin end of
the main bridge.

The fourth reference to sentry boxes was
found in the Orderly Books of the 4th New York
Regiment. The entry, made on January 8, 1781,
reads in part "A watch Coate will be furnished for
Each Sentry Box on the Basteens [Bastions] for
Which the Corp ' of the Guard is to be
Accountable." 223

Additional sentry boxes may have been
furnished at other guard post positions. An Orderly
Book entry written on April 11, 1781; reads:

The Command' observes some Irregularity in the duty
of the Guards which he wishes to correct. The
Sentinals on their posts after Tattoo beating are to
call all is well once in a quarter of an Hour, but not
till ordered, which order is to be Given by the officer
of the Guard, to the Sergeant Who is to order Number
one at the Guard house to call all is well, which call
is to be answered distinctley in Rotation, as they are
Numbered except the Sentinal at the Commanding
officers door, who is not to answer, he is in case of an
alarme to call the Commanding officer. 224

An entry on the following day is as explicit:

The Sentinals without the gates are in case of an
alarm are to shut and barr the outside gates and
Remane their till further orders and not open the gates
for any person Unless ordered by the Commanding
officer the officer of the Day or officer of the Guard. 225

The above several references are interpreted to
mean that sentries were definitely placed at the
guardhouse, on each of the four bastions, and just
outside the Commandant's door. Other possible
locations for posts would be at the sally port
entrance and just beyond the outside gates. There
is also a possibility that a guard room could have
been built under the gun platform of the ravelin.

Construction of the Sentry Box

Only one military dictionary was found listing
the dimensions for a sentry box: "They ought to
be about six Foot high, and their Breadth three and

162 Fort Stanwix

a half." 220 These dimensions are identical with the
French drawn sentry box. Practically all of the roof
shapes were found to be pyramidal, that is, with
four sloping roof surfaces terminated at the peak
with a finial. The roof covering was probably wood
shingles swirled at the juncture of the hip angles.
The walls were probably sheathed with one inch
thick vertical boards nailed into a ground sill, a
rail at mid-point and into the plate. One side of
the sentry box would have been used as the entry
and was possibly hung with a door which could be
removed during the summer months. Small open-
ings would be cut through the three side walls to
permit the sentry to observe his post while under
cover in inclement weather.

The French drawings of a sentry box show two
methods of base frame construction. One method
is to be used for a portable sentry box while the
other method is to be used for a sentry box which
might be exposed to the forces of a high wind. This
latter method involves the addition of a perpen-
dicular frame attached to the basic chassis and sunk
underground. The latter type sentry box would be
mounted on the exposed ramparts of the bastions.-- 7

KK. Storehouse

This building stood on the east or right-hand
side of the main entrance gate on the parade
ground, but no physical remains of this building
were found during the archeological excavations.
No reference has been found to a storehouse or
commissary building being built at Fort Stanwix
between July 13, 1776, and April 1777.~ s In the
engineer's report of late April, he states that he
". . . has made a Small Store, to put provs under
Cover." -"- >!l By February 7, 1778, ". . . farmers
Soldiers Officers & Others" were allowed to sell
vegetables and other produce "brought to the
Garrison. . . ." 230 On February 24, a garrison order
was issued stating:

The Officer of the Day will sec that there are no
unnessary Lights in any of the Barracks, after Tattooc
Beating, and the Serg. ts of the Different Squads see
that the Men belonging to their Squads retire to their
Births It is expected that the Sutler will Shut up his
Shop and entertain no Company after the heating of
the Tattooe. 231

The above order implies that a sutler was
permitted to occupy shop space within the fort.

Unfortunately, there is no known record of where
the shop was located.

There are entries in the orderly book kept
between 1780-81 at Fort Stanwix that imply a
commissary was in use, but the wording is not
explicit.- 3 - Reconstruction will have to rely pri-
marily upon the five contemporary drawings that
show the identify this building. The so-called
"Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix" identifies three
of the five buildings standing on the parade ground,
one of which is marked "Commissy House." On
another drawing of Fort Stanwix, apparently the
original from which the Gansevoort Map was
copied, the same building is marked Commissi
Store." The three powder horns all show a building
comparable to the storehouse.

The design of the proposed storehouse is
based on information interpreted from the drawing
found on the McGraw powder horn of December
1777:

( 1 ) Foundation dimensions of the main build-
ing are 16 feet X 22 feet; two lean-tos of equal
size are attached to the east and west ends,
measuring 8 feet X 10 feet. (All are conjectural
measurements.)

(2) It is a frame building utilizing post and
still construction; walls are covered with horizontal
boards; there is a gable roof with a central chimney
on the main building; shed roofs are built over the
lean-to additions and there is an end wall fireplace
in the west lean-to; roofs are wood shingled; wood
sleepers are used as underpinning.

(3 The powder horn drawing shows three
exterior doors and two window openings along the
north wall, with no openings shown in the west
end walls. The window openings in the south and
east walls are conjectural. There should probably
be board and batten shutters hung on the exterior
of the windows.

(4) Four drawings agree that there was a
central chimney, which would indicate that the
main building, 16 feet X 22 feet, was divided into
two rooms (or one room) separated by a centrally
located chimney block containing two fireplaces.
The McGraw powder horn is the only drawing that
allows a lean-to attached to both end walls. While
the existence of the lean-tos cuts sharply into the
overall size of the main storehouse, they do reflect
the hurried building construction of the fort in 1 777.

The interior room finish of the storehouse
might be one that leaves the post and beam con-

Historic Structure 163

struction exposed, in contrast to the headquarters
and guardhouse, which should have the walls and
ceilings lined with boards. It is quite possible that
the rough mill-sawn outer weatherboards, studding,
ceiling boards (laid over the joists), and ceiling
beams were whitewashed. Shelves should be
furnished for the Quartermaster and possibly a
counter of sorts. 233 The west lean-to room with the
fireplace could have been the living quarters for
either the Sutler or the Quartermaster Deputy, Mr.
Hansen. The walls and ceiling of the west lean-to,
if it had been used as quarters, would have been
lined with boards to insulate as well as decorate
this room.

Most likely there would have been a door
opening between the main storehouse and each of
the lean-tos. All rooms would have wood floors.
The Quartermaster would have taken advantage of
the storage space found in the attic; hence, a trap
door and a wall ladder would have been required
to gain access to this area.

LL. Timber

The chief tree species found in the Fort
Stanwix area in 1758 were white pine, white cedar,
elm, beech, maple, birch and poplar. 234 In 1793,
other species of trees listed were sugar trees, button-
wood, white walnut, pitch pine, elm, oak, shellbark
hickory, and hemlock. 235

Of the 42 wood samples submitted by the
archeologists to the State University of New York
for identification, 24 samples were white pine, 1 1
samples hemlock, four samples white cedar, one
sample white ash, and one sample slippery elm.
Except for the predominant use of hemlock in the
northwest bombproof (nine samples) there was an
indiscriminate use of tree species in construction.

In 1777 the engineer, de Lamarquise, pro-
posed to raise the parapet with cedar which was
found about one mile from the fort. 23 ' 5 On the
deFIeury map there is an area about one mile to
the southwest of Fort Stanwix marked "Cedar
Swamp."

It is proposed to build the outer rampart walls
with logs. Starting with a 30-36 inch diameter
foundation log, each tier of logs would be reduced
in diameter until the height of the parapet is
reached, at which point a 12-14 inch diameter log
should be used. The inner rampart walls forming
the walls to the casemates should start out with a

24 inch diameter foundation log, and end with a
15-17 inch diameter log at the top of the wall.

Smaller trees will be needed to construct the
fraise, pickets, bombproofs, passageways, bake-
house, etc., but a variety of local species can be
used as long as pressure treating is specified after
cutting and fitting.

For the heavy squared timbers used on the
roofs of the casemates, etc., it will probably be
necessary to use West Coast Douglas Fir.

Douglas Fir (or white pine if available in wide
widths), can be used for the exterior boards of the
barracks, headquarters, guardhouse, and store-
house. From 1776-1781, the roofs of these build-
ings were probably covered with shingles rived
from white cedar or white pine, then tapered and
smoothed. We can substitute sawn white cedar
shingles for the handmade variety since the saw
marks will weather out in a few years.

Southern yellow pine may be substituted for
the local white pine. Hemlock still grows in some
of the remoter areas of up-state New York and
should be acceptable for wall logs. It will have to
be cut in the spring of the year if the bark is to be
removed.

MM. Wells

Water for the use of the garrison at Fort
Stanwix was obtained from a branch of "Teochnohat
Creek" which ran along the east side of the fort. 237
Members of the garrison had to carry water from
the creek, which was protected by a short covered
way and an earthern redan, through the sally port
into the fort. This method of furnishing fresh water
for the fort's consumption was kept in use after
the Americans arrived in 1776.

The military engineer realized that a good
supply of water was of paramount importance dur-
ing a time of siege. This fact must have been
realized by the Americans shortly before August
1777. ColbratfVs Diary records the chain of events
that took place on August 1 1 :

This Day the Enemy having Observed that we brought
water from the Creek altered its Course so that it
becme dry This wou'd have done us much Damage
had we not been able to open two wells in the Garri-
son which with One we had already proved a Sufficient
Supply

The same day Colonel Gansevoort issued a
garrison order stating: ". . . The Quarter Master

164 Fort Stanwix

will Likewise Order as many Barrels filled with
Water, as he can procure and see that they are
Constantly full." 238 Not only were the barrels of
water used for cooking, drinking and washing pur-
poses, but they were also useful in case of fire.

No evidence of wells was uncovered in the
archeological excavation work of 1970-72. The
only plan of Fort Stanwix showing a well appears
on an original banknote issued by the Bank of
Rome in 1832. The plan shows a blockhouse, a
magazine, and a well located near the center of the
north casemate. 239

When grading work begins on the parade
ground, an attempt should be made to locate the
well(s), if indeed they were dug in this area.

The aboveground well structure will have to
be conjectural since neither a description nor a
drawing exists from the military period.

four persons could be tied or manacled to the ring
at one time.

The location of the whipping post is unde-
termined, but it would probably have been some-
where near the center of the parade ground, as the
punishment was to be executed in full view of the
garrison.

Reconstructed forts such as George, William
Henry, and others have included a stock in addition
to the whipping post as part of their exhibit.
Evidence that a stock was used at Fort Stanwix was
not found. Unless reliable documentation is found
for this feature, it has been recommended that the
stock should not be included.

Another form of punishment used at Fort
Stanwix in 1781 was chaining a block two feet long
and six inches in diameter to the leg of a
prisoner. 241

NN. Whipping Post

Flogging, as a form of corporeal punishment,
continued in use throughout the Revolutionary
War. At Fort Stanwix, the three most commonly
mentioned forms of punishment were flogging,
confinement in either the guardhouse or bombproof,
and running the gantlet.

Flogging was executed at a whipping post.
The first mention of a whipping post at Fort
Stanwix is in 1776, when four men were tied
together and whipped. 2,n Throughout the Willett
Orderly Book kept from May 30, 1777, through
May 19, 1778, and the 4th and 2nd New York
Regiment's Orderly Books kept from November
22, 1780, through June 10, 1781, whipping is
mentioned continually. During the twenty day
siege of Fort Stanwix, however, whipping is not
mentioned.

The writer has not found an early description
of a whipping post, but reproductions at Fort
George, Ontario, and at Fort William Henry and
New Windsor Cantonment in New York State. Of
the three, the post at New Windsor seems to be
the most convincing. It is a peeled wooden post
approximately nine inches in diameter and IV2
feet high terminated at the top with a round finial.
Four iron rings. 2Vi" in diameter, are stapled at
equal distances around the post near the top and
four more rings are stapled into the post about 12
inches off the ground. Thus the hands and feet o\~

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PROPOSED USE OF BUILDINGS

APPENDIX A

The Fort Stanwix Historical Center —
A Preliminary Report

A preliminary report was prepared by Mr.
Charles M. Stotz. Architect from Pittsburg, Penn-
sylvania, on November 18, 1963, outlining in detail
a proposal for the partial reconstruction of Fort
Stanwix. The report's recommendations were either
adopted or were so necessary to reconstruction of
the fort that the Park Service's master plan
addressed the same points made by Mr. Stotz.
A copy of the following report was given to the
writer by Mr. Stotz in August 1971 .

Primary Purpose

To make the Rome region a better place in
which to live by fostering in the residents the desire
for a full and true knowledge of and pride in their
cultural heritage so that both they and visitors to
the region may better understand the planting and
development of civilization in the region.

To accomplish this, it is intended to memori-
alize and to instill an understanding of the events,
personalities, military installations and other his-
torical aspects of the French and Indian, and
Revolutionary Wars that transpired in the region
of modern Rome, New York, with emphasis on
the principal fortified stronghold, Fort Stanwix.

Secondary Purposes

To also present later phases of military activity
in the War of 1812, to memorialize the life of
Francis Bellamy and his Pledce of Alleeiance to

the Flag, to develop a knowledge of all phases of
the social and economic life of the region from its
geological origin and prehistoric residents to its
leading role in road, canal and steam transporta-
tion of the early 19th century, by comprehensive
modern museum techniques. This calls for emphasis
on interpretation and a major effort in exhibit
preparation.

Site

The site is bounded by Black River Boulevard,
an un-named alley east of North James, East
Liberty, and East Dominick Streets. Under the
basic proposal all of this land is to be utilized
except the business properties fronting on North
James Street. It is further proposed that a portion
of the parcel lying between East Dominick Street,
Erie Boulevard and North James Street be con-
sidered. See site diagram herewith.

Site Preparation

The basic site would be cleared of all buildings
except the Rome Club. North Spring Street, East
Willett Street and the un-named alley would be
abandoned and the land absorbed in the plot.

The Rome Club is a good example of a
Corinthian Order of the Greek Revival period and
this building, with some restoration, could serve a
useful purpose in the project plans.

The existing museum building is of com-
bustible construction and is unsuitable to modern
museum use as well as unattractive in design. The

ififi

cost of rehabilitation would not be justified. We
recommend that it be razed.

There are in this site several buildings of some
historic and architectural character, the preserva-
tion of which might be desirable. However, from
our experience in this field we believe that their
rehabilitation and maintenance would present a
major charge on the community in cost and man-
agement and would constitute a serious distraction
from the essential purposes of the project. The
only exception is the facade of the American
Legion Building, an excellent example of an Ionic
Order of the Greek Revival period. It is a pos-
sibility this portico, that is, the columns and the
pediment over them, with some restoration might
be preserved as a museum exhibit.

The Empire House is said to have been built
in the early thirties but its exterior character shows
considerable alterations of a later period and is
not judged to be worthy of preservation from an
historical-architectural point of view.

It is suggested that the museum contain an
area devoted to the early architecture of Rome in
which would be displayed pictures and drawings of
buildings in their original unspoiled condition
together with exhibits of details or portions that
have been preserved.

Topography

While we do not yet have a topographical
survey of the site, there appears to be little varia-
tion in grade and we visualize no hazards in layout
from this source.

Full-Size Reconstruction of Fort Stanwix

The principal source of information on the
original condition of Fort Stanwix is the military
engineer's drawing made in 1758, and now pre-
served in the Crown Collection of American Maps
in the British Museum. It was a simple square with
bastions at the corners. The walls were of horizontal
logs. There is adequate information to accomplish
a reasonable faithful reproduction.

The 18th century frontier forts were made of
the materials most readily available, earth and wood.
They deteriorated readily under the effects of rain,
frost and rot, as we have learned in the reconstruc-
tion of the contemporary Fort Ligonier 50 miles
east of Pittsburgh. It is therefore recommended that
reconstruction be restricted to the southeast quar-
er of the fort. This includes the flag bastion with
its cannons and the powder magazine beneath it,
half of the east and south curtain walls, each
backed by a barracks building and several buildings
within the parade ground. The life of the wood
may be lengthened by certain precautions in treat-
ing the wood with preservatives. The moat with its
picket line is to be built around the restored portion
of the fort. Thus all of the essential and typical
features of the fort may be examined by the
visitor. The trace of the remaining portion of the
fort will be shown by a narrow stone path on the
ground, except of course where concealed by the
buildings.

As will be described later a small scale model
of the entire fort is to be built in a location that
will afford a view both of the model and the full
size portion. While the bastion will be visible from
the surrounding streets, visitors will be admitted to
the fort area only from the museum building, after
viewing the model.

Program

The several physical elements of the program,
as shown on the site diagram and to be discussed in
detail later, are as follows:

1. Full size reconstruction of the southeast
quarter of Fort Stanwix.

2. Restoration of the Rome Club.

3. Construction of a new museum building.

4. Provision for on-site parking of 75 to 100
cars.

5. Landscape development of the entire area.

Restoration of the Rome Club

The Rome Club will form a distinguished
background for the exhibit of typical furnishings of
the early homes of Rome. Additional uses for this
building have been recommended but this aspect of
the program remains to be defined. It must be
recognized that the fire and panic laws of most
states, including New York, restrict the use of
residences as places of public assembly. Any use

167

168 Fort Stanwix

of the second floor by the public requires drastic
alterations to provide fireproof stairways at ex-
treme ends of the building, although it is likely that
quarters for a resident caretaker would be per-
mitted on the second floor without such construc-
tion. The degree of restoration needed to return
the building to its original condition must await
further study and research. Access to the building
will be provided from the adjacent museum, as all
persons must enter and exit through the main lobby
for reasons of security.

New Museum Building

The existing museum building was originally
constructed as a tennis court, later altered by the
introduction of a second floor of wood construc-
tion, and finally adapted to use as a museum,
utilizing the first floor only. In a project of such
importance and permanence as we are now con-
sidering it would seem shortsighted to reuse or
extend this building which is inadequate in size,
combustible in character and undesirably located.

A new building is proposed in the general
area shown on the site diagram. It would be a
one-story building of fireproof construction, with
a flexible plan that will permit readjustment and
extension of museum exhibits as required. As in
modern museums of this type, lighting will be
artificial and subject to control to suit the exhibit
needs. However, windows will light the offices,
lobby and certain staff areas while a large open
landscaped central court will provide a welcome
foil to the interior areas. This court would provide
a dramatic setting for the principal theme, our
flag, with a memorial to Francis Bellamy or other
feature as determined by the committee. It is
important to maintain simplicity and unity to
achieve an effective memorial.

The entrance to and exit from the buliding is
by a spacious lobby on the western front, accessible
by a new street. The lobby will be served by public
rest rooms. A gift sales area opens ofl" the lobby.
This facility provides important funds for the
maintenance of the project as has been amply
demonstrated in many similar institutions throughout
the country.

This lobby also provides direct access to one
of the principal features of the museum, an Infor-
mation Center, or Theater of History, to sett 300

persons, provided with a large stage or exhibition
area. Special techniques are contemplated by which
all phases of history represented in the museum
may be presented here in synoptic form and with
telling dramatic effect by an interesting new
method conceived by your curator, Gilbert Hagerty.
As at Williamsburg, Virginia, this Information
Center will prepare the visitor for a full apprecia-
tion of what he will later see. The use of this center
for groups of school children will provide a vital
regional educational feature as well as a visitor
attraction of great value.

The important adjuncts of storage and prepa-
ration workshops will be provided with a separately
controlled delivery entrance off East Liberty Street.
As one reaches the southeast corner of the
museum he enters an elevated room looking down
through a large window directly on the restored
portion of the fort. This room will contain a model
about 20 feet in diameter of the entire fort and its
immediate environs at the scale of % inch to a
foot. Here the significance and character of the
restored fort will be fully explained so that when
the visitors walk out of the model room they are
prepared for the visit to the restoration.

Similar models might be considered for the
historic portage area from the Mohawk River to
Lake Oneida. Also a model of the Mohawk-
Oswego military route would explain why Fort
Stanwix was a fortified place of strategic importance.

In addition to the exhibits pertaining to the
French and Indian and Revolutionary Wars and the
War of 1812, there is a significant story to be told
of water transportation from the early bateaux to
the canal days. A model of the early Erie Canal,
including the Black River branch, may do much
to help the modern visitor visualize structure, as
well as the social and economic impact of this
vanished system.

It is desirable to establish a building that may
he operated with a minimum staff and suited to
year-round operation.

On-Site Parking

It is presumed that the Urban Renewal
Agency will require adequate parking to serve the
museum. We recommend a parking compound of
75 to 100 cars on the western extremity of the
property as shown on the site diagram.

Historic Structure 169

Landscape Development

The borders of the project area are to be
planted in a park-like manner and the entire lot
surrounded by an attractive fence or barrier that
will prevent access but yet afford an uninterrupted
view from the bordering street.

It is suggested that appropriate outdoor ex-
hibits be distributed through the area surrounding
the museum, including a garrison garden and such
fort adjuncts as a forge, outdoor bake oven,
saw-pit, and the like.

It may be desired to consider a light and
sound program now so popular at historic sites
throughout Europe, and presently being considered
for Point State Park in Pittsburgh. If so, provisions
must be made for a proper installation.

We recommend that an intensive archaelogi-
cal program be conducted before construction of
the new building. It is likely that valuable artifacts,
essential for the new museum exhibits, may be
recovered from the ground, as at Fort Ligonier and
other fort sites.

Cost

It is not possible to make a reliable estimate
of cost until the completion of preliminary studies,
showing the plans, elevations and sections of the
buildings, layout of the grounds and outline specifi-
cations. When this is known, revisions may be
made to accommodate a practical budget. We sug-
gest now that an outside figure of one and one-half
million dollars be considered for the construction
cost of the above described project including archi-
tect's fees but exclusive of land acquisition and
exhibits. It is impossible at this stage to estimate
the cost of the exhibits themselves which, except
for the fort model and possibly the museum cases,
lie outside the architect's responsibility. We suggest
tentatively that the sum of $250,000 be allo-
cated for exhibits. Thus the total cost would be
approximately $1,750,000.

If land acquisition is not disproportionally
high in cost, we suggest inclusion in the project of
the strip of business properties fronting North
James Street.

Land Between Dominick Street and
Erie Boulevard

It is suggested that consideration be given to
the acquisition of the area east of Montgomery
Ward, leaving in place the more valuable buildings
on the western portion. The eastern section would
be graded and made into a landscaped public
parking area which would provide an open, dignified
foreground to the project. We assume that the cost
of this would not be borne by the Fort Stanwix
Historical Center project.

Architectural Services

This report is provided without obligation to
the committee and as an assistance in resolving
the main features of the project. Our firm now
proposes that we be engaged to perform the neces-
sary architectural services and submit a schedule
of fees for such work. We base these fees as per-
centages of contract cost according to the schedule
adopted by the Pennsylvania Society of Architects
of The American Institute of Architects.

For the museum building, the fee would be
IVa percent of the contract cost, while the remain-
der of the work, including the restoration of the
Rome Club, reconstruction of Fort Stanwix, and
site development would be at 10 percent of the
contract cost.

The standard form of agreement as issued by
The American Institute of Architects is submitted
herewith for your inspection. You are encouraged
to raise any questions concerning the details
therein. This project will be handled in the name
of Charles M. Stotz on behalf of the firm of Stotz,
Hess and MacLachlan.

Upon execution of an agreement the architects
will proceed with preliminary studies, which, as
mentioned above, will provide a clear statement of
the project by plans, sections, outline specifications,
perspective views and detailed cost estimates. Upon
review of these studies and after making any altera-
tions or budget adjustments after consultation with
the client, the final working drawings and specifica-
tions may be prepared.

Throughout this process, the architect will
consult with the client through a building com-
mittee to establish a well-defined program, accept-
able to the Urban Renewal Agency. The architect

170 Fort Stanwix

will likewise consult the local and state building
codes and secure all preliminary approvals that
may be required.

To expedite the work and simplify communica-
tion, we suggest the work building committee be
restricted to three persons. Of course all decisions,
as represented by the architect's drawings and data,
will be presented for ratification by the committee
as a whole.

We believe the project has a sound and
justifiable basis for becoming a civic asset of great
worth. Our impression is that the citizens who
conceived this worthy enterprise have developed
an enthusiastic backing among the people of Rome.
We trust that the momentum thus produced will
carry us to an early and successful accomplishment
of the project. In sharing your enthusiasm, we will
bend every effort to this end.

Respectfully submitted,
Charles M. Stotz/lw

Charles M. Stotz

CMS/dds
November 18, 1963

APPENDIX B

Class C — Cost Estimates

Reconstruction of Fort Stanwix, Rome, New York

Based on Preliminary Drawings NPS No. 015/25000, 4 Sheets

March 22, 1973

Site Preparation

Excavation Work

Area east of the fort:

200' X 700' X 2.5' ave. depth
Excavate Parade Ground to original
elevation:
240' X 240' X 2.0' ave. depth
Cellars in east barracks, two each,

hand excavation:
Area south of the fort:

160' X 50' X 1.0' ave. depth
Deepen & widen ditch on south & west
sides of fort:
(400' X 2.0') + 400' X 17' X 10'
Excavate area between east scarp and
Liberty Street:
400' X 40' X 5.0'
Excavate remaining ditch area:

600' X 10' X 35'
Excavate stream bed east of the fort:

800' X 2.0' X 1-0'
Install catch basin at outlet &

connect to storm sewer:
Excavate trench for pickets & backfill:
Removal of eleven house foundations

on site:
Removal of existing pipe lines, disconnect

& cap off:
Removal of asphalt curbs & walks left

on fort site:
Removal of existing trees and tree stumps:

1 3,000 cu. yds.

$1.60

$20,800.00

4,266 cu. yds.

1.60

6,825.00
300.00

300 cu. yds.

1.60

480.00

' 2,800 cu. yds.

1.50

4,275.00

3,000 cu. yds.

1.60

4,800.00

8,000 cu. yds.

1.60

12,800.00

60 cu. yds.

7.40

444.00
480.00

1 ,020 cu. yds.

7.40

7,541.00

5,000.00

700.00

800.00
1,700.00

$66,945.00

171

172 Fort Stanwix

Earth Fill

Level parade ground and cellar holes on

fort site:
Southeast Bastion, fill and compact earth:
Ramp, Ravelin to main bridge:
Glacis, 1665 lin. ft.
Redoubt, fill & compaction:
Sally port, glacis of passageway:
Bastions, less parapets, bombproofs

and passageways:
Fill above curtain walls in parapet:
Fill in parapet of ravelin:
Earth banquettes in bastions:
Earth banquettes in redoubt:
Fill south of ravelin:

3,750 cu. yds.

$4.00

$15,000.00

178 cu. yds.

4.00

712.00

25 cu. yds.

4.00

75.00

13,067 cu. yds.

3.50

45,735.00

330 cu. yds.

3.50

1,155.00

167 cu. yds.

3.50

585.00

7,906 cu. yds.

3.50

27,671.00

400 cu. yds.

3.50

1,400.00

71 cu. yds.

3.50

250.00

123 cu. yds.

4.00

492.00

10 cu. yds.

5.00

50.00

500 cu. yds.

3.50

1,750.00

94,875.00

ST $161,820.00

Top Soil

Area east of the fort: (a) 0.2' deep

Glacis: 1665 lin. ft. @ 0.2' deep

Covered Way: 1275 lin. ft. @ .2'

Counterscarp, scarp:

Ditch: 1475 lin. ft. @ 0.2' deep

Redoubt, glacis & parapet: @ .2'

Sally port, glacis:

Redoubt, banquette: 32 lin. ft.

East scarp of fort: 560 lin. ft. X 10'

Berm: 1170' X 7' X 0.2' deep

Bastions, banquettes & terrepleins:

1,040 cu. yds.

$6.40

$6,656.00

808 cu. yds.

6.40

5,171.00

83 cu. yds.

6.40

531.00

234 cu. yds.

6.40

1,498.00

220 cu. yds.

6.40

1.408.00

28 cu. yds.

6.40

180.00

15 cu. yds.

6.40

96.00

1 cu. yds.

6.40

7.00

36 cu. yds.

6.40

231.00

80 cu. yds.

6.40

512.00

82 cu. yds.

6.40

525.00

16,815.00

ST $178,635.00

Sod Work

Parapet of Glacis: 1522' X 8'

Covered Way: 1275' X 10'

Covered way-Ravelin: 80' X 6'

Counterscarp-scarp: 2,515' X 15'

Parapet of redoubt:

Banquette of redoubt:

East scarp of fort: 560' X 10'

Berm: 1,550' X 6.5'

Bastions, terrcplein, ramps, banquettes:

Parapet of ramparts: 1.535' X 12'

Parapet of ravelin: 110' X 8'

1,353 sq. yds. $4.00 $5,412.00

1,417 sq. yds

54 sq. yds.
4,192 sq. yds.

28 sq. yds.

1 1 sq. yds.

622 sq. yds.

1.070 sq. yds.

1,376 sq. yds.

2,046 sq. yds.

98 sq. yds.

4.00 5,668.00

4.00 216.00

4.00 16.768.00

4.00 112.00

4.00 44.00

4.00 2.488.00

4.00 4.280.00

4.00 5.504.00

4.00 8,184.00

4.00 392.00

49^068.00
ST $227,703.00

Historic Structure 173

Slope Work

Trim scarp, counterscarp, parapets:
Seeding

5,000 lin. ft. $1.00 $ 5,000.00
ST $232,703.00

Glacis:

3 acres

$800.00 $2,400.00

Ditch:

.65 acres

800.00 540.00

Glacis of redoubt & passageway:

650 sq. yds.

800.00 20.00

Area east of the fort:

3.2 acres

800.00 2,560.00

5,520.00

ST $238,223.00

Construction Work

Concrete Work

Excavation work:

Footings, foundation walls & piers:
Retaining walls within ramparts:
Retaining walls, roof & floor slabs

around bombproofs and passage-
ways, ends of casemates:
Floor slabs where needed in remaining

buildings:
Precast "pan" construction under sod &
soil of ramparts:

Note: Estimate prepared by Rome, N.Y. firm

$200,000.00
ST $438,223.00

Building Construction

West Barracks: 20' X 120' 2,400 sq

East Barracks: 20' X 120' 2,400 sq

Headquarters: 20' X 54' 1 ,080 sq

Ell addition: 15' X 10' 150 sq

Guard House: 16' X 19.5' 312sq

Ell addition: 12' X 8' 96 sq

Storehouse: 16' X 21.5' 344 sq

Ell addition: 10' X 8' X 2 ea. 160 sq

N. Casemate: 22' X 148' trapezoidal 2,860 sq

East Casemate: 22' X 145' trapezoidal 2,904 sq

South Casemate: 22' X 137' trapezoidal 2,794 sq

West Casemate: 22' X 144' trapezoidal 2,794 sq

NW Bombproof: 14.5' X 21' 305 sq

Passageway: 6' X 55' 330 sq

60.00
65.00
65.00
65.00
60.00
65.00
60.00
65.00
80.00
85.00
85.00
85.00
50.00
50.00

$144,000.00

156,000.00

64,800.00

9,750.00

18,720.00

6,240.00

20,640.00

10,400.00

228,800.00

246,840.00

237,490.00

15,250.00

16,500.00

1 74 Fort Stanwix

NE Bombproof: 1 6' X 16'

Passageway: 6.5' X 25'
SW Bombproof: 19.5' X 20'

Passageway: 6.5' X 40'
Bakehs. & oven: 19' X 21' + 80

Passageway: 6' X 30'
Necessary: 12' X 22'
Bridge to Necessary. 7' X 58'
Main bridge: 10.5' X 62.5'

Drawspan: 10.5' X 12' lifts/chain
Main Gate & Entrance: 13.5' X 18'
Sally Port: 9.5' X 62'
Sentry Boxes: 3.5' X 3.5' X 7 ea.
Gun Platforms: 1 1.5' X 18' X 25 ea.
Whipping Post w/final 9" w/staples:
Wood Barrels, watertight:
Flag Pole, double mast: 14" X 40'
Wells w/wood curb:
Banquettes, wooden, pressure treated:

Curtain Walls: 516' X 3'

Ravelin Walls: 80' X 3'

Flashing under: 600' X 3.5'
Fraise: 6" dia. 12" o.c. 1,800 poles,

pointed
Pickets, main palisade w/ribband and
pointed ends, pressure treated:
1,822 poles
Pickets in redoubt w/ribband:

70 poles, pointed
Outer picket gate, double: 10' X 10'
Sally Port picket gate, single: 3' X 7'
Ravelin gate, double, solid: 10' X 10'
Log retaining wall at redoubt 24 lin. ft.

pressure treated:
Log retaining wall at entrance 80 lin. ft.

pressure treated:
Pickets for ends of earth banquettes:

1800 @ 3" X 2.5' @ 0.50<*
Steps to sentry boxes: 4 sets
Ravelin, Log work in walls, pressure

treated: 55,030 b.m. X $800.00

M -f- labor costs
Ravelin, platform & frame:
Ramparts, Log work, pressure treated
after fitting:

Exterior walls below embrasures:
371,960 b.m. (<> $800.00

M + labor costs 595,136.00

Parapets, embrasures, cross ties:
204.750 b.m. @ 800.00

M + labor costs 491.400.00

256 sq. ft.

50.00

12.800.00

163 sq.ft.

50.00

8,150.00

390 sq. ft.

50.00

19.500.00

260 sq. ft.

50.00

13,000.00

480 sq. ft.

80.00

38,400.00

1 80 sq. ft

50.00

9,000.00

264 sq. ft.

60.00

15,840.00

406 sq. ft.

35.00

14,210.00

657 sq. ft.

35.00

22.995.00

126 sq.ft.

150.00

18.900.00

243 sq. ft.

80.00

19,440.00

590 sq. ft.

90.00

53,100.00

80 sq. ft.

80.00

6,800.00

5.175 sq.ft.

10.00

5.175.00
250.00

20 ea.

50.00

1,000.00

1 ea.

2,000.00

3 ea.

1,000.00

1 ,548 sq. ft.

10.00

15,480.00

240 sq. ft.

10.00

2,400.00

2,100 sq.ft.

1 .50

3.150.00

25.00 ea.

45,000.00

30.00 ea.

54,600.00

30.00 ea

2.100.00

1,200.00

450.00

1.800.00

500.00

1.800.00

900.00
355.00

110.060.00

450 sq. ft

40.00

58.000.00

3.058,871.00

Historic Structure 175

Utilities

Telephone: 4" plastic, 720' @ $6.00

-f one pullbox
Water supply: 4" D.I.P., 400' @

$8.00 + controls
Storm sewer: 15" R.C.P., 440' @

$14.00 + drop inlet
Sanitary sewer: 8" A.C.P., 400' @ $1 1.50
Primary electrical service: 3 phase,

120/208 v 400 amp.

6" A.P.C., 465' + one pullbox @ $18.00
Secondary electrical service:

8" A.C.P., 280 lin. ft. + one
pullbox @ $20.00
Electrical distribution, fixtures, outlets:
Fire extinguishers: 10 @ $30.00

Estimate by DSC $ 57,000.00

Heating: electrical; provisions for future A.C.

For future A.C, 4" gas line, DIP. 680'— DSC 100,000.00

Plumbing: —DSC 90,000.00

Fire Detection System in separate conduit:
Intrusion Alarm System: 5,000.00

252,000.00

ST 3,749,094.00
Inflation factor: @ 5.5% per year for 3 years 618,600.00

ST 4,367,694.00
Contingencies: @ 5.0% 218,385.00

ST 4,386,079.00
Contractor's Overhead & Profit: @ 16% 733,772.00

ST 5,319,851.00
Balance brought forward: $5,319,851.00

N.P.S. Personnel on project: 3 yrs.

@ $20,000.00 60,000.00

Transportation for NPS personnel for 3 years: 4,500.00

Office expenses for NPS personnel, heat,

electricity, photos: 7,000.00

Architect's fee for consultation and

inspection: 8,000.00

79,500.00

Grand Total: $5,399,351.00

Note: Working drawings, specifications writing and contract documents included in
F.Y. 1974 program and is not included in the above estimate.

Submitted by O. W. Carroll
March 22, 1973

APPENDIX C

Addendum —

Lumber Procurement and Preservation

The use of large logs, 12 inches to 30 inches
in diameter, and large squared timbers as proposed
in the reconstruction of Fort Stanwix, poses some
logistical problems in the procurement and preser-
vation treatment of these items.

The writer has personally contacted several
owners and managers of lumber mills in central
New York as well as two wood preservation plants.
Most mill owners agree that procurement will re-
quire at least one year's time. The wood preserva-
tion plant managers say that a minimum of one
year should be allotted for air drying of the timber
prior to pressure treatment. The logs should be
peeled before pressure treatment begins.

Pressure treatment of the logs, large timbers,
pickets, f raise, etc., should be done after cutting
and fitting of the joints are completed. This would
require dismantling, hauling, presure treating and
re-erection, which could be accomplished if a
portion of the fort were constructed a section at a
time. Such a time table might also fit into the
schedule necessary for procurement of the logs
and the air drying time needed.

As an aid in preparing the working drawings,
the hiring of a local carpenter to fashion full-scale
dovetail joints would be in order. These large scale
models would then serve as a guide for the con-
tractors bidding the job.

It appears at this time that timber of the size
required is only available on the West Coast. The
nearest pressure treating plant of any size is in
Ohio. Resawing of the timbers will need to be done
with a band saw. Some salvage of the slabbed
boards from the flatted logs can be realized.

owe 3-23-1973

Ik, p

Historic Structure 177

*>*

f '' FLAN of Tort STAAfWrSE

> J r r

'•^^TtfT"" J'

"-m m

"PLAN of Fort STANWISE" possibly drawn by James Montresor, engineer, in 1 758. If this drawing is
the Montresor plan, it is our first scaled and dimensioned document of Fort Stanwix, The lengths of the
Hanks and faces as well as the overall distance between the salient angles of the bastion tips, as shown on
this plan, compare very favorably with the proposed reconstruction dimensions. Reproduced from the

178 Fort Stanwix

fc /U » <'

Historic Structure 179

»J

Plan

O RT iSTANWIX

Duilt at (Tir OnutcT*.
,5t<vtion i7^d-w-

1 . SoIJitri b Arrjtko .
| Olwrr. H ••■!••
(V Pewd»r M «£**•■*«.
-a 3t OK • t» o»t 1«

5 c a 1 r io«» fwli«

— i| puff fa— ■—

-PLAN OF FORT STANWIX, Built at the Onnida [sic] Station 1758." This plan was probably drawn in 1759 or 1760 since it shows the two
additional buildings on the parade ground constructed "from July to December 1759/' Note the storehouse to the northwest, bu.lt outs,de the
fort. Reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

"PLAN OF FORT STANWIX BUILT at
ONIEDA STATION by PROVINCIAL
TROOPs in 1758" signed by Jn. Williams,
Sub. Engineer. This plan probably represents
Fort Stanwix as it looked after the initial
round of construction by the colonial troops
supervised by regular British and Provincial
Army officers. Construction details for the
ramparts and casemate walls as well as for
the footbridge and necessary structure were
taken from this plan. Reproduced from the
Collections of the Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress.

180 Fort Stanwix

• 4.- <*»»•, k^. X, t*. ./t^u.
JUS *t &~l> «^— — *» — ~J •/*»«■/

*r4&t A+* /am %■* fk*jk,

tfu. frit e

t&* J*** tltJt ja~^ r«M<4 « <V^ *-« «* ^v-

Ay*.:j * e.

••»«^, *-.>~ y«,x — —

AfpL \i> rx i \

"Man of FtWT STANtfDC -howiny «.;

( |on» ** th.At Po*t iron Ju 1 v to IV r^i <

tMftvUM, Crown roll»nion OCXI, 1.1.
COf.y in ^h|> Division, lilT.rv ot COngr*»«,

/ t

Historic Structure 181

"Plan of FORT STANWIX showing what
Works were done at that Post — from July to
December 1759." The original plans at the
British Museum, were colored to show the
extent of new work as listed in the
explanation at the lower left of the drawing.
The National Park Service should obtain
color reproductions of these original
drawings to complete this part of the fort
story. This is one of two plans that show the
location of the fraise; see "Profill thro A B."
It also shows the earliest type of construction
of the parapet in "Profill throu EF."
Reproduced from the Collections of the
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

"Plan of FORT STANWIX, Showing what is to be done tocompleat it." Dated (in another script) 1764. Unsigned. A black and white copy of
another original colored plan kept in the British Museum. Compare this plan with the previous ones to see the changes that were made to the
buildings on the parade ground. A new covered communication (caponiere) was added to the east end of the sally port and a newly built ravelin
constructed opposite the main gates and bridge. This plan furnished the primary construction details above ground level for the sally port and
redoubt beyond. (See sections A B and C D.) Reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

1'ORT STAXWIX

iS 'lowing -»-|iui i- ImMlu'il mil
■ • i* to be done lo eoiiwleat it ,

cjr(Cf» t<\

H lit. «/«•« /'/,«/!

I". Hi »,».*

182 Fort Stanwix

. rfRrf AM&nmm wcMiH* ^-uilduiai k im/mrrO Jdtmim 11* 176+

"A Sketch of Fort Stanwix, with its
Buildings & outworks November 19th
1764" signed by Geo. Dernier. This and
the previous plan are the only two
drawings found to date that indicate the
work done by the British at For Stanwix
"between the 1st of July 1764, and 31st of
December followg." This plan was used to
locate the placement of the picket line
along the east berm of the fort. Also, the
method of closing off the northeast and
southeast ends of the ditch as shown on this
plan was adapted in the proposed
preliminary plans. Reproduced from the
Collections of the Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress.

lor^ Dchuyler:
Dec! 25: 7777

J* 1 i-ILjraw

Historic Structure 183

A REVOLUTIONARY WAR POWDER HORN

With An Early American Flag

By SAMUEL E. SMITH

The James Wilson powder horn of Fort Schuyler. James Wilson was a private in the 1st Company of the 1st New York
Regiment commanded by Col. Goose Van Schaick. The 1st New York Regiment replaced the 4th New York Regi-
ment at Fort Stanwix near the end of 1778. The regiment stayed at the fort until November of 1780; thus, the Wilson
powder horn has a probable date of 1779 or 1780. The Wilson powder horn is unique in that it shows the location of
five sentry boxes, four of them found on the bastions. The structure shown on the southeast bastion is surely the
shed that "the Carpenters are to pull down . . .Built Over the bomb proof." (Garrison order, Dec. 20, 1780.)

"Fort Schuyler: Deer 25: 1777, J: Mc Graw." A two dimensional
drawing of the original McGraw powder horn now owned by
Chester Williams of Rome, New York. Drawing by John
McManagle of Rome, New York, in 1963. James (Alexander)
McGraw enlisted in the American army during July of 1775. He
participated in the invasion of Canada in 1776 where he was shot
through the leg. On June 13, 1777. McGraw reenlisted in Capt.
Bleecker's Company of the 3rd New York Regiment, which arrived
at Fort Stanwix on May 26, 1777. Although we are not positive that
James McGraw was here at the fort during the siege, it seems very
likely that he was. Our first account of McGraw actually being at
the fort is found in a hospital return dated March 1, 1778, which
lists (James) McGraw, Capt. Bleecker's Company, as having been
confined to his quarters with an "Ulcerous leg." This was surely
the old leg wound of 1776 acting up again. During McGraw's
period of convalescence, he would have had time to carve the fort
plan on his powder horn. McGraw was discharged on May 30,
1778, "as unfit for duty from his wound and old age." Source:
Original sketch at Fort Stanwix Museum, Rome, New York.

184 Fort Stanwix

UmiW'UP li

— .

"Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix." New York Public Library.

1 1 : -

KtiJ" 7

Plan of Fori Stanwix dated 1802. The
original drawing of this plan has not heen
located to date Presumably it was drawn on
the spot by the Rev. John Taylor, but not
published until 1850 Re\ Taylor writes in
his journal on the 18th: "The old Fori
Stanwix stands about 30 rods from ye river.
It is regularly built: the intrenchment is \ei\
deep. In the centre ol the fori stands the old
block house. This can hctict be described by
my drawing." Another e\eu itness report ol
1815 placing the blockhouse of 1794 in the
center of the old Fort is solid evidence that
this was the location of its construction
Source: Documentary History of New York.
Vol. III. 1850. p. 1137. (Jervis I ihrary.
Rome. N.Y.)

Historic Structure 185

HOME

1810

COURT

7r,

■ a a

LIBERT/

out

r, > fesg -,

• »■--•■>■ L a — :.'«!■ I I I I [ I •] . '

OOMIN I CK

i----irijrrsr;
AN0 NAViGAi on: Cp's canal

Li 12
s

Plan ol Fori Stanwix, dated 1810. The original drawing of this plan has not been loeated as yet. It first appeared in a local newspaper, the Rome
Citizen in 1871. Later, in 1878. it was published in book form. The description, in part, of Fort Stanwix reads as follows: "Fort Stanwix
originally extended through from Dominick Street to what is now Liberty Street, and the block-house was in the centre (about where Dr.
Kingley's barn is)." The plan shows that the leveling of the Fort proper started in the southeast bastion where Mr. Dominick Lynch built a
house between 1802 and 1810. Source: History oj Onieda County, New York, by Samuel W. Durant, 1878, p. 382. (Jervis Library. Rome,
N.Y.)

t'l ■ i il i il I i I .i - - |-i

'ESSESS*

isaass?*

Plan of Fort Stanwix as engraved upon an
original Bank of Rome note in 1832. An
octagonal blockhouse, a well and magazine
are shown on the plan. The fort and the
blockhouse were probably gone prior to
1832; thus, the engraving probably
represents the fort as someone remembered
it. Source: From the Rome Directory of
1857, p. 131. (Jervis Library, Rome, N.Y.)

[ in only engr
of the write

A Dunk of
a ''n culut ion

.f this fortification that ha* met, tin.
a -mall bird's-eye view, upon the
notes, mnv principally withdrawn

186 Fort Stanwix

Drawing of Fort Stanwix. dated 1793, attributed to Peter Hugunine. Actually misdated, as the blockhouse was not constructed until 1794. This
sketch represents the artist's concleption of Fort Stanwix in 1793. We have very little information on the blockhouse of 1794. In 1815, William
Dunlap made a drawing of the remains of Fort Stanwix, showing'the blockhouse that occupied the "centre of the fortification.'" An
unsuccessful attempt was made to locate the drawing, which may have perished in the Dominick Lynch house fire ofc. 1824. Source: From a
4" x 7" negative owned by Chester Williams, Rome, New York.

-y.*

*m c

For) Stanwix as it appeared August 6, 1777, as interpreted by the artist, Peter Hugunine. in 1897. The original oil painting has not been
located. Source: From an engraving owned b\ the Fort Stanwix Museum. Rome. New York.

Historic Structure 187

-*-• ~ r ***^-.« jw

•v<«».V"»* i^y^f^ dJZZi.* Jfi>m.t^~£i j£

: v.

md^UZHH ii-^-l — ^ -~.A<i dfc -^ ^* * JjitS' Xt *t+. .' -i lr+.V f'-f Cr

"The Fort upon Great Island in Piscataqua River, 1699, New Hampshire." This
particular sketch has been included to show the location of the Sentry boxes on the tips
of the bastions. A sketch of Fort George, in the New York Harbor, by Archibald
Robertson, dated 1776, also shows a sentry box placed on the tip of each bastion. This
location agrees with the military handbooks of the day. Crown Map Collection, Mss.
Room, New York State Library, Albany, New York.

"Sunrise at Fort Stanwix August 3, 1777."
An oil painting by Edward F. Buyck in 1927.
Funds to pay Mr. Buyck for this painting
were raised by the citizens of Rome. The
theme of the painting is the raising of the
"Stars and Stripes" above Fort Stanwix
during the siege of August 2-22. Both
Hugunine and Buyck elected to show the
rampart walls as constructed from earth
covered with sod. Source: Copied from an
8" x 10" B &. W photograph owned by
Chester Williams, Rome, New York.

188 Fort Stanwix

Historic Structure 189

*-..

'
\

Reconstructed drawbridge and outer
gates at Fort Erie, Ontario, Canada.
This is a recent reconstruction,
probably within the last ten years. A
similar drawbridge design was used
at the Upper Canada Village near
Cornwall, Canada. From a 35 mm.
slide taken by O. W. Carroll, 1971.

Gueritte dc Charpentc

qu.cn/ait aux pcrtes ,;

dts edifices miiicaircs < -S ~ \ J ~xV

Plan of Fort Edward, New York, c. 1757. The
profile drawing through T-U, showing the exterior
construction of the rampart wall and an embrasure,
is the method of construction proposed for Fort
Stanwix. Note the dovetail joints at the corner of the
embrasure and rampart end wall. Along the superior
slope can be seen the tie beams, dovetailed into the
inner and outer log walls. Library of Congress, No.
45215, January 1973.

A drawing of a French designed sentry box, dated
1739. We are indebted to Mr. John Fortier, Head
Research Historian at Fortress of Louisbourg NHP.
Canada, for providing us with a copy of this sketch.
Since De LaMarquisie was the French engineer in
charge of building the sentry boxes at Fort Stanwix
in 1777, the writer assumes that he would use a
drawing having a French origin. The sentry boxes
proposed for use at Fort Stanwix follow this design.
Source: Fortress of Louisbourg, Canada. From Lu
science ties ingenieurs duns la continue ties travaux
de fortification et d' architecture civile . . .

sfutre Gueritte qu'cttfiiic sus-
Lrs ramparts ijuiscntretenus^.
en terre par un chassis qui
/ait au'elle resiste a-lapcusse'c
du- vent-

Echelle pour les figures decette planclie

•ir

190 Fort Stanwix

Historic Structure 191

192 Fort Stanwix

GROUND PLAN

(0«t SIANWH 17J6 1781

'iiiiiiint pi i a i

Historic Structure 193

" :•

■ :: ---

194 Fort Stanwix

Notes

Historic Structure Report

1. Copy letters of correspondence between Generals
Abercromby and Stanwix received from Richard Mattice.
Pennellville, N.Y., November 1971. From the Bureau of
Archives, Ottawa, Canada, hereinafter called Canadian
Archives. Reference to order is found in letter dated
July 27, 1758.

2. Ibid. Letters dated July 20, 23, 24, 27. Corres-
pondence, Stanwix with Abercromby, in which the three
engineers are mentioned as being at the Carrying Place
in July 1758.

3. Ibid. Letter dated August 20, 1758, Stanwix to
Abercromby.

4. "Orderly Book of Captain Horatio Gates at Oneida
Station," 1758. Typescript copy furnished by W. E.
Scripture of Westmoreland, New York. Entry dated
September 6, 1758.

5. Canadian Archives, letter dated August 30, 1758.
Abercromby to Stanwix. "Yesterday Evening I receiv'd
from Lieut. Col. Montresor; Engineer Williams's Opinion
in regard to the Impracticability of finishing this Season
the intended Fort at the Oneida Carrying place, and
accompanying the same with the plan of another he and
Capt. Green had pitched upon. . . " Lt. Williams' signature
is affixed to Crown Map No. 99, dated 1758.

6. Ensign Moses Dorr Diary: ". . . about four
o clock the first Stock of timber was Layd of the fort."
Copy obtained from the Rome Sentinel.

7. Canadian Archives, letter dated October 22, 1758.
Stanwix to Abercromby. Meanwhile. Thomas Sowers had
returned from the Col. Bradstreet expedition on Sep-
tember 8 and stayed on to help with the supervisory work
at Fort Stanwix. His signature (and Lt. Williams') is
affixed to the ordnance demand dated September 14,
1758.

8. John Luzader, The Construction and Military
History of Fort Stanwix (N.P.S., 1969). See plan follow-
ing page 41 for dimensions of the original fort. Herein-
after cited as Luzader.

9. See notes on Crown Map No. 101 for work
completed in 1759.

10. The Papers of Sir William Johnson. The University
of the State of New York (Albany, 1962), Vol. XIII.
p. 273.

11. Canadian Archives. From Col. Harry Gordon's
itemized list of expenses.

12. Journals of Col. James Montresor and Capt. John
1779, N.Y. Historical Society CoUectionsMontresor 1757-
for 1881, p. 70.

13. See Illustrations Nos. 5 and 6 in the Appendices.
Crown Maps No. 102 and 103.

14. Letter dated April 23. 1775. Robert Duncan to
William Livingston. Taken from the Rome Sentinel.
March 3. 1969. Copied from Fort Stanwix Museum files
by Lee Hanson.

15. "Journal Kept During An Expedition to Canada
in 1776." by Ebenezer Elmer, Lieutenant in (he Third
Regiment of New Jersey Troops in the Continental
Service. Commanded by Colonel Flias Dayton. Printed
from the original manuscript in the Proceedings of the
New Jersey Historical Society. 1847^(8, Vols. II & III.
and 1927, p. 134. Hereinafter called the Elmer Journal.

16. Elmer Journal, p. 32: "In the evening Capt.
Potter with his officers moved into the room contiguous
to ours, and between which there is no partition. . . ."

17. Jonathan Lawrence Diary, New York State
Library, Mss. Room.

18. Letter from Lt. Col. Cornelius Van Dyck to Col.
Van Schaick dated April 17, 1780. From Fort Stanwix
Museum letter files.

19. Public Papers of George Clinton, published by
the State of New York (Albany, 1900), Vol. VI. pp.
876-880. Hereinafter called the Clinton Papers.

20. From the Rome Sentinel, November, 1970. Taken
from The Writings of George Washington, Vol. 22 (GPO,
April 1932). Letter written to Gov. George Clinton.

21. Orderly Books of the Fourth and Second New
York Regiments, 1778-1783, The University of the State
of New York (Albany, 1932), pp. >750-752. Hereinafter
called the Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg't.

22. From The Writings of George Washington, Vol.
27. Letter to Col. Willett, dated August 4, 1783.

23. Willett Levies, kept in New York State Library.
Three letters pertaining to the building of the blockhouses
received from Wayne Lenig, St. Johnsville, N.Y., 1971.
On file at Fort Stanwix NM.

24. Diary of Griffith Evans. October, 1784. From the
Fort Stanwix Museum File No. 3124.

. . . Fort Stanwix (also dictum Schuyler) is Situate
or rather has been on the South side of the Mohawk
River, there being now remaining no more than 3
small Blockhouses Vi Mile below the Ancient works,
and some Cabins nearthereto. the Fort being aban-
doned by Gen. Gansevoort in being first burnt and
demolished by Accident. . . .

25. "Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1784," The Olden
Time (Pittsburgh, 1848). p. 409. Letter from Oliver
Wolcott. Richard Butler, and Arthur Lee to Lieut. John
Mercer of the Jersey Troops.

26. Assembly Papers. Vol. 45. pp. 71-73, New York
State Library. Dept. of Mss. and History. A copy of this
letter received from Wayne Lenig. October, 1971.

27. We have two maps drawn of Rome, New York,
one dated 1802 (Journal of Rev. John Taylor's Missionary
Tour Through the Mohawk and Black River Countries in
1802. published in Documentary History of New York,
Vol. III. 1850. p. 72) and one dated J810 (History of
Oneida County. New York, by Durant. 1875. p. 382).
Both maps show a blockhouse in the center of the parade
ground of Fort Stanwix. The blockhouse is also shown on
an original Bank of Rome note printed in 1832. as
published in the 1857 Rome Directory, p. 130. See
Illustrations Nos. 10. 11 & 12, included in the Appendices
of this report.

28. William Dunlap. History of the New Netherlands
Province of New York, and State of New York. Vol. II.
p. 112.

29. File Mss. 1 DAR.2-C.W. Darling. COR. 1-13.
( orrespondence with D. E. Wagers dated Jan. 23. 1891.
Oneida County Historical Society. Utica. N.Y. Copy of
correspondence in FOST files.

30. Documents Relating to the Colonial History of
the State of New York. State Archives (Albany, 1887).

Historic Structure 195

Vol. I, p. 208. McGraw was in the Eighth Company.

31. Capt. Bleeker's Company was stationed at Fort
Constitution under Col. Willett before marching to Fort
Stanwix, where they arrived on May 26, 1777 (Willett
Orderly Book). The exact day the 3rd N.Y. Regiment
left Fort Stanwix is not known but the 1st New York
Regiment arrived around January 1, 1779.

32. Copied from the files of Fort Stanwix Museum,
folder marked Muster Rolls.

33. Description found in FOST files; source unknown.

34. Information, in part, obtained by Lee Hanson
from the Fort Stanwix Museum files. Additional details
taken from the Rome Sentinel, June 8, 1965.

35. See Illustration No. 15 in the Appendices of this
report.

36. Excavated by J. Duncan Campbell for Rome
Urban Renewal Agency in 1965. The bakehouse area was
reopened by the National Park Service in 1971.

37. Hanson and Hsu, "The Bakehouse at Fort
Stanwix." (N.P.S., April 1972). Typescript copy in rough
draft form circulated in-Service during April of 1972.

38. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg't., p. 577.

39. Fort Herkimer, N.Y.; Fort Ticonderoga, N.Y.;
Fort Chartres, 111.; Fort Conde, Ala.; Fort Du Quesne,
Pa.

40. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg't.. p. 555.
December 30, 1780: "The Morning Gun is to be fired in
the Southeast Bastion to Morrow Morning. . . ." We also
have the deFleury map and two powder horn plans drawn
not long after the siege that place cannons and/or
embrasures in the southeast bastion.

41. Ibid., Hanson and Hsu.

42. The height of the chimney cap above the terre-
plein follows those shown in the casemate drawings of
1758-59. The writer has found an existing chimney cap
that is identical in construction at Fort Putnam, West
Point, N.Y.

43. Capt. George Smith, An Universal Military
Dictionary (London, 1779), p. 99. Hereinafter cited as
Capt. Smith.

44. Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. IX. 1893, p. 428.

45. Crown Map No. 102.

46. Crown Map No. 102. See section C-D for detail
of wooden banquettes.

47. Crown Map No. 100 shows a barracks-like build-
ing scaling 20 feet X 118 feet located about 300 feet
west of the fort. The structure is identified as a "Store-
house."

48. See Crown Maps Nos. 102 and 103.

49. "Journal from New York to Canada, 1767,"
published in the New York State Historical Association
Quarterly, Vol. XXX. 1932, p. 188:

Tuesday May 19th. 1767. Continued our course to

Fort Stanwix. ... It is a regular square fortification,

with a Fossee [sic] covered way. Glacis, and Ravellin

sic, and calculated for a Garrison of 1000 or 1500

men. The works being of wood are now falling to

decay.

Extract of a letter from Major Gen. Gage to the

Earl of Shelburne dated New York, May 27. 1767.

Documents Relating to the Colonial History of the State

of New York, Vol. VII, p. 985:

The Fort is in a ruinous situation and I dont judge
it of consequence enough at present to deserve the
repairs it would require to make it defencible. It is
proposed as soon as the military stores can be re-
moved, to withdraw the Garrison, and to grant the
Place with the ground dependant on the Fort, to an
old half pay officer on condition that he shall take

care of the Buildings for the Kings use and return
every thing again to the Crown when required for
the use of the Kings Service, and that on considera-
tion of a small Salary he shall likewise take charge
of all the Stores destined for the Lakes, and to see
them forwarded over the Portage for Fort Ontario.

50. Extract of a letter from Richard Duncan to
William Livingston as printed in the Rome Sentinel, Rome,
N.Y.. March 3, 1969:

1 hope to be able to go and reside there (Ft. Stanwix)
myself — the people who live on the ground are one
John Roof, Thomas Mayers, William Cloyne, Bar-
tholemew Brodhock — John Steers and Stephenus
Delyrod a Frenchman — who trades there for Major
Fonda — the Fort is all in ruins, and the barracks by
an accident last fall was burnt to the ground, nothing
now remains— but a Room which the officers used
to mess in now — occupied by the Frenchman above
ment. — there is Fifty Acres of land enclosed about
the Fort, it is — chiefly meadow, and Five little huts
of houses with a couple of barns. . . .

51. Elmer Journal, p. 134.

52. Ibid., p. 32.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., p. 411.

55. Peter Force. American Archives, Vol. I, 5th
Series, 1776 (Washington, D.C.. 1848). p. 1119. Extract
of a letter dated Elizabeth-Town, August 23, 1776.

56. For a complete list of the Connecticut soldiers
stationed at Fort Stanwix under Colonel Elmore, see
Muster Roll from Connecticut Men in the Revolution,
compiled by the Adjutant-general's office. (Hartford,

1889).

57. Luzader, p. 62.

58. John Scott, Fort Stanwix and Oriskany (Rome.
NY.. 1927). p. 100. Hereinafter cited as Scott.

59. Luzader, p. 66.

60. Luzader, p. 68.

61. Gansevoort map of Fort Stanwix; plan from
Willett's Narrative (1831); deFleury map (post-siege);
and three powder horn maps: McGraw, DeWitt. and
Chatfield.

62. Scott, p. 113. Letter from Gansevoort to Schuyler
written June 15, 1777:

The Engineer at this place has just laid the founda-
tion of a salient angle before the gate and the
carpenters are employed in framing a Barracks to be
raised just before the glacis opposite the south
Bastion the Barracks at present being bad. . . .

63. Scott, p. 113: "I have been obliged to send for
boards as far as Foxes at Canajoharry."

"Collonel Willet's Orderly Book February 18th
1777 — " Original manuscript kept in the New York
Historical Society. Microfilm borrowed and tran-
scribed by W. E. Scripture. Westmoreland, N.Y.,
March. 1972. Typed in final form by Roselyn Infusino.
Copied for FOST files. Hereinafter called Willett
Orderly Book.
Willett Orderly Book. May 30, 1777: "1 Sub. 1

Sergt and 15 privates are to hold themselves in Readyness

to Embark tomorrow at ten o Clock, in Six Batteoux to

fetch boards for Use of this Garrison."

Willett Orderly Book. June 16, 1777: "The Batteaus

that arrived here this day with Boards are to be ready to

set out again, with the other four Batteaus that are at

this place. . . ."

The writer assumes that the casemates of 1777 were

constructed in the same manner as the original fort work

of 1758.

196 Fort Stanwix

64. American Archives-, 4th Series, Vol. 3. Copy of
B. Romans' Estimate and Expense of erecting forts in the
Highlands, September 18, 1775.

65. Minnies- of the Albany Committee of Corres-
pondence 1775-1778, Vol. 1, compiled by James Sullivan
(Albany, 1923) p. 560.

66. Archeologists' report in draft form at Fort
Stanwix.

67. Elmer Journal, p. 411, October 10, 1776: -The
fatigued men are employed in getting and hauling
shingles. . . ."

68. Scott, p. 239. Willett's Narrative speaks of
shutting the windows of the dining room.

69. The room arrangement for the east and west
barracks was suggested by Lee Hanson.

70. Willett Orderly Book.

71. I he post-siege deFlcury map lists a "labaratory"
as being located in the west barracks. This military
function not included as part of the proposed barracks
layout. The southwest casemate with its packed soil floor
best suits the purpose of a laboratory space.

72. Other contemporary forts having officers and
soldiers housed in the same barracks building are: Forts
Erie, Niagara, Johnston, Mount Pleasant, Half Moon.
Lawrence, and Saco.

73. William Willett, A Narrative of the Military
Actions of Colonel Marinus Willett, reprinted by Arno
Press (New York. 1969), p. 49. Hereinafter called
Willett's Narrative.

74. Letter, Wilkinson to General Gates, February 3,
1778.

75. Moses Dorr Diary. Entries for October 7, 20,
22, 1758.

76. Willett Orderly Book.

77. Ibid.

78. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg't., p. 544.

79. Ibid., p. 555.

80. Willett Orderly Book.

81. Capt. Smith, p. 29.

82. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. IX, 1893, p. 428.

83. See Crown Maps Nos. 102 and 103, dated 1764.
During the repair and remodeling work of 1764, a berm
was constructed across the open ditch opposite the south-
east bastion and the pickets extended from the covered
way across the berm and along the east side of the fort.

84. Willett's Narrative, p. 49.

85. Willett Orderly Book. April 16, 1778.

86. See Crown Map No. XXX. 1756, noting "D". The
brick kiln is located on the south side of "Little Creek"
not far from the Mohawk River. The clay used in making
the bricks probably came from a river deposit nearby.

87. Information on (he bricks was furnished by Lee
Hanson. January 4. 1973.

88. John Mullcr. A Treatise of Fortification (London.
1746). p. 214. reprinted by Museum Restoration Service
(Ottawa. Canada. 1968).

89. Observation by the writer based on the study of
plans from other colonial forts in the northeastern part of
the United States.

90. Luzader. p. 20.

91. Ibid., p. 21.

92. Ibid., p. 41.

93. Ibid., p. 43.

94. Ibid., p. 50.

95. Gates Papers, taken from microfilm reel No. 4.
Letter from Gansevoort to Gates. Papers of General
Horatio Gates located in the New York Historical Society.
Microfilm copies borrowed by W. E. Scripture through the
Kims library Transcribed in part by Mr. Scripture and

NPS personnel working at Fort Stanwix NM. Final typing
done by Roselyn Infusino.

96. Ibid., taken from microfilm reel No. 4. Letter
from James Wilkinson to Gates.

97. Forts Ontario, N.Y.; Mount Pleasant, Md.; Fort
George, N.Y.C.

98. John Barr's Diary, p. 843, Orderly Books of the
4th N.Y. Reg't.

99. Capt. Smith, p. 71.

100. Capt. Smith, p. 35.

101. Sidney Toy. A Historv of Fortification from
3000 BC to AD 1700 (London. 1955) p. 200.

102. Ibid., pp. 200-201. Pulleys and chains; platform
pivot with pit, the overhead counterpoise; port cullises;
counterweights and pulleys.

103. Drawbridges found in New York State: Forts
Frederick (2). Crown Point (4), Ticonderoga (2),
Ontario (2), Herkimer. Edward, Niagara, and William
Henry. Also at Forts Du Quesne and Pitt (4). Pennsyl-
vania; Forts Erie, Louisbourg (2), Lawrence and Windsor
in Canada.

104. Willett's Narrative, p. 43.

105. Hinge (V5 pr) found near the main entrance
way to the fort; currently kept at FOST. See archeologists'
report.

106. Ordnance demand by order of Brig. General
Stanwix, dated September 18. 1758. Original kept in Mss.
Room, New York State Library, Albany.

107. Luzader, pp. 68-69.

108. Willett's Narrative, p. 49.

109. See Crown Map No. 101 included in the Ap-
pendices of this report.

110. There are several powder horns depicting Fort
Stanwix or Schuyler. The Fort Stanwix Museum has
collected a number of drawings and photographs of
powder horns showing Fort Stanwix, yet we know of
additional horns listed in Stephen V. Grancsay's book.
American Engraved Powder Horns (New York. 1945).
that have not been located for study purposes. The five
powder horns we now have sketches of which show the
flagstaff are those identified with Jeams Thomson. Oct. 8.
1777; J. McGraw, Dec. 25. 1777; Capt. T. DeWitt, 1778;
lames Wilson, n.d., c. 1780; and Cornelius Chatfield.
Nov. 5. 1780.

111. A short list of sketches illustrating the double
masted flagstaff is as follow.?: Fort William and Mary.
N.H.. 1699 (Crown Collection map); fort at Crown
Point. N.Y.. 1759; Fort Stanwix. 1777. 1778. 1780: Fort
Mackinac, 1820; Fort Howard, c. 1840; and Fort McHenry.
Md.. c. 1862. In addition, we have an eyewitness account
of the flagstaff at Fort Pitt in 1759, as follows: ". . . on
ye South East Bastion stands a High Poal like a Mast
& top Mast to Hoist ye flag which is Hoisted on the first
Day of ye Week from about Eleven to One o'clock & on
State Days &c." (From the Kenny Journal as found in
Drums in the Forest by Charles Stotz. p. 160.)

1 12. For a complete description and set of construc-
tion drawings of a ship's mast, see Steel's Elements of
Mastmaking, Sailmaking & Rigging (London. 1794).
Plates III and IV.

I 13. Ibid., Plates III & IV.

114. Gay Dc Vernon. On the Science of War and
Fortifications, translated bv John Michael O'Connor (New
York, 1817). p. 290.

115. Elmer Journal, p. 134: "Fort Stanwix [in
1776] ... is large and well situated, having a glacis,
breastwork, ditch and a picquel fort before (he walls,
which are also well guarded with sharp sticks of timber
shooting over the walls. . . ."

Historic Structure 197

St. Leger, the British commander, described the fort
in 1777, as follows: "Its form is a kind of Trapezium or
four sided figure with four Bastions freized and picketted,
without them as a good ditch with pickets nipping out a
considerable way at the salient angles of Bastions. . . ."
Luzader, p. 81.

116. Capt. Smith, p. 112.

117. Humphrey Blank, A Treatise of Military Dis-
cipline (London, 1759) pp. 201, 203:

Half an hour before the gates are to be shut, which
is generally at the setting of the sun, a Serjeant and
four men must be sent from each port to the main-
guard for the keys; at which time, the drummers of
the port-guards are to go upon the ramparts, and beat
a Retreat, to give notice to those without, that the
gates are going to be shut, that they may come in be-
fore they are. As soon as the Drummers have
finished the Retreat, which they should not do in less
than a quarter of an hour, the Officers must order the
barriers and gates to be shut, leaving only the
wickets open; after which, no Soldier should be
suffered to go out of the town, though port-liberty
should be allowed them in the day-time.

He must order a Corporal and four men more with
arms to escort the keys to the outermost barrier, and
to place two men with rested arms, on every draw-
bridge, till they return from locking the barriers. He
must send likewise a sufficient number of men with-
out arms to assist in the locking of the gates and
drawing up the bridges.

118. The names "Swing Gate," "back gate," "great
gate," and "folding gate," have been used to describe
gates constructed at various New York forts during
this period.

119. Elmer Journal, August 16. 1776, p. 179:
"Almost finished the fort, but could not enclose it for
want of some pickets and the gate, carpenters making the
gate and about repairing the barn."

120. Elmer Journal, August 27, 1776, p. 188: "The
Fort Schuyler or Stanwix is exceedingly well situated. . . .
the gates are strong, without any ravelling to the
front. . . ."

121. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg't., p. 575:
"The Sentinals without the gates are in case of an alarm
are to shut and barr the outside gates and Remane their
till further orders and not open the gates for any
person. . . ."

122. Ibid., p. 541.

123. Charles Lamb. An Universal Military Dictionary
in English and French, etc. 4th Ed. (London, 1816)
p. 994:

WICKET, a small door in the gate of a fortified
place, through which people go in and out, without
opening the great gate: likewise a small door within
a gate, or a hole in the door; through which what
passes without may be seen.

124. The Revolutionary Journal of Col. Jeduthan
Baldwin, 1775-1778, edited by Thomas W. Baldwin
(Bangor, Me., 1906). p. 27. February 27. 1777: "went to
mount Independance the forenoon, ordered the wicket
gates to be hung and the Gates Barred."

An elevation of the "New Fort" to be built at
Schohary, N.Y.. (mid-18th century?) shews a wicket
gate built within the main gate (Crown Map No. CXXI.
photocopy of the original kept in Crown Collection. New
York State Library).

125. Orderly Books of the 4th New York Reg't.,
p. 543.

126. American Archives, 5th Series, Vol. I, p. 1119.
Extract of a letter dated Elizabeth-town, August 23, 1776:
"A wide ditch is sunk round it (Fort Stanwix), about ten
feet deep, the glaces on the outside are raised six feet
above the surface. . . ."

127. As determined by archeology.

128. As scaled and projected off Crown Map No.
102. Section A-B.

129. Elmer Journal, p. 33. Dr. Elmer was stationed
at Fort Stanwix with Colonel Dayton's Regiment.

130. Scott, p. 100. Letter from Capt. De Lamarquise
to General Gates, no date, but probably written in late
April of 1777.

131. Willett Orderly Book:

June 5, 1777: ". . . John Baker to be releas'd from
the Guard House. . . ."

June 9, 1777: "And Richard Watson Ordered to be
Releas'd from the Guard House. . . ."

June 12, 1777: ". . . James Rogers and Cornelius
Swartwout Ordered to be Releas'd from the Guard
House — as also James McCormick. . . ."

March 5, 1778: "Serg:* Myers of Capt Tiebouts
company confin'd by Lieut: Bowen for defrauding the
Publick was Order'd back to the-Guard House untill the
Arrival of Lieut Stockwell — a principal Evidence. The
Commanding Officer approves of the Suspending the
Tryal, but Orders the prisoners Releas'd from his Con-
finement in the mean Time. . . ."

132. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg't., p. 548:
December 3, 1780: "Charles Kinney to [be] Dis-
missed from Confinement, and John Holms and Eph m
White to be shut in the Bomb proof for the space of six
hours."

133. Letter from Corn's v. Dyck to Col 1 Van Schaick,
April 17th 1780. (We owe thanks to the Fort Stanwix files
for this letter.)

Dr Sir

1 am sorry I must inform you of an unluck circum-
stance which happened to use on the night between
the 13th & 14th Ins T . & between the Hours of twelve
& one, some fire had unhappily lodged itself between
the Chimney and the Chamber floor of the Guard
House which caught so violently & it being on the
Chamber so that the Gaurd did not perceive it until
it had got so far that it was impossible to extinguish
it, but but consumed with the Snowshoes, and all the
Arms unfit for use belonging to the Garrison; we
were necessiated (in order to save the rest of the
Garrison from being consumed) to also haull down
part of the rist of the Barracks, immediately in the
morning I had all the Carpenters collected & em-
ployed who have now nearly again repaired the
Barracks that were knock'd down and hope if nothing
extraordinary falls in our way to have the Gaurd
House also rebuilt by next Saturday — This accident
might have destroyed the whole Garrison had it not
been for the Dexterity of the Officers & Soldiers who
by taking down part of the Barracks, & the constant
applying of Water (to that part which was on fire)
which was conveyed thro the Sally Port prevented the
fire from catching in any of the other Buildings, not
a man was hurt saving a few who lamed themselves
by treading Nails in their feet —
I remain
Sir

134. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Regiment, op.
cit.. p. 544: ". . . The officer of the Main Guard, is not to
Suffer any Damage to be Done to the Flours sic of the
Guard Hous sic. . . ."

198 Fort Stanwix

135. The six contemporary drawings showing the
headquarters building are as follows: McGraw powder
horn, 1777; DeWitt powder horn, 1778; Cornelius
Chat field powder horn, 1780; DeFleury map. n.d., but
post-siege; Gansevoort map, n.d., but post-siege; map
accompanying Willett's Narrative of 1831. One written
reference can be found in John Scott's book entitled Fort
Stanwix and Oriskany, p. 95, as follows: "The adjutant
was ordered to make three copies and 'fix one at Head
Quarters, one at the fort gate and the other at Mr.
Roof's.' " The second written reference is the word
"HeadQ rs " labeled beside the north fort building drawn on
the "Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix." See Appendices
for this map plan.

136. Scott, p. 239:

. . . Permission having been granted, they were con-
ducted blindfolded into the fort, and received by
Colonel Gansevoort in his dining room. The windows
of the room were shut and candles lighted; the table
also was spread, covered with crackers, cheese and
wine.

137. Capt. Smith, p. 131.

138. Moses Dorr Diary. August 25. 1758: "I Ges
came of Dutey and ordered to oversea the Building of a
Hopatal for the Sick. . . ."

139. Elmer Journal, October 5, 1776, p. 32.

140. Willett Orderly Book. June 2, 1777.

141. "A Diary of the Siege of Fort Schuyler." written
by William Colbraith, edited by Max. W. Reid, The
Magazine of History, Vol. III. January-June, 1906
(William Abbatt, New York), p. 32. Hereinafter called
Colbrath Diary.

142. New-York Historical Society Collections (New
York, 1915), Vol. 48. pp. 430-431.

143. Clinton Papers, Vol. IX, p. 120.

144. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg't.. p. 574.

145. The Gentleman's Compleat Military Dictionary
(Boston, 1759).

146. Capt. Smith, p. 175.

147. Humphrey Bland, p. 225.

148. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg't., p. 541:
"for the future Provision for the Garrison, Staff officers,
and the Dependants for Publick supplies, are to Draw
always on one Day as no Provision Return will be allowed
on other Days."

149. Documents Relating to the State of New York
in the Revolution, p. 81. The Committee of War. acting
upon orders from the Provincial Congress, issued the
following instructions to the Barrack Master in March
of 1776:

That the Field Officers of each Corps in this Colony
be supplied with one Room: the Captains with the
Subalterns of each Company together with the
Quarter Master and Adjutant to be entitled to a
Room between each two.

The Officers' Rooms of the said Corps to be
furnished each with 1 p r . Tongs. 1 Table, two Chairs
and one Candlestick.

For every Room for Non Commissioned Officers
and Soldiers of the said Corps, each room to contain
20 men. 10 Cribs. 10 Bedcases and 10 Boulsters to
be filled with straw every three months. 2 Iron Potts.
2 Trammells. 1 p r . Tongs. 1 Wood Axe. 1 Iron
Candlestick. 1 Table, 2 Benches and 1 Bucket. — and
with firewood as follows:

For every Room for Officers. Non-Commissioned
Officers and Privates from the 1 st day Ocf. to the 1 st
April 3-8 ,,ls of a Cord of Wood per week for each
room so occupied as aforesaid — and for 5 Wicks

preceeding the 1 st Ocf. and 5 Weeks after the I s '
April 3-16 ,h s of a Cord of Wood p r week and for
the remaining 16 weeks 1-8 of a Cord per week. . . .

150. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg't., p. 541:
"no Officer Waiter to be absent at Roll Calls in the
Fvening on pain of being punished."

151. Luzader, p. 133 (Willett Narrative): "Permis-
sion having been granted, they were conducted blindfolded
into the fort, and received by Colonel Gansevoort in his
dining room."

152. Crown Map No. 99. This drawing is interpreted
as having two necessary houses drawn on the fort plan.
Without question the elevated privy is shown in plan
projecting off the southeast bastion and is marked with a
dotted line called C-D which is called a section, but
actually is an elevation view of the necessary and foot-
bridge. The plan of the elevated privy is almost identical
to that of what is called the officers' privy, located near
the center of the officers' huts. The elevated privy contains
two compartments; one side could have been used by the
soldiers and the other side used by officers. During the day
the officers would be required to use the elevated privy,
but at night a privy located on the parade ground would
have been used. The soldiers, meanwhile, would be re-
quired to use the exterior privy at all times.

153. Crown Map No. 103, dated November 19'h 1764.

154. Richard Day, Calendar of Sir William Johnson
Manuscripts in the New York State Library (University of
the State of New York. Albany. 1909) p. 357. May 26,

1767. letter from Daniel Campbell to Sir Wm. Johnson
stating that Capt. Stevens is to dismantle the garrison at
Fort Stanwix; p. 361, June 20. 1767. letter from Hugh
Wallace to Johnson stating that Major Goreham and 2nd
Lieut. Galland are to reside at Fort Stanwix; p. 485. May

16. 1771. letter from Edward Wall to Johnson describing
Lieut. Galland's condition (at Fort Stanwix). Johnson was
still concerned about the pay of the batteauxmen serving
to bring provisions up to Fort Stanwix during the treaty of

1768. (Johnson to Gage, letter dated April 26, 1773,
p. 518).

155. The last remaining soldiers' cabin built at the
New Windsor Cantonment in New York State during
1782-83 was constructed with logs used to fill in the
gable ends. The corners of the walls were not dovetailed
but simply half lapped and pinned together.

156. Crown Map No. 102. dated 1764. See drawings
of cross sections.

157. Colbrath Diary, pp. 99-100: "Augth. This Day
the Enemy having Observed that we brought water from
the Creek altered its Course so that it became dry."

158. Willett Orderly Book, entry dated September

17. 1777.

159. Ibid., entry dated September 20. 1777.

160. A photostat of the original plan, undated, is
lept in the Oneida County Historical Society. Utica. New
York. The Gansevoort Map of Fort Stanwix is thought to
be a copy of this plan.

161. See Illustration No. 8 for a view of the James
Wilson powder horn.

162. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg't.. pp. 575-76:
Fort Schuyler Fryday 13* April 1781 The

Sentinals after Nine OClock are to Chalence every
person and not suffer them to pass unless they giv
the Countersign except those who are going to the
Necesary House who are not to pass or Repass
without giving their Names.

163. E.B. O'Callaghan, Colonial History of the State
oj Wew York. Paris Documents: XVII. 1745-1778; and
\ I Albany. 1858). p. 1162.

Historic Structure 199

164. Drawings of these three necessaries are kept in
the files of Fort Stanwix. Obtained from the Crown
Collection, Mss. Room, New York State Library.

165. Willett Orderly Book, March 15, 1778.

166. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg't., p. 541.

167. Ibid., p. 542.

168. Colbrath Diary, entry for August 11, 1777.

169. Elmer Journal, p. 135.

170. Capt. Smith, p. 102.

171. Crown Map No. 101, Profile thro E-F.

172. Crown Map No. 102, Section thro A-B.

173. Scott, p. 100.

174. Ibid., p. 180. Letter written for newspaper
publication by Willett for Jonathan Trumball, Albany,
August 15, 1777.

175. Luzader, p. 69.

176. Crown Map No. 103. Note symbol used for
pickets in ditch and berm.

177. Luzader, pp. 67-69.

178. Clinton Papers; letter from Lt. Col. Robert
Cochran to Gov. Clinton, May 12, 1781, reporting on the
condition of Fort Stanwix after the fire: "2d that the
only remaining strength is the outside Picquets on the
Glacis."

179. Rome Daily Sentinel, Tuesday, February 25,
1969. Editorial by Mr. Fritz Updike.

180. Luzader, p. 68.

181. Charles Augustus Struenesee, The First Prin-
ciples of Field Fortification, translated from the German
by William Nicolay (London. 1800), p. 94:

Manner of fixing Palisades — Two palisades are then
firmly fixed at some distance asunder, with great
accuracy, and exactly of equal height. At the points
of these palisades, nails are driven, and a cord is
stretched between them; by which means the situation
of all the palisades is determined, and it is easy to fix
them sufficiently correct.

Colonel C. B. Jebb, J ebb's Treatise on Attack and
Defense, 5th Edition (London, 1857), p.38:

The Palisades should be 9 or 10 feet long, so that
when finished, the ends shall be at least 7 feet above
the ground. They may be made out of the stems of
young trees of 6 or 8 inches diameter. ... If the
Materials are weak, a cross piece must be nailed to
them near the top, to prevent their being broken
down, and they must not be placed so close together
as to cover an Enemy.

182. Original ordnance demand dated Sept r 18 th
1758, and signed by James Stephens Capt Lieut of
Artillery, T Sowers Engineer, and Jn°: Williams Engineer,
is kept in the Mss. Room, New York State Library,
Albany. N.Y.

183. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg.'t.. Novem-
ber 24, 1780, pp. 541-542.

184. Colbrath Journal; references to August 2 on
page 95, August 6 on page 96.

185. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg't., May 24,
1781, p. 583.

186. A full listing of military dictionaries dealing with
platforms would be too lengthy to include at this point but
the most useful books are as follows:

Duane, William, A Military Dictionary (Philadelphia,
1810), p. 533.

Gay De Vernon, S.F., On the Science of War and
Fortifications, translated by John Michael O'Connor (New
York. 1817). Vol. I. p. 266-276.

Lacroix, Irenee Amelot de. The French Artillerist

translated by Samuel MacKay (Boston, 1808). p. 10.

Lallemand, H.. A Treatise on Artillery, translated by

James Renwick (New York. 1820). Vol. I. pp. 275-278.
Smith, George Capt.. An Universal Military Diction-
ary (England. 1779). (see under "Battery").

187. Sheffield, Merle G.. The Fort That Never Was.
Constitution Island in the Revolutionary War, (1972).
Plan No. 3 by Bernard Romans. September 14. 1775, on
page 5. showing solid gun platforms.

188. Colbrath Journal, p. 104.

189. Lallemand, p. 276.

190. Ibid., p. 278.

191. Ibid.

192. Capt. Smith, p. 220.

193. Crown Map No. 99 shows in Sections A-B and
C-D the construction of the outer two walls that formed
the log cribbing of the ramparts. This log cribbing filled
with earth was built around the entire circuit of the fort's
bastions and curtain walls. Section E-F, taken through the
north curtain wall, illustrates the construction of the
ramparts where the three walls were used to form the
outer log cribbing and the inner casemates. Also shown on
this plan is an elevation drawing of the casemates, indi-
cating the two 12" thick tiers of squared timbers used
for the teneplein or roof construction of the four curtain
walls.

194. Luzader, p. 40. See also Sections A-B, C-D, and
E-F on Crown Map No. 99 that show the ramparts
constructed en barbette.

195. Crown Map No. 101. See legend explaining the
amount of work completed at Fort Stanwix ". . . from
July to December 1759." Section A-B shows the fraise in
position on the ramparts of the northeast bastion. Section
E-F shows the newly raised wooden parapet built around
the northwest bastion. In section it scales 5'-6" high.
There appears to be either a banquette step or a hurter
piece for one of the gun platforms in this same drawing.
Note: The newly made parapet, banquette step and gun
platforms were stained in red on the original drawing.
These appear as darkened areas in the black and white
reproductions.

196. The Papers of Sir William Johnson, p. 273.

197. Notes found on Crown Map No. 101.

198. Notes found on Crown Map No. lOz.

199. Elmer Journal, p. 32.

200. Luzader. p. 20. Comments by Capt. William
Green.

201. Capt. Smith, p. 221.

202. Elmer Journal, p. 134.

203. Luzader, p. 70.

204. Luzader, pp. 68-69.

205. Capt. Smith, p. 312.

206. See Crown Maps Nos. 99. 100, and 101. Also
called caponiere.

207. See Crown Maps Nos. 102 and 103.

208. See Crown Map No. 103 which shows the
passageway in this manner.

209. Scaled directly from the archeologists' field
drawings of 1972.

210. Elmer Journal, p. 411.

211. Capt. Smith, p. 228.

212. Capt. Smith, p. 70.

213. Dick Ping Hsu. "Summary of the 1970 Excava-
tions at Fort Stanwix," N.P.S.. April, 1971, p. 9.

214. William M. Black, Evolution on the Art of
Fortification, U.S. Army Engineering School, G.P.O.
(Wash.. 1919).

215. Walter Muir Whitehill. Boston A Topographical
History (Cambridge, 1968), p. 19.

216. Henry E. Dunnack, Maine Forts (Augusta,
Me.. 1924).

200 Fort Stanwix

217. Copies of three different drawings of this fort,
built on the Piscataqua River, vere obtained from the
Crown Collection kept in the Mss. Room. New York
State Library. Albany. See Illustration No. 16.

218. The most useful of the military dictionaries
concerning sentry box descriptions are:

Gentleman's Compleat Military Dictionary (Boston.
1759).

GUERITE, is a small tower of stone or wood,
generally on the Point of a Bastion, or on the Angles
of the Shoulder, to hold a CENTINEL, who is to
take care of the Foss, and to watch to prevent
Surprizes; some call ECHAUGETTE those which are
made of Wood, and are of a square Form, for the
GUERITES of Stone are roundish, and are built half
without the Wall, and terminate at a Point below,
which ought to be at the CORDON, that the
CENTINEL may discover along the Faces, Flanks
and Curtins, and all along the Foss: They ought to
be about six Foot high, and their Breadth three and
a half.

Charles Lamb. An Universal Military Dictionary in
English and French in which arc explained the Terms of
the Principal Sciences that are Necessary for the Informa-
tion of an Officer, 4th Ed., (London, T. Egerton, 1816),
PP. 96, 301.
Centinel

Centry . . . No centry to move more than 50 paces
to the right, and as many to the left of his post; and
let the weather be ever so bad, he must not get
under any other cover, but that of the centry-box.

CENTRY-box, a sort of wooden box, or hut, to
shelter the centinel from the injuries of the weather:
but in fortifications made of masonry, they are of
stone in a circular form.

SENTRY . . . Sentries are placed before the arms of
all guards, at the tents and doors of general officers,
colonels of regiments, &c.

Thomas Simes, A New Military Historical and
Explanatory Dictionary (Humphreys, Bell and Aitken,
Philadelphia, 1776).

GUERRITTE sic, "a fort or small tower of stone or
wood, on the point of a bastion, or on the angles of
the shoulder, to hold a sentry. (A sketch of a
masonry sentry box is included with this explanation.)
Capt. George Smith, An Universal Military Diction-
ary (J. Millan, London, 1779). p. 80.

Centry-box, a sort of wooden box, or hut, to shelter
the centinel from the injuries of the weather. . . .
ECHAUGETTE sic, in military history, signifies a
watch tower or kind of a centry box. (The term
"tower of duty," found in many soldiers' diaries may
have meant duty served in one of the early fortified
towers in England. Later, this term probably became
known as tour of duty.)

219. This drawing was provided by Mr. John Fortier.
Head Research Historian at Fortress of Louisbourg NHP,
( anada. Its source is Bernard Forest de Belidor. La
Science des ingenieurs dans la conduite des travattx de
fortification et d 'architecture civile . . . (Paris, Jambert.
1739). See Illustration No. 19.

220. Scott, p. 100. Also checked against the original
letter found in the Gates papers, microfilm, reel No. 3.

221. Willett Orderly Book. May 15. 1778.

222. For a short biographical sketch of James Wilson,
see "Hobbies, The Magazine for Collectors," May, 1951.
pp. 146-147. Mr. Chester Williams of Rome, N.Y. was
the person responsible for calling attention to this article

and for permitting the power horn drawing to be photo-
copied. See Illustration No. 8.

223. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg't.. p. 556.

224. Ibid., p. 575.

225. Ibid.

226. See footnote No. 218.

227. See Illustration No. 19.

228. Storehouses were built at the Oneida Carrying
Place during the British occupation. See Crown Map No.
100 for location of a storehouse in 1758.

229. Scott, p. 100. Capt. de Lamarquise to General
Gates, n.d.

230. Willett Orderly Book.

231. Ibid., February 24. 1778.

232. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg.t.. pp. 542,
552-553, 573.

233. Letter from Hansen to Schuyler, dated Decem-
ber 30. 1776, (Fort Stanwix). commenting on the fact he
had been assigned a room for stores by Col. Elmore.
This extract furnished by NPS historian John Luzader:

The moment it is clean I will have proper shelves to
lay the goods to advantage. I am happy that the
Room which is to contain the goods adjoins the one
in which I live alone. Threw sic which I intend to
make a Passage and so use only one Door to the
Two Rooms.

The above comments suggest that the commissary
store in 1776 might have been located in one of the
barracks buildings. This is one instance where an altera-
tion was made between two interior rooms of a building.

234. Documentary History of New York, Vol. 13,
p. 526.

235. Expedition to Detroit, 1793. edited by John and
Isaac Comly, Byberry. Vol. II. 2nd Edition (Philadelphia.
1836) pp. 574-575.

236. Scott, p. 100.

237. Also called at various times Mill Creek and
Garden Creek.

238. Willett Orderly Book. August 11. 1777.

239. Rome Directory, 1857. p. 130. See Illustration
No. 12.

240. Elmer Journal, p. 135:

Orders which were much needed in our camp at this
time, as guns were frequently heard in the bush,
which were no doubt fired by soldiers; but we were
not able to find out the particular persons till this
day. when 4 were brought in and sentenced by the
Lieut. Col. to stand 1 hour stripped and tied alto-
gether at the whipping post, which was immediately
put in execution.

241. Orderly Books of the 4th N.Y. Reg't.. p. 577.

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